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Preface
The objective of The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020 is to present a comprehensive overview of the economy 
of the circumpolar Arctic, including the traditional production activities of the Indigenous Peoples. The report 
has been produced as part of the ECONOR IV project, undertaken under the Sustainable Deve lopment Working 
Group (SDWG) in the Arctic Council. The ECONOR IV project was carried out with Norway as lead country, Canada 
and the United States as co-leads among the Arctic states, and the Saami Council as co-lead among the Perma-
nent Participants. 
The ECONOR IV project was funded by Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nordic Council of  Ministers, and 
the Government of Canada’s Department of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern  Affairs Canada provided 
funding to Laval University towards the Canadian contribution to the report as well as for preliminary workshops 
where ECONOR IV scoping discussions took place. Additional financial support is provided by institutions partici-
pating in the ECONOR network of representatives of national statistical offices, academic researchers and other 
experts.
The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020 is the result of contributions from the ECONOR network of experts and 
researchers from national statistical offices and academic institutions located across the Arctic, and data have 
been compiled from many sources. Without the expertise and contributions from the ECONOR network, and 
their access to data sources, this report could not have been produced. While the report is the result of contribu-
tions from the entire ECONOR network, the individual chapters bear the names of the authors. Statistics Norway 
has hosted the editorial group that compiled and edited the contributions from the project network.
Several sections in Statistics Norway have contributed to the ECONOR IV report with data and statistical advice. 
The National accounts section has provided data, including data on value creation in marine areas, the Business 
cycle statistics and Structural business statistics sections have provided the presentation of Svalbard statistics, 
and the Population statistics section has provided the presentation of S mi statistics.
The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020 updates the time series of the previous ECONOR reports. The present 
report is a pioneering work in the sense that the path outlined in the first three ECONOR reports The Economy 
of the North, The Economy of the North 2008 and The Economy of the North 2015 is still relatively unexplored, with 
 challenges of statistical and conceptual nature, and with a need to develop partnerships. The Economy of the 
North – ECONOR 2020 was edited by Solveig Glomsrød (chief editor) of CICERO Center for International Climate 
 Research, Gérard Duhaime (co-editor) of Université Laval, Quebec, and Iulie  Aslaksen (co-editor and project 
leader) of the Research Department of Statistics Norway. Lars Lindholt of the  Research Department of Statistics 
Norway also participated in the editorial group. Marit Vågdal of Statistics Norway did the technical editing, and 
Siri E. Boquist of Statistics Norway was the photo editor. The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020 and previous 
ECONOR reports are available at www.ssb.no. Statistics Norway thanks all the individuals, institutions and organi-
zations having provided support, funding, data, analysis, texts, illustrations, and scientific and statistical advice for 
The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020. 
The following two disclaimers apply, by the Arctic Council and by Statistics Norway. The ECONOR IV project was 
undertaken as an endorsed project of the Arctic Council Sustainable Development Working Group. The project 
report was prepared by a project team and does not necessarily reflect the policy or positions of any Arctic State, 
Permanent Participant, or Observer of the Arctic Council. Since data are compiled from different sources in sev-
eral countries, Statistics Norway has not followed standard quality assurance, and a disclaimer applies, where it 
is emphasized that data and interpretations are the responsibility of the respective authors and not of Statistics 
Norway or the cooperating institutions or the funding agencies.
The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020 is submitted to the Arctic Council for approval to become  deliverable to 
the 2021 Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council. 
Statistics Norway, 21 April 2021
Linda Nøstbakken
Preface
Nuuk, Greenland. Photo: Tom Nicolaysen
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The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020 Introduction
The Arctic regions belong to different national re-
gimes, and information on social and economic is-
sues has been dispersed and not been easily avail-
able at the circumpolar level. A central task of the 
ECONOR IV project has been to contribute to filling 
this gap by presenting a comprehensive overview 
of the scale and structure of the circumpolar Arctic 
economy. Among several good reasons for compil-
ing an overview of the circumpolar Arctic economy 
is a need for an information platform from where 
to assess the sustainability of the Arctic communi-
ties in terms of natural wealth management and 
vulnerability towards climate change and global 
policies and trends.
While waiting for the upcoming 6th IPCC report, we 
refer to the 2019 IPCC Special Report on the Ocean 
and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, highlighting 
the increasing climate change: “Feedbacks from the 
loss of summer sea ice and spring snow cover on 
1. The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020:  
An introduction
Solveig Glomsrød, Gérard Duhaime and Iulie Aslaksen
land have contributed to amplified warming in the 
Arctic (high confidence) where surface air tempera-
ture likely increased by more than twice the global 
average over the last two decades”.1 
The Paris agreement and the 2030 Agenda for 
 Sustainable development are overarching initia-
tives with significant implications for the Arctic. 
Climate change and climate policies have large 
impacts on the economy of the Arctic, many of 
them dealt with in the ECONOR IV report, while 
the global focus on the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development offers hope for new advances to 
sustainable development of the Arctic.
The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020 report 
finalizes the ECONOR IV project which has been 
headed by Statistics Norway, CICERO Center for 
 International Climate Research, and Université 
Laval, Quebec, Canada, in cooperation with a 
Faroe Islands. Photo: sne Vigran
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 circumpolar network of statisticians, academics, 
and contributors from Indigenous Peoples orga-
nizations that hold Permanent Participant status 
in the Arctic Council. The purpose of this fourth 
report has been to update the economic statistics 
of the previous versions, The Economy of the North, 
published in 2006, The Economy of the North 2008, 
and The Economy of the North 2015, and to include 
a wider set of socioeconomic variables to more 
clearly depict the livelihood of Arctic people.2 Other 
objectives have been to shed light on the value of 
natural resources in the Arctic and to bring for-
ward knowledge about how Indigenous Peoples 
manoeuvre between subsistence activities and the 
market economy.
The Arctic Region as referred to in this report is de-
picted in the map in Figure 3.1. It covers Northern 
Russia with the Republics of Karelia and Komi, the 
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, the Yamal-Ne-
nets and Khanty-Mansii Autonomous Okrugs, the 
Republic of Sakha, the Magadan Oblast, and the 
Chukchi Autonomous Okrug (Chukotka). The North 
American Arctic includes Alaska and the Northern 
territories of Canada (Northwest Territories, Yukon, 
Nunavut). The European Arctic consists of Green-
land, Faroe Islands, Iceland and Arctic Norway (in-
cluding the Svalbard Archipelago and Jan Mayen), 
Arctic Sweden and Arctic Finland.
Following changes in Russia’s federal legislation, 
the statistical definitions of Arctic Russia – the 
 Arctic Zone - have been changed. In the new 
definition, Karelia, Khanty-Mansii and Magadan 
do not belong to the Arctic Zone, while several 
 regions of Krasnoyarskiy Krai and the entire Nenets 
 Autonomous Okrug do. Previously included regions 
– Evenkiyskiy Autonomous Okrug and Taymirskiy 
Autonomous Okrug - have become parts of Kras-
noyarskiy Krai and Nenets Autonomous Okrug, not 
included in this report. In The Economy of the North 
– ECONOR 2020 we present data for the regions 
previously defined as Arctic Russia, in order to 
retain time series and achieve statistical compara-
bility.
The homelands of the six Arctic Indigenous organi-
zations that hold Permanent Participant status in 
the Arctic Council extend across national borders, 
as depicted in the map in Figure 6.1. They are the 
Aleut International Association, Arctic  Athabaskan 
Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit 
Family Fishing in Tyonek – A father teaches his sons to pick fish nets outside Tyonek in West Cook Inlet. Although a 
sometimes tenuous relationship, the oil and gas industry has provided jobs and income to residents of Tyonek for over 
50 years. Photo: Davin Holen
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Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indig-
enous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council. 
These Indigenous Peoples Organizations represent 
approximately 500 000 inhabitants of the Arctic in 
total.  The Unangan (Aleut People) live in Alaska 
and on the Commander Islands in Russia. The 
Athabaskan Peoples have their territories in Alaska, 
and Yukon and Northwest Territories in Canada. 
Gwich’in territory is bisected by the Canada-USA 
border, and extends across Alaska, the Yukon, 
and the Northwest Territories. The Inuit have their 
homeland in Alaska, Canada, Greenland and Chu-
kotka. In the Arctic Russia, there are 40 Indigenous 
Peoples. The S mi people have their homeland in 
Finland, Russia, Norway and Sweden.
Since the publication of The Economy of the North 
2015, the backdrop of this statistical work has 
shifted considerably. This updated report reflects 
a period with resource prices falling dramatically 
before approaching pre-crisis levels around 2018, 
which is the most recent year we cover on a broad 
basis. As resource income in several regions partly 
is transferred to owners outside the Arctic regions, 
falling resource prices will also be felt outside the 
Arctic. Regionally, the local tax revenues, royalties 
and wage income will decline.
Chapter 2 presents in telling figures how the 
 development affects core elements in human 
welfare in Arctic regions. The composition of the 
population, the life expectancy and rate of infant 
mortality are all observations that convey  crucial 
information on living conditions, which gross 
regional product (GRP) for Arctic regions cannot 
convey: A quick glance at GRP would not bring us 
close to the reality concerning the basis for liveli-
hood, because distribution of income and public 
services matter to quality of life.
Chapter 3 looks at the Arctic from a bird’s eye 
perspective and presents macro level data of land 
area, population, GRP per capita and disposable 
income of households per capita by region. Re-
gional data are depicted in relation to data on the 
non-Arctic part of their corresponding Arctic states, 
and to the circumpolar level.
It is important to have in mind that the data in this 
report on revenues in resource extraction include 
the wealth component of natural resources. In 
 resource rich communities like the Arctic regions 
the sustainability of wealth management is par-
ticularly important. Non-renewable resources that 
have been extracted from the ground represent 
a loss in wealth that conceptually should not be 
counted as income. However, by national account 
conventions they are still included in income. Be-
cause the natural wealth is not explicitly accounted 
for, resource revenues can easily be consumed 
contrary to principles of long-term sustainability. 
To avoid myopic behaviour, revenues from petro-
leum production have in some cases partly been 
invested in financial funds. An alternative or sup-
plement could be investment in human capital. As 
the Arctic economies generate a substantial share 
of their income from resource extraction, it would 
have been useful to have data for genuine income 
generation in addition to the value of straightfor-
ward resource depletion. The Arctic region has 
higher extraction costs than in other regions and 
consequently the wealth loss component of re-
ported income tends to be lower. As this report 
illustrates, however, the shares in GRP of extractive 
industries in several Arctic regions are high, and it 
therefore remains a relevant question for the Arctic 
regions if wealth management is sustainable from 
their perspective. A decomposition of resource 
income into return to production factors and the 
wealth component is indicated for Norway in Box 
IV in this report.
On the other hand, the scarcity of pristine nature 
implies that the wealth component of nature is 
increasing. The nature value of Arctic wilderness, 
northern lights, rich biological resources, and 
traditional living shows up indirectly in income data 
for tourism and harvesting of renewable resources. 
The increased demand for other nature values has 
sharpened conflicts over land use between mineral 
industries and the renewable nature based indus-
tries, not the least for traditional living, with hunt-
ing, fishing and herding by Indigenous Peoples. 
In some regions these conflicts have reached the 
political arena at Arctic state level, in particular 
with respect to petroleum, other mineral extraction 
and wind power. These aspects are to some extent 
captured in Chapter 4, looking more closely into 
the regional economic activities.
Chapter 4 on Arctic Economies within the Arctic 
 Nations leaves the circumpolar perspective and 
looks closer at the role of each regional economy in 
the national context. The core tables in this chapter 
10
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are compiled to present a consistent set of data 
across regions, when possible at the same level of 
detail by industry in order to show economic struc-
ture in comparable categories.
Petroleum in the Arctic is the topic of chapter 5. 
One of the large uncertainties confronting the 
investors in the Arctic is the future price of petro-
leum, as well as the uncertainty about impacts of 
future climate and environmental policies. The 
Stated Preferences Scenario of IEA expects the 
price of crude oil (in 2012 USD) to be USD 70 in 
2025, rising to USD 90 by 2040.3 Current trends 
indicate that the petroleum industry now perceives 
higher risk and require an increasing return on 
investments. Chapter 5 presents a model based 
analysis of the impact of changes in required rates 
of return on the prospects for gas and oil activities 
in Arctic regions towards 2050.
This report has a strong focus on the commer-
cial activity in the Arctic. For several of the Arctic 
regions, employment and revenues from min-
eral extraction may be the pillar of the economy. 
However, the Arctic has a rich wildlife that pro-
vides substantial nutritional and cultural values 
to Arctic communities. Fishing and hunting for 
own consumption and sharing is a major source 
of subsistence livelihood for Indigenous Peoples 
and other Arctic residents.4 This source of income 
and consumption may at first glance seem to be 
decoupled from the shifting performance of the 
global economy - but even this local and mostly 
unregistered production feels the change, because 
cash income from employment and sales, or gov-
ernment transfers, are important for being able 
to purchase equipment and means of transporta-
tion for hunting, fishing and herding. In Alaska, 
dividends from the Alaska Permanent Fund are an 
important source of funding for the subsistence ac-
tivities. Hence, subsistence activities and the cash 
economy are mutually dependent on each other 
for providing consumption possibilities in the Arctic 
today, and are at the same time part of a way of 
life that represents continuity, sharing and connec-
tion to nature.
Chapter 6 on the interdependence of subsistence 
and market economies in the Arctic aims to give an 
overview of the importance of subsistence activi-
ties in different Arctic regions. The chapter pres-
ents an Inuit way of looking at the Arctic economy 
and a Gwich’in perspective on the caribou econ-
omy. With some notable exceptions, as in Alaska, 
subsistence activities are mostly invisible in of-
ficial statistics. Chapter 6 provides information on 
subsistence activities in Alaska, Northern Canada, 
Northern Russia and Greenland, and on the econ-
11
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omy of S mi reindeer husbandry in Norway. Some 
results from the SLiCA - Survey of Living Conditions 
in the Arctic - project are reported.5 The  economies 
of Arctic Indigenous Peoples are varied and com-
plex and much has been left out of this report. 
Future ECONOR reports will attempt to  address 
these gaps by developing partnerships with Indig-
enous Peoples to further develop this chapter from 
Indigenous perspectives. 
A circumpolar study of the economic importance 
of tourism is presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 
presents some characteristics of transportation 
and infrastructure, particularly in Arctic Russia, 
and some results from studies on the impacts 
and costs of melting permafrost. Climate change 
impacts on the economies of the Arctic regions, 
which at the time of the first ECONOR project 
were in their initial phase, are now happening at a 
large scale. What was previously projected to take 
place in the distant future is now occurring. The 
sea ice is at its lowest level. Coastal areas erode, 
the process of thawing permafrost is running, and 
wildlife is disturbed. These effects are already af-
fecting the Arctic economies, however, in a macro 
level overview like ECONOR climate effects are still 
over-shadowed by other changes and turbulence 
in resource rich and small economies.
Presenting an economic overview of the Arctic re-
gions in comparable terms offers some particular 
challenges that go beyond the question of qual-
ity and coverage. To add up or compare income 
accounted for in different countries it is necessary 
to transform the numbers to a common currency. 
The USD is frequently used for this purpose, and 
most people have an understanding of how much 
a dollar can buy in the world market. However, a 
translation of income based on a straightforward 
use of market exchange rates will normally lose 
some of the information about the true capacity 
to consume in the domestic market of a specific 
region. To adjust for price differences in domestic 
markets purchasing power parity (PPP) indicators 
have been established as an attempt to harmonize 
income measures across regions. However, the 
PPP transformation may sometimes lead to biased 
assessment of income in different regions. This 
problem is further discussed in Box I. Some Arctic 
regions are regions within states, and it is a general 
phenomenon that regional economic statistics has 
been less developed and is less complete than the 
The circumpolar ECONOR network consists of  
the  following persons and institutions:
Alexander Pilyasov, Lomonosov Moscow state universi-
ty, Russia. Contact persons in the Federal State Statistical 
Service, Russia: Irina Dmitrievna Masakova, Tatarinov 
Andrei Anatolievich, and Levit Svetlana Rafailovna
Gérard Duhaime, Université Laval, Québec, Canada 
(ECONOR Co-editor)
Karen Everett, Université Laval, Québec, Canada
Ryan Macdonald, Statistics Canada
Jukka Muukkonen, Statistics Finland
Birger Poppel, Ilisimatusarfik, University of Greenland
Anders Blaabjerg, Statistics Greenland 
Gilli Wardum, Statistics Faroe Islands 
Thórólfur Matthíasson, University of Iceland 
Bjørn R. Gudmundsson, Statistics Iceland
Do an addad osefine ossheim, Statistics Sweden
Scott Goldsmith, Institute of Social and Economic 
 Research (ISER), University of Alaska at Anchorage, USA 
Davin Holen, University of Alaska at Fairbanks, USA 
Andrey Petrov, University of Northern Iowa, USA 
Ellen Inga Turi/Ravdna Biret Marja E. Sara, University 
of the Arctic EAL T Institute 
Devlin Fernandes, Gwich’in Council International 
Magnus Helliesen/Edita Zahirovic, Statistics Norway
Lars Lindholt, Statistics Norway
Wei Taoyuan, CICERO Center for International Climate 
Research, Oslo
Solveig Glomsrød, CICERO Center for International 
Climate Research, Oslo (ECONOR Chief editor)
Iulie Aslaksen, Statistics Norway (ECONOR Co-editor, 
Project leader)
The editorial group at Statistics Norway and CICERO  
has consisted of:
Solveig Glomsrød, CICERO (Chief editor)
Iulie Aslaksen, Statistics Norway (Co-editor)
Lars Lindholt, Statistics Norway (Researcher)
Siri E. Boquist, Statistics Norway (Photo editor)
Marit Vågdal, Statisitcs Norway (Lay-out editor)
The editorial group at Université Laval, Québec, Canada, 
has consisted of:
Gérard Duhaime, Université Laval (Co-editor)
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one at the national level. It may also occur that 
regional data are unavailable at detailed level due 
to confidentiality reasons as the number of en-
terprises involved is too low. Further, some Arctic 
regions are nations or autonomous regions with 
small populations and limited capacity for eco-
nomic statistics and national accounts. The major 
challenges associated with production of regional 
statistics are outlined in Box III. Due to the diversity 
in the statistical material, the data and interpreta-
tions in this report should be read with care.
The data have been given a common format 
facilitating comparison of income, production and 
economic structures among the individual Arctic 
regions. This represents a major improvement on 
earlier available material and may work as a build-
ing block in a further process towards a harmo-
nized database on arctic economic issues. The path 
outlined in the ECONOR reports is still relatively 
unexplored.
It is our hope that the present overview of the 
 Arctic economy will inspire work to further 
strengthen the information basis from where to 
 assess the sustainability of the Arctic communities 
in terms of livelihoods, natural wealth manage-
ment and environmental challenges.
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Box  Defining the Arctic region and the si e of the Arctic o u ation
According to the Arctic Human Development Report 
(AHDR) the population of the Arctic is about 4 million, in 
contrast to about 10 million according to the ECONOR 
definition. AHDR takes as its point of departure the 
definition of the Arctic from the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP), however, due to 
location of administrative boundaries and availability 
of data, the area covered in AHDR and AMAP differs in 
some respects:
“Thus, the AHDR Arctic encompasses all of Alaska, 
Canada North of 60o together with northern Quebec 
and Labrador, all of Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and 
Iceland, and the northernmost counties of Norway, 
Sweden and Finland. The situation in Russia is harder 
to describe in simple terms. The areas included, as 
demarcated by our demographers, encompasses the 
Murmansk Oblast, the Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets, Taimyr 
and Chukotka autonomous okrugs, Vorkuta City in the 
Komi Republic, Norilsk and Igsrka in Krasnoyarsky Kray, 
and those parts of the Sakha Republic whose bound-
aries lie closest to the Arctic Circle. This, then is the 
AHDR Arctic. It encompasses an area of over 40 million 
square kilometers or about 8% of the surface of the 
Earth, a sizeable domain by any standards (AMAP 2002, 
Armstrong et al. 1978). But the human residents of this 
vast area number only about 4 million, of whom almost 
half are located within the Russian federation (AMAP 
2002)” (AHDR 2004, p. 17-18).
In contrast, the ECONOR definition of the Arctic  covers: 
Northern Russia with the Republics of Karelia and 
Komi, the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, the 
Yamal-Nenets and Khanty-Mansii Autonomous Okrugs, 
the Taimyr and Evenkia former Autonomous Okrugs, 
the Republic of Sakha, the Magadan Oblast, and the 
Chukchi and Koryak Autonomous Okrugs. The Ameri-
can Arctic includes Alaska and the Northern territories 
of Canada (Northwest Territories, Yukon, Nunavut). The 
European Arctic consists of Greenland, Faroe Islands, 
Iceland and Arctic Norway (including the Svalbard 
Archipelago and Jan Mayen), Arctic Sweden and Arctic 
Finland.
Following changes in the Russian Federation legislation, 
the statistical definitions of Arctic Russia have been 
changed. “The Economy of the North 2015” presents 
data for regions previously defined as Arctic Russia, in 
order to retain time series. In the new definition, Kare-
lia, Khanty-Mansii and Magadan are no longer included 
in the Arctic Zone, while Nenets and several regions 
of Krasnoyarsky Krai are included. Previously included 
regions - Evenk autonomous okrug and Taymir autono-
mous okrug - have become parts of Krasnoyarsky Krai 
and Nenets autonomous okrug.
The main reason for the large difference in the popula-
tion figures between the Arctic Human Development 
Report and The Economy of the North (ECONOR) is that 
due to the economic focus of ECONOR, its delineation 
of the Arctic includes Khanty-Mansii which is the largest 
Russian oil producing region, adjacent to oil and gas 
producing Yamal-Nenets. Moreover, due to availability 
of statistical data, all of the Republic of Sakha- Yakutia 
is included.
Sources: AMAP (2002). Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme (AMAP): Arctic Pollution 2002. AMAP. Oslo. AHDR 
2004. Arctic Human Development Report. Arctic Council’s Sus-
tainable Development Working Group.
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Introduction 
In the Arctic, regional economies often prioritize 
the development of the extractive industries. While 
these industries can certainly be profitable, ques-
tions remain about the benefit of such industries to 
nature and human development, especially consid-
ering the volatility of world markets and the fair-
ness in distribution of natural wealth.1 The creation 
of conditions favourable to human development 
include more than just the economy; other social 
and political structures also have a role to play. 
Therefore, an in-depth understanding of multiple 
indicators is required to obtain a broader under-
standing of the socio-economic situation across the 
circumpolar Arctic.2 
Comprehensive studies, such as the Arctic Hu-
man Development Report (AHDR),3 have sought 
to identify inequalities in the circumpolar Arctic, 
while indicators of inequality have been identi-
fied, developed, and operationalized as part of the 
Arctic Social Indicators (ASI) report.4 The ECONOR 
reports, The Economy of the North, contribute to 
these important efforts to identify and understand 
inequality, particularly from a socio-economic 
perspective. This chapter builds on our previous 
efforts to measure specific socio-economic indica-
tors across the circumpolar Arctic and presents the 
data within their larger contexts. 
2. Social and economic conditions and inequalities 
in the circumpolar Arctic
Gérard Duhaime, Karen Everett, Sébastien Lévesque, Taoyuan Wei,  
Marileine Baribeau and Andrée Caron 
In our previous comparative study, The Economy 
of the North 2015, we presented an update of the 
comparative analysis of socio-economic condi-
tions in the regions of the circumpolar Arctic. Our 
findings showed some divergence from the main 
pattern within the three geographic regions, North 
America, the Nordic countries, and the Russian 
Federation. However, we concluded that the most 
important general characteristics were the over-
all persistence of a major gap between the geo-
graphical regions, a modest convergence between 
them, and less pronounced internal inequalities 
in the Arctic regions of the Nordic countries than 
elsewhere, due to the substantial extent of public 
provision of health and education in the Nordic 
countries. 
This chapter updates and extends the previous 
comparative study of socio-economic and social 
conditions across the circumpolar Arctic, by com-
paring the situation in 2018 and 2012. Comparing 
the indicators over time allows us to verify whether 
the socio-economic models of the three geographi-
cal groups are still relevant. The socio-economic 
models are shaped by different factors, including 
political structures, emphasis on different eco-
nomic industries, and transportation systems. The 
updated results continue to indicate that differ-
ences between the three geographical groups are 
shrinking, although there are increasing internal 
inequalities in some regions. 
Methodology 
This chapter examines the demographic, health, 
and economic situation in the circumpolar Arctic. 
In order to compare with the previous ECONOR 
report, we revised and harmonized the indicators, 
we have included the Gini coefficient, and updated 
indicators to 2018, the most recent year for which 
data were available. We collected 2012 and 2018 
data for the following indicators: 1) population 
growth, 2) female rate (proportion of women in 
the total population), 3) youth rate  (proportion of The Faroe Islands. Photo: Åsne Vigran
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 children and youth 0-14 years in the total popu-
lation), 4) replacement rate (defined in Box 2.1), 
5) demographic dependency (proportion of chil-
dren and elders to adults), 6) life expectancy at 
birth, 7) infant mortality rate, 8) tertiary education 
attainment, 9) economic dependency ratio (pro-
portion of non-employed persons to employed 
persons), 10) household (personal) disposable 
income per capita5 11) gross regional product (GRP) 
per capita (GRP is gross domestic product (GDP) at 
regional level), and 12) Gini coefficient. In addition, 
population data are presented. As in the previous 
ECONOR report, we do not include the propor-
tion of Indigenous Peoples in the total population 
due to a lack of systematic data in most northern 
regions. 
Data for the following Arctic regions are analyzed: 
Alaska (USA); Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and 
Yukon (Canada); Faroe Islands and Greenland 
(Denmark); Lapland, Northern Ostrobothnia, and 
Kainuu (Finland); Iceland; Finnmark, Nordland, and 
Troms (Norway); Norrbotten and  Västerbotten 
(Sweden); and Arkhangelsk, Chukotka, Karelia, 
Khanty-Mansii, Komi, Magadan, Murmansk, Sakha, 
and Yamal-Nenets (Russian Federation). Similar 
to the previous study, The Economy of the North 
2015, we could not include Evenk and Taimyr 
(Dolgan-Nenets) as their official data are included 
in Krasnoyarsk, which extends quite far south, and 
separate data could not be extracted.6 
The data are presented in several ways, in tables, 
graphs, and maps. For the radar diagrams (Figures 
2.1 to 2.8), the indicators were transformed to a 
Box 2.1. Converting social and economic  
   indicators to a common scale 
Since the indicators are of different units, each in-
dicator has been converted into an index on a scale 
of 1 to 10. The indices were calculated by min-max 
normalization, where 1 represents the lowest (or least 
desirable) observed value among the regions and 10 
represents the highest (or most desirable) value.
Each index, for each indicator for each Arctic region 
(see Table 2.1) has been calculated in the following 
way, by this formula: 
 
For example, the life expectancy in Alaska is calcu-
lated by first subtracting the lowest observed life 
expectancy (among all Arctic regions) from the life 
expectancy in Alaska, then multiplying by 9, (indicated 
as 10-1 in the formula to explicitly recall the range 
of conversion) and then dividing by the difference 
between the highest and lowest observed life expec-
tancy (among all Arctic regions). Then 1 is added to 
this result, to obtain the index value. From Table 2.1 
we see that life expectancy in Alaska is 78.8 years. 
The region with lowest observed life expectancy is 
Chukotka, with 63.6 years, and the region with highest 
observed life expectancy is Iceland with 82.9 years.  
With the calculation described, we find that the index 
value for life expectancy in Alaska is 1+ (78.8-63.6) * 9/ 
(82.9-63.6) = 8.1. 
For the following indicators, the maximum and mini-
mum values have been inverted in the formula to 
express that low values are beneficial: infant mortal-
ity, economic dependency, demographic dependency, 
and Gini coefficient. In the case of the female propor-
tion, the maximum and minimum values have also 
been inverted in the formula, and the calculation was 
based on the difference, converted in absolute values, 
between the proportion of women in the region and 
the global average proportion of women. 
The replacement rate was calculated based on a 
ratio between children (age 0-14) and women (age 
15-54 years) as a proxy measure for the total fertil-
ity rate, which is not available for all Arctic regions. 
We calculated the distance of this fertility rate proxy 
to the minimal replacement rate used in developed 
countries (defined as 2.1 children per woman). We 
then calculated the distance between the fertility rate 
proxy and the replacement rate of 2.1.
A composite index for each region was also calculated 
based on the average of the scaled indices (Table 2.1, 
last column), allowing us to produce a comparative 
ranking of the regions (see Table 2.1 and Annex 2.1). 
Selected indices are also used to create the radar 
diagrams (Figures 2.1 to 2.8). All indices, except for 
tertiary education, for lack of comparable data, were 
used to create the composite index. Leftovers, Nunavut. Photo: Mary Stapleton
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common format, presented as an index on a scale 
from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the least favour-
able condition and 10 the most favourable condi-
tion for human development7 (see Box 2.1). Note 
that the radar diagrams present GRP and dispos-
able income per capita. 
The data for this study were collected from the 
national statistical agencies of the Arctic countries, 
and from other sources, including the Centre for 
Disease Control and Prevention (USA: life expec-
tancy, infant mortality), Finnish Institute for Health 
and Welfare (Finland: infant mortality), Swedish 
Register of Education (Sweden: tertiary education), 
World Bank Development Indicators (Iceland: life 
expectancy), and the World Bank (global female 
population). Data were collected near the end of 
2020, and where data for 2018 were not available, 
we used data from the most recent year available 
(see note 8). 
There were some challenges to data collection 
at the regional level, particularly for regions with 
smaller populations.8 For example, for life ex-
pectancy, the reference period is usually presented 
for a multiple year range rather than for single 
years, and we used the data that aligned best with 
2012 and 2018 (see note 8). Data at the regional 
level are often updated on a different schedule 
than data at the national level and some data for 
2018 have been estimated (see note 8). There are 
also methodological differences in the  approaches 
of the statistical agencies, for example, in the 
 calculation of the Gini coefficient. When avail-
able, we have presented the Gini coefficient for 
the equivalized household disposable income per 
capita (see note 8). 
Considering the differences in data, efforts were 
made to ensure valid comparisons. In some cases, 
we had to make compromises, with slight differ-
ences, in concepts or data used, as for the Gini 
coefficient, while in other cases, as for education, 
we concluded that a circumpolar comparison was 
not possible for this update (see note 8). 
These limitations notwithstanding, we were able to 
analyse the data and achieve a picture of the socio-
economic situation in the circumpolar Arctic.
The socio-economic situation of the 
circumpolar Arctic in 2018
Table 2.1 provides a portrait of the socio-economic 
situation in the circumpolar Arctic in 2018 accord-
ing to our selected indicators, with actual values for 
each indicator for each of the Arctic regions. Notes 
on definitions are included in Table 2.1, while ad-
ditional information on the data are found at the 
end of the chapter. 
The results of eight key indicators are displayed 
in radar diagrams (Figures 2.1 to 2.8), where more 
area coverage within the lines of the diagram 
indicates a more favourable situation for human 
development. The comparison of the obtained dia-
grams allows us to identify a recurrent pattern in 
each geographical region, which is called the “main 
pattern”. Similarly, in each geographical region, one 
or a few diagrams differ from the main pattern and 
are called “variations” (Table 2.2). 
In comparison to the previous ECONOR, the 
 following analysis does not include tertiary 
 education, for lack of comparable data. The most 
current data from the Russian regions on tertiary 
 education attainment is from the 2010 census and 
Picking blueberries. Photo: Davin HolenLearning about Chinook Salmon in Tyonek. Photo: Davin Holen
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was presented in the previous ECONOR report. 
In this updated study, education data for Russia 
encompass the percentage “of students study-
ing  under the  bachelor’s, specialist’s and master’s 
 degree programs”,9 while data for the North Ameri-
can and Nordic regions reflect the percentage of 
the population with a tertiary degree, thus making 
it impossible to compare data for the education 
indicator across all Arctic regions. 
Our analysis demonstrates continued differences 
between the three geographical regions, North 
America, the Nordic countries, and the Russian 
Federation (Figures 2.1 to 2.8). The results also find 
that some regions continue to vary from the main 
pattern within a given socio-economic model (Table 
2.2). 















































Ratio USD-PPP per cap Ratio n
Alaska 735 139 0.1 47.8 20.9 1.3 0.49 78.8 5.9 34.3 0.6 55 735 74 454 0.432 6.15
Northwest 
Territories 44 956 0.5 48.6 20.3 1.4 0.39 77.0 9.6 22.1 0.7 32 810 87 799 0.328 6.11
Nunavut 38 139 1.6 48.6 32.0 1.0 0.56 71.6 24.2 11.4 1.3 23 189 74 852 0.379 5.43
Yukon 40 612 1.9 49.1 16.8 1.5 0.40 79.0 6.8 27.3 0.8 33 006 62 588 0.295 6.27
Faroe Islands 50 475 0.8 48.5 21.1 1.2 0.63 82.4 0.0 .. 0.9 21 449 57 554 0.227 6.38
Lapland 178 522 -0.4 50.0 15.1 1.4 0.66 80.5 2.9 26.7 1.2 22 314 45 542 0.243 4.86
Northern 
Ostrobothnia 412 161 0.3 49.5 19.6 1.3 0.63 81.6 2.4 29.8 1.3 21 315 40 573 0.263 5.41
Kainuu 73 061 -1.0 49.7 14.1 1.4 0.71 80.3 4.1 24.9 1.1 22 455 38 840 0.241 4.63
Greenland 55 877 -0.3 47.2 21.0 1.3 0.41 70.8 7.3 12.3 1.1 15 543 50 901 0.354 4.56
Iceland 348 450 1.4 49.0 19.3 1.4 0.50 82.9 1.7 35.1 0.8 21 358 59 467 0.234 6.66
Finnmark 76 167 0.5 48.5 16.5 1.4 0.52 79.8 5.0 28.0 0.9 24 323 46 138 0.224 5.68
Nordland 243 335 0.3 49.3 16.5 1.4 0.57 81.1 3.0 26.8 1.0 23 536 45 241 0.217 5.66
Troms 166 499 0.8 49.1 16.8 1.4 0.52 81.7 1.8 32.9 0.8 25 375 47 623 0.222 6.18
Norrbotten 250 497 0.1 48.8 15.4 1.4 0.65 81.1 2.9 27.8 1.0 22 889 55 888 0.253 5.21
Västerbotten 270 154 0.6 49.3 16.8 1.4 0.61 82.0 2.7 23.5 1.0 21 717 46 908 0.264 5.51
Arkhangelsk 1 155 028 -0.8 53.1 17.9 1.4 0.48 72.1 4.8 2.0 1.2 15 358 28 630 0.382 3.66
Chukotka 49 348 -0.5 49.2 21.6 1.3 0.36 63.6 12.7 0.5 0.7 34 941 63 919 0.405 5.15
Karelia 622 484 -0.5 54.4 17.3 1.4 0.48 70.6 5.6 2.2 1.2 12 541 18 157 0.341 3.39
Khanty-Mansii 1 655 074 1.0 51.3 22.0 1.4 0.39 74.3 2.9 1.8 0.9 20 872 108 468 0.398 5.77
Komi 840 873 -0.9 52.8 19.2 1.4 0.44 71.1 4.5 2.3 1.1 14 014 31 958 0.382 3.91
Magadan 144 091 -1.2 51.6 17.8 1.5 0.39 69.6 3.5 2.6 0.7 25 466 47 826 0.388 4.60
Murmansk 753 557 -0.7 52.0 17.6 1.4 0.41 71.7 5.6 1.3 0.9 17 102 25 848 0.356 4.32
Sakha 964 330 0.1 51.5 23.5 1.3 0.46 72.7 5.0 3.3 1.1 18 819 45 397 0.405 4.88
Yamal-Nenets 538 547 0.1 50.4 22.8 1.4 0.35 74.1 5.6 0.2 0.7 34 144 231 116 0.435 6.40
1 Population growth: average annual per cent; female rate: per cent of women in total population (as compared to global average at 49.58 in 2018, from 
World Bank); replacement rate: distance of the ratio of children (0-14 years) and women (15-54 years) from the replacement rate of 2.1; youth rate: per 
cent of 0-14 years in the total population; demographic dependency: (0-14)  (65 ) / (15-64); infant mortality: per 1 000 live births; tertiary education: 
per cent of tertiary level graduates in total population; economic dependency: (non-employed/employed person in total population); disposable income: 
personal disposable income in 2018 USD-PPP; GRP: gross regional product in 2018 USD-PPP.
2 The composite index calculation is based on all indicators with the exception of the total population and tertiary education. See Box 2.1 for further 
explanation.
Table 2.2. Arctic regions distribution by socio-economic 
model. 2018
Model Main pattern Variation
North America Model 





Nordic Country Model 
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However, when comparing disposable income 
per capita, and above all, GRP per capita, across 
the Arctic regions, the circumpolar comparison is 
 heavily influenced by the high resource revenues 
of some of the Arctic Russian regions. As made 
visible by comparison of GRP per capita across 
regions in the following diagrams, the level of GRP 
per capita for other regions are dwarfed especially 
by the high GRP per capita of Yamal-Nenets due to 
the high resource revenues of this region. 
Overall, the North American regions demonstrate 
favourable conditions for human development. 
They have the highest disposable income per 
capita, the highest population growth, and the 
 largest share of youths. The indicators for female 
rate, life expectancy, and Gini coefficient are aver-
age, while infant mortality is the highest in the 
circumpolar Arctic (Figure 2.1). Although the North 
American regions have a high level of GRP per 
capita, compared to most other Arctic regions, in 
relative terms their GRP per capita is dwarfed by 
the high level of GRP per capita of Yamal-Nenets, 
as mentioned above. 
The Nordic regions also have favourable conditions 
for human development, although with a different 
pattern than in North America. In particular, the 
Nordic countries have the lowest Gini coefficient, 
meaning they have the lowest income inequality 
within their populations. Moreover, the female rate 
is the closest to the global average, they have the 
longest life expectancy, and the lowest infant mor-
tality rates. However, population growth is slower, 
and disposable income per capita and GRP per 
capita are much lower than in the North American 
regions. The Nordic regions also have the lowest 
share of youths among the three geographical 
regions (Figures 2.2 and 2.3).
The situation in the Arctic Russian regions is in 
contrast to what is observed in the North American 
and Nordic regions. The main pattern shows the 
youth rate is higher than in the Nordic countries 
but lower than in North America. The infant mor-
tality rate is lower than in North America, although 
not as low as in the Nordic regions. Moreover, 
the population in the Russian Arctic has  generally 
been in decline (Annex 2.1). The female rate is 
the  furthest away from the global average, and all 
regions but one have a female rate of 50 per cent 
or above (Table 2.1). Life expectancy, disposable 
income per capita, and GRP per capita are the low-
est, and the Gini coefficient is the highest (Figure 
2.4). Some of the Russian regions have the least 
favourable conditions for human development for 
several indicators. 
As previously mentioned, the regional geographical 
groups are not homogenous and they each have 
variations from the main patterns. In North Ameri-
ca, Nunavut has a different pattern than the other 
Longyearbyen, Svalbard, the world's northernmost city. Photo: Crestock
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regions. For example, life expectancy is lower, as is 
the disposable income per capita. The region also 
has the largest share of youths, but also a substan-
tially higher rate of infant mortality (Figure 2.5). 
Greenland has a similar GRP per capita in rela-
tion to the other Nordic regions and a relatively 
high youth rate, but differs for many indicators. In 
particular, the region has lower values than their 
Nordic neighbours for female rate, life expectancy, 
and disposable income per capita. Moreover, 
Greenland also has a high infant mortality rate, and 
a high level of economic inequality as indicated by 
the Gini coefficient (Figure 2.6). 










































There are two variation models of the socio-eco-
nomic situation in the Russian Federation. The first 
variation includes Khanty-Mansii, Sakha, and Ya-
mal-Nenets. In relation to the main Russian model, 
these regions are the only regions to experience 
population growth, and they have the highest 
youth rates. Khanty-Mansii and Yamal-Nenets also 
have the highest GRP per capita in Arctic Russia 
and the circumpolar Arctic, while Yamal-Nenets has 
the second highest disposable income per capita in 
Arctic Russia (Figure 2.7). 
The second variation model is for Chukotka. The 
region falls just behind the other variation model 
with regards to youth rate. It also has the highest 
disposable income per capita in Arctic Russia, and 
the third highest GRP per capita behind Khanty-
Mansii and Yamal-Nenets. Despite these relatively 
positive economic indicators, it also has the lowest 
life expectancy and highest infant mortality rate 
(Figure 2.8). 
The analysis of key socio-economic indicators for 
2018 demonstrates consistency in the existence 
of regional models for North America, the Nordic 
countries, and the Russian Federation. At the same 
time, the analysis also shows that variations are 
still found within each model, further confirming 
that inequalities exist both between and within 
regions. 
Maps are used to visualize the differences between 
the regions for three indicators: life expectancy, 
infant mortality, and Gini coefficient (Figures 2.9 to 
2.11). Figure 2.9 shows that the highest life expec-
tancy is found in the Nordic regions and North 
America. Figure 2.10 shows that the highest infant 
mortality is found in Nunavut. Figure 2.11 shows 
that inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, is 
highest in Yamal-Nenets and Alaska, and lowest in 
the Nordic Arctic regions.
Circumpolar Changes 
Finally, we provide a synthesis of the circumpolar 
changes from 2012 to 2018. The change between 
2012 and 2018 was calculated for each of the 
indicators (see Annex 2.1), and selected indicators 
are illustrated in a series of bar graphs (Figures 
2.12 to 2.19), presenting the changes observed 
from 2012 to 2018 (2012 being the year of ob-
servations in the previous ECONOR report). The 
selected key indicators are: population growth, 
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youth rate, life  expectancy, infant mortality, female 
rate, disposable income per capita, GRP per capita, 
and the Gini coeffi  cient. Compared to the previous 
ECONOR report, we now include infant mortality 
and the Gini coeffi  cient, while we are not able to 
include tertiary education, for lack of data.
On average, the population growth in the Arctic in 
2018 compared to 2012 seems very low. In  reality, 
this result masks contrasting changes between the 
geographical groups: while there is a growth of 
13 849 inhabitants in North America and 56 860 in 
the Nordic countries, this increase is almost com-
pletely cancelled out in the total for the Arctic by 
the population decrease in the Russian regions by 
66 795 inhabitants. The Canadian regions of Yukon 
and Nunavut show the highest relative growth, 
followed by Iceland in the Nordic countries. Of the 
three regions in Russia with population growth, 
Khanty-Mansii is the only region where growth is 
substantial. However, population decline is seen 
in six of the nine Russian regions, as well as in 
 Lapland, Kainuu, and Greenland in the  Nordic 
countries. North America is the only group of re-
gions that did not experience a decline in 2018 as 
compared to 2012 (Figure 2.12).
The change in the youth rate also presents 
 contrasts that tend to follow the contours of the 
geographical regions. Notably, there is a larger 
growth in the youth rate in the Russian North than 
in other regions. The only regions outside  Russia 
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1 Data for life expectancy in diff erent regions are the most recent available data, see notes at the end of the chapter.
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where there have been slight increases in the 
youth rate are in northern Sweden and in Nunavut 
(Figure 2.13). 
With the exception of Murmansk, all Russian 
 regions show an increase in life expectancy of 
more than two years (see notes at the end of the 
chapter), while the variations in the rest of the 
 Arctic are generally quite small. Nevertheless, an 
increase in life expectancy of about one, to one 
and a half years is observed for the regions of 
Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Kainuu, and Troms 
(Figure 2.14). 
The Russian regions experienced a decline in 
infant mortality, while the North American re-
gions  experienced a small increase. In the Nordic 
 countries, generally small variations are recorded, 
except for Faroe Islands (Figure 2.15). It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the infant mortality rate 
for the Faroe Islands can substantially vary from 
year to  year, and is sometimes zero. This was the 
case in 2018 (see Table 2.1). Changes to the female 
rate are relatively small across the circumpolar 
Arctic. The largest decrease is in Iceland while the 
largest increase is in Yamal-Nenets (Figure 2.16).  
In all Nordic regions, both economic indica-
tors, GRP and disposable income, improved in 
2018 compared to 2012. The range of growth 
between regions, however, is considerable. The 
Faroe  Islands and Iceland, for example, show a 
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1 Data for infant mortality in diff erent regions are the most recent available data, see notes at the end of the chapter.
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 substantial increase in both disposable income 
per capita and GRP per capita, while the northern 
regions of Sweden show a smaller increase in gross 
regional product per capita than in disposable 
income per capita. In North America, the observed 
variations for both these economic indicators are 
generally less substantial than in other regions, 
with the exception of Nunavut. Nunavut saw its 
GRP per capita grow substantially in 2018 com-
pared to 2012, and also experienced a decline in 
disposable income per capita. 
The Russian regions present a more contrasted 
picture. Some regions saw both GRP per capita and 
disposable income per capita increase, including 
Chukotka, Magadan and Yamal-Nenets. In con-
trast, Komi and Khanty-Mansii have experienced 
a decline in GRP per capita and have the largest 
declines in disposable income per capita (Figures 
2.17 and 2.18).
Variations in income inequality are rather small, 
but they show some generally homogeneous 
trends across the geographical regions.  Inequality 
has decreased slightly in most of the Russian 
regions, while it has increased slightly in some of 
the Nordic regions. Nevertheless, these variations 
remain small, and are marginal in several regions, 
particularly in North America (Figure 2.19). 
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1 Data for the Gini coeffi  cient is based on equivalized household disposable income in diff erent regions, where possible, and the most recent data 
 available are used. See notes at the end of the chapter.
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ain n ings 
The findings comparing the situation in 2018 
with 2012 raise questions about what is retained 
in 2018 from the situation in 2012, and what 
 conclusions we can draw from the changes. Our 
study finds that the socio-economic  situations in 
the three geographical regions follow d ifferent 
 patterns of change. These similarities and 
 differences can be explained by factors related  
to political systems and regional economic  
trends. 
Similar to the previous study, Russia’s Arctic 
 regions continued to see improvement; in  addition 
to a growing GRP per capita, these regions  overall 
saw a substantial increase in the youth rate, an 
Figure 2.14. Life expectancy by Arctic regions, absolute 
changes 2012-2018. Years 
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Figure 2.12. Population by Arctic regions, relative changes 
2012-2018. Per cent
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Figure 2.15. Infant mortality by Arctic regions, absolute 
changes 2012-2018. Per 1 000 live births
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Figure 2.13. Youth rate by Arctic regions, absolute changes 
2012-2018. Percentage point 
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increase in life expectancy, and a reduction of 
income inequality. The socio-economic situation 
of the Nordic regions also improved, with the 
 exception of the Gini coefficient as there was a 
slight increase in income inequality, except for 
Iceland. Overall, the North American Arctic regions 
also experienced improvements in life expectancy, 
disposable income per capita, and GRP per capita. 
The following examines each of the three geo-
graphical groups. 
North America 
When looking  at the changes observed in 2018 
compared to 2012, we can see improvement, 
with the exception of the youth rate and infant 
 mortality. This, however, does not mean that 
Figure 2.16. Female rate by Arctic regions, absolute changes 
2012-2018. Percentage point 
Percentage point

























Figure 2.18. Gross regional product in 2018 USD-PPP per 
capita by Arctic regions, relative changes 
2012-2018. Per cent
Per cent

























Figure 2.19. Income ine ua ity measured by ini coe cient 
by Arctic regions, absolute changes 2012-2018
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Figure 2.17. Disposable income in 2018 USD-PPP per capita by 
Arctic regions, relative changes 2012-2018. Per cent
Per cent
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 economic growth is substantial. For example, 
increases in disposable income per capita and GRP 
per capita are rather modest when  compared to 
the Nordic regions, and in some regions, these 
indicators are in decline, such as the disposable 
 income per capita in Nunavut and the GRP per 
 capita in Alaska and Yukon. Differences in change 
also exist in other indicators, such as the Gini 
 co efficient where the changes are too small to 
lead to a clear conclusion on changes to income 
inequality.
The differences between the regions have an 
impact on the main pattern in 2018 for Alaska, 
the Northwest Territories, and Yukon. The area 
covered by these regions on the radar diagram is 
different, particularly for the disposable income 
per capita in Alaska and the population growth in 
Yukon. Yet, despite these differences, these three 
regions remain more similar together than when 
they are compared with Nunavut, which varies sub-
stantially with regards to disposable income, infant 
mortality, youth rate, life expectancy, and Gini co-
efficient. This, in part, may be explained by higher 
costs of living, and that Nunavut does not benefit 
substantially from the mining industry, despite the 
Nunavut Agreement.10 This could also be explained 
more broadly by the general socio-economic condi-
tion of the Inuit in Nunavut. Even though they form 
the majority of the population in Nunavut, they are 
disadvantaged compared to non-aboriginals in the 
territory, and compared to Canadian standards, in 
terms of health, education and economic condi-
tions.11 
Certain factors contribute to both the similarities 
and differences within the North American North. 
First, the federal political systems in the United 
States and Canada, and  the transfer of responsi-
bilities to territorial governments (devolution) in 
the Canadian territories, provide state and territo-
rial governments with an increased ability to make 
decisions,12 in comparison to  regions in other parts 
of the circumpolar Arctic with centralized govern-
ment structure. 
Second, the regional primary economic activities 
are dominated by the extractive resource sec-
tor, public administration and defence.13 There 
are, however, some consequences to reliance on 
Tyonek Fish Camp – A fish camp in Tyonek on the shore of West Cook Inlet, Southcentral Alaska in June 2004. Photo: Davin Holen
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per capita. Certain indicators, such as popula-
tion growth and infant mortality, demonstrate 
 improvement for some regions and a decline in 
others. 
Nevertheless, the overall portrait of the Nordic 
 regions continues to remain similar, as demon-
strated in the main patterns for 2018. There is con-
siderable similarity in life expectancy, disposable 
income per capita, GRP per capita, Gini coeffi  cient, 
and to a lesser extent infant mortality. 
The extent to which conditions are similar in the 
main pattern highlights the diff erences found in 
certain sectors, such as public administration. 
 According to political scientist Heather Exner-Pirot, 
these jobs have “driven up the cost of wages, which 
has infl ated the cost of all other goods, resulting in 
an extremely high cost of living”14 as in the case of 
Northern Canada. 
Nordic countries 
The changes observed in 2018, when compared 
to 2012, show an overall improvement, with the 
 exception of youth rate and Gini coeffi  cient. The 
most substantial growth occurred for the dispos-
able income per capita, while modest improve-
ments are observed for life expectancy and GRP 
Box 2.2 Nunavik and other regions with undocumented socio-economic conditions   
Some Arctic regions are not explicitly included in 
this circumpolar comparison because there is not a 
 suffi  cient statistical data set to be able to describe 
their socio-economic conditions in a meaningful way. 
There are several reasons that explain these situations. 
First, some regions are not systematically covered by 
national statistical agencies because of their status. In 
Canada, this is the case for Nunavik, Nunatsiavut, and 
the Inuvialuit region, as they are Inuit regions that are 
administratively attached to provinces. In Alaska, this 
is the case for all sub-state regions such as boroughs. 
Second, regions that were previously treated as self-
governing can no longer be so treated due to admin-
istrative changes, with their inclusion in new, larger 
administrative regions. In Russia, this is the case of the 
Evenkiyskiy Autonomous Okrug, the Taimyr  Peninsula 
inhabited by the Dolgan-Nenets, which are now includ-
ed in the Krasnoyarsk region, and the Koryak region 
now included in the Kamchatka region.
Data on these regions exist, but their creation, extrac-
tion and analysis are generally the responsibility of 
initiatives outside national statistical agencies. For 
example, in Nunavik, the Kativik Regional Government 
has set up an autonomous statistics program. The pro-
gram is called Nunivaat, which in Inuktitut means “our 
harvest,” a metaphor by which statistics are likened 
to wild berries harvested by hand.1 Nunivaat main-
tains an open-access portal with all available socio-
economic statistics. Moreover, it conducts studies to fi ll 
in the gaps. For example, several studies have shown 
the disparity in consumer prices and have led to the 
implementation of a permanent cost-of-living reduction 
program;2 others follow the evolution of the regional 
economy over the long term.3 There are other similar 
initiatives in other regions.4 To integrate these realities 
into the circumpolar comparison, an inventory and 
analysis of the content produced could be a valuable 




2 Robitaille, J., E. Guénard, S. Lévesque and G. Duhaime, The Cost of 
Living in Nunavik in 2016. Research Report Revised and Expanded 
 Version. 2018. Chaire de recherche du Canada sur la condition autoch-
tone compare: Québec. 22 pages  10 app.
3 Robichaud, V. and G. Duhaime, Nunavik Economic Portrait 2012. Final 
Report on the Construction of a Social Accounting Matrix for Nunavik. 
Research Report. 2015.
4 For instance : http://www.north-slope.org/your-government/nsb-
2015-economic-profi le-census-report; http://www.north-slope.org/
your-government/comprehensive-plan; Petrov, A., Inuvialuit Settlement 
Region Baseline Social Indicators: A Pilot Study by ReSDA.  2014. Lake-




Nunavik in Figures 2015
Pocket Edition
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Greenland, which takes a very different shape in 
the radar diagrams. In particular, the youth rate 
and GRP per capita are higher, while the outcomes 
of remaining indicators are behind many of the 
other regions. Statistics Greenland points out that 
“income inequality in Greenland is higher than the 
Nordic average”.15 As well, Greenland is similar to 
Nunavut in that it also experiences disadvantaged 
health outcomes.16
In contrast to North America, the government 
structure in the Nordic countries is generally 
centralized at the federal level,17 while munici-
palities have “the right to decide what tasks they 
want to manage to strengthen the welfare of their 
residents”, although the extent of federal control 
and municipal authority varies from one country 
to another.18 Regardless of these differences, the 
Nordic Welfare Model ensures equitable access 
to social and public services, and is likely the main 
contributor to the similar situation across the re-
gion. However, there has been a general shift from 
preventative to reactive measures,19 thus potential-
ly altering the outcomes for individuals. Research 
has shown that household income inequality is 
increasing across the Nordic regions,20 and this is 
demonstrated in our study as the Gini coefficient 
has increased in all regions but Iceland.
Another consideration that differentiates the 
Nordic regions from North America is the extent 
of the transportation infrastructure system. In 
particular, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland 
have a relatively comprehensive road network, 
connecting most of the communities throughout 
the region, while many but not all communities in 
Alaska, Yukon, and the Northwest Territories are 
connected by road. In contrast, intercommunity 
road networks in Nunavut and Greenland are non-
existent.21
Russian Federation 
In the regions forming the main socio-economic 
pattern of the Arctic regions of the Russian Federa-
tion, the improvements of social conditions that 
are documented are in line with the observations 
Box 2.3. Wealth of the Arctic Group of Experts (WAGE) 
The WAGE Circumpolar Partnership is supported by the 
Government of Canada’s Department of Crown-Indigenous 
elations and Nort ern airs  w ic  financially s orts 
the development and pilot phase of its work.
Despite its size and vitality, the Arctic economy is not 
spared by inequalities. This is suggested by evidence 
from recent work that identifies income inequalities 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples;1 
between women and men;2 between rural and urban 
areas;3 between regions with different industrial struc-
tures and those with different levels of economic activ-
ity;4 between regions with different levels of health, 
education and training.5 While recent knowledge has 
provided a glimpse of the phenomenon, its systematic 
understanding is still only at an exploratory stage, de-
spite the importance that inequalities have taken on as 
an object of social science and as an issue for political 
decision-making. 
The WAGE Circumpolar Partnership (Wealth of the 
Arctic Group of Experts) focuses on the economic and 
social inequalities in the Arctic and circumpolar North. 
It intends to respond to calls at the Arctic Council for 
states to address inequalities particularly affecting 
Indigenous Peoples and to initiate a fundamental trans-
formation in the distribution of wealth produced in the 
Arctic. It echoes the Government of Canada’s Arctic and 
Northern Policy Framework, which identifies address-
ing inequalities as a priority for action and research 
and international collaboration as a means to inform 
public policy decisions. 
WAGE has its origins in the ECONOR network, with 
which it is associated. It brings together more than 
35 members from all Arctic countries; from the policy 
and practice community, including representatives of 
Indigenous organizations, NPOs and governments; and 
from the research community, universities, research 
centers, and statistical agencies. The WAGE Circum-
polar Partnership is supported by the Government of 
Canada, which financially supports the development 
and pilot phase of its work. It is directed by Université 
Laval in Canada.
1 Duhaime, G. and R. Édouard, Monetary poverty in Inuit Nunangat. 
Arctic. 2015. 68(2):223-32.; Lévesque, S. and G. Duhaime, Inequality and 
social processes in Inuit Nunangat. The Polar Journal. 2016. 6(1): 69-86.
2 Oddsdóttir, E. E., A. M. Sigurðsson and S. Svandal, Conference Report 
Gender Equality in the Arctic: Current Realities, Future Challenges. 
2015. Iceland Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Reykjavik.
3 Rasmussen, R. O. Megatrends. 2011. Nordic Council of Ministers: 
Copenhagen.
4 Nordic Council of Ministers, Arctic Social Indicators: ASI II: Implementa-
tion. 2015. Nordic Council of Ministers: Copenhagen.
5 Rautio, A., B. Poppel and K. Young, Human health and well-being. in 
Arctic Human Development Report: Regional Processes and Global 
Linkages, J.N. Larsen and G. Fondahl, Editors. 2014. Nordic Council of 
Ministers: Copenhagen. pp. 299-348.; Hirshberg, D. and A. N. Petrov, 
Education and human capital, in Arctic Human Development Report: 
Regional Processes and Global Linkages, J.N. Larsen and G. Fondahl, 
Editors. 2014. Nordic Council of Ministers: Copenhagen. pp. 349-99.
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made when comparing the data for 2006 and 2012 
in the previous ECONOR reports. The decrease in 
infant mortality and the increase in life expectancy 
may be associated with the relative decrease in 
income inequality, observed earlier in the Arctic.22 
These changes may be associated with improved 
employment conditions and quality of life in the 
High North regions.23 Above all, they may be linked 
to national policies, with a major objective of recent 
Russian policy to re-establish basic social guaran-
tees, particularly in the field of health, after the 
destabilization that followed the end of the Soviet 
regime.24 
As far as economic indicators are concerned, two 
main characteristics emerged. While GRP per 
capita has increased almost everywhere, personal 
disposable income per capita has decreased in 
most of the regions. The growth of the GRP per 
capita would generally be explained by an increase 
in petroleum production,25 as well as minerals (see 
Chapter 4). There is also growth in construction 
(see Chapter 8) and other production, to some 
extent linked to an increase in local production 
to counter the effects of the American and Euro-
pean sanctions adopted in 2014.26 The observed 
decline in personal disposable income (adjusted 
in terms of purchasing power) may also reflect the 
weakening of purchasing power resulting from the 
same sanctions, as imported goods became more 
expensive.27 
In Russia, the variations of socio-economic patterns 
identify very different situations. The increase in oil 
and gas production has led to different results for 
the regional economies: in Yamal-Nenets, the huge 
growth in production led to a corresponding in-
crease in GRP per capita; but in Khanty-Mansii, the 
reduction in oil prices between 2013 and 2017, the 
weakening of the ruble, and the increase in popula-
tion resulted in a decrease in GRP per capita, when 
converted to USD-PPP28. In these two regions, 
unlike almost all the others, the population has 
grown and the cities have continued to develop.29 
In Chukotka, the highest disposable income per 
capita in Arctic Russia, and second highest in the 
circumpolar Arctic, have been made possible by 
large extractive industries. 
The socio-economic conditions in the three geo-
graphical groups are shaped by different factors, 
such as political structures, emphasis on certain 
economic industries, and transportation systems, 
for example. In line with the results presented in 
previous ECONOR reports, we continue to see that 
differences between the three geographical groups 
are shrinking, although there are increasing inter-
nal inequalities in some regions. 
Summary 
Our capacity to understand the socio-economic 
situation in the circumpolar Arctic has been  limited 
by data availability. Some statistics that were avail-
able for the previous ECONOR report were not 
available for the current study. This was the case 
with the frequency at which the data is updated, 
e.g. when censuses are only completed every 10 
years. Moreover, some statistics are not available, 
as is the situation when knowledge about the 
demographic situation on Indigenous Peoples is 
limited. There are challenges in obtaining popula-
tion data for Indigenous Peoples,30 while regional 
statistics are provided for the entire population. 
Finally, there are conceptual differences between 
definitions used by the different statistical agen-
cies. 
Comparing 2012 and 2018, the statistical chal-
lenges are no less today. Changes have occurred 
in some regional boundaries, resulting in loss in 
statistical coverage. It remains difficult to infer 
 significant trends from small and very large chang-
es, especially in regions where population size 
is small. It is difficult to elucidate local situations 
in the context of a broad comparison. For most 
regions, it remains impossible to obtain statistical 
information that is sufficiently recent and system-
atic to adequately describe the situation of Indig-
enous Peoples.  
In addition to these challenges, there are also 
knowledge gaps in factors that have a direct  impact 
on the wellbeing of northerners. For ex ample, what 
is the real purchasing power across and within 
 regions, and what is the basket of public services 
that are offered for free to residents? Moreover, 
not all statistical agencies provide data on the dis-
tribution of wealth within regions,  making it more 
difficult to have a deeper understanding of income 
inequality. 
Despite the statistical challenges, our analysis 
confirms three dominant features of the socio-
economic portrait of the circumpolar Arctic. First, 
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a major gap continues to exist between the three 
geographical regions. Second, a modest conver-
gence between them can be seen when we con-
sider the diminishing income inequalities and the 
increasing life expectancy in Russia. Finally, the 
internal differences within the major geographical 
groups, that continue to have main and variation 
patterns of socio-economic conditions, have not 
changed since an overall picture was first present-
ed in The Economy of the North 2008. 
There are some phenomena that are important in 
explaining these differences, such as the popula-
tion structure and dynamics, each region’s role in 
the national and global economies, and redistribu-
tion of income and provision of public services to 
populations of the Arctic regions, both to Indig-
enous Peoples and other Arctic residents. In future 
research and statistical work, including ECONOR 
reports and the recent initiative of the Wealth of 
the Arctic Group of Experts (WAGE) (Box 2.3), it is 
important to continue to improve the knowledge 
basis for exploring the social and economic condi-
tions and inequalities in the circumpolar Arctic.
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Annex 2.2: ArcticStat Circumpolar Databank
As a result of multiple sources, finding the relevant 
socio-economic data for the Arctic regions has long 
been a highly time-consuming process.
ArcticStat was created to overcome this difficulty and 
to increase research capacity by taking advantage of 
already existing data. This databank aims to facilitate 
research by importing, stocking, and organizing, in a 
user-friendly way, socio-economic data covering some 
30 Arctic regions belonging to 8 countries.
The data in ArcticStat covers dwellings, population, 
 language, health, education, migration, economy, 
 employment, and other social and economic realities.  
It is an open-access web-based databank that links 
users directly to the relevant tables on the original web-
sites, when possible; moreover, the portal offers a PDF 
and an EXCEL copy of these tables.
ArcticStat was launched in 2007, and it has been kept 
up to date by monitoring updates on the relevant 
statistical agency websites. It gives access to more than 
11 800 tables through 8 indicators and some 77 sub- 
indicators. ArcticStat is an independent databank 
 created at Université Laval by the Canada Research 
Chair on Comparative Aboriginal Condition. It was 
considered as a major Canadian contribution to the 
International Polar Year. It can be found at  
www.arcticstat.org
Annex 2.1. Changes in selected social and economic indicators1 and composite index. Arctic regions, 









































Ratio USD-PPP per cap Ratio n
Alaska 4 696 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.1 0.80 0.7 2.6 0.0 2 119 -6 939 0.009 -0.50
Northwest 
Territories 1 308 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.90 5.2 2.5 0.1 1 562 7 020 -0.005 -0.25
Nunavut 3 467 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.10 2.8 1.0 -0.1 -1 294 14 229 0.001 0.15
Yukon 4 378 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.50 4.5 2.4 0.0 854 -3 287 -0.006 -0.13
Faroe Islands 2 271 0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 1.20 -16.9 .. -0.2 4 061 16 163 0.000 1.33
Lapland -4 322 0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.45 2.3 3.0 -0.1 1 882 8 695 0.000 -0.08
Northern 
Ostrobothnia 8 241 -0.1 -0.8 0.0 0.1 0.81 0.3 2.8 -0.1 1 687 744 0.014 -0.12
Kainuu -4 374 -0.3 -0.6 0.0 0.1 1.31 2.7 2.7 -0.1 2 395 3 826 0.008 -0.08
Greenland -872 0.2 -1.0 0.0 0.0 1.04 -1.6 1.9 -0.1 1 084 5 084 0.018 0.10
Iceland 28 875 -0.8 -1.4 0.0 0.0 -0.06 0.6 7.8 -0.1 3 330 9 158 -0.006 0.26
Finnmark 2 380 0.3 -1.8 0.1 0.0 0.93 1.6 3.5 0.0 763 3 903 0.022 -0.03
Nordland 5 015 -0.5 -1.1 0.0 0.0 0.68 -0.7 3.8 0.0 525 3 225 0.015 0.06
Troms 7 849 -0.4 -1.3 0.0 0.0 1.42 -1.6 4.5 -0.1 1 622 4 791 0.013 0.23
Norrbotten 1 860 -0.4 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.57 -0.9 3.2 -0.1 2 553 2 085 0.014 0.19
Västerbotten 9 937 -0.4 0.9 -0.1 0.1 0.81 -0.1 2.4 -0.1 2 326 2 834 0.018 0.28
Arkhangelsk -58 505 -0.1 1.8 -0.1 0.1 2.45 -2.3 -1.3 0.1 -595 4 656 -0.005 0.08
Chukotka -1 640 -0.1 0.7 -0.1 0.0 2.79 -8.5 0.3 0.1 3 978 9 677 -0.011 0.42
Karelia -17 197 0.0 1.9 -0.1 0.1 2.56 -2.0 -1.4 0.1 -1 123 885 -0.030 0.29
Khanty-Mansii 93 836 0.2 2.2 -0.1 0.1 2.49 -1.6 -1.3 0.0 -4 212 -14 291 -0.032 0.06
Komi -48 964 0.1 2.1 -0.2 0.1 2.73 -1.4 -1.8 0.1 -4 674 -4 220 -0.042 0.12
Magadan -10 394 0.1 1.6 -0.1 0.1 3.47 -4.9 -3.9 0.1 549 10 015 -0.027 0.28
Murmansk -34 391 -0.3 2.0 -0.1 0.1 1.87 -1.0 -2.6 0.1 -2 982 2 725 -0.041 0.25
Sakha 8 471 0.1 1.5 -0.1 0.1 4.79 -4.6 -1.8 0.0 -590 4 951 0.000 0.37
Yamal-Nenets 1 989 0.7 2.3 -0.1 0.1 3.41 -4.9 -1.8 0.1 261 49 630 -0.006 0.14
1 Population growth: average annual per cent; female rate: per cent of women in total population (as compared to global average at 49.58 in 2018, from 
World Bank); replacement rate: distance of the ratio of children (0-14 years) and women (15-54 years) from the replacement rate of 2.1; youth rate: per 
cent of 0-14 years in the total population; demographic dependency: (0-14)  (65 ) / (15-64); infant mortality: per 1 000 live births; tertiary education: 
per cent of tertiary level graduates in total population; economic dependency: (non-employed/employed person in total population); disposable income: 
personal disposable income in 2018 USD-PPP; GRP: gross regional product in 2018 USD-PPP.  
2 The data from Table 2.1 is compared to the following years: Life expectancy: Canada 2010-2012; Finland and Greenland 2011-2012; Iceland and Russia 
2012; Finland and Alaska 2012 (ECONOR); Norway 2006-2010; Sweden 2008-2012; Infant mortality: Norway 2006-2010; Tertiary education: Canada 2011 
census data; Gini: Canada 2011 census data. In order to compare Disposable Income and GRP per capita across time, the values for 2012 were conver-
ted into 2018 USD PPP. 2012; Finland and Alaska 2012 (ECONOR); Norway 2006-2010; Sweden 2008-2012; Infant mortality: Norway 2006-2010; Tertiary 
education: Canada 2011 census data; Gini: Canada 2011 census data. In order to compare Disposable Income and GRP per capita across time, the values 
for 2012 were converted into 2018 USD PPP. 
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Appendix: Data sources for Chapter 2
Alaska
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). SAGDP1 Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) summary, annual by state  
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?acrdn=6&isuri=1&reqid=70&step=
1 reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). SAINC4 Personal Income and Employ-
ment by Major Component 
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). SAINC5 Personal Income by Major 
Component and Earnings by Industry 
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?acrdn=6&isuri=1&reqid=70&step=
1 reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1 
Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (National Centre for Health 




Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC Wonder). About Underly-
ing Cause of Death, 1999-2019  
https://wonder.cdc.gov/controller/saved/D76/D93F116 
U.S. Census Bureau. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for 
Selected Age Groups by Sex for Alaska: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019 
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2010-2019/
state/detail/sc-est2019-agesex-02.xlsx 
U.S. Census Bureau. Educational Attainment 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=Education&g=0400000US02&y=2
018&tid=ACSST1Y2018.S1501&hidePreview=true 




Statistics Canada. Census Profile. 2016 Census. Statistics Canada Cata-
logue no. 98-316-X2016001. Ottawa. Released November 29 2017 
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/index.
cfm?Lang=E 
Statistics Canada. National Household Survey Profile. 2011 National 
Household Survey. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 99-004-XWE. Ottawa. 
Released June 26 2013 
http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang=E 
Statistics Canada. Table 13-10-0140-01  Life expectancy and other ele-
ments of the life table, Prince Edward Island and the territories  
https://doi.org/10.25318/1310014001-eng
Statistics Canada. Table 36-10-0222-01  Gross domestic product, expendi-
ture-based, provincial and territorial, annual (x 1,000,000) 
https://doi.org/10.25318/3610022201-eng 
Statistics Canada. Table 36-10-0224-01  Household sector, current ac-
counts, provincial and territorial, annual 
https://doi.org/10.25318/3610022401-eng 
Statistics Canada. Table 13-10-0713-01  Infant deaths and mortality rates, 
by age group 
https://doi.org/10.25318/1310071301-eng 
Statistics Canada. Table 14-10-0202-01  Employment by industry, annual 
https://doi.org/10.25318/1410020201-eng 
Statistics Canada. Table 17-10-0005-01  Population estimates on July 1st, 
by age and sex 
https://doi.org/10.25318/1710000501-eng
Faroe Islands 
Statistics Faroe Islands. AM03030 Employees by industry, region, sex, age 
and month (1985-2020) 
https://statbank.hagstova.fo/pxweb/en/H2/H2__AM__AM03/lont_vkaomd.
px/ 
Statistics Faroe Islands. B01030 Population by sex, age and village/city, 
1st January (1985-2020) 
https://statbank.hagstova.fo/pxweb/en/H2/H2__IB__IB01/fo_aldbygd.px/
Statistics Faroe Islands. IB02050 Life expectancy by age and sex (1966-
2019) 
https://statbank.hagstova.fo/pxweb/en/H2/H2__IB__IB02/fd_livsavi.px/ 
Statistics Faroe Islands. IB02070 Mortality rate (per 1,000) by age and sex 
(1985-2019) 
https://statbank.hagstova.fo/pxweb/en/H2/H2__IB__IB02/fd_deydkvot.px/ 
Statistics Faroe Islands. IP01010 Gini and Hoover indexes and income 
quantile ratios by age, sex, type of household and region (2009-2018) 
https://statbank.hagstova.fo/pxweb/en/H2/H2__IP__IP01/innt_ginfim.px 
Statistics Faroe Islands. IP01035 Income and taxes by municipality, de-
ciles and average (2009-2018) 
https://statbank.hagstova.fo/pxweb/en/H2/H2__IP__IP01/des_kom.px/ 




Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare. Select indicators 
https://sotkanet.fi/sotkanet/en/haku?indicator=s_YtBgA=&region=szYPsT
bSMwQA&year=sy6rsjbS0zUEAA==&gender=t 
Statistics Finland. 11ra -- Key figures on population by region, 1990-2019 
http://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/StatFin__vrm__vaerak/stat-
fin_vaerak_pxt_11ra.px/
















Statistics Finland. 12bs -- Population aged 15 or over by level of educa-
tion, municipality, region, gender and age, 2007-2019 
http://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/StatFin__kou__vkour/stat-
fin_vkour_pxt_12bs.px/ 
Statistics Finland. 127r -- Income differences and equalising impact of 




Statistics Finland. Appendix table 1. Life expectancy at birth by region in 
the period 2016 to 2018 
http://tilastokeskus.fi/til/kuol/2018/01/kuol_2018_01_2019-10-24_
tau_001_en.html
Statistics Finland. Appendix table 1. Life expectancy at birth by region in 
the period 2015 to 2017 
http://tilastokeskus.fi/til/kuol/2017/01/kuol_2017_01_2018-10-26_
tau_001_en.html 
Statistics Finland. Appendix table 1. Life expectancy at birth by region in 




Statistics Greenland. Disposable income for persons (14 years +) by 
municipality (2002-2019) [INEPI201] 
https://bank.stat.gl/pxweb/en/Greenland/Greenland__IN__IN20/INXPI201.
px/ 
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Statistics Greenland. Life Expectancy 2-year basis BEEDT2A] 
https://bank.stat.gl/pxweb/en/Greenland/Greenland__BE__BE10__BE20/
BEXDT2A.px/?rxid=9f179859-94a3-4e93-9138-4e917bbee157 
Statistics Greenland. Main employment for permanent residents by time, 
industry, gender, age, place of birth and place of residence AREBFB1] 
https://bank.stat.gl/pxweb/en/Greenland/Greenland__AR__AR30/ARX-
BFB1.px/?rxid=995b81ad-5d5a-4937-a320-6054c709fddd 
Statistics Greenland. Population Account (Greenland) 1994- BEECALC] 
https://bank.stat.gl/pxweb/en/Greenland/Greenland__BE__BE80/BEX-
CALC.PX/ 
Statistics Greenland. Population January 1st 1977-2020 BEEST1] 
https://bank.stat.gl/pxweb/en/Greenland/Greenland__BE__BE01/BEX-
SAT1.PX/?rxid=9f179859-94a3-4e93-9138-4e917bbee157




Statistics Iceland. Educational attainment of the population according to 
ISCED 2011 2003-2019, percentage distribution 
https://px.hagstofa.is/pxen/pxweb/en/Samfelag/Samfelag__skolamal__5_
menntunarstada/SKO00002.px 
Statistics Iceland. Gini-index and quintile share ratio 2004-2018 
https://px.hagstofa.is/pxen/pxweb/en/Samfelag/Samfelag__launog-
tekjur__3_tekjur__2_tekjur_silc/LIF01110.px 




Statistics Iceland. Infant mortality and late fetal deaths 1951-2019 
https://px.hagstofa.is/pxen/pxweb/en/Ibuar/Ibuar__Faeddirdanir__
danir__danir/MAN05321.px 




Statistics Iceland. Population - key figures 1703-2020 
https://px.hagstofa.is/pxen/pxweb/en/Ibuar/Ibuar__mannfjoldi__1_
yfirlit__yfirlit_mannfjolda/MAN00000.px












Statistics Norway. 05378: Infant mortality (C) 1966-1970 - 2011-2015 
https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/05378/ 
Statistics Norway. 05797: Expectation of lifetime, by sex and selected age 
(C) 1971-1975 - 2011-2015 
https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/05797/ 
Statistics Norway. 07459: Population, by sex and one-year age groups (M) 
1986 – 2020 
https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/07459/ 
Statistics Norway. 09114: Measures of income despersion. Household 
equivalent income (EU-scale) between persons (M) (UD) 2004 – 2018 
https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09114 
Statistics Norway. 09429: Educational attainment, by municipality and sex 
(M) 1970 – 2019 
https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09429/ 
Statistics Norway. 11713: Regional accounts, by industry (C) 2008 – 2018 
https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/11713 




Statistics Sweden. Deaths by region, age (during the year) and sex. Year 
1968 – 2019 
https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__BE__
BE0101__BE0101I/DodaHandelseK/  
Statistics Sweden. Disposable income of households (ESA2010) by region 
(NUTS1-3) and transaction item. Year 2000 – 2018 
https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__NR__
NR0105__NR0105A/NR0105ENS2010T02A/ 
Statistics Sweden. Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), number of 
employed and wages and salaries (ESA2010) by region (NUTS1-3). Year 
2000 – 2018 
https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__NR__
NR0105__NR0105A/NR0105ENS2010T01A/# 




Statistics Sweden. Live births by region, mother´s age and child´s sex. 
Year 1968 – 2019 
https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__BE__
BE0101__BE0101H/FoddaK/
Statistics Sweden. Population by region, marital status, age and sex. Year 
1968 – 2019 
https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__BE__
BE0101__BE0101A/BefolkningNy/  
Swedish Register of Education. Number of persons (16+) with a tertiary 
education concluded with a degree in Västerbotten and Norrbotten 
county 2012-2018. Data obtained through Statistics Sweden. 
Russia 
Fed Stat.   (   ) (Janu-
ary December) Gini Coefficient (income concentration index) (January 
December)] 
https://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/31165 
Fed Stat.   (  1 .  ) 
(ppm (0.1 percent),    ) Infant mortality (per 
1,000 live births) (ppm (0.1 percent), value per year)] 
https://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/55376 
Fed Stat.      (year, 
indicator value for the year) [Life expectancy at birth (year, indicator 
value for the year)] 
https://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/55386 
Fed Stat.    -    
 1  (man) Number of resident population - males by age as of 
January 1 (man)] 
https://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/31548 
Fed Stat.    -    
 1  ( ) Number of resident population - women by age 
as of January 1 (people)] 
https://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/33459 
Rosstat.  .   
   2019  
. 2019, : . Regions of Russia. Main characteris-
tics of the subjects of the Russian Federation 2019 statistical digest. 2019. 
Moscow: Rosstat.]
Rosstat.     15-72    
  Number of employees aged 15-72 years by 
regions of the Russian Federation] 
https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/aBHrzZ2j/trud2_15-72.xls 
Statistics Showcase. 22111200200050200001    
  (  1998 . -  . .) Total cash incomes of the 
population (until 1998 - in million rubles)] https://showdata.gks.ru
Statistics Showcase. 21220000200080200002   
 Gross regional product] https://showdata.gks.ru
World Bank 
World Bank. Population, female (% of total population) https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS?end=2018&start=2018 
OECD
OECD. 4. PPPs and exchange rates https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.
aspx?datasetcode=SNA_TABLE4&lang=en  
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Box I. The use of Purchasing Power Parities in this report1
The main purpose of this report is 
to provide an overview over eco-
nomic activity in the Arctic regions. 
A major challenge has therefore 
been to compare and add up value 
of production in terms of income 
of industries of regions in different 
countries. A conversion of income 
data based on a straightforward 
use of market exchange rates 
(MER) will normally not appropri-
ately reflect the income levels of 
the different regions. To adjust 
for price level differences across 
regional markets Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) indicators have 
been applied. However, also PPP 
conversion may sometimes lead to 
a biased assessment of production 
and income levels.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the economic activity in the circumpolar region. Based on PPP-
conversions it is estimated that gross product of the circumpolar Arctic in 2018 was 615 billion USD-PPP 
corresponding to 0.7 percent of the world economy. The Arctic regions of Russia alone accounted for 
449 billion USD-PPP, or 73 percent. 
PPP-converted gross products (value added) are proxies for income in terms of capacity to consume. 
In that respect income levels in the Arctic vary from a low of 42 000 USD-PPP per capita in Northern 
Finland to a high of 75 000 USD-PPP per capita in Alaska (see Figure 3.8). 
It is interesting to note the differences between income in arctic versus non-arctic regions within the 
Arctic states. For example, per capita income of Russia outside the Arctic is around 21 000 USD-PPP 
while it is as high as 67 000 USD-PPP in the Russian Arctic. In Norway the pattern is reversed: While per 
capita income outside the Arctic is 62 000 USD-PPP, the income level of Artic Norway is 46 000 USD-PPP. 
A major factor behind these differences is that the income from petroleum in Norway is registered out-
side the arctic region, in Russia this is not the case.
As noted, the data for the different countries have originally been reported in national currencies but 
have in this report been converted into a common currency using purchasing power parities. Alterna-
tively, the national currency data could have been converted into a common currency by use of the 
market exchange rates (MER). The Russian share of the Arctic gross product would, for example, then 
have been estimated to 50 per cent, instead of 69 per cent (see also Figure 2).
In most studies comparing income of different countries, PPP-conversion is preferred to market ex-
change rates. We have followed this tradition and have applied PPP-converters developed by the Inter-
national  Comparison Program and the OECD-Eurostat PPP-program. 
The advantage of PPP-conversion is taking into account that price levels vary considerably between 
countries. A frequently applied illustration of the variation in price levels is the price of a Big Mac in dif-
ferent countries. Using market exchange rates, the average price of a Big Mac in Sweden was 6.37 USD 
in January 2021, whereas the price in Russia at the same time was 1.81 USD. This illustrates that almost 
identical products are priced quite differently if we use market exchange rates as the basis for price 
comparisons. Consequently MER-conversion of income levels might give seriously misleading numbers 
as far as production and consumption potentials are concerned. 
1 Bjart Holtsmark, Statistics Norway, contributed this text for the first ECONOR report, now with updated data.
Fishing in Qeqertarsuatsiaat, Greenland. Photo: Hunter T. Snyder
Box I. The use of Purchasing Power Parities in this report1
When practicing PPP-conversion we would have preferred to use PPP-factors specific for the Arctic 
regions in each country, but Arctic-regional PPP-factors have not been developed. Instead, we have 
 applied PPP-factors for the national economies.
It is difficult to judge to what extent the use of national PPP-measures is misleading. If the economies 
of the Arctic regions simply were downscaled versions of the economies of the respective nations and 
products were priced uniformly across regions, the national PPP-converters would not have been a 
source of error. However, the Arctic regions are quite different from their respective national econo-
mies, as discussed in chapter 4. Moreover, the general price levels are different between different 
regions within the individual countries. A Big Mac is, for instance, more expensive in Anchorage than 
in New York. Hence, just as the use of MER-based numbers would represent a source of error, using 
national PPP-based numbers is also a source of error.
There are indications that the price level in arctic regions might be somewhat higher than in the rest of 
the respective Arctic states due to extended transport distances as well as more limited infrastructure. 
Further, the arctic economies tend to be more involved in mineral extraction and public services provi-
sion than the south, both activities with relatively high wage rates. If this is the case, the PPP adjustment 
of income level of the arctic region would be biased upwards.
The Russian Arctic region is more dominated by oil and gas production than the rest of the Russian 
economy. Oil and gas are internationally tradable goods and the relatively high average income level 
of the Russian Arctic is largely due to the export of oil and gas traded in USD. The dominance of the 
petroleum industry in the Russian Arctic indicates that the use of a PPP-converter calculated for the 
Russian economy will probably imply a downwards bias when it is applied to the Russian Arctic regions. 
However, a higher price level in the Russian Arctic would tend to modify that bias.
Figure 1 illustrates how sensitive the estimates of regional GDP per capita are to the choice between 
PPP and MER. When PPP-factors are applied, regional GDP per capita in Russian Arctic is higher than 
in the Arctic regions of the Scandinavian countries. However, as MER-factors are applied, the income 
levels in Arctic Russia appear to be much lower.
It should be noted that we have reported data on regional GDP, not gross regional incomes. Regional 
GDP represents regionally generated income and does not include transfers in and out of the regions. 
Hence, regional GDP per capita does not constitute a precise representation of income levels in the 
 different regions.
Figure 2.  Arctic Region share of total circumpolar 
GDP 2018. Per cent
Per cent












Figure 1.  GDP per capita by Arctic region 2018.  
1 000 USD at 2018 prices 
1 000 USD
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Box II. Sámi statistics in Norway
The Sámi traditional settlement area is in the north of 
Norway, Sweden and Finland, and at the Kola Peninsula 
in Russia. The national statistical offices of the Nordic 
countries publish population statistics based on census 
and population registers. However, ethnicity is not 
included as a dimension in the census, neither for Sámi 
nor for any other ethnic groups. It is therefore not pos-
sible to produce statistics for the Sámi population from 
the population registers.
From 1845 to 1930 the census in Norway included 
estimates of the number of Sámi and kvener (people of 
Finnish descent in Northern Norway). The 1950 cen-
sus provided estimates of the use of Sámi and Kven 
language in some villages in the northern counties in 
Norway. The 1970 census was the last time when ques-
tions about Sámi language and ethnical background 
were included, in a supplementary questionnaire to 
selected municipalities and local communities in the 
northern counties.
It is difficult to assess the number of S mi in Norway 
based on previous census data. The reason is partly 
that the censuses used different basis for defining 
who is Sámi, according to ancestry, language or self-
reporting, and partly that not all Sámi were reached by 
the census as the supplementary questionnaire about 
Sámi identity only was used in selected municipalities. 
The census had registered a Sámi population of about 
15 000 from 1845 to 1875, and the number increased 
to about 20 000 from 1890 to 1930. In 1950 the number 
was 8 778, a number that was considered far too low. 
In 1970 the number was slightly below 10 000. 
The last decades have seen a distinct change in policies 
and attitudes towards Sámi people in Norway. Assimi-
lation into the Norwegian society was a clearly stated 
policy for a long period, lasting long into the post world 
war II period. Sámi were expected to give up their lan-
guage and adopt the way of life of the majority popula-
tion. Starting around 1980, considerable efforts have 
been made to reverse the consequences of assimilation 
policies and to secure the rights of the Sámi people. 
A S mi Parliament has been established, with its first 
election in 1989. 
There has, however, been a lack of statistical informa-
tion basis to describe Sámi society and evaluate to what 
extent political objectives have been achieved. In 2003 
the Sámi Parliament commissioned a project with coop-
eration between Statistics Norway and Sámi Instituhtta 
(Nordic Sámi Institute) to develop a permanent frame-
work for development, production and dissemination 
of Sámi statistics. Since the central population  register 
does not include information on individual ethnicity, 
as explained, other approaches must be taken. The 
solution chosen so far is to produce statistics for areas 
defined as S mi settlement areas. IIn practice, this was 
operationalized by selecting those areas that qualify for 
support to business development from the Sámi Parlia-
ment, the STN area.1 The geographical area for support 
has been extended several times, most recently in 
2012. 
The main argument for choosing this geographical 
approach is that the selected area encompasses local 
communities whose viability is seen as crucial for sus-
taining and further developing Sámi culture and local 
businesses, at the same time as the Sámi Parliament 
has support schemes applicable to this area. In order 
to plan the use and evaluate the effect of these policy 
instruments, the Sámi Parliament needs data that can 
illustrate current status and development over time. 
This geographical approach to Sámi statistics, based 
on the STN area, has obvious shortcomings. Many of 
the inhabitants in these areas are not Sámi, and many 
Sámi live outside these areas The entire STN area lies 
north of the Arctic Circle, and none of the large towns 
of Northern Norway are within the STN area. To a 
large extent, the difference between S mi and non-
S mi areas observed in the statistics therefore reflects 
the difference between urban and rural areas, and to 
some extent the difference between north and south. A 
statistical approach that would have allowed compari-
son of Sámi and non-Sámi, independently of place of 
residence, might have been better.
Statistics Norway has explored the possibilities to 
produce Sámi statistics for individuals, by combining 
existing registers where individuals directly or indi-
rectly have declared themselves as Sámi, such as the 
1970 census, the register of the Norwegian Agriculture 
Agency, of persons affiliated with reindeer herding, 
and the electoral register of the Sámi Parliament.2 The 
results from this work was not followed up, partly due 
to difficulties to achieve permission to use and combine 
the registers, and uncertainty about the representativ-
ity of the sample of the Sámi population. 
Table 1. Income account for households. All of Norway, 
STN-area, and north of Saltfjellet. Average for 










Income from work 717 400 596 100 672 600
Employee income 692 000 560 600 644 600
Net income from self-
employment 276 400 266 100 297 300
Property income 45 600 16 000 28 600
Taxable transfers 290 200 300 600 289 600
Social security benefits 302 600 299 500 302 700
Unemployment benefit 96 600 81 800 81 100
Compensation for illness leave 61 600 69 900 67 500
Tax-free transfers 37 500 37 300 37 000
Child allowances 21 400 22 000 21 400
Dwelling support 20 200 12 300 16 200
Social assistance 53 000 31 300 43 400
Total income 814 200 707 300 775 700
Total assessed taxes and 
negative transfers 215 400 156 500 193 600
After-tax income 606 400 559 400 588 600
1 The STN-area is defined as the areas that qualify for support from the 
Sámi Parliament to business development. 
2 Those areas north of Saltfjellet not defined as STN-area. 
Source: Statistics Norway
Box II. Sámi statistics in Norway Anders Sønstebø, Statistics Norway
Statistics Norway continues to produce geographically 
based Sámi statistics. As long as the Sámi Parliament 
continues to provide support to particular geographi-
cal areas, regardless of whether the applicant is Sámi 
or not, it will be important to closely follow the devel-
opment in these areas. The first of these bi-annual 
publications Samisk statistikk/Sámi statistihkka 2006 
was launched in 2006 on the Day of the Sámi People 
on 6 February. The topics cover elections to the Sámi 
Parliament, population, education, including use of 
Sámi language in schools and kindergartens, income 
and personal economy, labor market, reindeer herding 
and agriculture, and fishing and hunting. 
A Government appointed expert group, where Statistics 
Norway is represented, has been assigned the mandate 
of compiling an annual report on the situation and 
trends in the Sámi community. The report, Samiske tall 
forteller (Sámi statistics speak), is used in annual bud-
geting and consultations between the government and 
the Sámi Parliament. An English translation of selected 
articles was published in 2018 as Sami Statistics Speak. 
Population data for the current STN areas have been 
calculated back to 1990. The population in these areas 
has in recent years been about 55 000 persons, now 
declining after a stable level from 2011 to 2017, follow-
ing a continuous decline since 1990, when population 
was 10 000 persons higher. There is no population 
growth observed in the STN area from 2010 to 2020, 
although population in Norway has increased with al-
most 510 000 persons, or 10.5 per cent, over the same 
period.
Table 1 shows the income account for households 
in the STN area in 2017, compared to other areas of 
northern Norway (north of Saltfjellet) and average for 
Norway. Average total household income (before tax) 
for the STN area was about 9 per cent lower than for 
other northern areas and about 13 per cent below the 
average for Norway. Average income from employment 
and from property was considerably lower in the STN 
area than the average for other northern areas and 
for Norway. Taxable transfers were higher in the STN 
area. Average unemployment benefit in the STN area is 
almost equal as in other northern areas, but lower than 
average for Norway. Child allowance is the only tax-free 
income type that is higher on average for recipients in 
the STN area. Average after-tax (disposable) household 
income for the STN area was 5 per cent lower than 
average for other northern areas and about 8 per cent 
lower than the average for Norway. 
1 The Norwegian term for support from the Sámi Parliament to business 
development is Sametingets tilskuddsordninger for n ringsutvikling  
(STN).
2 Holth, B. A. & Lillegård, M. 2017. Statistikk over samiske språkbrukere i 
Norge. En kartlegging av eksisterende datakilder og vurdering av frem-
gangsmåter for statistikk. SSB/Statistics Norway, Notater 34:2017.
Sámi reindeer herding, Finnmark. Photo: Tom Nicolaysen.
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Arctic catfish sold at local marketplace, Nuuk, Greenland. Photo: Tom Nicolaysen
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The population of the Circumpolar Arctic counts 
about 9.7 million people, less than the 10 mil-
lion threshold, which qualifies cities to be called a 
megacity according to UN definition.1 There are 33 
megacities in the world. In contrast to these urban 
crowds, the arctic inhabitants roam on 8 per cent 
of the global land area, which is partly sovereign, 
partly managed by the respective Arctic states. 
The outsiders view on this land area as remote and 
uninhabitable is gradually modified. People around 
the world have come closer to the Arctic as tourists 
and trading partners whereas the arctic peoples 
reaches the rest of the world through better 
communications and opening up of northern sea 
routes. The Arctic is under rapid change from new 
economic opportunities but also from opportuni-
ties lost through climate change. 
For the Arctic, the term global warming is an under-
statement, as the temperature rise in the Arctic is 
more than twice the rate of temperature increase 
globally.2 The reason for rapid warming is that the 
ice cover disappears, replacing strong heat reflec-
tion from ice and snow with absorbed heat by the 
dark open ocean. The nature is affected and so are 
the Arctic societies, both directly by climate change 
3. Comparative analysis of Arctic economies from a 
macro level perspective
Solveig Glomsrød and Taoyuan Wei
and via stricter climate policies, as fossil energy has 
been an important export commodity for several 
regions. 
Variations in the regional endowments of natural 
resources lead to considerable variation in income 
across the circumpolar Arctic. However, transfers 
within Arctic states tend to modify the gaps in dis-
posable income per capita between Arctic regions 
and their non-Arctic counter parts. This chapter 
takes a broader look at the Arctic economies from 
a macro level perspective, providing a circumpolar 
outlook as well as comparing the Arctic regions 
with their non-Arctic counterparts within the Arctic 
states.
The Arctic economies are generally confined to 
regions that are encompassed or traversed by the 
Arctic Circle. In many contexts, however, regions in 
Europe that are situated somewhat to the south of 
the Arctic Circle but participate in the cooperation 
of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council3 are included 
among the Arctic economies. The Arctic regions 
of the ECONOR project largely comply with this 
definition, however the Canadian region of Nunavik 
is left out because Nunavik is part of Quebec and 
lacks official regional accounts4 (Figure 3.1). 
Box 3.1. The harmonisation of economic values across regions
In the national statistics the figures of gross regional 
product (GRP) and disposable income of households 
(DIH) are expressed in national currencies. Converting 
income in different regions and countries to a single 
currency will not adequately represent the purchasing 
power of income by country (see Box I). Thus GRP and 
DIH are converted to unified purchasing power parity 
(PPP) values and expressed in USD 2018 prices. The 
PPP conversion factors have been taken from OECD 
Statistics. The role of the PPP conversion factors is to 
adjust for differences in  regional purchasing power, 
thus providing a better  indicator of the capacity to 
 consume based on regional price levels while at the 
same time achieving a unified valuation.  However, 
 national PPP conversion factors reflecting national 
price  levels have been used, causing some bias in the 
GRP and DIH values, because the price levels in Arctic 
regions may differ from the country average price 
levels.
Regional accounts for Norway, Sweden, Russia, 
 Greenland and Faroe Islands are available only at 
 current prices. To get the volume growth of the 
 regional economy the GRP of the years 2012-2018 are 
converted into USD 2018 prices by  using the implicit 
price index of the national GDP series.
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Eight countries have regions belonging to the 
Arctic economies: United States, Canada, Denmark, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. 
Greenland and Faroe Islands are represented in 
the table alongside Arctic states corresponding to 
their extensive Self-Governance Rule within the 
Realm of Denmark. Greenland and Faroe Islands 
have Self-Governance in most policy areas, includ-
ing management of natural resources. However, 
foreign policy and security issues are a Danish 
competence area.
The overview presented below illustrates regional 
indicators on land, population and economic 
activity in terms of Gross Regional Product (GRP). 
Further, Disposable income of households (DIH) 
per capita is included to indicate economic welfare 
of the populations living in the arctic regions. 
While GRP indicates the total value of goods and 
services, household disposable income repre-
sents the value of private household’s incomes 
from wages, net interest and dividends, plus net 
 transfers from other sectors. The majority of 
transfers to households from other sectors are 
payments from governments as pensions and 
social security. Transfers from households to other 
sectors are  essentially taxes paid to governments.
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The people in the Arctic have strong traditions and 
rich opportunities for living off the land. However, 
the value of hunting, fishing and harvesting for 
own consumption is neither included in GRP nor in 
household disposable income due to lack of data. 
This might represent a bias in the comparison 
between arctic and non-arctic regions within arctic 
states
Note that provision of public services might add 
further to livelihood and welfare but differ among 
the Arctic regions. Governments provide substan-
tial services in education and health care, and total 
value of consumption by households can exceed 
the conventional estimate of household disposable 
income. In a pilot assessment for Northern Canada, 
the disposable income of households including 
these services are estimated (see Box 4.2). 
The data used in this analysis are based mainly on 
the regional accounts of the statistical offices of the 
Arctic countries.
The regional data are converted from local curren-
cies to USD in purchasing power parities (PPP). Box 
3.1 explains the reason for using PPP rather than 
market exchange rates when comparing across 
regions and countries and illustrates some of the 
steps that have to be taken when harmonizing the 
valuation of economic data across regions.
An overview of Arctic economies
At circumpolar level the Arctic regions with 0.1 per 
cent of the world population generated as much as 
0.7 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) 
in 2018. The Arctic covers as much as 8 percent of 
the global surface area.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the role of the Arctic states 
within the entire Arctic region. Russia’s Arctic area 
covers slightly more than half of the total Arctic 
land area. In 2018 the Arctic Russian income (GRP) 
amounts to 73 percent of the total Arctic economy 
and the population share of the Arctic is similarly 
high (69 per cent). Canada has the second largest 
share of the Arctic surface area (29 per cent) but 
has disproportionally low population and a share 
in the economy of the Arctic at 2 per cent. 
The second largest economy is Alaska with some-
what less than 10 per cent of the Arctic GRP. Only 
minor shares of arctic land are left for the other re-
gions, with Greenland as the largest, covering 3 per 
cent of arctic land with its ice-free area. Iceland and 
the Arctic regions in Norway, Sweden and Finland 
all have small shares of the arctic territory but their 
shares of arctic population and GRP are relatively 
larger.
Russia, Fenno-Scandinavia and Iceland have 
higher shares of Arctic population than of land 
Figure 3.2. Arctic surface area, population and GRP of 
Arctic states as share of the Arctic total. 2018. 
Per cent
Per cent















Figure 3.3. Arctic region share of surface area, population 
and GRP of corresponding country. 2018. Per 
cent
Per cent
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area.  Russia has a slightly higher share of Arctic 
GRP than of population, whereas Arctic regions 
of Fenno-Scandinavia and Iceland all have lower 
shares of Arctic GRP than of population. Arctic 
Canada is so sparsely populated that its shares in 
Arctic population and GDP are dwarfed when com-
pared with the share of Arctic Canada´s territory.
Figure 3.3 looks into the position of arctic regions 
within their respective Arctic state. The Arctic re-
gions Greenland and Faroe Islands are represented 
in the table alongside Arctic states corresponding 
to their extensive Self-Governance Rule within the 
Realm of Denmark. Greenland and Faroe Islands 
have Self-Governance in most policy areas, includ-
ing management of natural resources. However, 
foreign policy and security issues are a Danish 
competence area. 
The Russian Arctic has a higher share of Russia’s 
GDP than of population, whereas Northern Fin-
land and Arctic Norway generate smaller shares 
of national GDP than their shares in populations. 
In  Sweden the arctic shares of national popula-
tion and GDP are fairly equal. For Canada and the 
United States the non-Arctic economies and popu-
lations are totally dominating.
Population
During 2012-2018 the Arctic population as a whole 
has remained stable (Figure 3.4). The Russian Arctic 
with by far the largest population among Arctic 
regions had a decline of about 0.6 per cent. Green-
land was the only other region with population 
decline (1.5 per cent). Their declines were balanced 
over the Arctic by the increase in population in all 
other Arctic regions. Behind Iceland with 9 per cent 
growth, Northern Canada followed suit with 8 per 
cent growth during 2012-2018. In Arctic Sweden 
the population increased by 2 per cent whereas 
Alaska showed minor population growth of 0.6 per 
cent over the period. 
The largest population increase of 9 per cent in 
Iceland is a result of generous policy towards 
families with children. In European context, Iceland 
had a relatively high total fertility rate of 1.7 in 
2018. However, the trend is falling after a relatively 
stable period 1990-2010.5 Total fertility rate, or the 
number of children per woman in childbearing age, 
continued a declining trend only interrupted by an 
increase at the time of the financial crisis, of 2.2 in 
2009. The share of women employed was nearly 80 
per cent in 2016, and almost all children are in day-
care (90 per cent).
Arctic Norway, supposed to have similar day-care 
and employment opportunities for women has a 
Figure 3.5. Population growth by Arctic region. 2012-2018. 
Per cent
Per cent


























Figure 3.4. Population growth. Arctic and non-Arctic 
regions by country. 2012-2018. Per cent
Per cent















The Economy of the North 2020 – ECONOR 2020 Comparative analysis of Arctic economies
much lower population growth than Iceland. This 
indicates that there is still limited opportunities for 
jobs and day-care in the Artic region as the popula-
tion in Northern Norway is spread along the coast 
and in smaller inland communities, imposing high 
costs on services. In contrast, in Iceland the major-
ity of the population lives in or around the capital 
of Reykjavik and can benefit from the centralized 
services. 
Among Arctic states, all had higher population 
growth in non-Arctic regions, except Canada.
Figure 3.5 shows population growth during 2012-
2018 by Arctic sub-region, revealing substantial 
variation in population development within Arctic 
regions. In Arctic Russia the only sub-regions with 
population growth were the petroleum-rich re-
gion of Khanty-Mansii (6 per cent) and to a much 
smaller extent, in Sakha and Yamal-Nenets. Other 
Arctic Russian sub-regions faced population decline 
of 2.7-6.7 per cent, with the largest decline in 
Magadan.
Most Arctic regions in Western Europe had in-
creasing populations. In Finland, however, only 
Northern Ostrobothnia, housing the knowledge 
center Oulu, had population growth, in contrast to 
declines in Lapland and above all, in Kainuu (5.6 
per cent). Other Fenno-Scandinavian sub-regions 
had population growth in the range of 2.1-4.9 per 
cent,  except Norrbotten in Sweden with a marginal 
growth of 0.7 per cent. 
Dependency ratio
A useful socio-economic indicator is the economic 
dependency ratio, which is the number of  persons 
unemployed or outside the labour force per em-
ployed person. The persons outside the labour 
force include children, elderly, disabled, students, 
unemployed, and, especially relevant in the Arctic, 
people involved in the informal subsistence econ-
omy.
Factors that increase the dependency ratio can 
be high population growth, with many children to 
support, or low population growth with an  ageing 
population. Unemployment also increases the 
dependency ratio. A large migrant workforce, for 
instance temporarily or seasonally employed in 
resource extraction with their families outside the 
region, tends to reduce the dependency ratio.
Figure 3.6 shows that in USA, Canada and Russia 
the Arctic regions have lower dependency ratios 
than their non-Arctic regions. The use of seasonal 
Figure 3.6. Dependency ratio in Arctic and non-Arctic 
regions, by country. 2018. Per cent
Per cent













Figure 3.7. Dependency ratio, by Arctic sub-region. 2012 
and 2018. Per cent
Per cent





























Comparative analysis of Arctic economies The Economy of the North 2020 – ECONOR 2020
and migrant labour in petroleum and mining 
 industries may explain the low dependency ratios 
of these regions. The difference between arctic and 
non-arctic regions is particularly large in Northern 
Canada. Arctic regions of Finland, Sweden and 
Norway all have higher dependency ratios in arctic 
regions than in non-Arctic parts of the countries. 
However, the differences for Norway and Sweden 
are less pronounced than for Finland, which has 
the highest dependency ratio among all arctic and 
non-arctic regions, followed by Greenland. 
The dependency ratios in 2012 and 2018 in Arctic 
sub-regions are shown in Figure 3.7. For under-
standing the factors behind the differences of 
dependency ratios, more detailed statistics on the 
population age structure etc. would be needed.
The main petroleum producing regions Alaska, 
Khanty-Mansii and Yamal-Nenets, have fairly low 
dependency ratios, indicating use of seasonal/tem-
porary labour. So is the case with the Northwest 
Territories of Canada with diamond production. 
However, in all these sub-regions, the dependency 
ratio has been increasing during 2012-2018.
In 2018 the highest dependency ratio is found in 
Northern Ostrobothnia, with 1.3 additional per-
sons to support for every employed person. Then 
follows Nunavut, Lapland, Karelia, Arkhangelsk 
and Komi, the latter at par with Greenland. For 
the Arctic as a whole, there is a small increase in 
dependency ratio from 2012 to 2018. There is a 
marked increase in all Arctic Russian sub-regions, 
with the exception of Sakha, where there is a 
negligible change. The trend in Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, Iceland, Faroe Islands and Greenland is 
the opposite, all reducing their dependency ratios. 
Nunavut is the only North American arctic region 
which reduced its dependency ratio. 
The economies of the Arctic
Figure 3.8 shows GRP per capita of Arctic regions 
and non-Arctic counterparts in 2018. For the Arctic 
as a whole GRP per capita is larger in arctic than in 
the non-arctic regions. This aspect is clearly visible 
in the mineral exporting arctic regions of Russia, 
Canada and the USA. In Northern Russia with its 
huge petroleum and other mineral production the 
GRP per capita is more than three times that of the 
non-Arctic level in 2018. Canada has the highest 
GRP per capita among the Arctic regions, closely 
followed by Alaska and Northern Russia. Iceland 
and Faroe Islands achieve levels of GRP per capita 
at about the average of the Arctic, with fisheries 
as an important industry. Arctic Norway generates 
less value added per capita than these fish based 
economies and less than the non-arctic part of 
Norway. Norway has a substantial petroleum pro-
duction but mainly in non-Arctic regions. Although 
there is petroleum production in the arctic region, 
Figure 3.8. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita, by 
Arctic region. 2018. 1 000 USD-PPP
1 000 USD-PPP













Figure 3.9. Disposable income of households per capita, by 
Arctic region. 2018. 1 000 USD-PPP
1 000 USD-PPP
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Finland, Sweden and Norway all have about similar 
levels of DIH per capita. The overview clearly shows 
how GRP per capita differentials are not directly 
reflected in DIH per capita which are much more 
evenly distributed although wide differences in 
mineral based income occur. 
Figure 3.11 gives an overview of real economic 
growth by regions, in terms of average yearly 
percentage growth in GRP measured in purchas-
ing power parities (GRP-PPP). At circumpolar level 
the growth rate of Arctic regions (0.8 per cent) 
has been markedly lower than in the non-Arctic 
 regions of the Arctic states (2.2 per cent). The high-
est growth occurred in Faroe Islands and Iceland 
with 6.5 and 4.3 per cent annual growth, respec-
tively, both benefiting from increasing fish prices. 
Canada had the highest arctic growth rate after 
Faroe  Islands and Iceland. Northern Canada, Arctic 
Norway and Arctic Finland had stronger growth in 
Arctic than non-Arctic regions.
Arctic Sweden grew less than half the rate of 
 non-arctic Sweden. Except in fisheries intensive 
regions of Faroe Islands and Iceland, the regions 
roughly had 1-2 per cent annual growth. Alaska 
was the only region with a yearly decline of 1.3 per 
cent. 
At sub-regional level, Khanty-Mansii and Alaska 
both experienced annual average reductions in 
Figure 3.11. Average annual economic growth of Arctic and 
non-Arctic regions, by country. 2012-2018. Per cent
Per cent













Figure 3.10. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita and 
disposable income of households (DIH) per 
capita, by Arctic sub-regions. 2018. 1 000 
USD-PPP
1 000 USD-PPP




























this extraction takes place offshore and the income 
is by statistical convention assigned to a virtual 
“region”.
Figure 3.9 shifts the focus from GRP or value 
generation at regional level to the actual income 
of people living in the Arctic, as indicated by the 
disposable income of households (DIH) per capita, 
which represents per capita income adjusted for 
taxes and transfers.
On average for the Arctic, DIH is substantially 
higher in non-Arctic regions. In contrast, the three 
dominating mineral producers – Alaska, Canada 
and Russia – have higher DIH per capita in Arctic 
than in non-Arctic regions. Note that Alaska’s DIH 
per capita is supported by the annual per capita 
contributions from the Alaska Permanent Fund 
(see Box 4.2). Greenland has the lowest disposable 
income level among arctic regions.
Figure 3.10 compares GRP per capita and DIH per 
capita, in Arctic sub-regions. Alaska has the  highest 
DIH per capita followed by Chukotka, Yamal-
Nenets, Yukon and Northwest Territories. Arctic 
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GRP by 1.1 and 1.4 per cent respectively (Figure 
3.12). This is mainly due to the decline in oil prices 
around 2015. Komi had an even more rapid decline 
(3 per cent) whereas all other regions had positive 
growth rate, with Nunavut at 5 per cent annual 
growth, second highest growth rate after Faroe 
Islands.
The growth in Northern Canada was unevenly 
 allocated among sub-regions, with high growth 
above all in Nunavut with Northwest Territories 
and Yukon markedly below. In Arctic Finland, 
 Lapland showed relatively strong growth of about 
3.2 per cent per year, whereas the region of North-
ern Ostrobothnia kept an annual growth of only 0.6 
per cent, surpassed by Kainuu with a growth rate 
of 0.8 per cent. 
Figure 3.12. Average annual economic growth, by Arctic 
sub-region. 2012-2018. Per cent 
Per cent
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Box III. Considerations When Evaluating Gross Domestic Product Estimates for Arctic Regions
   
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the total value of final goods and services1 produced within a region 
during a specified time period. It is one of the important measures of the level of economic activity in a 
region, along with employment and personal income. 
GDP is a measure of how much output a region produces as well as how much income it generates 
from that production. For this reason GDP is equivalent to Value Added (VA), defined as the economic 
contribution to goods and services production at each step in the production process by the factors of 
production mostly labor and capital. Since the sum of value added equals both the value of output 
and the income to factors of production, total income equals total output. 
The international standard for measuring GDP is established in the System of National Accounts 
(SNA93) prepared by representatives of the International Monetary Fund, European Union, Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development, United Nations, and World Bank. The rules and 
measures for the measurement of national  accounts are designed to be flexible, to allow for differ-
ences in local statistical needs and conditions.2 GDP statistics are available for most countries and are 
commonly used to track and compare economic performance. 
GDP is generally measured in the local currency, and so to compare the economic activity or perfor-
mance between different countries requires that the GDP in each country be converted to a com-
mon base, typically using either the currency exchange rate or the purchasing power parity exchange 
rate. The choice depends on the objective of the comparison. The former compares the international 
purchasing power of different economies. The latter is a better measure of the domestic purchasing 
power of the average producer or consumer within the countries. Some implications of this choice with 
relevance for The Economy of the North are discussed in Box I. 
Analysts using GDP as a measure of economic performance for a country need to keep in mind that it 
has a  number of well-known shortcomings including:
1. Non-market transactions (child rearing, homemaker production, etc.) are generally excluded. 
2. Measurement does not distinguish between what are considered economic “goods” and “bads”.  
For example the response after an environmental disaster would increase GDP. 
3. The value of leisure and other aspects of the quality of life are excluded. 
4. The sustainability of production is ignored. 
5. The distribution of income across the population is not measured.
In many countries GDP is also calculated at a regional level, allowing comparisons between regions 
within a country as well as between regions in different countries. These comparisons need to recog-
nize certain features of regional GDP calculations, particularly when the regions are small and remote.
1. Residency GDP is a measure of the value of production within a region, regardless of the resi-
dence of the labor or the residence of the owner of the capital used in production. A companion 
measure at the national level, Gross National Product (GNP), measures the value of production by 
the residence of the owners of the labor and capital used in production, wherever that production 
takes place, but there is no comparable figure at the regional level, at least in the United States.  
 
This can be a problem when using GDP as a measure of the income of a small and remote regional 
economy. A significant share of the work force could consist of commuters or seasonal workers 
who live outside the region. A large share of the capital could be owned by non-residents and the 
profits from production could leave the region. Under these conditions the income accruing to the 
residents of the regional economy would be less than the value of production measured by GDP.  
 
The opposite is also possible. The state of Alaska controls a large investment fund, the Alaska 
 Permanent Fund, with a portfolio of investments almost entirely outside the state. Each year the 
Fund generates several billion dollars of income that is not included in Alaska GDP because the 
production associated with those investments occurs outside the state. 
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Box III. Considerations When Evaluating Gross Domestic Product Estimates for Arctic Regions
   
2. Federal Assistance—A remote rural region of a national economy may be dependent upon assis-
tance from the central government to pay for and provide public services, over and above the level 
that taxes from the region to the central government can provide. In such a case the GDP, which 
generally includes all public sector spending in the region, will be an overestimate of the produc-
tive capacity of the region itself by the amount of the «subsidy». For example, an increase in central 
government spending in the region would increase GDP, even though it would not represent an 
increase in productive capacity of the resources in the region.
3. Location of Production—When production of some output involves inputs located in more than 
one region it can be difficult to allocate the share of value added attributable to each region. For 
example, oil production on Alaska’s North Slope depends on the inputs physically located in Alaska, 
but also on capital and labor inputs located in the headquarters offices of the oil companies outside 
the state. Allocating economic rents (the value of output in excess of that required to compensate 
capital and labor) between regions in this case will be somewhat arbitrary.  
 
Production may occur in one region and be reported in another. A share of the seafood harvested 
in the ocean adjacent to Alaska is done by boats headquartered outside the state. The value of that 
harvest is reported in the GDP of other regions. 
4. Valuing Subsistence Activities—A share of the population in many remote rural regional econo-
mies engages in productive activities outside normal economic markets, such as the subsistence 
activities of  Indigenous  Peoples. The valuation of these subsistence activities can be handled in 
several different ways in the GDP  accounts. They may be excluded altogether as is the case in the 
United States. If they are included, there may be differences in the types of activities included. 
 Placing a value on subsistence activities can be done in  different ways. For example, the value of 
output of subsistence activities can be determined by comparison to similar items that have market 
prices (replacement value), by valuing the outputs at the cost of the inputs used in subsistence, or 
by  imputing a value using a “willingness to pay” measure. 
5. Price Variation Small remote regional economies may be dominated by a limited number of 
primary commodity producing industries. The value added in the production of those commodities 
can be quite volatile from year to year because of volatility in their market prices. The Alaska GDP is 
heavily influenced by oil production, and much of the change in GDP from year to year is a result of 
the annual change in the price of oil rather than any change in its physical output.  
 
This volatility means that comparisons with other regions are sensitive to the year in which the 
comparison is made. A comparison when the price of oil is high will indicate a larger Alaska econo-
my relative to other locations than would be the case of a comparison when the price of oil is low. 
6. Data o ection Di cu ties—The small size of regional economies results in less precision in 
estimates of GDP based on sampling (due to sampling error). Remoteness can also contribute to 




2 Countries may differ in the types of non-market activities they chose to include in GDP. They also may differ in which prices they 
use to present output figures. Among the alternatives are market prices (including any sales, property, and excise taxes) or factor 
costs (market prices net of taxes which are not a return to a factor of production). This measure is also known as GDP in basic 
prices. 
Scott Goldsmith, Institute of Social and Economic  Research, University of Alaska Anchorage
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Iceberg, Icefjord north of Nuuk, Greenland. Photo: Tom Nicolaysen
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4. Arctic economies within the Arctic nations
Solveig Glomsrød, Taoyuan Wei, Ryan Macdonald, Lars Lindholt, Scott Goldsmith  
and Thórólfur Matthíasson
At a first glance the Arctic seems frozen and firm 
but recent years have shown that the climate as 
well as the economies are in a dynamic mode. 
There is damage to infrastructure as permafrost is 
thawing but also prospects of harvesting potential 
for renewable energy and better communication. 
International markets want high quality seafood 
from clean waters and emerging energy inten-
sive industry knocks on the doors of cool regions. 
Climate change and climate policy have started to 
change the Arctic.
This chapter focuses on the economic structure 
and development within the arctic regions. Most 
of the economies are based on resource export. 
When looking at the price indices of fish, minerals, 
and energy in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 there is reason to 
reflect on how these world market conditions have 
affected the arctic regions during the last years. 
However, new activities have increased their foot-
print in the economic statistics, e.g. wind energy 
and datacenters.
The ECONOR projects have followed the economy 
from 2002 to 2018, capturing peaks and  turbulence 
in world resource prices. The previous version of 
this report – The Economy of the North 2015 – 
 covered the years 2008-2012, capturing the turbu-
lence around the financial crisis and the recovery, 
supported for some time by higher prices on 
energy and minerals. The current report compares 
the situation of 2018 with 2015 levels, the year 
when the prices for energy and other minerals 
dropped drastically and only partly recovered over 
the next years. 
Fish prices (Figure 4.2) show some similarities with 
the development of mineral prices, but enjoyed 
a less volatile increase. In the following presenta-
tion of National Account data and other economic 
statistics it is useful to keep in mind the recent 
resource price development when interpreting 
the results. Note, however, that these world price 
indices do not precisely reflect prices on arctic 
resources as there are variation in resource types, 
species and qualities. Salmon and cod are highly 
priced in international markets.
For each of the Arctic regions this chapter contains 
a core table showing gross regional product (GRP 
or GDP for nations) in current prices (local currency 
basic prices, i.e. net of taxes and subsidies) and 
the contribution to GRP by industry. Standardized 
figures present GRP by main industry category, 
GRP volume index and real growth rate 2000-2018 
(2020) and disposable income of households. 
GRP per capita and DIH per capita are presented 
in purchaser price parities (USD PPP) to facilitate 
comparison among Arctic states. Core tables and 
figures generally refer to the years 2015 and 2018. 
The data for the Arctic regions are based on Na-
tional statistics. Data sources by region are listed in 
Box 4.4.












Commodity Metals Price Index
Commodity Food Price Index
Commodity Fuel (Energy) Price Index
Source: Primary Commodity Price System (PCPS) (01/15/2021)  
https://data.imf.org:443
https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9
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Recreation in Alaska. Photo: Davin Holen
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While Oil and gas declined, Mining (except oil and 
gas) saw a strong growth of almost 40 per cent, 
increasing its share in the economy from 2.5 to 3.3 
per cent. 
The Construction industry declined by 8 per cent, 
reducing its contribution to GRP to 3.9 per cent. 
Factors behind this development are reduced in-
vestments in oil and gas development and a practi-
cally stagnant population limiting the demand for 
housing. Construction was also lower because of a 
slowdown in State of Alaska government spending 
and flat federal spending on construction.
Manufacturing has a modest position in the econ-
omy with a share of 3.6 per cent of total income in 
2018, about the same as in 2015, after an increase 
in Petroleum and coal products manufacturing 
roughly compensated for a decline in Food pro-
cessing, which to a large extent is fish processing. 
Among services, Wholesale and retail trade lagged 
behind the average economy with a growth of less 
than 1 per cent during the period.
After Pipeline transportation the largest activity 
among private services is Real estate activities with 
9.4 per cent of GRP, practically sustaining its share 
over the period. 
Alaska
Alaska has 735 000 inhabitants and about half the 
population lives within the Anchorage region. The 
backbone of the economy is the petroleum indus-
try. However, the giant oil field of Prudhoe Bay on 
the North Slope has long been in the decline phase 
and new fields have not been able to compensate 
for that. Real economic growth rate was negative 
during 2012-2018 and the level of employment 
decreased. 
Table 4.1 shows the industrial structure of the 
economy in 2015 and 2018. The Oil and gas in-
dustry declined by 6.8 per cent over these three 
years whereas the economy as a whole had 4.7 
per cent growth. The Oil and gas industry came 
out as the second largest single activity with 10.6 
per cent of GRP after Public administration and 
defense at 22.8 per cent of GRP. A major factor 
behind the decline in Oil and gas is the drastic 
reduction in exploration drilling and other services 
to oil and gas production, falling by more than a 
third over the period. On the other hand, income 
in Pipeline transportation grew by around 40 per 
cent, increasing its share in GRP from 6.8 per cent 
to 8.4 percent. In 2018 Oil and gas production 
and  Pipeline transportation jointly contributed 19 
per cent to total income, slightly above the 18.7 
per cent in 2015. It might seem that petroleum 
 sustains its position in terms of income genera-
tion. However, these income data are measured 
in basic prices, net of taxes and subsidies and only 
expressing the total return to labour and capital. 
Different  components within the petroleum cluster 
have  different tax/subsidy rates and a reallocation 
among these business components affects the 
level of tax revenue, which has decreased during 
2015-2018.











Agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
hunting  316 0.7  264 0.5
Oil, gas and support activities  5 721 11.9  5 330 10.6
Mining (except oil and gas)  1 202 2.5  1 675 3.3
Utilities  697 1.5  719 1.4
Construction  2 118 4.4  1 943 3.9
Wood products  75 0.2  41 0.1
Food, including seafood  897 1.9  739 1.5
Petroleum and coal products  587 1.2  806 1.6
Other manufacturing  223 0.5  232 0.5
Wholesale and retail trade  2 870 6.0  2 897 5.8
Pipeline transportation  3 271 6.8  4 216 8.4
Other transportation  2 298 4.8  2 308 4.6
Accommodation and food services  1 502 3.1  1 528 3.0
Finance and insurance  1 181 2.5  1 348 2.7
Real estate and rental and leasing  4 514 9.4  4 709 9.4
Public administration and defense  10 426 21.8  11 411 22.8
Educational services  188 0.4  199 0.4
Health care and social assistance  3 643 7.6  4 239 8.5
Other service activities  6 145 12.8  5 537 11.0
Total  47 874 100.0  50 139 100.0
1 At basic prices net of taxes and subsidies.
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Other services, containing information services 
and scientific and administrative services, de-
clined partly due to a drop in business services 
(legal, accounting, etc.) stemming from the general 
slowdown of the economy. An increase in tourism 
prevented a stronger decline in Accommodation 
and food services from the general slowdown of 
the economy. On the other hand, Finance and in-
surance showed three times stronger than average 
growth.
Public administration increased at twice the rate of 
the economy at large, mainly due to rising Federal 
civilian services and State and local services, in-
creasing its share in the economy from 21.8 to 22.8 
percent. Education sustained its share of GRP (0.4 
per cent), whereas Health care and social services 
increased markedly by 16 per cent, well above the 
growth in GRP, as a response to the rising number 
of seniors 65 years plus and an example of the 
economic diversification in the wake of this demo-
graphic change. 
Economic growth
Population growth can work as a driver of 
 economic growth as well as being a result of a 
booming economy. These mechanisms related 
to economic growth now seem to be reversed in 
Alaska. Exploration at the huge Prudhoe Bay oil 
field and the construction of the Alaska pipeline 
generated a large inflow of young working age 
people and the economic boom sustained popu-
lation growth. Hence, the population has been 
young for a while, however, the population has 
stabilized in recent years and the share of seniors 
is increasing rapidly. The working age population is 
in decline in parallel with the falling trend in the oil 
and gas industry. 
As Alaska is relying on the mineral extraction for 
most of its income, the state is sensitive to shifts 
in global demand and business cycles in general. 
As shown in Figure 4.3 the economy was in steady 
or high growth towards 2009, except in 2003 and 
2008. From 2009 real growth was more unstable 
and a declining trend took over from 2012, involv-
ing a yearly reduction of 1.4 per cent on average in 
real GRP towards 2018. The shift in growth mode 
points to a structural challenge associated with the 
oil dependency and limited domestic demand from 
a zero-growth population with an increasing share 
of seniors with a relatively high saving rate. A modi-
fying factor is that a rising number of retirees has 
generated an inflow of pension cash transfers from 
outside the state. The cash flow into the state from 
this spending is difficult to estimate but is similar in 
magnitude to the cash flow from tourist visitors to 
the state. Retiree expenditures as well as publicly 
funded health care spending on their behalf has 
become a significant source of economic diversifi-
cation.
Figure 4.4 shows only minor shifts between main 
production sectors. Note that primary production 
is limited to extraction of natural resources and 
harvesting, whereas services to extractive indus-
tries is part of private services. Public civil services 
at all levels increased, whereas private services 
declined. There is also a small decrease in pri-
mary production, as higher than average growth 
in  mining did not compensate for the decline in 
Oil and gas and in Agriculture, forestry, fishing 
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Figure 4.4.  Value added by main industry (at current price). 
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and hunting. Secondary industries decline mainly 
due to lower activity in Construction, and to some 
extent in manufacturing industries.
In 2018 GRP per capita was somewhat higher in 
Alaska than in non-Arctic states of the USA due to 
the high shares of petroleum and mining (Figure 
4.5). Disposable income of households (DIH) per 
capita is also somewhat higher in Alaska, partly 
because there is no state tax on income and partly 
reflecting the higher cost of living and the higher 
wage levels in extractive industries. In addition, 
the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend program 
provides annual cash transfers to each citizen, 
adding to the disposable income level and reduc-
ing income differences, as every person including 
children receives the same amount (see Box 4.1). 
Alaska is the state within USA with the smallest 
income differences.
Royalties and taxes from petroleum industry 
have over the years largely financed the public 
sector and investments in infrastructure. In addi-
tion,  revenues have been set aside in the Alaska 
Permanent Fund. However, with Prudhoe Bay in 
decline and lower oil prices the petroleum income 
falls short of covering the state expenditures to 
the same extent. Foreseeing a situation with less 
petroleum income, the government established 
the Alaska Permanent Fund in 1976 to turn petro-
leum income into a sustained source of income. 
The fund has received 25 per cent of royalties on 
 petroleum production and ended the fiscal year 
2018 with a balance of USD 65 billion, unchanged 
from a year earlier. In 2018 the dividend was USD 
1 600, originally estimated to USD 2 700 but re-
duced by legislative action.1 In 2020 it was down to 
USD 990. The fall in oil prices in 2015 together with 
smaller oil volumes required additional income 
sources to balance the budget. Between 2015 and 
2018 the additional revenue sources used to bal-
ance the state budget came from cash reserves 
outside the Permanent Fund. From the fiscal year 
2018-2019 the Legislature opened up for using 
fund earnings not only for paying dividends but 
also as contribution to state government to sup-
port public services.2 Since then, Permanent Fund 
earnings not allocated to the dividend have been 
used to help pay for government expenditures.
The federal government has been another source 
of income through direct expenditure and trans-
fers to the state government. Direct expenditures 
to federal activity relate to management of public 
lands, services to Alaska natives and military activi-
ties. Direct federal expenditures to Alaska also 
include a large number of programs that trans-
fer money to individuals including social security 
(a retiree pension), Medicare (health care for senior 
citizens), Medicaid (health care for low income 
 persons), and federal employee pensions.
Petroleum
When including shale oil and shale gas Alaska’s 
share of proven US oil and gas reserves is around 
7 and 2 per cent, respectively.3 However, Alaska 
has huge amounts of undiscovered petroleum 
resources amounting to 5 188 Mtoe4 oil and 5 261 
Mtoe gas,5 corresponding to around 30 percent of 
US undiscovered resources. 
Figure 4.5. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita and 
Dis osab e Income for ouseho ds DI  er 
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cfm. Oil price from https://data.imf.org/?sk=388dfa60-1d26-4ade-b505-
a05a558d9a42&sId=1479331931186
Recreation in Alaska. Photo: Davin Holen
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Explorations at Prudhoe Bay, the largest oil field 
in the USA, started in the 1960s and oil came on 
stream in 1977 when the Alaska pipeline was 
opened. Prudhoe Bay peaked in 1988 and the de-
cline of this giant field has not been compensated 
by supply from other fields, reducing the taxes and 
royalties to the state and federal governments. The 
pressure for opening-up new reserves is increas-
ing although lower petroleum prices more recently 
have reduced the incentive to explore, develop, 
and produce. The state has responded by revising 
the production tax (2013) to stimulate petroleum 
activity. At the same time technological advances 
such as coiled tube pipe, horizontal drilling, multi-
ple completions from a single well, 3d seismic, and 
advances in computer simulation capabilities have 
driven down the cost of exploration and produc-
tion.
Exploration activities outside the Prudhoe Bay area 
are in three areas controlled by the federal govern-
ment – Alaska National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to 
the east, National Petroleum Reserve Alaska (NPRA) 
to the west, and the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 
offshore. Development in all these areas has met 
resistance from environmental groups. The Native 
community is divided on questions of development 
as some groups have benefited from past develop-
ment and would stand to gain economically from 
future development. 
The ANWR is the largest remaining wilderness area, 
rich in wildlife and home to the Porcupine caribou 
sustaining the livelihood of the Gwich’in and I u-
piat peoples with ancient relations to the land. 
After many years of advocacy by the state, the 
 federal government opened a portion of ANWR 
for exploration and oil leases were auctioned in 
January 2021. The State of Alaska and two small 
companies were the only bidders, paying a price 
barely above the minimum price per acre set by 
the government and buying only half of the area 
offered for lease.6 As of publication, activity there 
is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Low interest 
might reflect a more risk averse attitude in the 
petroleum industry towards big projects with a 
long-time horizon (see chapter 5). In the current oil 
price regime and with serious global climate policy 
at the gate, oil companies tend to go for fast deve-
lopment of proven reserves in other regions of the 
USA. Further, several large banks7 will not finance 
drilling in the area, in support of the native peoples 
and for environmental reasons. 
Bull Moose, Alaska. Photo: Davin Holen
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On the other hand, there have been large discover-
ies in the NPRA by ConocoPhillips and Oil Search 
that would, if successful, reverse the projected 
decline in oil production in Alaska for many years. 
Alaska’s oil production in 2019 was less than a 
quarter of the production in 1988, the year of peak 
production from Prudhoe Bay. 
Currently there is no activity in the Outer Con-
tinenetal Shelf since Shell left. Their departure was 
partially due to the high cost of exploration and 
development in such an environmentally challeng-
ing region.
Other minerals
The value added in other mining than petroleum 
increased markedly from 2015 to 2018 (Table 4.1) 
and the dominant minerals in terms of production 
value are zinc and gold (Figure 4.7). The produc-
tion value of zinc increased markedly from 2016 to 
2018, whereas the value of gold production de-
clined. The production values of silver and lead are 
lower and relatively stable. In comparison to gold 
and zink the production values of industrial and 
other minerals are marginal.
Fisheries
The harvest, primarily of salmon, halibut, shellfish, 
and groundfish, is taken partially by Alaska resi-
dents but also by boats based in other ports along 
the west coast of the USA. Processing of the har-
vest occurs both on shore in Alaska and elsewhere 
and on large processing vessels. The fisheries are 
managed to sustain their yield over time, primar-
ily by limiting the number of harvesters and their 
catch. The salmon and shellfish harvests are man-
aged by the state while the halibut and groundfish 
fisheries are managed by the federal government. 
Fisheries employment tends to be stable although 
the value added fluctuates due to price and harvest 
variation from year to year. A long-term challenge 
for this industry is competition from farmed fish.
Tourism
As seen from Table 4.1, petroleum, other mining 
and public services dominate the economy. Other 
industries play minor roles, however, in this picture 
it is easy to forget the role of tourism, which is gen-
erating income in many industries like transporta-
tion, hotels and restaurants etc. Tourism is not an 
industry in national account context, but satellite 
accounts have been developed (see Chapter 7). For 
Alaska a satellite account was developed for 2004. 
An update for 2013 indicates that tourism in Alaska 
contributed 6.9 per cent to GRP, and tourism fur-
ther increased by about one percentage-point by 
2017 (see Chapter 7).
Notes
1 Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend amounts by year. https://
pfd.alaska.gov/Division-Info/Summary-of-Applications-and-
Payments
2 Historical Timeline of the Fund and APFC - Alaska Permanent 
Fund Corporation
3 BP (2016).
4 Million tonnes of oil equivalents
5 USGS (2008)
6 The Economist January 9th 2021.
7 Wall Street backs away from Arctic drilling amid Alaska political 
heat  Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-oil-
alaska-idUSKBN20Q0H2











Source: Table 11. Athey, J.E., and Werdon, M.B., 2019, Alaska s mineral in-
dustry 2018: Alaska Division of Geological & Geophysical Surveys Special 
Report 74. http://doi.org/10.14509/30227
 
Box : he A aska ermanent und and the ermanent und Dividend
Scott Goldsmith,University of Alaska at Anchorage
The Alaska Permanent Fund is a sovereign wealth fund 
of the state of Alaska established in 1976 by a vote of 
the people to preserve the wealth from petroleum pro-
duction on public lands for future generations. Since its 
inception about 18 percent of petroleum revenues have 
been deposited into the fund either as constitutionally 
required contributions or special legislative appropria-
tions of windfalls. The legislature has also added to the 
principal to offset the effects of inflation on its value. 
Today the fund has a balance of USD 65 billion,1 about 
USD 85 thousand per capita. 
The fund portfolio is invested in a broad range of non 
Alaskan income producing assets ranging from bonds 
to real estate. It generates annual income after inflation 
of more than USD 3.0 billion. These earnings can be 
spent at the discretion of the legislature, but spending 
of the principal is prohibited by the constitution.
 Since 1982 about half the fund earnings have been 
used to pay an annual dividend, the Alaska Permanent 
Fund dividend, to every Alaska resident. In this way 
all residents have been able to share directly in the 
petroleum wealth. The dividend has ranged in size 
from USD 331 to 2072 as the fund has grown. The total 
amount distributed as dividends each year represents 
a significant share of household income for many 
Alaskans. Since its inception the cumulative Permanent 
Fund dividends have been USD 66 thousand (2020 
USD) per person. Fund income not appropriated to the 
dividend (or inflation proofing) has, until recently, been 
reinvested. 
The Permanent Fund has successfully transformed a 
portion of state non-sustainable petroleum revenues 
into a sustainable financial asset that can produce 
an annual flow of income for future generations of 
Alaskans. By diverting a portion of current petroleum 
revenues from the annual budget cycle, it has also 
helped to constrain the growth of public spending and 
moderated the economic cycles generated by price 
sensitive fluctuating oil revenues. The current success 
of the fund can be attributed to a number of factors. 
First, management of the fund is largely independent 
of the other branches of government. The governing 
corporation has a clearly defined and narrow purpose 
which is to manage the portfolio to generate income 
for the state. It has no role in two challenging  political 
questions how much revenue to extract from the 
 production of petroleum, and how to spend the earn-
ings the fund produces. 
Second, the fund is not a development bank. Alaska has 
collected more oil revenues than originally anticipated 
and has taken advantage of the occasions when rev-
enues were high to create programs that have deflect-
ed pressure on the fund to take on the role of fostering 
economic development through capital investments in 
the state. These programs have included a number of 
agencies--including the Alaska Renewable Resources 
Corporation, Alaska Industrial Development and Export 
Authority (AIDEA), the Alaska Housing Finance Corpora-
tion (AHFC), the Alaska Science and Technology Foun-
dation, the Alaska Energy Authority, and the Alaska 
Aerospace Development Corporation designed to 
promote economic development in the state. Conse-
quently, there has been limited pressure to “put the 
fund to work” building the Alaska economy. 
Third, only about 10 percent of the petroleum revenue 
stream has been constitutionally dedicated to the fund. 
This has left 90 percent for the legislature and gover-
nor to spend on expanded government programs and 
reduced taxes for businesses and households. 
Fourth, there is a continuing perception that the state 
wasted its original bonanza a USD 900 million  bonus 
payment collected from producers in 1968 at a time 
when the state budget was only USD 150 million. 
Consequently, there is pressure to deposit any new 
windfalls into the Permanent Fund, where they will be 
safe from wasteful spending. 
Fifth, the fund has a policy of not investing in Alaska. It 
looks worldwide to build a portfolio to maximize long 
term return on investment adjusted for risk. In this way 
it avoids any political pressure to funnel money into 
particular investments favored by powerful individuals 
or groups or to invest in Alaska projects that produce a 
non-monetary benefit rather than a financial return. 
Sixth, the Permanent Fund corporation is probably the 
most highly respected institution in the state. Opera-
tional transparency adds to confidence in the corpora-
tion. Board meetings are open to the public and held 
in communities throughout the state. The corporation 
publishes a clearly written annual report, produces 
educational materials for Alaskans, and maintains a 
speaker’s bureau. One can access a current list of port-
folio holdings on a daily basis, the value of the fund, 
and detailed minutes of past board meetings from the 
corporation web site. It reports annually to the legisla-
ture. Finally, because Alaska is a small state, the board 
members are widely known in their communities. 
Second guessing the investment decisions of the cor-
poration is not a popular public pastime even in times 
when financial markets are down. The attention of the 
public is concentrated on the issue of how to collect the 
“fair share” of petroleum wealth from the companies 
producing oil in the state (a never ending political de-
bate). Once the wealth has been converted to financial 
assets, the public feels confident that these assets will 
be professionally managed for their benefit. 
And finally, the Permanent Fund dividend has created 
a constituency protecting the fund. (This constituency 
is a proxy for future Alaskans whose voices cannot be 
heard today.) Alaskans have come to expect the annual 
dividend and react very poorly to any suggestions for 
changing the way the Permanent Fund is managed. 
Most Alaskans feel that individuals can benefit more 
from deciding themselves how to spend at least a 
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 portion of the public wealth rather than allowing the 
government to decide on their behalf. And many feel 
that since the oil production is on land owned by the 
state, they have a right, as individuals, to an annual 
dividend payment. 
Although the Permanent Fund has accumulated an 
impressive balance over its 40-year life, looking ahead 
it faces its biggest challenges as Alaska transitions away 
from a petroleum based economy. Alaska has relied 
almost entirely on petroleum revenues to fund govern-
ment (about 90 percent) for 45 years. But now oil 
production is only 25 percent of its 1989 peak level, and 
although rising oil prices offset declining production for 
many years, current oil revenues alone can no longer 
fund public needs. And since the state economy has not 
been able to develop an alternative tax base to replace 
petroleum, earnings of the Permanent Fund will need 
to begin to help funding government. 
This transition from “saving” to “spending” has  created 
two questions that the state has not been able to 
resolve for several years, but answers to which become 
more critical as time passes. 
The first question is how much to draw from the fund 
to spend each year. Most residents recognize the need 
to balance the needs of the current generation with 
future Alaska residents who also have a right to the 
public wealth. However, it is easier to see and politi-
cally tempting to respond to the needs of the current 
generation compared to future Alaskans.
A simple spending rule would impose some discipline 
against the tendency to overspend in the present. Such 
a rule could be based on a percentage of fund value or 
it could be a specific amount adjusted over time based 
on inflation, population, and other variables. But the 
rule should recognize that as long as the state is col-
lecting current petroleum revenues it should continue 
to save a share as it has in the past. So in a transition 
period until there is no petroleum left to produce, 
 saving should continue in the same fashion as the last 
45 years. 
The second question is how much of the annual draw 
to continue to allocate to the dividend and how much 
to make available to fund government spending. 
Unfortunately, a large share of dividend recipients feel 
that the sole purpose of the Permanent Fund is to pay 
the dividend. For them the fund is not a saving account 
but rather an income distribution fund. In fact, many 
Alaskans now incorrectly refer to the fund as the Alaska 
Dividend Fund. 
But maintaining the historical practice of using half 
the earnings of the fund to pay the annual dividend 
while leaving half to pay for government programs has 
led to significant budget shortfalls, covered by draw-
ing down the balances in savings accounts outside the 
Permanent Fund. Now that those balances have been 
depleted, the state must decide among significant cuts 
to public programs, the introduction of new taxes, or a 
reduction in the size of the annual dividend (or perhaps 
all three) to balance the budget.
Unfortunately the easiest option politically might be 
increasing the annual draw from the Permanent Fund 
above the sustainable level. If that were to happen the 
transition from “savings” to “spending” would result in 
the ultimate depletion of the fund with dismal conse-
quences for the ability of the Alaska economy to sustain 
itself. 










The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020 Arctic economies within the Arctic nations
 The Canadian 
North
 
Northern Canada is com-
prised of the three Northern 
Territories, Yukon, Northwest 
Territories and Nunavut. The population of North-
ern Canada in 2018 was 124 thousand people, with 
the population of Northwest Territories being the 
highest and that of Nunavut the lowest. Tradition-
ally, resource extraction has been the major activity 
in the  Canadian North, but over the period from 
2008 to 2017, an important transition took place 
where the central position of resource extraction 
was eclipsed by the Public sector, including public 
administration, health and education. Mining and 
in particular diamond extraction has continued to 
have a strong position in the economy, whereas oil 
and gas production declined to marginal levels in 
2017. 
Economic structure
The two largest industries in Northern Canada 
are Mining and quarrying (excluding oil and gas 
extraction) and Public administration and defense 
(Table 4.2). These industries were roughly equal in 
size in 2017, each constituting close to 20 per cent 
of Northern Canadian GRP. The next three larg-
est industries are Real estate, rental and leasing 
(10.9 per cent), Construction (9.4 per cent) and 
Health care and social assistance (7.8 per cent). The 
contribution of the Oil and gas industry to GRP was 
marginal in 2017, in contrast to its scale a decade 
earlier of about 8 per cent of GRP.1 
Resource extraction has been a feature of Canada’s 
northern economy for centuries and has included 
fishing, hunting and trapping across the north, 
whaling in Nunavut, the 1898 Klondike Gold Rush, 
the discovery of oil at Norman Wells in the 1920s, 
mining for gold, silver, lead, zinc and copper and, 
recently, the discovery of diamonds in the North-
west Territories in the 1990s. Both the Mining 
and the Oil and gas industry have been important 
sources of economic activity for a long time, being 
major determinants of migration from southern 
regions and of exports from Northern Canada.
However, resource extraction has declined as a 
share of economic activity in Northern Canada in 
recent years. In 2008, during the 2007-2009 global 
recession, Mining and Oil and gas extraction to-
gether constituted 28.8 per cent of Northern Cana-
dian GRP.2 At this time, it was the largest source of 
economic activity in the region. The recession saw 
rapid declines in commodity prices, particularly for 
oil and gas. As the global economy and commod-
ity prices recovered, the share of Mining in GRP 
approached its pre-crisis level by 2017. In contrast, 
the Oil and gas industry entered a state of steady 
decline even as the global economy expanded. On 
top of this, the production was hard hit as an oil 
pipeline was shut and reduced supply markedly, 
so that petroleum income contributed negligibly 
(0.1 per cent) to GRP in 2017. The declining trend 
reflects both weakness in commodity prices in later 
years and shrinking production (Figures 4.11-4.13).
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Agriculture, forestry and logging 24.7 0.3 27.2 0.3
Fishing, hunting and trapping 7.9 0.1 25.7 0.3
Oil and gas extraction 143.2 1.5 7.6 0.1
Mining and quarring 1 601.5 16.8 2 023.8 19.8
Electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution 156 1.6 151.5 1.5
Natural gas distribution, water 27.3 0.3 29.2 0.3
Construction 969.3 10.2 964.8 9.4
Manufacturing 48.2 0.5 44.8 0.4
Wholesale trade 176.2 1.9 209.6 2.0
Retail trade 428.7 4.5 434.1 4.2
Transportation and warehousing 435.3 4.6 407.5 4.0
Information and cultural 
industries 235.4 2.5 311 3.0
Finance and insurance 242.4 2.5 244.6 2.4
Real estate and rental and 
leasing 1 035.3 10.9 1 114.2 10.9
Professional, scientific and 
technical services 224.8 2.4 208.9 2.0
Management of companies and 
enterprises 54.3 0.6 32.8 0.3
Administrative and support, 
waste management 159.9 1.7 155.9 1.5
Educational services 603.9 6.3 626.5 6.1
Health care and social assistance 710.1 7.5 799.7 7.8
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 25.8 0.3 31.2 0.3
Accommodation and food 
services 200.7 2.1 234.2 2.3
Other services (except public 
administration) 121.1 1.3 132.2 1.3
Public administration 1 887.4 19.8 2 010.6 19.7
Total 9 516.5 100.0 10 224.7 100.0
1 At basic prices net of taxes and subsidies.
Economic growth
Current dollar measures of GRP allow for examina-
tions of the composition of the northern economy 
across industries and sectors but can present less 
than ideal measures of economic growth because 
price changes can obscure changes in scale of 
production. To account for this, measures of real 
GRP remove the effect of price changes, allow-
ing for a more appropriate measure of growth in 
economic volume. However, measures of real GRP 
are typically not comparable based on their level 
values and are presented as indexes or growth 
rates. And, often, real GRP measures are examined 
over longer periods to help mitigate the effects of 
year-to-year fluctuations when looking at longer 
term trends. 
Between 2000 and 2019, Northern Canada’s real 
GRP increased by an average of 2.5 per cent per 
year with the fastest growth occurring in the early 
2000s and in 2007 as a result of rapid increase in 
the diamond industry (Figure 4.8, Figure 4.11). Con-
sistent with the global recession occurring at the 
time, the Northern Canadian economy contracted 
in 2008 and 2009, and also had weak years in 2011, 
2015 and 2019. The weak years held back growth 
so that from 2008 to 2017 the average annual 
growth rate was 1.3 per cent. This is roughly half 
the growth rate of the overall period.
Primary or extractive industries increased from 
2015 to 2017, mainly driven by a marked increase 
in Mining (excluding oil and gas), and also support-
ed by Fishing, hunting and trapping, which tripled 
its modest contribution to regional GRP (Table 4.2, 
Figure 4.9). Within secondary industries, Construc-
tion and Manufacturing both declined somewhat. 
Construction represents a considerable share of 
the total economy (9.4 per cent). Manufacturing 
is, however, a minor industry with only 0.4 per 
cent of GRP in 2017. The largest single activities 
in Manufacturing are chemical industry and food 
 processing. 
Public services sustained its role in the economy, 
whereas private services slightly declined. Retail 
trade and Transportation, in particular pipeline 
transportation, contributed to this decline.
While GRP indicates the total value of goods and 
services, household disposable income represents 
the value of private household’s incomes from 
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Figure 4.9.  Value added by main industry. Arctic Canada. 
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Figure 4.10. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita and 
Dis osab e Income of ouseho ds DI  er 















 employment and self-employment, net interest 
and dividend income, plus net transfers from other 
sectors. The majority of transfers from other sec-
tors are payments from governments as pensions 
and social security. Transfers made to other sec-
tors are essentially taxes paid to governments.
GRP per capita and household disposable income 
per capita in Northern Canada are both higher 
than in Southern Canada (Figure 4.10). In 2018, 
GRP per capita in Northern Canada was 75 000 
USD-PPP, which was 50 per cent higher than GRP 
per capita in Southern Canada. This partly reflects 
price differentials and partly differences in industry 
structures. Prices for goods and services in North-
ern Canada can be higher than in Southern Canada 
due to extended transport distances as well as 
more limited infrastructure. This is particularly the 
case for Nunavut where communities are not con-
nected by all-weather roads. Further, the Northern 
Canadian economy is also more concentrated in 
mineral extraction and public services provision 
than the south, both activities with relatively high 
wage rates. 
Household disposable income at 30 000 USD-PPP 
in Northern Canada in 2018 was also higher than in 
the south, but not by the same extent as GRP per 
capita. In 2018, Northern Canadian household dis-
posable income per capita was 17 per cent higher 
than in Southern Canada (26 000 USD-PPP). Be-
sides disposable income, households also benefit 
from public services through education and health, 
An example of adjusting the DIH for public services 
is shown for Northern Canada in Box 4.2. 
As with GDP per capita, the relatively higher values 
for Northern Canada result from relatively higher 
prices as well as a different industry structure from 
Southern regions. 
Petroleum and mining
Canada produces lots of oil and gas, but little in the 
Arctic. There is however, some oil production in the 
Northwest Territories
The volume of oil production (Figure 4.12) and 
natural gas production (Figure 4.13) in Northern 
Canada have been in decline for most of the 21st 
century. The declining output volumes mean that 
for oil and gas extraction to maintain its share of 
economic activity, the price of oil and gas needs 
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Box 4.2: Adjusting Disposable income for 
subsistence production and consumption of 
public services
Household disposable income per capita is often used 
as an approximate measure of household material 
well-being because it represents, on average, how 
much consumption persons within a region can un-
dertake without having to sell assets or take on debt. 
However, household disposable income measures do 
not take into account subsistence activities, which can 
be an important source of food in remote northern 
communities. And, where governments provide 
important services, particularly education and health 
care, the total value of consumption undertaken by 
households can exceed the privately received dispos-
able income. This occurs either when the taxes used 
to pay for government provided services such as 
health and education are raised from businesses, or 
when transfers from a different jurisdiction are used 
to support government programs.
Estimates for the value of subsistence activities in 
Northern Canada are not available, but it is pos-
sible to account for the difference in consumption 
levels due to government provided services. To do 
so, a measure called adjusted household disposable 
income that takes into account in-kind transfers from 
government can be calculated. This raises the value 
of household income and household consumption 
equally. On a per-capita basis, adjusted household 
disposable income was CAD 62 298 in Northern 
Canada 2017, about 50 per cent higher than the 
CAD 41 354 adjusted household disposable income 
in Southern Canada, and similar to the size of the 
difference in GRP per capita between Northern and 
Southern Canada
Conventional and adjusted Disposable Income of 


















Notes: Gross regional product is measured at market prices to enable 
consistency with household sector estimates. 
Other charts and tables use measures of Gross domestic product at 
basic prices
to increase to offset the reductions in production. 
During the early years of the 2000s, rising com-
modity prices buoyed current dollar measures 
of oil and gas extraction in GDP. However, as the 
commodity boom ended, and as commodity prices 
cycled down, the value of oil and gas extraction in 
Northern Canada declined. 
From 2016 to 2018, the Norman Wells Oil Pipeline 
was shut because of safety concerns, and as a 
result, production at Norman Wells was suspended 
and Arctic Canadian oil supply almost came to a 
halt, as is visible from the marginal level of income 
in Oil and gas in 2017 (Table 4.2).
In 2016, the federal government announced that 
Canadian Arctic offshore, including areas offshore 
of Northwest Territories, is indefinitely off limits to 
new offshore oil and gas licensing to be reviewed 
every five years. The first five-year review is due in 
2021.3
Despite the value of diamond production not 
increasing in over a decade (Figure 4.11), diamonds 
continue to make a major contribution to the 
economy of the Northern Territories. A majority of 
the diamonds mined in Canada are produced in 
the Northwest Territories and the diamond mines 
currently in production in the Northwest Territories 
are characterized by high grade deposits which in-
crease their economic viability. Only a few compa-
nies are processing diamonds in Northwest Territo-
ries and most of the diamonds from the Northwest 
Territories are exported outside Canada as rough 
or un-worked diamonds. This trade constitutes the 
majority of Canada’s trade with the Netherlands 
and is a major determinant of northern export 
performance.
The diamond industry has had a positive impact on 
other sectors in the economy of Northern Canada, 
including exploration, which has been carried out 
to some extent in Nunavut as well as in Northwest 
Territories. Foreign investors generally consider 
Canada, including the Northwest Territories, more 
attractive from both a geopolitical and investment 
risk perspective than many other diamond produc-
ing countries. However, it is expensive to construct 
and maintain diamond mines in the Northwest 
Territories as a number of factors contribute to 
high construction and maintenance costs including 
a harsh climate, transportation on ice roads, and 
environmental commitments.
The territories
The three Northern Canadian Territories combined 
accounted for 0.3 per cent of the total Canadian 
population and 0.5 per cent of Canadian GRP in 
2017. These sparsely populated territories have 
private sector economies that are smaller than 
the provinces of Southern Canada and dispersed 
populations where service delivery is expensive. 
As a consequence, it is challenging for territorial 
governments to raise sufficient revenue through 
taxation to allow for commensurate service levels 
for territorial residents with their southern com-
patriots, and transfers from the Federal Govern-
ment constitute an important source of territorial 
government revenue. In 2017, transfers from the 
Federal Government accounted for 88.3 per cent of 
total public revenues in Nunavut, 80.3 per cent in 
Yukon and 64.8 per cent in Northwest Territories. 
These shares are considerably higher than the 21.2 
per cent average across the provinces of Canada 
(Table 4.3).




Population  39 670  44 890  37 550 
GRP at basic prices (Mill. CAD)  2 780  4 480  2 970 
Real GRP annual growth rate 
2012-2017 0.6 2.2 5.2
Share of Northern Canadian GRP  27.2  43.8  29.0 
Percent of territorial government 
revenue from federal transfers  80.3  64.8  88.3 
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The Northwest Territories has the highest GRP and 
GRP per capita across the territories while  Nunavut 
had the second highest and Yukon the lowest in 
2017. The high GRP of the Northwest Territories 
reflects the high levels of mining, above all of 
 diamonds, and also its oil and gas industry. 
The Public sector has been rising in importance 
over the past decade and is larger than resource 
extraction as a source of economic activity in the 
Northern Canadian economy in 2017. The Public 
sector is a special aggregation of Public administra-
tion and defense as well as the publicly provided 
portion of economic activity from other industries, 
such as Education and Health care and social as-
sistance. Together, the Public sector accounted 
for 33.6 per cent of Northern Canadian GRP in 
2017. This makes the Public sector larger than any 
individual industry and larger than the entire goods 
producing side of the Northern Canadian economy. 
The provision of public sector services increased 
steadily over time, rising from a share of economic 
activity roughly equal to Mining, quarrying and oil 
and gas extraction in 2008 to become the larg-
est source of economic activity in 2017. Between 
2008 and 2017, the current Canadian dollar value 
added in Mining, quarrying, oil and gas extraction 
declined by an annual average of 1.9 per cent while 
the value added of Public sector increased by 4.6 
per cent per annum. As a result, the contribution 
of Public sector in Northern Canada’s GRP rose by 
6.3 percentage points from 27.3 per cent in 2008 
to 33.6 per cent in 2017. Over the same period, the 
share of GRP from Mining, quarrying and oil and 
gas extraction declined by 8.9 percentage points to 
19.9 per cent in 2017. 
The effect of the transition occurring within North-
ern Canada’s economy is a reorientation of activity 
away from the Business sector to the Public sector. 
The transition resulted from a combination of weak 
growth in Mining, quarrying, oil and gas extraction 
which held back business sector growth, in paral-
lel with strong Public sector growth. In effect, the 
Business sector saw moderate growth, but was hin-
dered by weak growth from resource extraction. 
The public sector expanded at a more rapid rate, 
and this lead to it becoming the central feature of 
the Northern Canadian economy in 2017.




















Source: Natural Resources Canada. Annual Statistics of Mineral 
Production. 
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Source: Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers. 
64
Arctic economies within the Arctic nations The Economy of the North 2020 – ECONOR 2020
the largest industrial growth was in the Mining, 
quarrying and oil and gas extraction combined, 
while in Yukon, the largest industrial growth rate 
came from Information and cultural industries. 
Manufacturing declined in all three territories while 
Public administration, Education and Health care 
and social assistance increased (Figure 4.14). 
Notes
1 Glomsrød, S., G. Duhaime and I. Aslaksen (2017): The Economy 
of the North 2015. Statistics Norway, SA 151
2 Glomsrød, S., G. Duhaime and I. Aslaksen (2017): The Economy 
of the North 2015. Statistics Norway, SA 151
3 Canada Energy Regulator (2020): Provincial and Territorial 
Energy Profiles – Canada, https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/nrg/ntgrtd/
mrkt/nrgsstmprfls/cda-eng.html
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The transition from resource extraction to the pub-
lic sector in Northern Canada is reflected in real 
terms and in current dollar terms. That the change 
occurs in real and current dollar terms indicates 
that the change in the share of activity from Min-
ing, quarrying and oil and gas extraction is not 
due solely to weak mineral and energy prices, but 
suggests a more permanent adjustment is taking 
place.
Across the Northern Canadian economies, Nunavut 
had the strongest growth between 2012 and 2017, 
Northwest Territories the second strongest and Yu-
kon the weakest growth (Table 4.3). The industrial 
growth rates were the strongest on the goods side 
of Nunavut’s economy. For Northwest Territories, 
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Faroe Islands
Faroe Islands is a self-governing nation within the 
Kingdom of Denmark. The Government of the 
Faroe Islands has legislative and administrative 
responsibility in a wide range of areas mentioned 
in the Home Rule Act such as the conservation 
and management of marine resources, protection 
of the environment, continental shelf resources, 
external trade relations, financial policy, business 
regulation, taxation and customs, energy, transport 
communications, emergency preparedness, social 
security, culture, education and research.1 
Faroe Islands had 52 080 inhabitants by  January 
2020 of which 22 000 live in the capital region 
of T rshavn. The livelihood has throughout 
 history been based on the ocean and the marine 
 resources. It still is, and Faroe Islands has built up 
businesses and  expertise within fisheries, aqua-
culture and marine engineering.
Table 4.4 shows GRP or value added by industry 
in 2015 and 2018. Total income of the economy 
 increased by 16 per cent during this period. Income 
in Fisheries also increased but only at half that 
rate, reducing its share of GRP from 12.5 per cent 
in 2015 to 11.7 per cent in 2018. Fisheries and fish 
farming generated 19.2 per cent of total income 
in 2018. In addition to these major contributions 
to GRP the fisheries cluster creates activity and 
gene rate income in Fish processing and marine 
industry. Other manufacturing industries than Fish 
processing increased more than twice the average 
growth in the period. 
Fisheries is the largest single industry in Faroe 
 Islands, but two industries are about to  challenge 
its position. Aquaculture is rapidly growing, 












Fisheries 1 885 12.5 2 040 11.7
Aquaculture 803 5.3 1 310 7.5
Agriculture, mining and quarrying 36 0.2 53 0.3
Manufacture of food products 
and beverages 1 083 7.2 1 027 5.9
Other manufacturing 468 3.1 634 3.6
Electricity, gas and water supply 383 2.5 370 2.1
Construction 839 5.6 1 501 8.6
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels 
and restaurants 1 665 11.1 1 885 10.8
Transportation and storage 1 267 8.4 1 404 8.1
Information and communication 428 2.8 445 2.6
Finance and insurance 553 3.7 538 3.1
Real estate and renting 1 617 10.7 1 541 8.8
Public administration 730 4.8 819 4.7
Education 840 5.6 939 5.4
Health and social work 1 611 10.7 1 906 10.9
Other service activities 847 5.6 1 018 5.8
Total 15 053 100.0 17 429 100.0
1 At basic prices net of taxes and subsidies. 
T rshavn. Photo: sne Vigran
Photo: sne Vigran
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 increasing by 63 percent over the period and with 
a large potential for further growth, in terms of 
natural conditions and market potential based on 
good environmental reputation. The other indus-
try is Construction with the highest growth among 
all industries (79 per cent) during 2015 to 2018. 
The high construction activity is to a large extent 
a result of the largest infrastructure  project so far 
in Faroe Islands. In 2014 the parliament2 decided 
to build subsea tunnels connecting several islands 
and the first tunnel opened in December 2020, 
whereas another tunnel is under construction. This 
infrastructure investment has been a strong driver 
behind growth in Construction during 2015-2018. 
Health and social services increased slightly more 
than the total economy, raising its share in GRP 
from 10.7 to 10.9 per cent in 2018. Education and 
Public Administration increased as well, but some-
what less than the economy at large. 
Real growth has been strong in the period 2013- 
2016 with annual growth rates of 8-9 per cent, 
followed by a moderate 3 and 1.4 per cent growth 
respectively in 2017 and 2018 (Figure 4.15). 
GRP represents total income generated by the 
regional economy and by 2018 the GRP per capita 
was 58 000 USD measured as purchaser price pari-
ties (PPP), which indicates the capacity of the whole 
economy to consume or save. Disposable income 
of households depicts the share of GRP allocated 
to private households after taxes and subsidies 
and represents the maximum level of household 
consumption that is possible without having to 
take up loans or sell assets. In 2018 the disposable 
income of households at 21 000 USD-PPP made up 
36 per cent of GRP (see Figure 4.17).
Natural resources 
Fisheries are the backbone of the economy. I 2020 
export of fish products contributed 92 per cent to 
the total commodities export value. Figure 4.18 
shows development in catches by main species 
during 2008-2018. In recent years, blue whiting 
has been the dominating catch in terms of volume. 
However, catches fell drastically during 2009-2011 
and only reached its former catch level towards 
2014 before increasing further towards 2017-
2018. The dramatic decline was followed up with 
an agreement between the coastal states of EU, 
Norway, Iceland and Faroe Islands on a long-term 
plan to increase the recruitment and re-establish a 
sustainable stock. 
The catch of mackerel was negligible until 2010 
when the species migrated further into  northern 
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Figure 4.16. Value added by main industry. Faroe Islands. 

















Figure 4.17. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita and 
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waters due to a substantial rise in the sea 
 temperature. Catches increased and peaked at 
nearly 150 000 tonnes by 2014, before stabilizing 
somewhat below that level towards 2019. Figure 
4.19 shows the value of fish export by main spe-
cies during 2008-2019. Blue whiting is dominating 
in volume and mainly used for fish meal or fish 
oil, contributing relatively modest to the value of 
fish export. The processing of blue whiting is less 
labour intensive than processing of fish for food, 
and employment in Fish processing industry has 
remained relatively stable through 2015-2019.
Farmed salmon represents by far the largest ex-
port value. Aquaculture is vital in future supply of 
fish products as the potential for wild fish harvest-
ing is limited on a global basis. Being a natural 
feeding ground for the stock of Atlantic salmon, 
the environment of Faroe Islands is well suited for 
fish farming with clean and temperate sea waters 
and sheltered fjords. The main species are Atlantic 
salmon and Rainbow trout. The export value of 
salmon has increased almost every year since 2008 
and contributed 43 per cent to the total export 
value of fish products by 2020, far more than any 
other fish product (figure 4.19). 
The energy system is to a large extent fossil based, 
but the Faroe Islands are developing their potential 
for renewable energy. In 2019, 59 per cent of elec-
tricity was oil based, 27 per cent from hydropower 
and 14 per cent from onshore wind. Onshore wind 
was planned to increase further. However, opposi-
tion was increasing towards further loss of nature 
and attractive landscapes. More recently, plans for 
further investments in onshore wind energy has 
been reoriented from land based to offshore wind 
production, near T rshavn, with capacity to replace 
5 onshore wind farms. The dominant producer of 
electricity is SEV, a company owned by the munici-
palities in Faroe Islands. 
Of total oil consumption the fishing fleet is the 
largest user with 29 per cent, electricity production 
uses 17 per cent and road vehicles 12 per cent. The 
production of wind power increased from 4.2 per 
cent of total electricity production in 2005 to 14 per 
cent in 2019. The government has ambitious goals, 
aiming for 100 per cent green electricity produc-
tion by 2030. The potential for further renewable 
 capacity growth is large, both for wind and tidal 
power.
The first licensing round for petroleum exploration 
in the Faroe Islands was held in 2000. However, 
so far commercially viable discoveries have not 
been made. The Faroese economy has, however, 
benefited from the demand for supply services 
from mechanical industries and transportation 
during exploration activity. The Danish parliament 
decided to halt all new exploration for oil and gas 
in the North Sea and phase out petroleum produc-
tion by 2050. Faroe Islands have self-governance 
in management of natural resources. Faroe Islands 
has signaled that they will continue exploration. 
Significant oil and gas fields have been discovered 
outside the Shetland Islands, only a few kilometers 
from Faroe Island’s maritime border. Faroe Islands 
opened a 5th oil and gas licensing round in 2019 in 
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Arctic Finland
Northern Finland consists of the sub-regions 
Lapland, Kainuu and Northern Ostrobothnia with a 
total population of 662 000 in 2019. The manufac-
turing industry is highly developed and integrated 
in the global economy although the dominance of 
the electronic industry with the large-scale pro-
duction of mobile phones is history. From 2015 to 
2018 GRP increased by 11 per cent. The highest 
growth occurred in Mining and quarrying, raising 
its income by 200 per cent from 2015 to 2018. 
Within manufacturing, Metal industry including 
basic metals and metal products is the most im-
portant activity, contributing 10.4 per cent to GRP 
in 2018 (Table 4.5). However, growth from 2015 
to 2018 was as low as 3.5 per cent, far below the 
average growth of 11 per cent. In contrast, Wood 
and wood products, Paper and printing and Other 
manufacturing saw growth around 25-28 per cent 
during the period. All in all, manufacturing indus-
tries generated 17 per cent of total income in 2018, 
about the level prevailing after the peak level of 
26.6 per cent before the drastic decline in the elec-
tronics industry (see ECONOR III). Among goods 
producing activities we find the production of snow 
mobiles at the factory in Rovaniemi, exporting to 
Nordic regions and Russia.1 
Construction had a larger than average growth, 
raising income by 27 per cent and contributing 8.3 
per cent to GRP in 2018. Utilities containing pro-
duction and distribution of electricity, gas and heat 
and a range of other services increased by 23 per 
cent, twice the growth of the economy at large. 
Trade and Transportation had less than average 
growth, at 6 and 9 per cent respectively. The sector 
Other private services generally had lower growth 
around or below the growth in the economy at 
large, except Accommodation and food services 
and Information and communication. The growth 
in tourism was an important driver behind growth 
in income of hotels and restaurants (see Chapter 
7). There was zero growth in the knowledge-based 
industry of Professional, scientific and technical 
services, reducing its share in GRP from 4.1 to 3.7 
per cent. 












Agriculture and hunting activities 190 1.0 165 0.8
Forestry and fishing 638 3.5 692 3.4
Mining and quarrying 194 1.1 584 2.9
Wood and wood products 178 1.0 222 1.1
Paper and printing industries 321 1.8 408 2.0
Metal industry 2036 11.2 2108 10.4
Other manufacturing 556 3.0 712 3.5
Utilities 598 3.3 735 3.6
Construction 1310 7.2 1669 8.3
Wholesale and retail trade 1323 7.3 1406 7.0
Transportation and storage 783 4.3 853 4.2
Accommodation and food service 
activities 325 1.8 417 2.1
Information and communication 427 2.3 547 2.7
Finance and insurance 322 1.8 340 1.7
Real estate services 278 1.5 291 1.4
Rental and operation of dwellings 2087 11.4 2307 11.4
Professional, scientific and technical 
services 753 4.1 755 3.7
Administrative and support services 512 2.8 580 2.9
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 1375 7.5 1324 6.6
Education 1236 6.8 1238 6.1
Health care and social work services 2221 12.2 2199 10.9
Other service activities 582 3.2 632 3.2
Total 18 243 100.0 20 185 100.0
1 At basic prices net of taxes and subsidies.
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Figure 4.20 shows real growth in GRP during 2000- 
2018 assuming fixed prices, thus reflecting annual 
volume growth rates and the real GRP index. After 
the financial crisis 2008-2009 and the immediate 
bounce back in 2010, the annual growth rate was 
marginal or even below zero until activity picked 
up markedly in 2016 and 2017. The years of low 
growth in particular reflect the downscaling of 
the large electronics industry, mainly related to 
the production of the Nokia mobile phone – the 
flagship of the manufacturing industry. In 2018 
the annual growth rate was positive but marginal. 
Although the electronics industry collapsed with 
the mobile phone production, the industry has 
developed further within electronic network tech-
nology, contributing to high growth (28 per cent) in 
both Information and communication and Other 
manufacturing.
Figure 4.21 shows structural changes in the 
 economy during 2015-2018. The trend has been 
a notable increase in primary or extractive indus-
tries, above all due to the boost in Mining. The 
goods producing secondary industries containing 
Construction and Utilities in addition to manufac-
turing also increased in importance. Both private 
and public services reduced their shares in GRP.
Figure 4.22 compares GRP – total regional income 
– per capita and disposable income of households 
(DIH) per capita in Northern and Southern Finland. 
Both these indicators are lower in the Arctic region 
than in the rest of the country, however, the differ-
ence in DIH per capita between Arctic and non-
Arctic regions is much smaller than the difference 
in GRP per capita. Disposable income per capita in 
Northern Finland in 2018 was 22 000 USD-PPP, cor-
responding to 52 per cent of GRP per capita gener-
ated in the region. In contrast, in 2005 the share of 
DIH in GRP per capita was as high as 64 per cent 
(see ECONOR III).
Disposable income of households is total private 
income adjusted for taxes and transfers/subsidies. 
However, there is reason to assume that with rich 
wildlife outside the door the inhabitants in the 
northern regions have larger income from own 
produce of food from hunting, fishing and harvest-
ing than in the non-arctic regions. However, these 
values are difficult to measure and not included 
in national account data of DIH. Another relevant 
adjustment of the DIH relates to received value of 
in-kind services, for instance as unpaid education 
and health services. By convention these are not 
included either, however, this income flow can be 
estimated. A pilot example of adjusted DIH per 
capita with respect to the value of in-kind services 
like health and  education is presented for Northern 
Canada in Box 4.2.
Minerals2
The mining industries tripled its income from 2015 
to 2018 and a driving force in global markets has 
been demand for metals and minerals used for 
batteries, fuel cells and electronic devices relevant 
for the green transition.
Lapland’s Kemi mine is the only cromite mine in 
the EU. Chromite is used in alloys for hardening 
and corrosion resistance, practically indispensable 
in the production of ferrochromium used in stain-
less steel for construction. 
Figure 4.22. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita and 
Dis osab e Income of ouseho ds DI  Arctic 












Figure 4.21. Value added by main industry. Arctic Finland. 
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In Lapland there is also some nickel production in 
the Kevitsa mine. Nickel is used in chemical and 
aerospace industries and for batteries and fuel 
cells. The Kevitsa mine also extract copper for use 
in construction and electrical and electronic in-
dustries. The mine also produces a small amount 
of palladium, mainly used by the car industry for 
catalytic converters.
There is some gold production in the Kittila Mine in 
Lapland. Gold is used for jewelry and as monetary 
reserves, besides being a catalyst in industrial pro-
cesses. There is a small platinum production in the 
Suhanko mine in Lapland.
Northern Finland has mineral reserves that are 
suitable for emerging industries, however, the 
seemingly empty areas is home to S mi rein-
deer herders and the mining adds to the existing 
 pressure from construction of roads, wind-parks, 
logging, and tourism. 
Energy
In 2018 hydropower dominated electricity supply 
in Kainuu (53 per cent) and Lapland (66 per cent) 
whereas in North Ostrobothnia wind power deliv-
ered 37 per cent of the regional electricity supply, 
slightly more than hydro power (34 percent). Ther-
mal power ranged from18 per cent in each of the 
Kainuu and Lapland regions to as much as a third 
in North Ostrobothnia.3 
The growth in onshore wind power has been 
moderate in comparison to in Northern Sweden.4 
The largest potential is along the west coast and 
offshore, however there is a moderate potential in 
most of the arctic region.5 Wind power investments 
have been encouraged with a feed-in tarif. How-
ever, subsidies are now being phased out. 
In contrast to arctic regions of Sweden and Nor-
way, Northern Finland tends to depend on imports 
of electricity. However, the Hanhikivi 1 nuclear 
power plant in Northern Ostrobothnia commis-
sioned for 2028 will change the energy balance in 
Finland by adding capacity of national electricity 
supply by 10 per cent.6
Tourism
Arctic Finland has specialized in mass tourism at 
compact resorts, like Levi in North Lapland receiv-
ing 750 000 visitors per year, mostly for skiing7. 
There has also been a large increase in visitors in 
the months leading up to Christmas, reflecting the 
popularity of the Santa Claus Village in Rovaniemi. 
(see Chapter 7). Rovaniemi Airport is the third 





2 USGS 2015. Mbendi (2019): https://mbendi.co.za/indy/ming/
mingsa.html Mineral Gallery (2019): http://www.galleries.com/
minerals_by_name.
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Greenland
Greenland is a self-governing nation within the 
Kingdom of Denmark. The Government of Green-
land has sovereignty and administration over the 
areas mentioned in the Self-Government Act such 
as education, health, fisheries, environment and 
climate.1
The population counted 56 081 in 2020 and popu-
lation growth has been low or negative after 2000, 
with falling birth rates and variable but net emi-
gration. However, from 2012 the decline in total 
 fertility is replaced by a relatively stable trend 
around 2.00 towards 2020.2
The economy of Greenland increased by 13 per 
cent from 2015 to 2018 (Table 4.6). Fisheries, enjoy-
ing favorable prices and good harvests increased 
by 23 per cent, contributing 17.5 per cent to GRP in 
2018. Greenland’s open sea fisheries of Northern 
prawns and halibut are Marine Stewardship Coun-
cil (MSC)3 certified as sustainable, requiring that 
politically determined quotas comply with biologi-
cal advice, a precondition for selling to many of the 
large buyers of fish and shellfish. 
Besides fisheries, Manufacturing, Construction and 
Transportation had growth rates above average. 
Manufacturing including fish processing saw 35 per 
cent growth, the largest income growth among our 
industry categories during 2015-2018.  Construction 
grew 32 per cent, reaching a share of 11.1 per 
cent of GRP in 2018. Income in extraction of raw 
 materials has been falling further, to only 0.4 per 
cent of the GRP in 2018. 
Figure 4.23 shows real economic growth, that is 
the volume growth assuming fixed prices of goods 












Agriculture and hunting 341 2.1 310 1.7
Coastal fisheries 709 4.3 878 4.7
Offshore fisheries 1 486 9.0 1 937 10.5
Other fisheries 334 2.0 418 2.3
Extraction of raw materials 86 0.5 76 0.4
Manufacturing 715 4.4 964 5.2
Utilities 549 3.3 408 2.2
Construction 1 557 9.5 2 051 11.1
Wholesale and retail trade 1 652 10.1 1 601 8.6
Transportation 1 274 7.8 1 529 8.3
Accomodation and food services 277 1.7 298 1.6
Finance and insurance 236 1.4 229 1.2
Real estate and rental services 1 147 7.0 1 229 6.6
Public administration 1 562 9.5 1 731 9.3
Education 989 6.0 1 008 5.4
Health services 743 4.5 832 4.5
Social services 1 144 7.0 1 343 7.3
Other services 1 628 9.9 1 697 9.2
Total 16 430 100.0 18 539 100.0
1 At basic prices net of taxes and subsidies.
Nuuk, Greenland. Photo: Tom Nicolaysen
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Table 4.7.  Fisheries in Greenland. Value added1 2012-2018. 
Mill. DKK
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Coastal fisheries 759 685 782 709 865 867 878
Ocean fisheries 1 105 975 1 329 1 486 1 724 2 034 1 937
Other fisheries 257 240 285 334 453 388 418
Total 2 121 1 900 2 396 2 529 3 041 3 288 3 232
1 At basic prices net of taxes and subsidies.
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and services. After 2012 there has been a strong 
growth in several years, although negative or low 
growth also appear. 
Figure 4.24 sums up the economic changes in 
terms of shifts between main industry categories. 
Growth in fisheries has lifted primary production, 
and fish processing and construction raised the 
share of secondary (goods producing) industries, 
whereas public and in particular private services 
both contributed smaller shares of GRP in 2018 
than in 2015. 
Figure 4.25 compares the GRP per capita with 
Disposable income of households per capita in 
2018. Greenland has a GRP per capita more than 
three times the disposable income per capita, a 
bigger difference than for other Arctic regions, 
except  Arctic Russia. In comparison, the share of 
disposable income of households in GRP in Green-
land was 45 per cent in 2012 (see ECONOR III). 
Note, however, that disposable income does not 
include the in-kind benefits through public health 
and educational services, which might be consider-
able. Besides disposable income, households also 
benefit from public services through education 
and health services which represent 17 per cent of 
GRP. A modified approach to calculating disposable 
income by also including the value of in-kind public 
services is shown for Northern Canada in Box 4.2.
Figure 4.24. Value added by main industry. Greenland.  

















Figure 4.25. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita and 
Dis osab e Income for ouseho ds DI  er 
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Fisheries
There has been a favorable trend in fisheries 
mainly as a result of increasing fish prices, creating 
a booming economy and labour shortage, reduc-
ing unemployment from more than 10 per cent in 
2014 to less than 4 per cent in 2019.4 Prices in-
creased for the most important fish species Green-
land halibut, cod and above all prawns. The large 
income growth has induced significant investment 
in new open-seas vessels.5 The value of fish export 
made a jump for cod, halibut and above all prawns 
in 2019, falling back to the trend in 2020 (Figure 
4.27). 
Greenland has introduced a resource tax on their 
highly profitable fisheries to reflect that profit 
in fisheries above normal return on capital shall 
benefit the whole society. The tax rate increases 
with the market price. In good times the resource 
tax revenue benefits the whole society, however, 
in the case of a negative shock the tax revenue will 
fall markedly, adding to the strain from lower direct 
and indirect income losses in fisheries. Some pe-
troleumbased economies like Alaska and Norway 
have built up funds to buffer against price shocks 
or resource depletion, ensuring a sustainable 
source of revenue based on the resource extrac-
tion (see Box 4.1). 
Petroleum
So far there is no petroleum production in Green-
land, but according to US Geological Surveys 2008, 
Greenland has considerable undiscovered resour-
ces of 47 billion barrels of oil equivalents (bboe), 
of which oil is around 25 bboe and gas 22 bboe. 
However, the location of these resources provides 
challenges in terms of ice and storms, and the 
neighborhood of a pristine natural environment. 
Even if profitable discoveries are made, reserves in 
Greenland are not expected to be developed in the 
near future because the time lag between discover-
ies and production tend to be considerable in the 
Arctic.
Natural gas has been indicated by seismic surveys, 
but no findings have proven viable so far. Several 
petroleum companies have stopped their explora-
tion activities the last couple of years. Currently, oil 
and gas companies hold 15 licenses to explore in 
Greenland. While none of them is actively drilling 
at the moment, the license holders are actively 
 analyzing seismic data in preparation for future 
drilling. If petroleum companies start to expect 
higher future prices, Greenland’s oil and gas 
 activity could recover again.6
Minerals
Greenland potentially has many different min-
eral resources, such as coal, copper, gold, lead, 
 precious stones, rare-earth elements, uranium, and 
zinc.7 The Greenland Self-Government Authority 
has primary sovereignty over mineral resources. 
However, half of potential mineral revenues above 
DKK 75 million will be subtracted from the Danish 
block grant. 
The Aappaluttoq ruby and pink sapphire mine 
started production in May 2017, however, 2019 
and 2020 saw considerable deficits, but a surplus is 
expected in 2021, as the covid-19 pandemic slows. 
As of 9 April 2021, the large scale zinc mining 
 project at Citronen Fjord is approaching a complete 
set of permits, the last one will be applied for when 
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the financial process is successfully concluded. 
The Citronen Fjord zinc deposit is large, and the 
mine will be among the six largest producers in the 
world.8 
The Kvanefjeld (Kuannersuit) is considered one 
of the world’s major undeveloped deposit of both 
rare-earth elements and uranium. The prospects 
for mineral incomes, including from the Kvanefjeld 
potential, play a role in Greenland’s aspirations 
for independence, which depends on its capac-
ity to sustain the welfare level without receiving 
the block grants from Denmark. Environmental 
groups and local inhabitants oppose the planned 
disposal of waste from Kuannersuit, and there is 
also local concern about the potential radioactive 
dust precipitation on the local communities and 
surrounding grazing lands, and waters. The new 
coalition government (as of 24 April 2021) following 
the general elections on 6th April is based upon an 
agreement that there will be no uranium mining 
and to stop the Kuannersuit project.  Legislative 
measures will be taken to ban exploitation of 
 minerals containing radioactive materials.9
Tourism
Another potential source of increased income and 
tax revenue is the tourist industry. There is no road 
network in Greenland, and most visitors arrive 
by air. In 2015 the parliament decided to develop 
three airports, with Denmark contributing finance 
and guaranties for the two airports in Nuuk and 
Illulisat. 
In recent years the increase in number of visitors 
has mainly come as cruise arrivals. The number of 
cruise passengers increased from 24 thousand in 
2014 to 45 thousand in 2018, followed by a minor 




2 Fertility rate, total (births per woman) - Greenland  Data 
(worldbank.org) https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.
TFRT.IN
3 The MSC Fisheries Standard  Marine Stewardship Council
4 Danmarks nationalbank: Strong growth, but reforms are 
required. ANALYSIS_No.21_ The Greenlandic economy.pdf 
(nationalbanken.dk)
5 Danmarks nationalbank: Strong growth, but reforms are 
required. ANALYSIS_No.21_ The Greenlandic economy.pdf 
(nationalbanken.dk)
6 Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (2017): Mineral 
resources assessment: Geological Survey of Denmark and 
Greenland.
7 Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (2017): Mineral 
resources assessment: Geological Survey of Denmark and 
Greenland.
8 USGS (2016): The Mineral Industries of Denmark, the Faroe 
Islands, and Greenland, The Minerals Yearbook.
9 https://ia.gl/da/2021/04/16/koalitionsaftale/
 Nuuk apartment blocks, view from above, Greenland. Photo: Colourbox
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silicon smelter was under construction from 2015, 
starting production in late 2018. 
The Accommodation and food industry serves tour-
ists and mobile labour, in addition to the residents 
Iceland
The pillar of the Icelandic economy has been the 
fishery cluster, with fishing, fish processing and 
now also fish farming as core elements. However, 
during most of the time since the financial crisis 
in 2008 tourism has grown into the role as an-
other pillar of the economy. Over the last decade 
 production and export of basic metals and metal 
products have emerged, so has an industry of 
datacenters dealing with computer clouds and digi-
tal  currency mining. Both metals and datacenters 
enable Iceland to indirectly export its landlocked 
surplus of renewable energy and diversify the 
economy through export of goods and services. 
However, the impact on the environment is sub-
stantial, as clearly expressed in Iceland’s politi-
cal landscape. The natural landscape of Iceland 
is highly valued by the population and the main 
 attraction of tourists. 
During 2015-2018 the economy of Iceland in-
creased by 22 per cent measured as GRP in  current 
prices. In relative terms the largest growth in 
income is found in Aquaculture, which tripled its in-
come from 2015 to 2018. Still the industry is small 
in national context, contributing only 0.3 per cent 
to GRP in 2018. Then follows Mining and quarry-
ing, which more than doubled, but still represents 
only 0.2 percent of total income in 2018. The third 
 largest growth and most impacting on the econo-
my is in Construction (76 per cent), raising its share 
of the economy from 5.4 per cent to 7.8 per cent of 
GRP.
The strong growth in Construction during 2015-
2018 is partly driven by further investment in metal 
producing capacity, in particular as the second 











Agriculture and forestry 21 948 1.1 23 924 0.9
Fishing 98 502 4.7 80 203 3.2
Aquaculture 2 152 0.1 6 626 0.3
Mining and quarrying 1 969 0.1 4 817 0.2
Fish processing 66 840 3.2 62 309 2.5
Basic metals 50 714 2.4 32 508 1.3
Metal products 14 312 0.7 19 374 0.8
Other manufacturing 114 499 5.5 128 661 5.1
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 86 124 4.1 94 746 3.7
Water supply, sewerage, waste 19 376 0.9 20 897 0.8
Construction 112 663 5.4 197 771 7.8
Wholesale and retail trade 187 114 9.0 230 640 9.1
Transportation and storage 136 213 6.6 176 693 7.0
Accommodation and food 
service activities 65 905 3.2 96 626 3.8
Information and 
communication 95 365 4.6 115 822 4.6
Finance and insurance 138 096 6.6 149 178 5.9
Real estate activities 230 375 11.1 288 101 11.4
Scientific, technical and 
administrative services 170 885 8.2 222 297 8.8
Public administration and 
defence 112 531 5.4 135 598 5.4
Education 128 165 6.2 154 266 6.1
Human health and social work 165 276 8.0 213 240 8.4
Arts, entertainment and other 
services 58 739 2.8 75 113 3.0
Total 2 077 762 100 2 529 409 100
1 At basic prices net of taxes and subsidies.
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in general. Increasing demand lead to a 47 per 
cent growth, more than twice the rate of the total 
economy. A rising tourist industry (see Chapter 7) 
might also explain the larger that average growth 
in Transportation, which also was influenced by the 
higher activity in Construction. 
Income in Fisheries was 19 per cent lower in 2018 
than in 2015, while Fish processing was down 6 per 
cent. 
The metal producing industries are attracted to 
Iceland by the abundant and low-cost supply of 
renewable energy in terms of hydropower and geo-
thermal energy. The cheap renewable energy more 
than outweigh the additional transportation costs 
for raw materials and products. There has been 
substantial investments in aluminium and silicon 
smelters. However, income in basic metal produc-
tion was lower in 2018 than in 2015. On the other 
hand, income growth in Metal products made up 
for some of this decline. 
The industry of Scientific, technical and administra-
tive services grew markedly more than the aver-
age economy, mainly driven by strong growth in 
administrative services. 
After the financial crisis in 2008-2009 positive real 
growth in Iceland was reestablished already in 
2011 and has since then been substantial, with 
highest growth around 2016, a year of the high 
investments in metal production capacity (Figure 
4.28). 
Figure 4.29 shows the industrial activity allocated 
to main industries. The fisheries are important 
to the economy, however the relatively low level 
of income in fisheries left the share of primary or 
extractive industries as low as 4.6 per cent in 2018, 
with small contributions from Mining and Agricul-
ture. Iceland’s economy is highly diversified with 
relatively large secondary industries and private 
services above 50 per cent of GRP, reflecting the 
high level of education and associated knowledge 
industries.
As shown in Figure 4.30 the GRP per capita is 
almost three times larger than disposable income 
per capita. Besides disposable income, households 
also benefit from services through education and 
health, which together represents 14.5 per cent of 
GRP in 2018. An example of adjusting the DIH for 
public services is shown for Northern Canada in 
Box 4.2.
Tourism
Tourism is the major source of export income, gen-
erating almost 40 per cent of total export revenue 
in 2018 and contributing 8.6 per cent to GRP in 
2017.1 The number of visitors increased by 12 per 
cent per year on average during 2015-2018, almost 
reaching 2.5 million in 2018 (see Chapter 7). Among 
the major attractions of Iceland are spectacular 
natural sceneries and the opportunities for hiking, 
trekking, whale watching – activities which also put 
pressure on fragile ecosystems. In March 2021, the 
volcano Fagradalsfjall near Reykjaviik erupted and 
added to spectacular views.2
Figure 4.29. Value added by main industry (at current price). 


















Figure 4.30. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita and 
Dis osab e Income for ouseho ds DI  er 
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As nature is the magnet of visitors there is also 
a concern that loss of valuable nature through 
development in energy supply to energy intensive 
industries is a factor which might interfere with 
interests of the tourist industry.3 A long-term Tour-
ism Policy Framework 2020-30 with a strong focus 
on sustainability was launched in 2019 in tandem 
with a environmental tool for assessing the status 
of protected areas and natural attractions.
In 2020 during the covid-19 pandemic there was a 
70 per cent reduction in number of visitors from 
the top ten countries4 and GRP in 2020 declined by 
6.6 per cent in real terms from the previous year.5 
This illustrates the vulnerability of small arctic 
economies achieving success in specific industries, 
a challenge that is not only relevant for mineral 
extraction.
Energy
Iceland is richly endowed with geothermal energy 
and hydropower, covering 65 and 18 per cent 
respectively of primary energy use in 2019.  Fossil 
sources dominated by oil contribute around 15 per 
cent to primary energy use and is mainly used by 
the fishing fleet and in road transportation. In elec-
tricity production, 69 per cent came from hydro-
power and 31 per cent from geothermal  energy. 
The supply of geothermal energy in primary energy 
increased significantly until 2012, when the level 
remained about constant until 2019. Landsvirkjun 
generates three fourths of electricity and is one 
of the largest producers of renewable energy in 
Europe. The contribution from wind energy is 
 marginal and did not increase  during 2016-2019. 
The potential for further supply of renewable 
energy is huge. However, as direct energy export is 
impossible, the economy has moved in a direction 
where energy can be exported indirectly as energy 
intensive goods and services. The government has 
opened-up for large scale investments in heavy 
industries, mainly aluminium and silicon smelters. 
The strategy for indirect energy export has left a 
big footprint on the environment. However, the 
 activity has been exposed to close-downs related 
to low world market prices or environmental regu-
lations.
Providing renewable energy to energy intensive 
industries make large improvements in the climate 
Reykjavik, Iceland. Photo: Colourbox
Nesjavellir geothermal power plant in Iceland. Photo: Crestock
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and environmental footprint of companies and is 
increasingly requested by investors and govern-
ments. Besides production of basic metals, another 
industry enjoying benefits of cheap renewable 
 energy is the data center business. Data centers 
are energy intensive activities, and the stable and 
cool climate of Iceland keeps costs of cooling down. 
Cryptocurrency mining is consuming about 90 per 
cent of total energy use by datacenters.6 
Domestic demand for electricity is expected to in-
crease. The Icelandic government will replace fossil 
fuels with electricity over the next decades. Among 
the government’s goals is a ban on new gasoline 
and diesel vehicles by 2030. The government aims 
to have 30 000 electric cars in Iceland by 2026.7 
Fisheries 
Figure 4.31 shows the catch of main species. Cap-
elin has in periods dominated in terms of landed 
weight. Capelin is a relatively short-lived and 
highly dynamic species, in addition, the changing 
temperature and ocean currents in recent years 
have made it difficult for researchers to locate 
and assess the stock, leading to large variability in 
catches. Traditionally, capelin has been used for 
fish meal and fish oil and has a lower commercial 
value than cod, which is by far the most important 
species in terms of export value (Figure 4.32). Over 
the last years, however, there has been increasing 
consumer demand of capelin from Asia. 
Cod is the most valuable single species with an 
 export value roughly 5-6 times that of other wild 
fish species. The export value of farmed salmon 
has increased to 19 thousand million ISK in 2020, 
exceeding that of several traditional wild fish 
 species. 
Iceland has managed its fisheries, by introdcing 
harvest quaotas by vessel or company at a sustain-
able level. Increasing demand and prices in recent 
years have strongly increased income in the indus-
try, which is endowed with the exclusive right to 
harvest the fish resources of the nation. To secure 
the society at large a share in the resource rent – 
the surplus above normal return on investments 
– a resource tax was introduced in 2012, based 
on the profit margins of harvesting the different 
 species. The resource rent tax is channeled into the 
government budget to the common benefit. 
The quota system provides the government with 
control of the harvest volumes, however, there is 
concern about distributional aspects of the system 
as the quotas are transferable and a concentration 
of quotas might disfavor smaller scale fisheries and 
local communities (see Box 4.3).
Notes









5 Statistics Iceland - Frontpage (statice.is) 
6 Talk book template (si.is)
7 Phase-out of fossil fuel vehicles - Wikipedia
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Box : An un concentrated effort to c arify the concentration ru es in Ice andic fisheries
Thórólfur Matthíasson, University of Iceland
In fisheries, quota systems are frequently used to 
allocate limited fish harvest to vessels or firms. All 
quota systems make it harder for newcomers to 
enter the industry. Transferable quotas add the new 
dimension that one or a few firms might exert mar-
ket power with unwanted societal consequences. 
In 1998 the Icelandic Parliament Althingi addressed 
these concerns. Act 27/1998 amends the Fishery 
Management Act (Act 38/1990). The amended Act 
prescribes a ceiling on the share of quotas a fishing 
firm can hold. For species where trade in quotas is 
unrestricted the ceiling was set to 12 per cent, oth-
erwise 8 or 10 per cent. The objective of Althingi in 
the new legislation was striking a balance between 
efficiency, distributional concerns and fairness.
Development of concentration of quotas in 
 Ice andic fisheries
After nearly two decades of quota trading, a study1 
mapped the actual development of concentration 
of quotas by firms and by geography during 2000- 
2023. 
The Icelandic quota system is organized in two 
categories, the regular system and the hook-and-
line system. Quotas can be moved from the regular 
system to the hook-and-line system, but not the 
other way around. It should be noted that the quota 
ceiling for the hook-and-line system are consider-
ably lower than in the regular system. One firm can 
at most hold 4 per cent of the cod quota and 5 per 
cent of the haddock quota earmarked for the hook-
and-line system. 
Figure 1 shows that the 25 biggest firms under the 
regular system increased their share of total quotas 
in all species under regulation from 40 per cent to 
65 per cent during the first nine years the system 
was in operation. The increase in concentration 
was even faster in the hook-and-line system, as 
the 25 biggest firms increased their lot from 23 per 
cent to 53 per cent during the first seven years in 
operation. The pattern in both systems is similar, 
with fast increase in concentration during the first 
years of operation, then a slow, almost microscopic, 
increase in concentration of quotas. The pattern 
suggests that there is an economy of scale in fisher-
ies that only can be realized if entry is restricted. 
The increase in concentration, as measured by the 
quota share of the biggest firms, slows considerably 
in both systems 7-10 years after implementation 
of tradable quotas. That might indicate that the 
scope for efficiency through sizing up the operation 
was exhausted. Alternatively, it might indicate that 
the quota ceiling is effectively restricting the drive 
towards concentration or it might indicate that the 
operators have learned to game the system.
riticism by he Ice andic Nationa  Audit ce
When Althingi amended the Fishery Management 
Act in 1998 to include the quota ceiling in the regular 
quota system it tried to prevent “ceiling hopping”, 
i.e. that a big investor could “disinvest” her quota 
holdings into several daughter-firms. If a firm holds 
the majority of voting rights in another company, the 
former is a mother-company and the other is the 
daughter-company, whereas the whole conglom-
erate is termed “related parties” and their quota 
holdings are counted as if this was one firm. The law 
also stipulates that spreading out the voting rights 
in smaller portions to more holding firms does not 
alter the rule that quota holding shall be counted as 
if the whole conglomerate is one firm. It should be 
noted that a mother-firm or a set of mother-firms 
must have a majority of voting rights in a daughter-
firm to invoke the “related parties” rule. This is in 
contrast to regulation in financial markets where a 
stake as low as 20 per cent will invoke a “related par-
ties” rule ( 18 of Act 161/2002).
The Directorate of Fisheries (Fiskistofa) is given the 
task to regulate the quota-ceiling. The Icelandic Na-
tional Audit Office (INAO) did a management audit 
(stj rns sluendursko un) of the directorate in 2018. 
Their report2 from 2019 concludes that the director-
ate collects and processes voluntary reports from 
the fishing firms regarding quota-holdings and “re-
lated parties” status. The directorate stated to have 
initiated un-expected audits but the National Audit 
Office expressed that this effort was not sufficient. 
Enforcing the rule regarding “related parties” seems 
not to have been prioritized by the directorate. This 
conclusion suggests that the slow development of 
concentration as shown in Figure 1 might be due to 
weak enforcing and/or incorrect understanding of 
the term “related parties” among those voluntarily 
reporting mergers and acquisitions to the director-
ate. 
uotas of the firms amher i and darvinns an
The quota holdings of two financially related firms, 
Samherji and S ldarvinnslan became an object of 
public discussion in late 2019 for matters indepen-
dent of the quota ceiling (alleged use of bribes to 
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acquire quotas in Namibia3).The Directorate had, 
according to the INAO, concluded that the two firms 
were unrelated according to the definition in the 
Fishery Management Act. Samherji has 49 per cent 
stake in S ldarvinnslan. When presenting Samherji 
internationally S ldarvinnslan is introduced as the 
pelagic fishing arm of the Samherji conglomerate.4 
The CEO of Samherji has from time to time served as 
Chairman of the Board of S ldarvinnslan. It is there-
fore no doubt that the two firms would be defined 
as related if the financial market definition is used. If 
they were, the conglomerate would hold between 16 
and 17 per cent of the total quotas.5
ro osa  for stricter ru es to regu ate the  
quota ceiling
The Ministry of Fisheries prepared amendments to 
the Fishery Management Act in late 2019 and early 
2020. When the bribery debacle in Namibia involv-
ing the fishing giant Samherji surfaced the Minister 
of Fisheries asked the committee that had the task 
to prepare the amendments to increase the pace of 
preparing stricter rules.6 A proposal was submitted 
for public hearing in February of 2020. According to 
the proposal more distant relatives and in-laws of 
owners would be listed as “related parties”. Further-
more, the concept of “control” was extended beyond 
majority of voting rights by adding that a party could 
be considered “controlling” another party if in posi-
tion to force its will upon that other party. “Related 
parties” exceeding the quota ceiling would be given 
six years to resolve that conflict with the law. It is 
clear that the proposal falls very short of the “related 
party” definition in financial markets. 
n concentrated c arification effort 
At the moment, the work towards stricter rules to 
regulate the quota ceiling seems un-concentrated, 
as only few of the interested parties did submit opin-
ions in the public hearing. The Ministry of Fisheries 
is yet to prepare a proposal for amendments to the 
Fishery Management Act. The control efforts of the 
Directorate of Fisheries still seem weaker than what 
is called for. While many Member of Parliament 
have called for concentrated efforts to implement 
stricter regulations, the Minister of Fisheries has not 
yet taken steps to make amendments to clarify the 
concentration rules and curb the excessive market 
power achieved through the quota system. 
Notes
1 Agnarsson, S., Matthiasson, T., & Giri, F. (2016). Consolidation and 
distribution of quota holdings in the Icelandic fisheries. Marine Policy, 
263-270.
2 Icelandic National Audit Office. (2019). Eftirlit Fiskistofu - stj rns slu t-





sem-hluta-af-samstaedunni/ See also: https://www.stjornarradid.
is/library/01--Frettatengt---myndir-og-skrar/ANR/KThJ/Sk rsla%20
verkefnastj rnar%20-%20lokaskjal_gj.pdf. See https://kjarninn.is/
skyring/2020-01-12-enn-bedid-eftir-tillogum-um-breytingar-kvotathaki/ 
as also pointed out in the report of a governmental panel headed by 
former head of the Icelandic National Audit Office.
6 https://kjarninn.is/skyring/2020-02-17-tengdar-utgerdir-fa-taep-sex-ar-
til-ad-koma-ser-undir-kvotathak/
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Arctic Norway 
Arctic Norway includes the counties Nordland, 
Troms and Finnmark, and the Svalbard Archi-
pelago, with a total population of 482 000. The 
population increased by 3 per cent during 2015 to 
2018, less than half the growth in the rest of the 
country (Figure 3.4). 
Fisheries have been a major source of living during 
history and is now also strengthened by a rapidly 
growing aquaculture industry. The rise of fish 
 farming is based on the favorable natural condi-
tions of numerous fjords and suitable sea tempera-
tures due to the Norwegian coastal current. The 
seafood industry including fisheries, aquaculture 
and fish processing represents a strong sector in 
Arctic Norway, contributing 11 per cent to GRP in 
2018. The fisheries are particularly important to 
employment in coastal communities.
Gross regional product (GRP) increased by 19 per 
cent from 2015 to 2018 (Table 4.9). Petroleum 
extraction contributed 0.8 per cent to GRP in 2018. 
 Income from petroleum extraction increased 
somewhat during 2015-2018 as the  liquefied 
 natural gas (LNG) plant at Melkeøya outside 
 Hammerfest approached full capacity, based on 
natural gas from the Snøhvit field. Other mining 
only contributed 0.5 per cent to GRP in 2018.
The regional income from oil and gas extraction 
does not correspond to the income from offshore 
fields in northern areas of the Norwegian Sea and 
in the Barents Sea. The reason is that all income 
in offshore petroleum is registered in a virtual 
accounting region for this purpose, only a minor 
share of the income is generated within the  context 
of the regional economy. There is no onshore oil 
and gas production in Norway. 
The rapidly growing aquaculture industry increased 
its share of GRP from 3.4 per cent in 2015 to 6.0 
per cent in 2018. Only two private industries were 
larger in 2018: Construction (7.7 per cent) and 
Trade (7.3 per cent).
Within manufacturing, both Fish processing and 
Other food processing reduced their shares of 
GRP, so did manufacturing of Wood and paper 
products. Other manufacturing increased markedly 
more than the average for the economy, but still 
made up only 2.1 per cent share of GRP in 2018.
Although tourism has increased in many  Arctic 
regions, this is not clearly indicated in the 












Agriculture and forestry 1 610 0.9 1 372 0.6
Fishing 5 214 2.8 7 058 3.2
Aquaculture 6 267 3.4 13 245 6.0
Oil and gas extraction including 
services 1 563 0.8 1 693 0.8
Other mining and quarrying 1 284 0.7 1 022 0.5
Fish processing 3 466 1.9 3 847 1.7
Other food processing 5 323 2.9 5 883 2.7
Wood and paper products 467 0.3 465 0.2
Other Manufacturing 3 554 1.9 4 738 2.1
Electricity, gas and steam 7 448 4.0 13 009 5.9
Water supply, waste 1 666 0.9 1 981 0.9
Construction 14 681 7.9 16 988 7.7
Wholesale and retail trade, 
repair of motor vehicles 14 599 7.9 16 039 7.3
Transportation 9 306 5.0 9 735 4.4
Accommodation and food 
services 3 344 1.8 3 979 1.8
Information and communcation 3 330 1.8 3 669 1.7
Finance and insurance 5 515 3.0 6 022 2.7
Real estate activities 4 293 2.3 5 275 2.4
Imputed rents of owner-
occupied dwellings 11 026 5.9 12 345 5.6
Scientific and technical activities 4 966 2.7 6 327 2.9
Administrative and support 
services 3 677 2.0 4 554 2.1
Public administration and 
defence 22 176 12.0 23 682 10.7
Education 15 105 8.1 17 340 7.9
Health and social work 31 873 17.2 36 318 16.5
Arts, entertainment and other 
services 3 746 2.0 4052 1.8
Total 185 499 100.0 220 638 100.0
1 At basic prices net of taxes and subsidies.
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 develop ment of the related service industries of 
Accomo dation and food services and Transporta-
tion. Hotels and restaurants sustain their share 
of the growing economy, whereas Transportation 
decreases by 4.6 per cent. However, land transport 
increased by 6.6 per cent, overshadowed by the 
decline in all other transportation activities. 
There was higher than average growth in Scien-
tific and technical services (27 per cent), followed 
by Administrative services (24 per cent) and Real 
estate activities (23 per cent). 
Among public services, Health care and social 
works are by far the largest, with 16.5 per cent 
of GRP, followed by Public administration (10.7 
per cent) and Education (7.9 per cent). The public 
sectors all had lower than average growth, above 
all Public administration, whereas Education and 
Health care came closer to the average growth rate 
with 15 and 14 per cent growth, respectively. 
Aquaculture more than doubled its income during 
2015-2018. After Aquaculture, Electricity produc-
tion had the second strongest growth by 75 per 
cent, also driven by the expansion of on-shore 
wind power, in response to the favorable incen-
tives related to the Green Certificates.1 
Fish processing increased by 11 per cent, around 
half the growth of the economy at large.  Fisheries 
on the other hand increased by 35 per cent, indi-
cating higher prices on landed fish rather than a 
growth in quantity. 
Figure 4.33 shows real GRP growth rates 2000-
2018 and GRP volume index2 for Arctic Norway, 
assuming fixed prices. Over the whole period the 
economy increased by 42 per cent. There has been 
variable but continuous growth from 2010 to 2018.
Figure 4.34 shows the development in the main 
structure of the economy. Primary production 
containing the extractive industries represents 
11.1 per cent of GRP, up from 8.6 per cent in 2015. 
Growth in fisheries and in particular fish farming 
explains most of the increase from 2015. Within 
secondary industries a major force behind the 
increase comes from electricity production. Both 
private and public services reduce their shares in 
the economy from 2015 to 2018. The public sector 
accounted for 35 per cent of GRP in 2018.
Figure 4.35 compares the GRP per capita and 
disposable Income of households per capita in 
the Arctic and non-Arctic regions of Norway. GRP 
per capita is considerably higher in the non-Arctic 
regions, however, for disposable income per capita 
there is only a minor gap. The national petroleum 
income is transferred to the Norwegian Govern-
ment Pension Fund Global, currently the largest 
sovereign wealth fund in the world. Norway does 
not pay dividends to individuals, as in Alaska. Use 
of the fund for government budgets is limited to 
the return on the fund’s financial investments, as 
determined by the Norwegian parliament.
Figure 4.34. Value added by main industry. Arctic Norway. 


















































 Growth rates in per cent
 GRP volume index
1 The GRP volume index for 2000-2018 for Arctic Norway is constructed 
for the circumpolar comparison in ECONOR and may differ from official 
data from Statistics Norway for regional volume growth rates, only avai-
lable from 2009. 
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Petroleum
Retreating sea ice, development of subsea tech-
nology and cost reductions increase the attraction 
of future offshore activity in arctic waters. Today 
Norway is producing gas in the Norwegian Sea 
and the Barents Sea (Snøhvit). The Johan Castberg 
oil field 100 km north of Snøhvit in the Barents 
Sea will come on stream in 2023 and is expected 
to produce oil for the next 30 years.3 Environ-
mental organizations argue that this activity will 
take  Norway further away from the climate target 
agreed upon in the Paris agreement in 2015. The 
development of petroleum activity in Lofoten, 
Vesterålen and Senja, the spawning ground of 
the North-Atlantic cod, which is the pillar of the 
 Nor wegian wild fisheries, has been put on hold and 
will be reconsidered in 2021.4
The arctic sea ice edge sustains the whole ecosys-
tem in the arctic through the nutrition generated 
by the early spring bloom of plankton and algae 
in the surrounding waters. The density and geo-
graphical position of the ice edge delineates the 
area open for petroleum exploration. In 2020 the 
government redefined the ice edge, moving it fur-
ther north by accepting ice cover up to 30 per cent 
at certain times of the year for drilling.
Renewable energy
Nordland has a substantial electricity surplus and 
is 100 per cent renewable, mostly by hydro power. 
Finnmark used natural gas for almost half of its 
electricity supply in 2018, generating electricity 
for the LNG plant at Melkøya. At the same time, 
Finnmark has a high share of wind power, repre-
senting 15 per cent of all wind power in Norway 
in 2019. In 2020, 37.5 per cent of all wind power 
production in Norway takes place in S mi reindeer 
herding areas5; areas also under pressure from 
mining,  hydropower, transmission lines and cabins, 
however wind power is the primary concern. The 
Norwegian reindeer herding Act states the rights of 
S mi people to their traditional livelihood and land. 
The power surplus of Nordland is due to limited 
transmission capacity. The option to produce zero-
emission hydrogen based on renewable electricity 
is attractive to regions with a surplus of renewable 
power. A hydrogen plant is under development in 
Glomfjord in Nordland,6 for supplying hydrogen 
to ferries in the Lofoten area in addition to many 
other applications as fuel for sea transport, heavy 
vehicles and industrial use, like in the HYBRIT 
project of fossil free steel (see section on Arctic 
Sweden). A factory for production of fuel cells that 
convert hydrogen to electricity is being developed 
in Narvik.7
Notes
1 Electricity certificates - Energifakta Norge
2 The GRP volume index for 2000-2018 for Arctic Norway is 
constructed for the circumpolar comparison in ECONOR, and 
may differ from official data from Statistics Norway for regional 
volume growth rates, only available from 2009.
3 Johan Castberg - field in the Barents Sea - equinor.com
4 Lofoten bør ikke åpnes for oljeaktivitet  Havforskningsinsti-
tuttet (hi.no)
5 vindrein-eng-alt (motvind.org)
6 Pressemelding - - Glomfjord Hydrogen https://www.glomfjord-
hydrogen.no/ac/pressemelding
7 Teco 2030 og AVL vil etablere hydrogenfabrikk i Narvik og 
skape 500 arbeidsplasser – NRK
Figure 4.35. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita and 
Dis osab e Income for ouseho ds DI  er 















Lofoten, Norway. Photo: Colourbox
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on metals and oil in 2018. However, strong growth 
primarily in gas production on the Yamal peninsula 
contributed markedly to the overall growth. Petro-
leum and other mining combined increased their 
contribution to GRP from 52 to 60 per cent. 
Besides petroleum and other mining, construc-
tion is the only industry with higher than average 
growth, increasing its share in GRP from 7.4 per 
cent in 2015 to 7.7 per cent in 2018. This increase 
looks modest, however, the strong growth in petro-
leum and mining (66 per cent) easily “shrinks” the 
relative contribution from other industries. Con-
struction is an industry that is heavily involved in 
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Agriculture, forestry, hunting, 
fishing and fish farming 124 823 1.6 173 003 1.6
Petroleum and other mining 4 002 211 52.3 6 669 869 60.0
Manufacturing 342 548 4.5 498 686 4.5
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas and water 235 156 3.1 285 604 2.6
Construction 568 328 7.4 850 754 7.7
Wholesale and retail trade 480 582 6.3 515 598 4.6
Transportation; Information 
and communication 611 198 8.0 686 681 6.2
Hotel and catering activities 48 213 0.6 56 029 0.5
Finance and insurance 6 221 0.1 10 712 0.1
Real estate activities 485 656 6.3 192 107 1.7
Public administration and 
military security; social security 279 115 3.6 315 532 2.8
Education 169 441 2.2 200 116 1.8
 Health and social services 229 166 3.0 291 121 2.6
Other private services 68 096 0.9 366 174 3.3
Total 7 650 753 100 11 111 986 100
1 At basic prices net of taxes and subsidies.
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Arctic Russia
Arctic Russia is by far the largest among the Arctic 
regions both in terms of land area and popula-
tion. In 2018 the population counted 6.7 million, 
down 0.4 per cent per year on average since 2012, 
however, in recent years the population has been 
stable. The economy is largely based on petroleum 
and other mining industries, and the development 
during the period 2015-2018 strengthened the 
mineral basis of the economy. 
The Russian Arctic is the Arctic region which faces 
the most impacting changes in terms of climate 
change. The shrinking sea ice opens the Northern 
Sea Route, offering groundbreaking possibilities for 
trade and development as demanding transporta-
tion over land can be replaced by river and sea 
transport, a great benefit to the extractive indus-
tries. 
A broad regional development targeting large 
projects in the extractive industries in the Russian 
Arctic was initiated during the second half of the 
2000s. The development program includes both 
new projects and upgrades of old plants, with the 
aim of building a cargo base for the Northern Sea 
Route. The opening of the Northern Sea Route is 
a large windfall gain for Arctic Russia from global 
warming, although the warming incurs costs, in-
cluding expected increasing costs from impacts of 
thawing permafrost related to damage of buildings 
and infrastructure (see Chapter 8). 
Table 4.10 shows the industry structure of the 
economy in 2015 and 2018. The economy as a 
whole increased by 45 per cent during 2015-2018, 
a development reflecting the higher world prices 
Russian trawler in the Barents sea.  Helge Sunde / Samfoto 
resource extraction and infrastructure investments 
in Arctic Russia. 
Within service industries, Trade, Transportation, 
Information and communication and Hotel and 
catering increased by 7, 12 and 16 per cent respec-
tively in nominal terms, growing markedly slower 
than the economy at large and seeing their shares 
of the economy of Arctic Russia decline from 2015 
to 2018. Manufacturing followed the growth of the 
total Arctic Russian economy, sustaining its share 
in GRP at 4.5 per cent. 
Finance and insurance continue to be a marginal 
industry. Real estate services used to be signifi-
cant at 6.2 per cent of GRP in 2015 but declined to 
only 1.7 per cent in 2018. The group Other private 
services generated a value in 2018 which is 5 times 
the 2015 level, contributing 3.3 per cent to GRP, 
more than Public administration in 2018.
Education did not keep track with the rest of the 
economy, neither did Health and social services, 
although the health sector had a more marked 
growth than Education and Public administration.
If we disregard price changes and calculate the vol-
ume changes in fixed prices, we have the growth 
in real terms (Figure 4.36). GRP measured in fixed 
prices show strong yearly growth from year 2000 
until 2009, the year when GRP declined by 5.3 per 
cent in response to the financial crisis and the fol-
lowing recession. Afterwards, the economy entered 
a period with variable but mainly modest real 
growth towards 2018. 
Figure 4.37 illustrates the dominating role of 
primary or extractive industries in Arctic Russia, in-
creasing from 53.9 per cent of GRP in 2015 to 61.6 
per cent in 2018, of which Agriculture, forestry, 
hunting, fishing and fish farming only contributed 
1.6 per cent points. Secondary production cover-
ing Manufacturing, Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas and water and Construction practi-
cally maintained its level at 15 per cent. Within 
secondary production, Production and distribu-
tion of electricity, gas and water had the weakest 
growth. Public services including Public administra-
tion, Education and Health declined, and private 
services even more so.
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Figure 4.37. Value added by main industry. Arctic Russia. 



















Figure 4.38. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita and 
Dis osab e Income of ouseho ds DI  er 
















GRP per capita in Arctic Russia was more than 
three times that in non-Arctic Russia. This gap is 
largely a result of the petroleum industry in Arctic 
Russia producing 70 per cent of total Russian oil 
and 90 per cent of Russian natural gas (see Figures 
4.39 and 4.40). 
While GRP depicts value generation, disposable 
income of households (DIH) indicates the economi-
cally sustainable potential for private consumption. 
The Russian Arctic has a moderately larger dispos-
able income per capita than non-Arctic regions. 
The higher wage level in petroleum and mining 
can explain the somewhat higher DIH in the Arctic 
region.
Petroleum 
Russian oil and gas production is dominating within 
the Arctic and largely determines the production 
profile for the Arctic as a whole.
The Yamal Peninsula is a power center of above 
all gas related, but also to some extent oil based 
industrial development in Arctic Russia. The first 
Russian Arctic offshore oil field, the Prirazlomnoye 
oil field at 20 meters depth in the Pechora Sea, 
started production in 2014. The Yamal LNG plant 
started production in 2017 for export to Asia along 
the Northern Sea Route and to Europe and the 
plant reached full capacity by the end of 2018. A 
new port facilitates the expected increase in export 
of oil and gas as well as other minerals along the 
Northern Sea Route to Asia. A new pipeline – North 
Stream 2 – will transport gas to Western Europe 
from the super-giant Bovanenkovo gas field, the 
largest on the Yamal Peninsula. This pipeline is 
close to being finalized in summer 2021, however, 
delays may occur due to sanctions from the USA. 
Figures 4.39 and 4.40 illustrate the position of 
Arctic sub-regions in oil and gas production in 
Russia. Russian Arctic oil production is dominated 
by Khanty-Mansii, with smaller shares from Yamal- 
Nenets and the other arctic regions of Russia. Oil 
production in non-Arctic Russia is relatively stable 
at around 30 per cent. Yamal-Nenets dominates 
the Russian gas industry, however, the last decade 
or so gas production outside Arctic Russia and also 
in other Arctic sub-regions becomes increasingly 
important.1
Khanty-Mansii provides a small and about constant 
contribution to gas supply. However, the increase 
in Bovanenkovo gas production and the adjacent 
Kruzenshternskoye field might increase the relative 
importance of Yamal-Nenets. 
A large program for investments in oil and gas ex-
traction and transportation has been carried out in 
the Eastern regions of Arctic Russia to serve the in-
creasing demand from Asian markets. The pipeline 
Power of Siberia started to transport gas in 2019.2 
Regional development 
The rich mineral resources of Arctic Russia are 
unevenly distributed and utilized across the 9 
subregions. Table 4.11 shows GRP by sub-region in 
current rubles in 2012, 2015 and 2018.
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Source: See note 1.
GRP for the Russian Arctic increased 45 per cent 
from 2015-2018. Rapidly growing exploration and 
development of gas reserves in Yamal-Nenets, 
including the development of the world’s largest 
gas field Bovanenkovo, increased its share in the 
Russian Arctic economy from 23.4 per cent to 27.7 
per cent during the period. In contrast, oil produc-
ing Khanty-Mansii saw somewhat less than average 
growth (41 per cent) and reduced its contribution 
slightly to 40 per cent during this period. There was 
a tendency of lagging behind in Murmansk, Kare-
lia, Arkhangelsk and Komi, whereas other regions 
roughly kept track with the Arctic Russian economy 
at large. 
Global warming is opening up the Northern Sea 
Route for longer periods during the year and there 
has been a strong increase in transport along the 
Northern Sea Route over the last ten years, with 
cargo reaching 32 million tonnes by 20203, up from 
2 million tonnes in 2013 and 18 million tonnes by 
2018, mostly a result of increasing activity at the 
Yamal LNG project and upgrading of the Prirazlom-
noye platform in the Pechora Sea. Sailings to and 
from the Yamal Peninsula carried 80 per cent of 
the total cargo in 2020. The low bunker oil prices 
during the last years have made the Northern Sea 
Route less competitive for cargo in transit between 
Asia and Europe
The prospects for the Northern Sea Route give 
incentives for further development of harbors and 
other infrastructure for access to sea transport. A 
system of floating storage units is developed for 
LNG transport, taking cargo from Yamal across the 
ice-covered parts of the Northern Sea Route with 
ice-class Arc-7 vessels to year-round ice-free har-
bors near Murmansk and Kamchatka (See chapter 
8).
Figure 4.41 shows average annual income growth 
in petroleum and mining by sub-region during 
2015 to 2018. Murmansk and Chukotka have zero 
and marginal growth, respectively, in mineral ex-
traction. For Chukotka the limited growth is a result 
of a declining trend in gold production. 
Karelia had the largest percentage growth among 
all. The staples in Karelian mining are non-metal 
minerals like stone, sand and other construction 
materials, an activity that was re-activated after a 
standstill of several years. The petroleum develop-
ment of Yamal-Nenets took place at an average 
annual growth rate at 27 per cent.
Notes
1 IEA (2014): Medium-Term Gas Market report, IEA/OECD. 
2 Power of Siberia (gazprom.com)
3 Cargo Volume on Northern Sea Route Remains Stable at 32m 
tonnes in 2020 (highnorthnews.com)
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Murmansk Region 284 4.8 402 5.2 483 4.3
Karelia 161 2.7 212 2.8 280 2.5
Arkhangelsk Region 472 7.9 628 8.2 819 7.4
Komi Republic 479 8.0 528 6.9 666 6.0
Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous Area 1 191 20.0 1 792 23.4 3 084 27.7
Khanty-Mansii 2 704 45.4 3 154 41.2 4 447 40.0
Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia) 541 9.1 748 9.8 1 085 9.8
Magadan Region 78 1.3 126 1.6 171 1.5
Chukotka 
Autonomous Area 46 0.8 62 0.8 78 0.7
Total 5 956 100.0 7 651 100.0 11 112 100.0
Arctic Sweden
Arctic Sweden consists of the sub-regions Norrbot-
ten and Västerbotten with a total population in 
2019 of 522 000 with 123 000 living in the largest 
city of Umeå. The majority lives along the coast, 
leaving vast areas of wilderness thinly populated 
and attractive for renewable energy and mining, 
increasingly in interest conflict with traditional rein-
deer herding, hunting and tourism. 
GRP or total value added for Northern Sweden 
increased by 18 per cent from 2015 to 2018 (Table 
4.12). In 2018, the Mining industry surpassed its 
2015 level by nearly 90 per cent, increasing its 
share in GRP from 6.2 per cent to 10.0 per cent. All 
other industries saw growth in the range of 10-20 
per cent, mostly lower than growth in the economy 
at large. The exception is Finance and insurance 
services, which declined by 6 per cent during the 
period.
Manufacturing is still the dominant activity in 
Northern Sweden, but grew at only 9 per cent, as 
did Utilities containing the production and distribu-
tion of electricity, with manufacturing as an impor-
tant customer. Västerbotten has a power surplus 
due to limited transmission capacity to Southern 
Sweden and higher supply tends to lower prices.
Construction and most private services kept bet-
ter track with the economy at large, with growth 
around 15 per cent during 2015-2018, with stron-
gest growth at 19 per cent in Real estate, slightly 
above growth in GRP.
Public administration and Education nearly kept 
track with overall growth, whereas Health care and 
social services lagged slightly behind.
Figure 4.42 shows real growth since 2000, i.e. 
the growth in production volume assuming fixed 
prices. A few years after the turbulence around the 
financial crisis, there were low or negative growth 
rates until 2015 when the economy saw four years 
of marked growth rates leading up to 2018.
The development shows variable impact on the 
industrial structure (Figure 4.43). Income from 
primary production or extractive industries jumped 
from 9.2 to 12.8 per cent of GRP, whereas second-
ary production containing Manufacturing, Con-
struction and Utilities declined somewhat to 25.8 
per cent. Both public and private services reduced 
their shares in GRP.
As seen from Figure 4.44, GRP per capita and 
disposable income per capita are slightly lower in 
Northern Sweden than in Southern Sweden. 
Natural resources and the global climate
Northern Sweden sees prospects of an industrial 
development where renewable energy, miner-
als and technology merge to improve the global 
climate. Within the HYBRIT project, industrial giants 












Agriculture and forestry 5 292 3.0 5 878 2.8
Mining and quarrying 11 086 6.2 20 982 10.0
Manufacturing 25 238 14.2 27 498 13.1
Utilities 9 744 5.5 10 585 5.1
Construction 14 051 7.9 15 986 7.6
Wholesale and retail trade 12 949 7.3 14 604 7.0
Transportation and storage 11 241 6.3 13 046 6.2
Accommodation and food 
services 3 081 1.7 3 577 1.7
Finance and insurance 3 836 2.2 3 610 1.7
Real estate activities 10 150 5.7 12 121 5.8
Public administration and 
defence 10 675 6.0 12 233 5.8
Education 12 083 6.8 13 747 6.6
Health care and social work 22 546 12.7 24 989 11.9
Other service 26 110 14.7 30 437 14.5
Total 178 082 100.0 209 293 100.0
1 At basic prices net of taxes and subsidies.
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in Northern Sweden have joined forces to produce 
the world’s first fossil free steel.1 The companies 
are the energy company Vattenfall, the iron ore 
producer LKAB and the steel manufacturer SSAB 
with plants in Luleå and in Finland. The fossil free 
technology relies on large amounts of renewable 
electricity and bio-oil, both available in Northern 
Sweden with its large forests and surplus of elec-
tricity. The target is a fossil free value chain for 
steel by 2035, reducing the CO2 emissions by 10 
per cent in Sweden and 7 per cent in Finland. To 
fulfill the prospects the iron ore mining will switch 
from diesel fueled to battery driven machinery and 
the iron ore pellets production will as a first step 
take heat from bio-oil from a plant commissioned 
by LKAB.2 A pilot plant in Luleå will develop the 
technology for steel production, testing hydrogen 
as a reduction agent to replace coal and coke. The 
hydrogen will be produced by renewable electricity 
to qualify as green.3 If all steel production adapted 
this technology, global CO2 emissions would fall by 
10 per cent.
However, the greening of steel is increasing the 
pressure on the environment through wind parks 
and infrastructure, interfering with wilderness for 
hunting, herding, fishing and tourism. Reindeer 
herders object to the expansion of wind energy, 
as roads and transmission lines create barriers 
to reindeer migration routes and disturb grazing 
areas. Reindeer herding is particularly exposed to 
the planned expansion of wind energy in Sweden,4 
which will mainly take place in the northern re-
gions. Visible and other damage to the wilderness 
is seen as a threat to a growing tourist industry.
Notes
1 HYBRIT – Towards Fossil-Free Steel (lkab.com)
2 LKAB produces the world’s first iron ore pellets with fossil-free 
fuels
3 The clean hydrogen future has already begun – Analysis - IEA
4 https://www.nrk.no/urix/tror-svensk-vindkraftsatsing-vil-gi-
storre-forskjeller-pa-strompriser-i-norge-1.15396083
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Figure 4.43. Value added by main industry. Arctic Sweden. 



















Figure 4.44. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita and 
Dis osab e Income for ouseho ds DI  er 
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Figure 4.45. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita and 
Dis osab e Income for ouseho ds DI  er 















Although this chapter has mainly focused on 
the individual arctic regions, the format of data 
allows for an overview at circumpolar level. 
When looking at the overall picture, the regions 
emerge as heterogeneous although as some, 
recognizable clusters. 
Arctic Russia, Alaska and Northern Canada are 
the main producers within petroleum and other 
mineral mining. In Arctic Russia, the primary 
production, consisting of mainly petroleum and 
mining, totally dominates the income generation 
as 60 per cent of GRP originate in these activities 
in 2018 (Table 4.10, Figure 4.37). The other two 
 major petroleum and mineral based regions also 
tend to have high shares of primary  (extractive) 
industries in their economies.
The same three regions have the lowest per-
centage contribution to GRP from secondary 
industries, with around 14 percent in Arctic 
Russia and 10 per cent each for Alaska and 
Northern Canada. In secondary industries in-
cluding  manufacturing, utilities and construction, 
Finland takes the lead with 28 per cent of GRP, 
closely followed by Arctic Sweden (26 per cent). 
Among the other regions, Greenland and Faroe 
Islands are equally and most dependent on 
 Primary industries (20 per cent), mostly  relying 
on fisheries. Still, each of them has close to 20 
per cent of GRP from secondary industries. 
 Iceland has the lowest share of primary indus-
tries of 4 per cent, mainly from fisheries, where-
as secondary industry accounts for 21 per cent, 
and the private services dominate by around 50 
per cent of GRP.
Figure 4.45 shows that on average GRP per 
capita is higher in the Arctic regions of the Arctic 
countries than in the non-Arctic regions, where-
as average disposable income of households per 
capita is markedly lower in the Arctic regions. 
However, there are substantial variations be-
tween countries. 
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Box 4.4. Regional accounts data sources  
Alaska
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, United States.
Alaska permanent fund dividend. https://web.archive.org/web/20141006103714/ http://www.apfc.org/home/Con-
tent/dividend/dividendamounts.cfm, and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska_Permanent_Fund
Mineral production of Alaska. 2016-2018. From Table 11 of Athey, J.E., and Werdon, M.B., 2019, Alaska’s mineral 
industry 2018: Alaska Division of Geological & Geophysical Surveys Special Report 74. https://dggs.alaska.gov/pubs/
id/30227
Canada
Statistics Canada, Gross domestic product, expenditure-based, provincial and territorial. https://www150.statcan.
gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=3610040201
Natural Resources Canada. Annual Statistics of Mineral Production. Available at: https://sead.nrcan-rncan.gc.ca/prod-
prod/ann-ann-eng.aspx?FileT=2008&Lang=en
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers. https://www.capp.ca/resources/statistics/
Greenland
Statistics Greenland, StatBank: https://bank.stat.gl/pxweb/en/Greenland/
Faroe Islands




Statistics Norway, Regional Accounts: https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/11713/
Sweden
Statistics Sweden, Regional accounts: https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__NR__NR0105__
NR0105A/
Finland
Statistics Finland, Regional account: https://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/StatFin__kan__altp/
Russia
Federal State Statistics Service of Russian Federation: https://rosstat.gov.ru/
National Minerals Information Center of U.S. Geological Survey: https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/international-
minerals-statistics-and-information
OECD Stat
PPPs and exchange rates. https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=SNA_TABLE4&lang=en
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Box IV  he va ue of having the exc usive 
 right to ex oit a natura  resource 
The artic regions are rich in natural resources; Alaska, Khanty-
Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets have vast oil and gas resources. 
Greenland, Iceland and Northern Norway enjoy access to 
rich fishing grounds and Canada’s Northwest Territories have 
found large diamond resources. Furthermore, other regions 
like Northern Norway, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, have 
hopes for discovering more oil and gas in the Barents Sea. 
The natural resource industries contribute by a large share to 
Arctic GDP. On the other hand, it does not follow that without 
the natural resources Arctic GDP would have been reduced 
by the same amount. GDP figures reflect the use of labour 
and capital for extraction. Without the natural resources, this 
labour and capital could have been utilized in other economic 
activities, and hence, contributed to GDP anyhow. 
In national accounting terms stocks of unexploited natural 
resources should be viewed as capital assets. The value of a 
capital asset is usually reckoned as the total discounted net 
income accruing from it. With respect to natural capital this is 
usually referred to as a stream of resource rents. The resource 
rents are thus the additional income a nation/region obtains 
from having the exclusive right to exploit a natural resource.
There are several definitions of resource rent in the literature. 
Since we apply figures from the National Accounts, we use 
the definition of United Nations System of Environmental 
Economic Accounting.1 Below we go through the individual 
components:
Value Added
 – Other taxes on production  other subsidies on production
 – Compensation of employees (input costs for labor)
= Gross operating surplus (SNA basis)
 – Product subsidies
  Product taxes
= Gross operating surplus (for the derivation of resource rent)
 – Consumption of fixed capital (depreciation) – return to  
  produced assets
= Resource rent
The value added earned through domestic production activity 
in an industry, is defined as output minus intermediate uses. 
To get the gross operating surplus-SNA basis we deduct other 
taxes on production and add other subsidies on production 
and in addition we deduct compensation of employees. Since 
output includes all subsidies on products and excludes taxes 
on products, we must adjust for this by adding product taxes 
and deducting product subsidies to get the gross operating 
surplus - for the derivation of resource rent. Finally, we deduct 
return on fixed capital and capital consumption from the gross 
operating surplus to get the resource rent. When calculating 
compensation of employees and return to fixed capital, the 
idea is to use wage rates and rates of return that reflect the 
 alternative value of both the workers and the capital employed 
to extract the resource. For Norway the average wage rate 
and the average rate of return to capital for all non-natural 
resource based industries have been used as a measure of the 
alternative value. Below is an example from oil and gas extrac-
tion in Norway. All figures connected to oil and gas extraction 
accrue to a separate off-shore  industry in the Norwegian 
national accounts. Note that the subsidies/taxes are neglect-
able and disregared.
The size of the resource rent is very dependent on world 
market prices of oil and gas. Output price movements can 
explain the large increase in resource rent from the 1995-1999 
period to the period 2010-2014, and the subsequent price 
drop explains the decline in resource rents in 2015-2019. Note 
also that the compensation to labour makes up a very small 
part of value added, and that the compensation to capital 
makes up a relatively large part. To the extent that the figures 
from Norway are representative for the situation in the Arctic, 
it is of great interest from an Arctic sustainable development 
perspective to study further whether resource rents are re-
invested in other capital assets located in the Arctic. 
Not all natural resources have a positive resource rent. Studies 
from Norway show that even though Norway has access to 
rich fisheries, the resource rent has not always been positive. 
These figures indicate that in organizing the fisheries, the 
Norwegian authorities do not only maximize the surplus from 
the fisheries, but also focus on other targets such as providing 
jobs in remote areas. From a resource rent perspective, inter-
vening to provide additional jobs is a cost because labour has 
an alternative value. One may of course discuss whether the 
average wage rate in the non-resource sectors is the correct 
measure of this value. However, we see that the resource rent 
in fisheries is on an increasing trend. The reason is that there 
has been a consolidation in the industry with fewer fishermen 
and fewer and more effective vessels. In hydropower, the 
increase in resource rent is due to higher electricity prices, at 
least after 2001. The growth in resource rent in aquaculture 
the last decade is mainly due to increasing prices of salmon.
1 SEEA (2014): System of environmental-economic accounting 2012, 
SEEA Central Framework, Chapter V Asset accounts, United Nations.
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Figure 1.  Protected areas of Svalbard
Box V: Svalbard – coal, tourism and research
Svalbard is an archipelago1 in the Arctic Ocean and is 
part of the Kingdom of Norway, but without the status 
of county or municipality. The area corresponds to ap-
proximately 16 per cent of the total area of Norway. The 
largest island is Spitsbergen, where all permanent settle-
ments and human activity are located.
Longyearbyen is the Norwegian administration centre 
and the largest settlement on Svalbard. In the past 30 
years, the town has gone from a homogenous commu-
nity built up around the mining company Store Norske 
Spitsbergen Kullkompani, to a more diverse society. The 
other settlements are Barentsburg (Russian), Sveagruva, 
Ny- lesund, Hornsund and the two meteorological sta-
tions on Hopen and Bjørnøya.
Norwegian sovereignty
Svalbard was long considered a so-called terra nullius 
by many nations – literally a no mans’s land’ over which 
no single state held sovereignty. The Svalbard Treaty 
was signed in Paris on 9 February 1920 as a result of the 
peace conference after the First World War. The treaty 
provides for Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard, 
while at the same time providing for certain rights for 
the  other signatories. In 1925 the islands were officially 
brought under the Kingdom of Norway. Norway lays 
down and enforces laws and regulations on Svalbard. 
However, the Svalbard Treaty requires Norway to grant 
persons and companies from the over 40 signatory 
states equal rights to engage in hunting, fishing and 
 certain forms of commercial activity in the archipelago 
and its territorial waters.
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Protected wilderness
About 65 per cent of the land area of Svalbard is protect-
ed in one way or another in order to conserve its unique 
nature, landscape and cultural heritage. There are seven 
national parks on Svalbard, six nature reserves, 16 bird 
sanctuaries and one geotope (geological protection 
area). The national parks comprise close to 14 500 km2. 
In addition, in excess of 20 000 km2 of marine areas are 
included in the national parks.
The Svalbard Environmental Protection Act regulates 
what can and what can’t be done in Svalbard’s nature. 
It lays down important overriding principles of environ-
mental law with regard to prudence, notification rules, 
the precautionary principle, total strain assessments, 
economic accountability for environmental damage, 
environment techniques and aspects of investment. The 
purpose of the Act is to safeguard virtually untouched 
area in Svalbard. Within the limits of this framework, 
environmentally sound settlement, research and com-
mercial activity is provided for.
On the basis of environmental surveillance programs 
there are several statistics available on various formats 
and web portals. The motivation for all of them is to 
show whether the management is in compliance with 
the protection act and that the unique wilderness is kept 
unspoiled. Statistics Norway plays a central role in estab-
lishing official statistics for Svalbard and environmental 
statistics is part of this.
Population of Svalbard
There are no Indigenous Peoples on Svalbard and the 
population consists mainly of people moving to the ar-
chipelago to work. There are about 2900 people settled 
on Svalbard in 2020 and the population is mainly concen-
trated in two settlements: Norwegians in Longyearbyen 
and Ukrainians and Russians in Barentsburg. 
In the Norwegian local communities of Longyearbyen 
and Ny- lesund there is about 2400 residents, and the 
number of foreign residents is over 700, 30 per cent of 
the population. The Norwegian local communities have 
residents from over 40 countries. 
Few people remain on Svalbard when they get old, and 
the proportion of children is lower than in mainland Nor-
way. Compared with mainland Norway, there is a clear 
predominance in the age 25 to 39 years. Nearly 40 per 
cent of the population in the Norwegian local communi-
ties is in this age group. 
Svalbard has been characterised as a churn society’, 
and Longyearbyen has much greater turnover than a 
Norwegian municipality of similar size. There is a large 
number of both arrivals and departures: in 2019 over 
400 departures were recorded, corresponding to around 
17 per cent of the population.
he economy of va bard
Coal mining was the main economic activity in Svalbard 
from the early 1900s to 2016. Ny- lesund, Longyearbyen 
and Barentsburg were all founded because of mining op-
erations and coal extraction. Ny- lesund is now a centre 
for international arctic scientific research and environ-
mental monitoring. Owing to low coal prices, the Norwe-
gian government closed down mining operations in Svea 
and Lunckefjell. As from 2017, coal production is not the 
most important industry in Svalbard and, measured in 
turnover, other industries such as construction and ac-
commodation and food service are more important. 
Statistics Norway produces annual industry statistics 
for Svalbard,2 and figures for 2019 show that there was 
a total employment of 1618 FTEs (full-time equivalents) 
in the Norwegian local communities at Svalbard. Only 
about 6 per cent of these FTEs are now directly linked 
to coal production. The statistics also show diversity in 
industrial structure, shedding light on economic develop-
ment in tourism, education and research. 
Jan Henrik Wang, Jakob Kalko, Mikael Sandberg, 
Hege Raaberg Bekkevold, Statistics Norwaywww.ssb.no/svalbard
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Box V: Svalbard cont.
Production of coal
In 1906 the American John M. Longyear founded the 
Arctic Coal Company and founded Longyearbyen in 
Adventdalen on the island of Spitsbergen. The American 
company was purchased ten years later by Store Norske 
Spitsbergen Kullkompani (Store Norske). Since then Store 
Norske has been in coal production on Svalbard, and the 
production grew considerably when the Svea Nord mine 
started production in 2002. There is still some mining 
activity in Svalbard, but there are significant changes. A 
new mine in Lunckefjell began production in 2014 but 
shut down in 2016. Svea was abandoned in 2017, with 
the result that Gruve 7 is the only mine with activity. In 
2008 the company Store Norske had about 410 persons 
employed. It had 97 in 2019. Svea and Lunckefjell mines 
are subject to a clean-up, and the area will be restored 
to the condition in which it was before the mining began. 
The clean-up operation is massive, with an estimated 
cost of approximately NOK 1.2 billion. 
The Russian settlements in Barentsburg are still based 
on coal production but are also engaged in research and 
tourism.
The Russian mine in Barentsburg has been in production 
since the 1930s and is operated by the company Trust 
Arktikugol. The company has also operated mines in 
other parts of Spitsbergen, but Barentsburg is the only 
one currently in production.
Tourism
The Norwegian government has pursued a policy where 
it has been important to facilitate industries other than 
coal mining to ensure a robust basis for settlement in 
Longyearbyen in the long term. The tourism industry 
lives of the untouched nature and ecotourism is a niche 
they have wanted to develop. After the commercial 
focus on tourism in Longyearbyen started up in the 
early 1990s, this industry has exhibited strong growth. 
Enterprises classified as accommodation and food 
service activities on Svalbard had a turnover of NOK 371 
million in 2019 and accounted for 240 of the 1618 FTEs 
of employment on Svalbard. Accommodation statistics 
from Statistics Norway show more than a doubling in the 
number of guest night on Svalbard from 2010 to 2019.
ab e  Main economic figures for the Nor egian sett ements on va bard in  I








Svalbard total 321 1618 3 645 405 764 685 1128204 423213
Mining and quarrying 1 97 152 495 - 93 545 1 552
Manufacturing; Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities 15 60 249 159 5 259 59 852 7 800
Construction 21 221 648 449 40 163 114 20 032
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 26 120 393 721 0 69 910 14 772
Transportation and storage 22 117 457 411 - 119 763 69 265
Accommodation and food service activities 21 240 371 263 33 019 116 223 48 239
Information and communication. Financial and insurance activities 15 66 677 751 520 55 347 101 479
Real estate activities 27 6 92 494 0 4 515 77 941
Professional, scientific and technical activities 49 70 51 184 73 130 51 322 8 857
Administrative and support service activities 64 174 336 052 76 741 97 717 31 933
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 8 101 30 511 333 654 80 710 14 899
Education 8 166 64 251 189 026 114 564 13 795
Human health and social work activities 9 65 14 158 22 601 49 345 524
Arts, entertainment and recreation 26 103 101 129 25 195 47 303 12 085
Other service activities 7 11 5 377 5 500 4 974 40
Source: Statistics Norway













1 It has not been any coal shipping from Russian mines in Barentsburg in 
2009 and 2010 due to fire spring 2008.
Source: Directorate of Mining with Commisioner of Mines at Svalbard, 
Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani.
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esearch and education
To enhance Svalbard as a platform for Arctic research 
the Norwegian government has since the 1990s 
 developed significant research infrastructure in terms 
of research stations and laboratories, satellite download 
stations and observatories on Svalbard. In addition, 
 several Norwegian research vessels operate in Arctic 
waters. Kings-Bay AS is a state-owned company situated 
in Ny- lesund. The company activities are to provide 
services and promote research and scientific activities, 
as well as to develop Ny- lesund as an international 
Arctic scientific station. Several nations have permanent 
research stations located in Ny- lesund, such as Norway, 
China, Great Britain and Germany. According to statis-
tics from Kings-Bay AS there were performed 15 100 
research person-days in 2019, a growth of 13 per cent 
from 2018. Research person-days include field days, and 
support and logistics activity originating at the stations.
The University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS) situated in 
Longyearbyen was crated by the four oldest  Norwegian 
universities in 1993. The University offers various 
courses at the master’s and doctoral levels. The courses 
focus on Arctic biology, Arctic geology, Arctic geophysics 
and Arctic technology. The number of students increased 
significantly until 2017, and about 740 students were 
 affiliated with the University Centre in 2019. 
More statistics on Svalbard
Svalbard has a separate section on Statistics Norway’s 
website,3 under the STATISTICS’ tab. Current and up-
todate statistics on and analyses of topics discussed in 
this article can be found there. The website also provides 
detailed background data on the various statistics
_______________ 
1 Svalbard is defined as a land area situated between 74 and 81 degrees 
north, between 10 and 35 degrees east.
2 http://www.ssb.no/en/sts 
3 https://www.ssb.no/en/svalbard 
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Box V: Svalbard cont.
Svalbard. Colourbox
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igure   cean management area in Nor ay for the Barents ea and ofoten and 
related land areas
Source: Faglig forum for norske havområder (2019): Verdiskaping i n ringene - Faggrunnlag for revisjon av 
forvaltningsplanen for Barentshavet og havområdene utenfor Lofoten M-1297/2019. Figure 2.1.
Box VI: Economic va ues from ocean management by Nor ay in the Barents ea and ofoten
Oceans contribute with large 
economic values. Environ-
mental management of 
oceans is crucial in order to 
maintain sustainable use of 
natural resources, as basis 
for current and future eco-
nomic activity. Norway has 
ocean management plans for 
the ocean areas outside Arc-
tic Norway, from the Barents 
Sea to Lofoten, denoted the 
ocean management area (for-
valtningsplanområdet). Eco-
nomic values from economic 
activities in and related to 
the ocean management 
area have been assessed by 
Statistics Norway for a recent 
report from the Norwegian 
Environment Agency.1 The 
main results from the as-
sessments of production and 
employment are presented 
here. 
The economic activities most 
directly related to the ocean 
management area are found in the four ocean based 
sectors seafood, petroleum, shipping, and tourism. In 
this study the sectors are defined as both the core activi-
ties of the sectors and the main deliveries of intermedi-
ate consumption to the sector. The land areas related 
to the ocean management area from the Barents Sea to 
Lofoten, consist of all municipalities in the counties of 
Finnmark and Troms and the northernmost municipali-
ties of the county of Nordland, i.e. north of Lofoten, as 
well as Svalbard.
For sector tourism the geographical delineation is the 
same regarding Svalbard and Nordland as for the other 
three sectors. Finnmark and Troms as counties are also 
included in the sector tourism but value added and em-
ployment are estimated only for the ocean municipalities 
in these counties and not for all municipalities. That is 
due to the assumption that tourists that only visits inland 
municipalities are not interested in sea as tourist attrac-
tion. Definition of core activities in the sectors and the 
geographical areas are given in Table 1. 
The economic values from the ocean management area 
consist of value added and employment in the four sec-
tors seafood, petroleum, shipping, and tourism. Results 
are presented for 2010 and 2016, in Table 2 for value 
added and Table 3 for employment. 
Data are from regional national accounts, with some 
additional data sources, including production data. For 
fisheries and petroleum, production data are utilized 
as basis for regionalizing production. As several ship-
ping services take place in other sectors, value added in 
the shipping sector is underestimated, in order to avoid 
double-counting. 
Assessments for the tourism sector is based on the 
satellite account for tourism.2 Estimates of the economic 
value of tourism can be consumption based, assessing 
expenditures by tourists, or production based, assess-
ing value added from businesses delivering goods and 
services to tourists. In this study, the economic value of 
tourism is based on estimates of consumption by tour-
ists. 
As shown in Table 2, value added in the four ocean 
based sectors, for all of Norway, was about 623 billion 
NOK in 2016. For the ocean management area from the 
Barents Sea to the Lofoten area, the value added in the 
four ocean based sectors was assessed at 51.4 billion 
NOK in 2016, which was 14.6 billion NOK higher than in 
2010
Petroleum and seafood represent most of value added 
in the ocean management area, and together the value 
added of these two sectors represent 91 per cent of 
value added in the ocean management area in 2016.
The value added of the seafood sector in the ocean man-
agement area was 12 billion NOK in 2010 and 21.4 billion 
NOK in 2016. As shown in Table 2, the value added of 
the seafood sector in the ocean management area is 37 
per cent of the value added of the seafood sector for all 
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Table 2. Value added in ocean based sectors. Norway 
and ocean management area. Billion NOK 






Sea to Lofoten 
(billion NOK)
Share of total  
in Norway  
(per cent)
Sector 2010 2016 2010 2016 2010 2016
Seafood 33.1 57.9 11,9 21.4 36 37
Petroleum 596.,6 478.5 21.2 25.3 4 5
Shipping 32.2 40.7 1.3 1.0 4 2
Tourism 32.2 45.4 2.4 3.7 7 8
Total 694.1 622.5 36.8 51.4 5 8
Source: Faglig forum for norske havområder (2019): Verdiskaping i 
n ringene - Faggrunnlag for revisjon av forvaltningsplanen for 
Barentshavet og havområdene utenfor Lofoten M-1297/2019. Table 
2.10.
Table 3. Employment in ocean based sectors. Norway 







Sea to Lofoten 
(1 000 persons) 
Share of total  
in Norway  
(per cent)
Sector 2010 2016 2010 2016 2010 2016
Seafood 24.9 28 9.4 11.3 38 40
Petroleum 113.4 114.6 13.7 14.5 12 13
Shipping 27.8 32.5 1.7 2.9 6 9
Tourism 74.2 88.4 4.8 6.1 6 7
Total 240.3 263.5 29.6 34.8 12 13
Source: Faglig forum for norske havområder (2019): Verdiskaping i 
n ringene - Faggrunnlag for revisjon av forvaltningsplanen for 
Barentshavet og havområdene utenfor Lofoten M-1297/2019. Table 
2.10.
ab e   ectora  and geogra hica  de ineation of ocean based sectors 
Sector Core activity Geographical delineation
Seafood
Fisheries and catch, aquaculture, 
processing, wholesale trade of 
seafood, and production of raw 
fish oils and fat
Fisheries and catch: Economic activity in the ocean management area
Aquaculture: Economic activity in the and areas re ated to the ocean 
management area 
Processing and wholesale trade of seafood: Share of total fisheries and aquaculture 
in Norway that can be related to the ocean management area
Production of raw fish oils and fat: Share of total fisheries and catch in Norway that 
can be related to the ocean management area
Petroleum
Extraction and production of oil 
and natural gas, and related 
services
Exploration and extraction activities in the ocean management area
Shipping 
Domestic and international 
shipping of goods, and domestic 
coastal transportation of 
passengers and goods
Economic activity in the and areas re ated to the ocean management area
Tourism
Accommodation and meals, 
transportation, other services 
and goods
Norwegian and international tourists’ consumption of goods and services in the 
ocean municipalities, defined as the municipalities related to the ocean 
management area except inland municipalities
Source: Faglig forum for norske havområder (2019): Verdiskaping i n ringene - Faggrunnlag for revisjon av forvaltningsplanen for Barentshavet og 
havområdene utenfor Lofoten M-1297/2019. Table 2.1.
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of Norway, and in the ocean management area, seafood 
has a larger share of the national economy than the 
other ocean based sectors together. 
While the value added of the petroleum sector, for all 
of Norway, declined between 2010 and 2016, the value 
added of the petroleum sector increased in the ocean 
management area, from 21.2 billion NOK to 25.3 billion 
NOK, an increase of four billion NOK. The petroleum sec-
tor in the ocean management area consists of produc-
tion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) at Melkøya outside 
Hammerfest with natural gas from the Snøhvit field, and 
from 2016, oil production from Goliat field. 
The value added of shipping increased, for all of Nor-
way, from 2010 to 2016, while it decreased in the ocean 
management area, from 1.3 billion NOK to 1.0 billion 
NOK. The value added of tourism in the ocean manage-
ment area was 3.7 billion NOK in 2016, an increase of 1.3 
billion NOK from 2010.
As shown in Table 3, employment in the four ocean 
based sectors, for all of Norway, was about 263 500 per-
sons in 2016. In the ocean management area, employ-
ment in the four ocean based sectors was estimated to 
about 34 800 persons in 2016. The highest employment 
in the ocean management area was in the petroleum 
sector, with about 14 500 persons in 2016, an increase of 
about 800 persons from 2010. Together the seafood and 
the petroleum sectors represent 18 per cent of employ-
ment in the ocean management area in 2016.
_________________
1 Faglig forum for norske havområder (2019): Verdiskaping i n ringene 
- Faggrunnlag for revisjon av forvaltningsplanen for Barentshavet og 
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Local marketplace, Nuuk, Greenland. Photo: Tom Nicolaysen
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Introduction
This study looks at the potential effects on the 
oil and gas extraction in the Arctic if petroleum 
 companies increase their required rate of return 
(RRR) on investments. The required rate of return 
serves as an economic criterion for investment 
decisions and is also used as the discount rate for 
expressing future income in present value.  Various 
trends indicate that the required rate of return for 
the  petroleum companies may be higher today 
than only some years ago as companies increas-
ingly focus on projects that deliver high rates of 
return rather than high reserve volumes.1 A con-
sequence has been a shift towards projects with 
shorter  investment cycles. Since the price drop in 
2014 many oil majors have moved from high-cost 
undeveloped resources to lower-cost areas where 
resources can be brought on relatively quickly.2 
The clearest  example of this is investment in light 
5. Arctic petroleum extraction with increased rates 
of return
Lars Lindholt and Solveig Glomsrød
tight oil reserves (shale oil) but is also seen in 
 conventional crude oil projects with shorter time 
lags between development approval and pro-
duction.3 In a recent study The Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies4 shows that investors now are 
 demanding a much higher minimum return to 
invest in long cycle oil projects than they did be-
fore. Further, the industry seems to drill fewer and 
better wells in commercially attractive areas than 
before, meaning that high returns are preferred 
over high volumes. 
Perceived risk is among factors raising investor’s 
required rate of return. Risk can relate to op-
erations or policy interventions. There has been 
 arising awareness within the business community 
of climate risk to the economy.5 Future investment 
bears the risk of assets being undeveloped and 
the fossil industry is under scrutiny from investors 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline. Photo: Colourbox
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about the impact of climate policies on their future 
earnings. Worldwide, pension funds and sovereign 
funds have increasingly pledged to avoid invest-
ments in fossil fuel companies over fears that their 
assets could become “stranded”, or worthless, if 
governments across the world introduce stricter 
rules to tackle global warming.6 This can lead to 
more near-sighted investment strategies by the oil 
and gas companies and hence, a higher required 
rate of return. This is confirmed by the study of The 
Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, which concludes 
that higher required rate of return in general is due 
to concerns of the green energy transition.
A possible threat to future oil demand is that the 
cost of electric vehicles (EV) is expected to be at 
par with the cost of cars with internal combustion 
engines as soon as by 2022.7 The largest emerg-
ing economies China and India have signaled high 
ambitions for EV8 and car producers have pledged 
to end production of cars with only internal com-
bustion engines.9, 10 Technological breakthroughs 
in battery technology could also promote EVs and 
reduce the oil demand from transportation, as 
can phasing in of hydrogen. In addition, oil deliver-
ies to the petrochemicals industry are vulnerable 
to environmental concerns as an emerging “war 
on plastics” is taking place,11 thus increasing the 
uncertainty about the prospects of oil. The effects 
described above are linked to a business environ-
ment of both higher required rate of return for the 
oil and gas companies as well as expectations of 
lower future prices.
There are different opinions on the appropriate 
rate of return to apply in petroleum analyses. The 
rate of return shall reflect the return to capital in 
the best alternative investment option, while the 
investor is compensated for taking risk. Hence, 
the real rate of return is the risk-free rate plus a 
premium for risk.12 Wood Mackenzie, a consultant, 
considers the standard industry benchmark for the 
internal rate of return for a robust oil and gas proj-
ect to be around 15 per cent or even somewhat 
higher.13 Further, according to The Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies the rate to investors is now 
closer to 20 per cent for new international oil and 
gas projects, especially deep-water and other long 
cycle projects. At the lower end, the Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has set the dis-
count rate in petroleum projects to be 7 per cent,14 
which we assume can represent a lower level of a 
relevant variation area. 
Hence, we look at the prospects for oil and gas in 
arctic regions until 2050 at 20 per cent required 
rate of return (the high RRR scenario) and compare 
with the case of 7 per cent (the reference scenario). 
This study applies a comprehensive and transpar-
ent global oil and gas model (FRISBEE) with prices, 
costs and reserves. An important contribution of 
our approach is the detailed modelling of the sup-
ply side. Petroleum producers base their invest-
ment and production decisions on profit maximi-
zation and detailed information about the access 
to fields worldwide. The producers might invest in 
rt  the r r r  e l t es  S he er lle  t the e   e  t er t s  S he er lle  h t  r r  h e  
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new reserves, which can be new fields or increased 
oil and gas recovery from already producing fields. 
The assumption that investments first target the 
most profitable reserves leads to a geographical 
spread of oil and gas extraction worldwide. Gradu-
ally less profitable resources are developed until 
the internal rate of return is equal to the required 
rate of return. An important feature of the model 
for this study is that due to generally long lead 
times, it takes time before a decline in oil and gas 
investment in new field reserves leads to reduced 
production. However, changes in investments in 
oil and gas recovery from existing fields will have 
a more rapid effect on supply. We emphasize that 
due to uncertainty in many estimates, the focus of 
this analysis is not on the future level of extraction 
itself, but the relative effects of higher required 
rates of returns on oil and gas production.
The oil price follows an exogenous trajectory in 
FRISBEE. Firstly, we develop the reference scenario 
with a RRR of 7 per cent and an oil price based 
on the Stated Policy Scenario of IEA.15 In this IEA 
scenario the real oil price (2012-USD)16 is expected 
to increase to 70 USD per barrel in 2025 before 
rising to reach almost 90 USD in 2040, all in 2012 
USD (Figure 5.1). As we study the effects until 2050, 
we keep the oil price constant after 2040. Note 
that we focus on long-term developments and not 
short-term fluctuations, like the drop in oil prices in 
2014/2015 and in 2020 due to the covid-19 pan-
demic.
Historically the gas price has followed the oil price 
relatively closely, but with a lag. During the last 
years the link between oil and gas prices seems to 
be weaker, at least in certain regions where prices 
are determined in spot markets rather than in 
contracts. The regional gas prices in FRISBEE are 
endogenous, determined by supply and demand 
under influence of transportation costs. Traded 
gas will find its way to buyers via the least cost 
transport mode. In the FRISBEE model, investors 
respond with adaptive price expectations, assum-
ing that the future oil and gas prices will settle at 
the average over the 6 previous years. When the 
price of oil is increasing, the adaptive expectations 
will lead investors onto a rising expected price path 
that is lagging somewhat behind the real price de-
velopment. This will also be the case for gas, if the 
endogenous market price for gas is increasing.
Arctic oil supply
Figure 5.2 shows the simulated future production 
of oil in the Arctic in both scenarios. The refer-
ence scenario with 7 per cent RRR will lead to a 
minor decline in total Arctic oil production up until 
the early 2040s, before it begins to increase from 
around 440 Mtoe to almost 500 Mtoe by 2050, 
slightly above the current production level. Behind 
this development, many fields are exhausted, while 
new fields are being developed. The reason for this 
surge towards the end of the projection period is 
rapidly rising supply from Greenland and Alaska.
Intuitively one would think that if companies raise 
the RRR to 20 per cent fewer high-cost reserves 
become profitable and investments would decline, 
ultimately leading to lower supply. However, Figure 
5.2 shows that the effect of higher RRR does not 
quite match this picture. With a 20 per cent RRR the 
arctic oil production falls markedly as expected at 
an early stage and stays there until the early 2040s. 
Then, counterintuitively, production takes off and 
nearly reaches the level in the 7 per cent scenario 
by 2050.
With identical oil prices in both scenarios, one 
would expect that with a high RRR production 
would stay low or continue to decline rather than 
rebound after 2040 as fewer of the high-cost fields 
are profitable to develop. However, lower invest-
ments in an initial period entail lower future capital 
costs, both because of reduced investment activity 
by itself and also because the pool of undeveloped 
reserves declines more slowly. This means that it 
will be less costly and more profitable to invest in 
these fields at a later stage, explaining why produc-
tion is higher after 2047 in the 20 per cent case 
compared to the reference scenario.










Source: IEA 2019 Stated Policy Scenario
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Oil production by region
Arctic Russia
Russian oil production is dominating within the 
Arctic and largely determines the production 
profile for the Arctic as a whole. Figure 5.2 shows 
Arctic Russian oil production in both scenarios. 
In the reference scenario, production is relatively 
constant up until the mid-thirties, before it starts to 
decline to 17 per cent below today’s level by 2050. 
Almost all oil production prior to 2030 comes from 
already discovered reserves, onshore in Yamal-
Nenets, Khanty-Mansii and Komi. Production 
offshore currently comes from the single field of 
Prirazlomnoye at 20 meters depth in Petchora Sea, 
which came into production in 2014. From 2030 a 
relatively large part of the production must come 
from undiscovered fields.
Oil production in Arctic Russia declines when intro-
ducing a higher required rate of return. However, 
after 2047 extraction is slightly higher in the 20 per 
cent scenario. First, introducing a higher RRR leads 
to lower investment and lower production from ex-
isting fields. Lower reserve investments drive down 
the capital costs and makes it profitable to invest 
in these reserves at a later stage, and eventually 
production is somewhat higher in the 20 per cent 
scenario. Accumulated supply in Arctic Russia and 
the Arctic as a whole decline by 9 per cent each 
during 2020- 2050 (Table 5.1).
Figure 5.3 highlights the impact of a higher RRR in 
other and less dominating petroleum regions in 
the Arctic.
Alaska 
Alaska’s oil production is mainly taking place on the 
North Slope, which covers the Central Arctic state 
lands and adjacent waters of the Beaufort Sea. 
Alaskan oil production has been declining for years 
and continues to decline up until the mid-2030s in 
our reference scenario. However, new resources 
at relatively low cost are available and over time, 
investment in new reserves steadily increases 
supply towards 2050 to around 15 Mtoe above the 
present level. However, substantial future increase 
in Alaskan oil production requires that onshore 
areas including the area of the Arctic National Wild-
life Refuge (ANWR)17 and the National Petroleum 
Reserve Alaska (NPRA) are accessible. It is possible 
that 90 per cent of the Alaskan undiscovered oil 
is found onshore on the North Slope as well as 
offshore in adjacent areas in the Arctic Ocean and 
closer to land than the Chukchi Sea.
A higher RRR further reduces production in Alaska 
towards the early 2030s, but the loss of output 
becomes smaller over time in relative terms. Ag-
gregated supply over the whole period declines by 
13 per cent (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1. Change in accumulated oil production 2020-
2050. Increased rate of return scenario. 
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Figure 5.2. Arctic oil production. Reference scenario and 
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Figure 5.3.  Regional distribution of West Arctic oil 
production. Reference scenario and increased 
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Northern Canada 
Canada produces lots of oil and gas, but little in the 
Arctic (Figure 5.3). There is some oil production in 
the Northwest Territories. In 2016, the federal gov-
ernment announced that Canadian Arctic offshore, 
including areas offshore of Northwest Territories, is 
off limits to new offshore oil and gas licensing to be 
reviewed every five years. The first five-year review 
is due in 2021.18 From 2016 to 2018, the Norman 
Wells Oil Pipeline was shut-in because of safety 
concerns, and as a result, production at Norman 
Wells was suspended and Arctic Canadian oil sup-
ply almost came to a halt. In our reference scenario 
oil production in Arctic Canada remains rather low 
up to 2042, followed by a relatively strong increase 
up to almost 10 Mtoe by 2050, a level which will 
require infrastructure investments. 
A higher RRR leads to a minor reduction in supply 
towards 2040. From then on production increases 
and surpasses the reference scenario in 2050 by al-
most 50 per cent, an effect of delayed investments. 
Accumulated supply increases by 8 per cent over 
the period.
Northern Norway
Arctic Norway includes the Norwegian Sea, where 
production started on the Draugen-field in 1993, 
and the Barents Sea. There is only production 
from one oil field in the Barents Sea, as Goliat 
was developed in 2016. Another Barents Sea 
field, Johan Castberg, is expected to start produc-
tion in 2023/2024. We keep the areas of Lofoten, 
Vesterålen and Senja closed for petroleum activity. 
In the reference scenario, oil production increases 
over the next few years, reflecting increasing sup-
ply from the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea 
up to 2025 and 2027, respectively, as relatively 
large amounts of new reserves are coming into 
production (Figure 5.3). From then on oil produc-
tion in Arctic Norway declines. The Norwegian Sea 
shows the steepest decline, and total oil produc-
tion in Arctic Norway in 2050 ends up at 40 per 
cent below the present level.
In the high RRR scenario we see that production 
initially declines but is above the reference scenar-
io after the early 2040s (Figure 5.3). Again, higher 
RRR leads to lower reserve investments initially 
which drives down future capital costs and makes 
it profitable to invest in these reserves at a later 
stage.
Greenland
Greenland has almost one-sixth of undiscovered oil 
in the Arctic, but no reserves have been proven as 
profitable and recoverable. In addition, Greenland 
has the longest lead times and highest costs. How-
ever, Greenland Gas & Oil Limited is planning for a 
drilling program commencing in the fall of 2020.19 
In our simulations production for total Greenland 
starts as late as from around 2035 and reaches 
over 80 Mtoe by 2050.
A higher RRR leads to lower production in Green-
land, although the reduction becomes relatively 
smaller over time. Aggregated oil supply from 
Greenland over the period declines by 50 per cent 
(Table 5.1). 
Gas production and gas prices
Contrary to the oil price, the gas price is deter-
mined in regional markets and introduces a differ-
ent dynamic in the scenario development.
Figure 5.4 shows total Arctic gas production in the 
reference scenario. Gas supply declines markedly 
towards the late 2030s to around a quarter below 
today’s level. From then on Arctic gas production 
increases to 2050 but ends at 10 per cent below 
the 2020 level. In our reference scenario the aver-
age regional gas price is 75 per cent higher in 2050 
than in 2020, compared to an oil price increase of 
almost 60 per cent over the same period.
Introducing a 20 per cent required rate of return 
leads to higher production after the late 2020s 
(Figure 5.4). Hence, the long-lasting decline in total 
Arctic supply of gas in the reference scenario until 
about 2038 has been modified already a decade 
earlier before it starts to rise around mid-2030s. 
By 2050 production increases to almost 510 Mtoe, 
more than 55 Mtoe above the level in the reference 
Photo Mary Stapleton
106
Arctic petroleum extraction with increased rates of return The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020
scenario. The initial period with lower gas produc-
tion is much shorter than what the oil market expe-
rienced with a higher RRR. Again, higher RRR leads 
to lower reserve investments initially which drives 
down the capital costs and makes it profitable to 
invest in these reserves at a later stage. As for oil, 
this eventually can lead to higher supply than in the 
reference scenario. However, for gas markets we 
have an additional effect that can stimulate invest-
ment and production and counteract the negative 
effect on investment from higher RRR. This effect 
relates to the endogenous regional gas prices in 
contrast to our fixed, exogenous oil price. Higher 
RRR and the corresponding lower production will, 
inter alia, lead to higher gas price. Higher regional 
gas prices will stimulate supply over time and we 
can therefore more easily end up with produc-
tion above the reference scenario. This effect may 
differ between regions and field  categories. With 
a higher RRR, some suppliers reduce production 
relatively more and for a longer initial period than 
others, depending on to what extent increased 
RRR makes the high cost fields become unprofit-
able. In addition, in regions with shorter lead times 
compared to the Arctic the period from reduced 
investment to lower production is relatively short. 
As a result, the increase in gas prices and, hence, 
production, differ across regions. The various arctic 
regions also export to different parts of the world 
and changes in export gas prices will not be equal 
across regions. All regions increase production in 
the high RRR scenario, largely without initial de-
clines except Russia.
Arctic Russia
Arctic Russia is a giant petroleum producer in Arctic 
and global context, with over 90 per cent of the 
total Arctic petroleum production today (and 90 
per cent of total Russian gas production). Arctic 
Russia has the lion’s share of total Arctic resources 
in terms of undiscovered gas resources, of which 
almost 90 per cent are found offshore. Supply 
declines until the late 2030s and then increases 
but only to 15 per cent below today’s level. In Arctic 
Russia the reference scenario is largely based on 
production from already discovered reserves, both 
developed and undeveloped. 
With a high RRR Arctic Russia experiences an initial 
period with marginally reduced activity but eventu-
ally supply starts to increase and surpasses that of 
the reference scenario around 2030. However, the 
higher activity in this mid-period eventually leads 
to higher costs and marginally lower supply than in 
the reference scenario as from 2045.
Fields are emptied over time and to prevent pro-
duction from declining even further, new fields 
must be discovered and developed to keep an 
increasing, or even constant, production profile 
over time. The lion’s share of new reserves in 
Arctic  Russia may have to come from offshore 
resources not yet discovered. One can question 
if this is  realistic as there is yet no gas production 
Figure 5.4. Arctic gas production. Reference scenario and 
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Figure 5.5.  Regional distribution of West Arctic gas 
production. Reference scenario and increased 
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Alaska
The long-lasting decline in Alaskan supply of gas 
until the late 2030s has been turned into growth 
a decade earlier with a high RRR, raising supply to 
about 30 Mtoe above the old reference scenario in 
2050 (Figure 5.5). Aggregated supply from 2020 to 
2050 is 135 per cent above the reference scenario 
(Table 5.2). This increase is due to relatively large 
increase in gas prices in the US market following a 
higher RRR. With a higher RRR, US suppliers reduce 
production relatively fast and to a relatively large 
extent, because of short lead times and the fact 
that relatively many fields become unprofitable. 
The regional gas price increases twice as much as 
the average world gas price. Alaska does not even 
reduce supply in an initial period with higher RRR 
as higher gas prices already counterweighs the 
negative effect of higher RRR on investment and 
production. 
Alaska has probably as much as one-fifth of undis-
covered gas in the Arctic, including Alaskan shale 
gas. Shell and Statoil (now Equinor) withdrew from 
offshore exploratory drilling in the Chukchi Sea in 
2015. However, over 90 per cent of the Alaskan 
undiscovered gas is found onshore on the North 
Slope as well as offshore in adjacent areas in the 
Arctic Ocean closer to land than the Chukchi Sea. 
The increase in gas supply is probably conditioned 
on a gas pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to the port city 
of Nikiski in southern Alaska, similar to the existing 
North Slope oil pipeline. There are plans of other 
pipelines and LNG factories, above all a new LNG 
plant in Nikiski. In 2018 the federal authorities 
in  Russian Arctic waters (the only offshore gas 
production takes place in shallow waters near the 
island of Sakhalin in more temperate regions). 
However, Russian engineers are world leaders in 
inland arctic pipeline technology crucial for the 
Yamal Peninsula projects, where almost all  Arctic 
Russian gas production takes place. Offshore 
extraction is costlier and more demanding than on-
shore production and is also dependent on differ-
ent technological expertise and experience. Today, 
western gas companies are not allowed to deliver 
such technologies due to economic sanctions. The 
supergiant Bovanenko onshore gas field, larger 
than the giant offshore Stockman gas field put on 
hold, began production in 2012. Bovanenko is now 
producing over 20 per cent of total Russian gas. An-
other giant field, the Kruzenshternskoye field, will 
probably start production in the mid-2020s and will 
be connected to the Bovanenkovo field via pipe-
lines.20 It is difficult to predict how future European 
gas import will develop and affect future Russian 
gas export. However, a new gas pipeline -North 
Stream 2- from Russia to Germany is expected to 
be finished in 2021. In addition, we can expect an 
increase in Asian demand. A new pipeline from 
East Arctic Russia is currently delivering gas to 
China. There are plans for connecting this pipeline 
to the rest of the Russian network, so that in some 
years it might be possible to transport gas from 
Yamal in Western Siberia to the Asian markets. 
Also, the Yamal LNG plant started production in 
2017 for export to Asia along the Northern Sea 
Route and to Europe. Hence, future demand for 
Russian gas in Europe might not 
decline, and in addition there will 
probably be an increase in Asian 
demand, leading to increased 
Russian output after late 2030s.
Note that in our model gas will 
be traded if profitable, using 
the lowest cost transportation 
 method, via pipelines or sea. 
Hence our study reflects a situ-
ation in the long term without 
sanctions.
Figure 5.5 highlights the project-
ed future reference supply of gas 
from other Arctic regions than 
Russia. Pipelines in Alaska. Photo: Colorbox
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decided to expand federal oil and gas leasing in the 
ANWR, in an even larger area of the NPRA and off-
shore. After decades of opposition to drilling in the 
ANWR oil leases were auctioned in January 2021. 
However, interests were low,21 possibly reflecting 
a more risk averse attitude towards large projects 
with a longtime horizon.
Northern Canada
The present level of gas production in Arctic 
Canada is very low and is consumed locally. Natu-
ral gas production at Norman Wells was suspended 
from 2017 to 2018 in response to the suspension 
of oil production in the region. Higher RRR and 
higher gas prices means that the increase in gas 
supply now starts around the mid-2020s, a decade 
earlier than in the reference case. This leads to 
an increase in aggregated gas supply of over 80 
per cent over the projection period, albeit from 
a low level. Developing Canada’s gas reserves at 
this scale might require substantial investments in 
infrastructure as pipelines or large-scale LNG facili-
ties. The Mackenzie Gas Project was cancelled in 
2017, because it was not considered economically 
feasible due to the low North American gas prices 
at that time. The Mackenzie pipeline was meant to 
transport gas from the North West Territories and 
south to Alberta oil sands areas and further. 
Northern Norway
Today Arctic Norway produces gas in the Norwe-
gian Sea and the Barents Sea (the Snøhvit field). 
In the reference scenario production steadily 
declines to only one-fifth of today’s level by 2050. 
Higher gas prices lift the production profile so that 
 accumulated production increases by 12 per cent 
Box 5.1. The FRISBEE model of global petroleum markets
Method 
The FRISBEE-model is a recursive, dynamic partial equi-
librium model for fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal), renew-
ables and electricity in 16 regions worldwide. Demand 
is a function of end-user prices of energy, population, 
GDP per capita and AEEI-autonomous energy efficiency 
improvement. Each region has three end-users: Indus-
try, households (incl. services) and power producers. 
The relevant consumer price of a fuel in a region is 
the sum of the producer price, delivery costs (due to 
transport, distribution and refining) and existing taxes/
subsidies. The CO2 tax comes in addition to delivery 
costs and existing taxes.
FRISBEE has previously been used for studies of petro-
leum production, emission from shipping and petro-
leum activities in the Arctic and impacts of petroleum 
industry restructuring.
On the oil market OPEC is a dominant player and 
 covers the residual demand (difference between global 
demand and Non-OPEC supply). The oil price scenario 
is from IEA (2019). We have perfect competition on the 
gas and coal markets (endogenous prices). Regarding 
oil and gas the model differs between fields in produc-
tion, fields not developed and undiscovered fields. 
Both production and investment decision are modelled 
explicitly and are based on profitability. We model low 
flexibility in the short-term and full flexibility in the 
long-term, and differ between capital and production 
costs. We also implement bilateral gas trade between 
regions. Coal supply is based on more simple cost 
functions. Renewables are introduced in exogenous 
amounts.
The model assumes that the basic incentive for oil 
and gas companies is to invest in provinces and field 
types with the highest expected return. We apply a 
pre- specified required rate of return, which is set to 
7 and 20 per cent in real terms in the reference and 
the alternative scenario, respectively. The oil and gas 
companies only invest in projects with a RRR above or 
at the pre-specified level. The assumption that invest-
ments first target the most profitable reserves leads 
to a geographical spread of extraction. Gradually, 
reserves that are costlier to extract become candidates 
for investment, and the cost of development will rise as 
reserves are depleted. On the other hand, new discov-
eries add to the pool of undeveloped reserves. 
Data on discovered reserves (both producing, deve lop-
ed and undeveloped) and operational and capital costs 
are based on the extensive database of global petro-
leum reserves in the year 2012. The parameters in the 
cost function are based on available cost data.
The model covers five arctic regions; Alaska, Arctic 
Canada, Arctic Norway, Greenland and Arctic Russia.
While discovered reserves already generate production 
or may lead to production in the relative short term, 
undiscovered resources identified through geological 
surveys (or seismic activity) are more uncertain and 
will only lead to production in the long-term. Expected 
undiscovered oil resources are mainly based on various 
reports from USGS, e.g. USGS (2012), as well as Norwe-
gian Petroleum Directorate (2017).
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(Table 5.2). This may be credible, partly due to the 
new pipeline that was opened in 2015 – Polarled 
– which crosses the Arctic Circle and can transport 
gas from the Aasta Hansteen field to Nyhamna/
Molde on the west coast of South Norway.
Greenland
In Greenland gas has been indicated by seismic 
surveys, but no findings have proven viable. Many 
parts of the Greenland continental shelf area 
are still relatively unexplored. However, there is 
still exploration for gas (and oil), and licenses for 
exploration and extraction of gas (and oil) have 
recently been granted.22 Our simulations show that 
even with relatively large undiscovered resources, 
the relatively high costs and long lead time means 
that Greenland is unable to start production before 
the mid-2040s. In the high RRR scenario the op-
portunity for profitable investments opens up for 
Greenland, experiencing a five-fold increase in 
aggregated production, almost reaching the level 
of Alaska in 2050 (Table 5.2). Greenland has no 
natural gas or LNG infrastructure or installations, 
including storage facilities and pipelines. Hence, 
our simulations assume the building of the neces-
sary infrastructure.
Summary
This study looks at the effects on the oil and gas 
extraction in the Arctic until 2050 if petroleum com-
panies increase their required rate of return on in-
vestments. A higher rate of return means that the 
oil and gas companies become more near-sighted 
and reflects concerns of the green energy transi-
tion which could make their assets “stranded”, or 
worthless.
When companies raise the required rate of return 
fewer high-cost reserves become profitable and 
investments decline, ultimately leading to lower 
supply. However, lower investments in an initial 
period entail lower future capital costs and this 
means that it will be less costly and more profitable 
to invest in these fields at a later stage. This ex-
plains why production does not decline as much as 
one initially would expect. Consequently, a higher 
required rate of return generally leads to a relative-
ly small decline in arctic oil production. Arctic gas 
producers in addition experiences higher prices, 
which means that production generally increases 
with a higher required rate of return.
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In addition to oil and gas, the arctic region contains other 
abundant mineral resources. However, many known 
reserves are not exploited because of their inaccessi-
bility. Arctic Russia clearly extracts the largest amount of 
minerals, but the other arctic regions also have certain 
important extractive industries, providing raw materials 
to the world economy.1
Below is an overview of important minerals that are 
found in the Arctic, including coal, iron and ferro-alloy 
minerals, several non-ferrous minerals, precious metal 
ores and industrial minerals. Due to the numerous 
sorts of minerals that exist, the list will obviously not be 
exhaustive. We also lack data for certain minerals. Some 
limited information on reserves will be included in the 
comments to production of the specific mineral. For 
information on the application of the different miner-
als, we have leaned heavily on the websites of Mbendi2 
and Mineral Gallery.3 Other sources have information on 
world production decomposed to a country level.4
Mineral fuels
Coal is the world’s most abundant and widely distributed 
fossil fuel, primarily used for electricity generation and 
steel production. Coal is a less abundant fossil fuel in the 
Arctic than oil and gas. Arctic coal production increased 
by 272 per cent from 2002 to 2015 (Table 1), leading to 
a doubling in the Arctic share of the world’s coal extrac-
tion, from 2 to 4 per cent (Figure 1). Coal production 
takes above all place in Arctic Russia, but in 2015 there 
is still some minor production in Norway (Svalbard) and 
Alaska. 
Climate policies worldwide is expected to reduce de-
mand for fossil fuels, above all for coal. The Arctic has, 
however, a share of around 25 per cent of global gas 
resources likely to substitute for coal and play a role 
in production of low carbon energy through hydrogen 
production with CCS. 
Iron and ferro-alloy minerals
Iron ore is the basic raw material used by the iron and 
steel making industry. Although iron has many specific 
uses, its main use is in the production of steel. The arctic 
share of global iron ore extraction declines from 2.3 
per cent to 1.3 per cent (Figure 1). However, there is an 
increase in production volume of 146 per cent over the 
period. In 2015 iron ore extraction takes place in Russia, 
in Kiruna in  Sweden and to a minor extent in Rana and 
Syd-Varanger in  Norway.
Chromite is used for a host of purposes. It is considered 
a strategic metal and is used in alloys for hardening 
and corrosion resistance. There are no economical 
substitutes for chromite ore in the production of ferro-
chromium. Northern Finland is the only arctic producer. 
Production is 245 per cent higher in 2015 than 2002, 
leading to an increase in the arctic share of global chro-
mite production from 4.7 to 7.2 per cent of total global 
production.
Cobalt is mainly used as an alloy with iron, nickel and 
other metals to produce corrosion and wear resistant 
products for high temperature applications such as in jet 
engines and gas turbines. Cobalt based alloys are also 
used in highly durable steels. Cobalt oxide is an impor-
tant additive in paint, glass and ceramics. Arctic produc-
tion decreases by 24 per cent over the period, leading to 
a steep decline in the share of global cobalt production 
from 11 to 1.6 per cent. In 2011 there is some minor pro-
duction in Arctic Finland. In 2015 production only takes 
place in Arctic Russia.
Nickel is used in the manufacture of stainless steel, steel 
alloys and super alloys, central in the chemical and 
aerospace industries. Nickel is also used in batteries 
and fuel cells, and as a catalyst in the production of fats 
and oils. The lion´s share of nickel mining takes place 
in Arctic Russia and total arctic extraction increases by 
116 per cent from 2002 to 2015 (Table 1). Arctic produc-
tion amounts to 10.6 per cent of the world’s production 
Figure 1.  Arctic share of global coal and iron and ferro-alloy 
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Table 1. Change in volume of coal and iron and ferro-alloy 
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Box VII: Mineral extraction in the Arctic
in 2002 and 12.5 per cent in 2015. In 2015 there is also 
some minor extraction in Arctic Finland.
Titanium is a lightweight mineral, non-corrosive, able to 
withstand temperature extremes and with strength as 
steel. Titanium alloys have many applications in air-
planes, missiles, space vehicles and in surgical implants. 
Arctic Russia is the only producer in the Arctic. Produc-
tion doubles over the period, leading to an increase in 
the arctic share of global titanium from 0.3 to 0.5 per 
cent.
Tungsten is produced both in Arctic Canada and Arctic 
Russia, and the arctic share of worldwide production de-
clines from around 9 to 3 per cent as extraction declines 
by 65 per cent from 2002 to 2015. Tungsten is used for 
hardening steel and the manufacture of “hard metal”, 
with hardness close to that of diamond. Tungsten metal 
products are extensively used in electric and electronic 
equipment and in the chemical industry as a catalyst. 
Non-ferrous minerals
Bauxite is the main raw material to produce alumina, and 
ultimately aluminium. The production of alumina con-
sumes over 90 per cent of global bauxite output. Alumin-
ium is used in electrical equipment as well as cars, ships 
and aircrafts, and is also used in metallurgical processes, 
buildings and packaging materials. Figure 2 shows that 
extraction in the Russian arctic declines from 1.9 per 
cent of global production of bauxite to 1.3 per cent even 
if the production volume increases by 39 per cent (see 
Table 2). When it comes to production of aluminium, 
we find the Arctic share to be around 3.6 per cent of 
world production in 2002. Russia’s bauxite reserves were 
then less than 1 per cent of world’s total5 and therefore 
 nepheline and apatite has been used as alternatives. 
These minerals have the disadvantage of needing more 
energy than bauxite in the production of aluminium. 
The Kola peninsula is the main region of nepheline and 
 apatite production in Arctic Russia, and production 
 capacity was around 26 million tonnes in 2015.6
Copper has its end uses in construction and in the electri-
cal and electronic industries. The Arctic produces around 
3.7 per cent of global copper production in 2002, above 
all in the Russian Arctic. An increase in arctic production 
of 25 per cent towards 2015 leads to a more or less con-
stant share of global extraction over the period. In 2015 
there is also some copper production in Arctic Sweden 
and to a lesser extent in Alaska and Northern Finland.
Lead has a variety of uses in chemical industries and 
 other manufacturing, and in construction. The manufac-
ture of lead-acid storage car batteries, chemical products 
Figure 2.  Arctic share of global non-ferrous mineral 
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Figure 3.  Arctic share of precious metal ores and industrial 
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Table 2. Change in volume of non-ferrous mineral 
extraction in the Arctic from 2002 to 2015. Per cent
Bauxite Copper Lead Zink Palladium
39 25 -1 16 1
Table 3.  Change in the volume of precious metal ores and 
industrial mineral extraction in the Arctic from 2002 
to 2015. Per cent
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and cables dominate the end uses of lead. Lead is also 
used for X-Ray shielding and at nuclear plants. Environ-
mental regulations (particularly in the western world) 
are now controlling the use of lead in end products such 
as tetra ethyl, paint and as a petroleum additive. A large 
amount of lead is recycled, generating about 50 per 
cent of current global lead supply. Production in North-
ern Canada was around 1 per cent of world production 
during 2000-2002, but as was the case with zinc, the 
mines were closed due to depleted resources. The Arctic 
produces around 5.6 per cent of the world total in 2002, 
above all in Alaska and to a minor degree in the Rus-
sian Arctic. The arctic volume of production is practi-
cally constant and the share of global extraction of lead 
declines by two percentage points from 2002 to 2015. 
While  Russian production halts during the period some 
production starts in Arctic Canada.
Zinc is used in special alloys for its unique industrial 
properties from great strength to unusual plasticity. 
Zinc coating of iron and steel products make them 
more corrosion resistant. Total extraction in the Arctic 
mainly takes place in Alaska and declines by 1 percent-
age point from 7.7 per cent of the world production over 
the  period, even if the volume increases by 16 per cent. 
In 2015 a large part of the zinc production in the Arctic 
takes place in Alaska. There is also some production in 
Arctic Sweden and minor production in Arctic Canada. 
Palladium is mainly used by the car industry for making 
catalytic converters. It is also used as a catalyst, in the 
production of nitric acids and in laboratory equipment. 
Palladium is also used in the electronics industry and as 
a dental material. Arctic Russia alone produces as much 
as around 40 per cent of the world’s palladium during 
2002-2015 as extraction increases by 1 per cent. Data 
suggest that Arctic Russia has around 10 per cent of 
global reserves in 2002.7
Precious metal ores
Gold has historically been used for jewelry and as a base 
for global monetary reserves. However, gold reserves 
have largely been disconnected from currencies. How-
ever, most countries still hold gold as reserves as do 
banks and investors worldwide. As a material, gold has a 
wide range of uses from catalyst in industrial processes 
to dental material and for decorative purposes. Of the 
world’s gold production, the arctic share is 3.2 per cent, 
Box VII: cont.
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primarily taking place in Arctic Russia and to some extent 
in Alaska and Northern Canada (Figure 3). Some small 
production also takes place in Northern Finland and 
Sweden. As total arctic extraction increases by 163 per 
cent (see Table 3), its share of world extraction increases 
to 6.6 per cent during 2002-2015. The tiny amount of 
gold production in Greenland ceased before 2015.
Silver is often classified along with gold and platinum as 
a precious metal. Silver is primarily used in photographic 
paper and film, as well as for medical and dental pur-
poses.  It is also used as jewelry and in the electronic 
industry. The Arctic extracts 3.6 per cent of global silver 
in 2002 and following an increase in extraction of 268 
per cent the share increases to over 9 per cent in 2015. 
Production over the 2002-2015 period above all in-
creases in Arctic Russia and to some extent in Northern 
Sweden, while declining somewhat in Alaska. The small 
silver production in Arctic Canada decreases, while the 
tiny production in Arctic Finland is closed down.
Platinum is used in jewelry, laboratory equipment, cars, 
electrical contacts and dentistry. Around 15 per cent of 
the world’s platinum extraction is found in Arctic  Russia 
in 2002. Production declines by one third over the 
period leading to a share of almost 10 per cent of global 
extraction in 2015. Alaska has stopped its small platinum 
production in 2015, while there still is a small platinum 
production in Arctic Finland.
Industrial minerals
Diamonds are famous as jewelry. However, not all 
diamonds are of gem quality and in fact most diamond 
deposits contain a mixture of industrial and gem qual-
ity. Industrial diamonds in Arctic Russia make up around 
23 per cent of global production by weight in 2002 and 
28 per cent in 2015. Industrial diamonds’ main use is in 
lens manufacture and electrical wires. Originally crushed 
industrial diamonds were used for these purposes, how-
ever, synthetic diamonds now pose a threat to industrial 
diamond mining. Synthetic diamonds have replaced 
natural diamonds in more than 90 per cent of industrial 
applications. Table 3 also shows that production of gem 
quality diamonds in the arctic part of Russia and Canada 
combined increases by 62 per cent from 2002 to 2015. 
This leads to a large upturn in the arctic share of global 
extraction from 26.8 per cent in 2002 to 48.1 per cent 
in 2015. Hence, almost half of the world’s production of 
diamonds of gem quality takes place in the Arctic.
Vermiculite is a kind of clay, which is very useful for many 
industrial purposes. It is very light, chemically non-reac-
tive and fire resistant. Vermiculite can be used to soak up 
toxic liquids like pesticides. This ability makes vermiculite 
serve well as bedding for pets and livestock. In addition, 
vermiculite can be used in concrete and ceramics as 
a heat resistant additive. Of total global production in 
2002, the Russian Arctic contributes 5.8 per cent. Arctic 
production declines by almost 5 per cent and the share 
of worldwide extraction declines by one percentage 
point towards 2015.
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The notion of benefit sharing originated from the 
Convention on Biodiversity in 1992 and was shaped in 
the Nagoya Protocol supplementary agreement of 2010. 
Benefit sharing can be defined as the act of sharing a 
portion of advantages/profits derived from the use of 
resources, land, or traditional knowledge with the re-
source. The notion of benefit sharing has been promoted 
by the global development institutions as standards of 
environmental and social performance and governance. 
Benefit sharing aims to address social justice and in-
equalities between communities and those who com-
mercialize resources. Indigenous and local communities 
are understood as rights-, stake- and knowledge holders. 
Benefit sharing is connected to corporate social respon-
sibility that companies should meet.2 
Benefit sharing may include monetary and non-mon-
etary benefits. Monetary benefits may take the form 
of development and investment funds, profit sharing, 
equity sharing and tax payments to governments, includ-
ing tax revenues from resource extraction and from 
stimulating economic activity through benefit sharing. 
The non-monetary forms may encompass investment 
in social infrastructure, investment in local employment 
opportunities, local procurement, professional training, 
and improved services.2
The arrangements are often driven by national and 
 local laws and practices:
• Compensation implies that the benefits are distributed 
to compensate for a past or future damage or loss 
of value resulting from extractive activity.3 This could 
be a compensation for lost income, land, pollution or 
loss of access to resources.
• Investment targets priorities identified by the receiv-
ing party or negotiated with the company and/or the 
government. It focuses on training and education, 
developing infrastructure, providing employment 
opportunities for the residents, contracting local busi-
nesses, etc. This principle could be empowering for 
local communities. 
• Charity assumes that a company has no fundamental 
obligation to provide benefits, but it chooses to share 
some benefits as a matter of philanthropy and good 
will.
Modes of benefit sharing describe interactions be-
tween an extractive industry and Indigenous/local com-
munity for benefit distribution:
• The partnership mode is based on partnerships 
among the extractive companies, government, and 
local, in particular Indigenous communities. This 
mode is positioned to generate investment in local 
capacities, infrastructure and businesses and pro-
moting development and self-reliance in the Indig-
enous communities.
• The beneficiary mode establishes community-oriented 
non-profit organizations to run community services, 
businesses, and civic institutions. These entities 
invest in local businesses, ventures, and financial 
markets. Revenues can be administered through 
community funds or be distributed on equal basis to 
all beneficiaries.
• The shareholder mode involves dividend funds and 
shares from native corporations. Indigenous share-
holders receive dividend payments. Native corpora-
tions provide services to industries on contractual 
basis and may receive royalties from extraction on 
the Indigenous-owned rights to resources.
Benefit sharing mechanisms are financial, legal, and 
procedural ways used to operationalize benefit sharing. 
Each benefit sharing mechanism would entail certain 
implementation forms depending on what principle is 
utilized to construct the benefit sharing regime.  
• Streamlined benefits are enshrined in legislation and 
regulations. Long-term contractual obligations, taxes, 
royalty payments, production sharing agreements 
became streamlined when agreements are reached.
• Negotiated benefits are negotiated arrangements 
between companies and local authorities or directly 
with communities or Indigenous organizations. 
• Semi-formal benefits represent a more informal sys-
tem, where a company may choose to share benefits 
on requests from community actors, local authorities 
or private citizens.
• Trickle-down benefits are gains through general eco-
nomic impacts, such as income growth, employment, 
increased consumer spending, rising real estate 
prices, new infrastructure development, etc.
Benefit sharing can be an important mechanism for 
attaining sustainable, just, and equitable economic 
development in the Arctic by retaining some of company 
incomes locally. Positive impacts can best be achieved 
when companies and communities work together as 
equal partners.
Benefit sharing is evolving as Indigenous and local com-
munities strengthen their voices. 
From Paternalism to company centered social 
responsibility (CCSR): Nenets Autonomous Okrug 
(NAO), Russia 
Several large Russian and international oil and gas com-
panies are operating in NAO. Benefit sharing is imple-
mented through negotiated socio-economic agreements 
with the governor’s office. The transfers contribute to 
community investment, e.g. the construction or repair 
of sports halls, kindergartens, schools, medical centers 
and recreation centers. To some extent companies also 
provide charity for culture and education to earn the 
license to operate.
By law, companies are required to compensate the herd-
ers for expropriated lands, which in NAO are designated 
for agriculture and leased by reindeer herders.4 
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Box VIII: Benefit sharing in Arctic Extractive Industries
Andrey N. Petrov, ARCTICenter, University of Northern Iowa 
Maria S. Tysiachniouk, Centre for Independent Social Research, St. Petersburg
Partnership Mode: Chukotka, Russia
The Kupol Foundation was established in 2009 by the 
Chukotka Mining and Geological Company (CMGC) to 
support sustainable development in the Chukotskiy 
 Autonomous Okrug. In 2008 the company signed an 
agreement with the regional Association of the Indig-
enous Peoples of the North to form a long-term part-
nership. Grants from the funds cover four focus areas: 
traditional livelihoods and culture of the Indigenous 
Peoples, healthcare, education and training, and sustain-
able development of small and medium-size businesses.5 
Beneficiary Mode: Nunavik6, Canada
The benefit sharing regime in the Canadian Arctic mostly 
builds upon the investment principle. Impact and Benefit 
Agreements is a prevalent mechanism.
The Raglan Mine is one of the two major mining projects 
in Nunavik started in 1994.  According to the IBA 4.5 % 
of the mines profits is divided between Salluit (45 %), 
Kangiqsujuaq (30 %) and Kaktivik Regional Government 
(25 %). The distribution of money depends on the com-
munity decisions by annual voting.7 
Shareholder mode: Alaska, USA
The Alaska’s North Slope benefit sharing arrangements 
are based on investment, compensation and charity. 
In Alaska there are several layers of benefit sharing, of 
which shareholder mode is the most unique and essen-
tial. Through the Alaska Permanent Fund every citizen 
receives a share of money from the oil income (see Box 
4.2). In addition, the Indigenous Peoples are sharehold-
ers of regional and village corporations established 
under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.8 
____________________________
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Box IX:  Social dimensions of mining in Yukon Territory
Different understandings of the environment
Remote, resource-rich regions far away from urban 
centres are widely considered to be “resource frontiers”. 
First Nation people in Canada’s Yukon Territory – who 
make up 23.3 per cent of the entire population of 42 
152 people – have been dealing with the implications of 
large-scale mining since the Klondike Gold Rush in the 
late 19th century. Today, Indigenous Peoples, settlers 
and miners as well as Canadian state institutions and 
extractive industry stakeholders share the land and 
the resources of the Yukon region, while also ascrib-
ing differing, contesting and conflicting meanings to 
this  environment as “resource frontier” and basis of 
economic wealth and settler colonial history or alterna-
tively, “land” as being at the centre of Indigenous life and 
worldviews.1 
Relations to stakeholders in mining 
The Yukon First Nations’ Umbrella Final Agreement 
between the Canadian State and the Yukon Govern-
ment (finalized in 1993) and the subsequent Land Claims 
Agreements (signed by 11 out of 14 Yukon First Nations 
during the 1990s and 2000s) enabled strong participa-
tion of First Nations in decision making over mining 
projects.2 First Nations hold the land title to 8.5 per cent 
of total land. The Indigenous Peoples’ right to be consult-
ed is facilitated by the Yukon Environmental and Social 
Impact Assessment Act (YESAA).3 
Mining is a key industry in the Yukon; however, 
local communities are in an unequal position 
towards the companies and the state bodies. 
This problem has been pronounced in the 
so called “Peel Watershed legal case”, when 
the Na-Cho Nyäk Dän, Tr’ondёk Hwёch’in and 
Vuntut Gwitchin First Nations took the Yukon 
Government to the Canadian Supreme Court, 
arguing over the unfaithful consultation pro-
cess in the land use planning process.4 In 2017, 
the Supreme Court ruled in favour of these 
First Nations and the consultation process had 
to start from scratch. Currently a new mineral 
development  strategy for the Yukon is be-
ing negotiated5 which tackles the revision of 
the Yukon Quartz  Mining Act and the Yukon 
Placer Mining Act; the latter has been nearly 
unchanged since the early 1900s. These acts 
do not meet anymore the requirements set 
out in the LCA and the contemporary political 
demands of the First Nations. 
Working in mining and land-based  activities
Many Indigenous people in the Yukon are 
employed in mining and traditional land-
based activities at the same time. Subsistence 
harvesting is crucial for the First Nations way 
of life and the sharing economy is still the 
essence of social bonds. At the same time, 
more and more First Nation people work in the 
mining sector while still having the sense of 
being stewards of the land. For the Indigenous 
workforce the high-income potential of mining 
has a specific relevance by supporting subsis-
tence activities and living off the land,6 which 
has become more expensive over time due to high fuel 
prices and the costs of vehicles such as boats, snowmo-
biles and other equipment. 
Unpredictable mining industry and potentials for 
sustainability
Benefit sharing agreements between the First Nations 
and mining companies include revenue sharing and local 
business development and also other items like commit-
ments to support training and local employment. A chal-
lenge is that professional training for Indigenous people 
lags behind the booming labour demand in the region. 
Indigenous people compete with many of the fly-in/
fly-out (FIFO) workers from the south, while Indigenous 
workers are often employed in entry-level jobs. However, 
vocational training programs such as those at the Centre 
for Northern Innovation in Mining (CNIM) at the Yukon 
University take place in the capital Whitehorse, and also 
at the local campuses in the villages throughout Yukon, 
through mobile training facilities. 
Sustainable economic paths beyond mining
First Nations in the Yukon intensely debate new orienta-
tions for socio-economic development and a sustain-
able future.7 Options include community gardening, 
agricultural tourism as well as the development of small 
businesses including arts and crafts. A key issue of these 
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debates is the need to provide opportunities for the 
younger generations to be trained in the various profes-
sions relevant for new businesses. Besides cultural tour-
ism, a future area could be the development of tourism 
in abandoned mining sites. 
Way forward to a more equal partnership in mining 
development
The requirement to seek free, prior and informed con-
sent (FPIC) from local communities for mining develop-
ment are essential part of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and of the earlier ILO 
Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. The 
right to be consulted also exists in other international 
standards and legal and corporate regulations related 
to mining.8 These rights are also points of reference for 
Indigenous claims and for authorities managing frame-
works for extractive industry operations. A key question 
for local communities is how to make decisions about 
mining, which may have massive, long-term effects on 
their environment, and socio-cultural livelihoods. There 
is often insufficient knowledge in communities about the 
complex nature of the mining industry and the manifold 
structures of community-industry relationships. There-
fore, capacity building and formal education in the field 
of the mining-community nexus can play an important 
role in community empowerment, conflict mitigation 
and in socially just, equitable and sustainable resource 
development. 
Conclusion
Mining and settler colonialism in Yukon has brought 
about tremendous effects and tragedies such as – to 
name a few – the decline in use of Indigenous lan-
guages, inter-generational residential school traumas, 
discrimination on the job market and disadvantage in 
the educational system. The mining sector as well as the 
state authorities are considered to be responsible for 
taking the recommendations of the Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission in Canada serious and to put forward 
more effective steps toward de-colonisation. The setup 
of more equal partnerships and power balances in nego-
tiations and consultations is of utmost importance. The 
Umbrella Final Agreement and the Land Claims Agree-
ments with their associated legislation are important, but 
a lot has to be done to prevent political bypassing and 
biased interpretation of the spirit of these frameworks – 
a viewpoint that is shared not only by Indigenous rights-
holders but also by politicians of the political parties in 
Yukon. First Nations in the Yukon want to see the realiza-
tion of sustainable mining as well as new and diversified 
economic opportunities to achieve social equality and 
decolonize societal relations.  
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An Inuit way of looking at the Arctic economy
Inuit Circumpolar Council
Twentieth century ideals of development in the 
Arctic centered around industrial economies 
focused on resource extraction and processing or 
manufacturing. In the 21st Century it is necessary 
to broaden the definition of economic develop-
ment, to be transformative to ensure that a new 
Arctic economy is well-adapted for the people it 
serves. A vision of a sustainable Arctic economy 
must ensure benefits stay in the Arctic and do 
not flow south at the expense of the people and 
the environment. As stated in the Inuit Circum-
polar Council’s (ICC) 2018 Utqia vik Declaration, 
“…economic development and social and cultural 
development must go hand-in-hand, resulting in 
self-sufficiency, which is an essential part of greater 
political self-determination.” The Declaration also 
states: “Sustainable wildlife management is an 
important element for achieving Inuit food secu-
rity. Inuit have rights in national and international 
agreements that protect Indigenous hunting and 
fishing activities. These human right instruments 
affirm Inuit rights to self-determination, including 
our right to govern wildlife management.”1 
Inuit and other Arctic Indigenous Peoples have 
experienced numerous failed attempts to impose 
economic development which disregards social 
and cultural circumstances. To be truly sustainable, 
development must be in accord with the realities of 
life in Inuit Nunaat and support Inuit rights to self-
determination in governing our land, our resources 
and ourselves. 
In the Canadian Arctic, Inuit are exploring a 
 “conservation economy” based on the establish-
ment of marine protected areas negotiated with 
6. Interdependency of subsistence and market 
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the federal government. Impact benefits agree-
ments between Inuit and the government cover 
management planning, rights to resources, Inuit 
stewardship, research and monitoring, career and 
training opportunities and economic opportunities 
for Inuit, among other things. 
In its early stages, this new economy is centered 
on development that supports communities by 
 providing sustainable jobs based on partner-
ships that recognize that Inuit continue to be 
the best stewards of our land and waters. These 
new  models will be managed through Indigenous 
Knowledge and the lived experience of generations 
of Inuit. In addition, by leveraging Inuit expertise 
and Inuit Quajimajatuqangit (Inuit Knowledge), this 
type of partnership empowers Inuit to exercise 
self-determination by managing our own com-
munities and environment. Finally, an Inuit con-
servation economy is guided by Inuit-led research 
which in turn is based on the co-production of 
knowledge.
Conservation is not usually considered a form 
of economic development; in fact, conservation 
and economic development are often thought of 
as opposing realities. However, Inuit see things 
 differently. Inuit are a part of the ecosystem, and 
we understand conservation as a way to sustain 
the resources that we rely on to feed our fami-
lies, share our food, celebrate our catch and pass 
on our knowledge. This in turn provides spiritual 
 balance, mental and physical well-being,  traditional 
values, medicines, energy, identity, and overall 
cultural sustainability. The connection between 
the economy and a healthy environment is, 
for us, obvious and was reaffirmed in the out-
come  document of ICC’s 2017 Circumpolar Inuit 
 Economic Summit, which referred to: 
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The desire of Inuit to maintain and strengthen 
their distinct institutions, cultures and traditions, 
and to promote their development in accordance 
with their aspirations and needs as well as to 
foster greater respect for Inuit knowledge, sus-
tainable and equitable development, and proper 
management of the Arctic environment.2
As the first inhabitants and stewards of the Arctic, 
we assume the responsibility to ensure meaningful 
and equitable roles for Inuit are built into conserva-
tion efforts. The preamble of the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes 
that “respect for Indigenous Knowledge, culture 
and traditional practices contribute to sustainable 
and equitable development and proper manage-
ment of the environment.”3
Increasing evidence shows that conservation has 
economic impacts far beyond the area conserved. 
For example, fisheries research has found that ma-
rine conservation areas can increase the productiv-
ity of commercial fisheries by up to 20 percent.4 
Protected areas developed through a conservation 
economy approach create meaningful jobs in Inuit-
led research, monitoring, as stewards, for artisans 
and harvesters. This approach protects coastal 
communities from the impacts of climate change, 
improves the lives of Inuit, and empowers Inuit and 
strengthens Inuit culture and language.5 It is critical 
that Inuit have a meaningful role in the manage-
ment of these areas so we can continue to use 
the resources that have always sustained us. Inuit 
management practices are rooted in Indigenous 
Knowledge and continue to be used and relied 
upon every day. They are focused on relationships 
and lead to “a holistic and adaptive approach that 
is applied to decision-making. Through this ap-
proach, key values such as gratitude, respect, hon-
esty, humility, sharing, cooperation, following ani-
mals and the weather as opposed to trying to exert 
control over the environment, and even humor are 
all part of maintaining resilience, sustainability, and 
a healthy environment (including human health).”6
Three Examples
The Canadian government agreed under the 
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 
to protect at least 10 percent of its maritime terri-
tory by 2020; 25 percent by 2025 and 30 percent 
by 2030. At the same time, Inuit organizations 
sought to advance development goals and increase 
self-determination in the territory of Nunavut. 
Although each government had different reasons 
to seek conservation, this collaboration has led to 
successful negotiations to create marine protected 
areas in Nunavut, along with agreements to further 
development goals. Three regions in Nunavut are 
discussed below; further agreements between the 
Federal Government and Nunavummiut partners 
will lead to increased benefits from these conserva-
tion projects.
Tallurutiup Imanga
In ancient times the sea mammals and all life in 
t e sea were created from t e fingers and ands 
of a woman who lives in the vast Arctic sea. She is 
the mother of the sea and when she is angry the 
seas are rough and dangerous and there is no 
food. She is angered when people do not care for 
her and the life that she has created. Inuit respect 
and honour her, and all life stemming from her, 
as a symbol of our reciprocal relationship. 
Our legend is profoundly connected to us, our 
spirituality, and our views of marine steward-
ship and Tallurutiup Imanga. Inuit of Tallurutiup 
Imanga, and the Qikiqtani region, are a coastal 
people, and have been so from time immemorial, 
with cultural values and identities intrinsically 
connected to our Arctic marine environment and 
wildlife.7
Tallurutiup Imanga (also known as Lancaster 
Sound) is one of the most biologically diverse re-
gions in the Canadian Arctic. Sometimes called the 
“Serengeti of the Arctic,” Tallurutiup Imanga is eco-
logically important due to the presence of polynyas 
which attract large numbers of Arctic birds and 
marine mammals, and as an important migration 
route through the Canadian archipelago.8 Among 
other animals, the region is home to approximately 
75 percent of the world’s narwhal population.9 
This diversity and ecological wealth also makes 
the sound important for the 3,600 Inuit who live in 
five communities in the region. The government 
of Canada proposed the creation of a National 
Marine Conservation Area (NMCA) in 2010 covering 
only 44 000 square kilometers. After negotiations 
with the Qikiqtani Inuit Association (QIA), and Shell 
agreeing to surrender oil leases it held in the area, 
the size of the proposed NMCA was increased to 
107 000 square kilometers in 2017, covering the 
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entire sound and bordering several smaller NMCAs 
and national parks.
Because the NMCA lies within the Nunavut Land 
Claim Settlement area, the Canadian Govern-
ment was required to negotiate an Inuit Impact 
Benefit Agreement (IIBA) with the government of 
Nunavut and QIA. This IIBA, which was finalized 
in August 2019, provides nearly $250 million in 
investments for the region in order to empower 
Inuit com munities to benefit from the conservation 
area.10 Among other things, the agreement sets 
aside money to establish a joint Inuit-government 
consensus management board for the Tallurutiup 
Imanga NMCA, and for infrastructure investment, 
including multi-use facilities and harbor develop-
ment in the five communities, and funding for In-
uit-led research, monitoring, training and  capacity 
development.11
The IIBA also sets aside funding for development 
for fisheries near and within the NMCA (Inuit hunt-
ing, fishing and collecting rights are guaranteed 
within the NMCA). Additionally, the IIBA provided 
funding for the Nauttiqsuqtiit program. Nauttiq-
suqtiit (“Guardians”) are members of the commu-
nity who fulfill a dual role, providing food for their 
communities while also monitoring the conserva-
tion area and assisting in any search and rescue 
operations.12 Through programs like these, both 
sides can benefit, as the Nauttiqsuqtiit program 
helps Inuit to transfer knowledge from Elders to 
the community’s youth, and the Nauttiqsuqtiit have 
been able to provide food for their communities 
and materials for local artisans. At the same time, 
Parks Canada has benefitted from partners who 
are able to utilize Inuit Quajimajatuqangit and their 
experience navigating and observing the Arctic 
environment in order to monitor the region.13 The 
early success of Tallurutiup Imanga has led to calls 
for similar programs, including the Nauttiqsuqtiit 
program, throughout the region.
Tuvaijuittuq Marine Protected Area
On the northernmost shores of Canada, 
 Tuvaijuittuq (“The Place Where the Ice Never 
Melts”) is expected to be the last place in the Arctic 
with year-round sea ice as the region warms. 
For that reason, it is likely to become a refuge 
for creatures that depend on the sea ice, such 
as walrus, seals and polar bears, leading to calls 
for its  protection. Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
initially proposed a Marine Protected Area (MPA) 
in  Canada’s federally-controlled waters, without 
imposing limitations on Nunavut waters under 
the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. However, in 
 response to QIA’s proposal to create a protected 
area on the north shore of Ellesmere Island, 
the proposed MPA was expanded into Nunavut 
 waters.14
Tuvaijuittuq is beyond even the historic range of 
Inuit activity, so the impact of a protected area in 
the region was uncertain. Therefore, Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada has imposed a five-year mora-
torium on commercial activity in the area, allowing 
for feasibility studies and consultations with Inuit 
partners into the benefits of more permanent 
protection for the region.15 The Nunavut portions 
of Tuvaijuittuq MPA are covered in the Talluru-
tiup Imanga IIBA, which may lead to development 
benefits for the region, such as Nauttiqsuqtiit. 
Closely associated with Tuvaiittuq, and building on 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council’s 2017 Pikialasorsuaq 
Commission recommendations, QIA is negotiat-
ing with the Government of Canada an interim 
Marine Protected Area called Sarvarjuaq. This area 
will cover the Canada side of the Pikalasorsuaq.  
Canada and Inuit are in discussions with Govern-
ment Greenland and Kingdom of Denmark on a 
bi-national agreement for this area.16
Qikiqtait Protected and Conserved Area
Farther south, on the Belcher Islands in Hudson 
Bay, the community of Sanikiluaq has been pro-
moting a conservation area to be named Qikiqtait, 
to protect the archipelago and the surrounding 
waters, which are an important habitat for marine 
birds. The project, a joint effort by the Municipality 
of Sanikiluaq, the Sanikiluaq Hunters and Trap-
pers Association (HTA), and the Arctic Eider Society, 
combines conservation and development goals in 
the same mould as the other projects referred to 
above.  The project received funding from the Gov-
ernment of Canada in 2019 to establish a research 
facility and a community-led stewardship program. 
The funding will help by providing sustainable local 
jobs and enable knowledge transfer to the com-
munity’s youth, in addition to conserving important 
habitats.17
The Qikiqtait project is an important example of a 
community-led initiative to promote Inuit conser-
vation economy principles. 
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Box 6.1: Indigenous Knowledge
Ottawa Indigenous Knowledge Principles 
Developed and agreed upon by the Arctic Council Permanent Participants for use in the Arctic Council in 2014,  
updated in October 2018
orking definition  Indigenous no edge1 
Indigenous Knowledge is a systematic way of thinking and 
knowing that is elaborated and applied to phenomena across 
biological, physical, cultural and linguistic systems. Indig-
enous Knowledge is owned by the holders of that knowledge, 
often collectively, and is uniquely expressed and transmitted 
through indigenous languages. It is a body of knowledge gen-
erated through cultural practices, lived experiences including 
extensive and multi-generational observations, lessons and 
skills. It has been developed and verified over millennia and 
is still developing in a living process, including knowledge 
acquired today and in the future, and it is passed on from 
generation to generation.
Preamble
These fundamental principles on Indigenous Knowledge will 
strengthen the Arctic Council and advance its objectives by 
supporting the active participation of Permanent Participants. 
Indigenous Knowledge has been formally recognized by the 
Arctic Council as important to understanding the Arctic in 
numerous Ministerial Declarations, including the 1996 Ottawa 
Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council. The 
“…role of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and their Indigenous 
Knowledge in the conservation and sustainable use of Arctic 
biological resources” was also emphasized in the Tromsø 
Declaration (2009). Furthermore, in 2013 the Kiruna Declara-
tion called for the Arctic Council to “recognize that the use of 
Indigenous and local knowledge is essential to a sustainable 
future in the Arctic, and decide to develop recommendations 
to integrate Indigenous and local knowledge in the work of 
Arctic Council.” Permanent Participants represent Indigenous 
Knowledge holders and are integral to the inclusion and use of 
Indigenous Knowledge in the work of the Arctic Council. These 
fundamental principles represent the foundation for the long 
term vision and framework for incorporating Indigenous 
Knowledge in Arctic Council activities.
The inclusion, promotion and use of Indigenous Knowledge 
in the work of the Arctic Council is a collective expression of 
 Arctic Council States in supporting the domestic and inter-
national rights, roles, and place of Indigenous Peoples in the 
circumpolar Arctic; and will address a collective need to pro-
duce information that are of use to Arctic Indigenous Peoples, 
decision makers and scientists of all cultures from a commu-
nity level to international governments.
Fundamental Principles for the Use of Indigenous Know-
ledge in Strengthening the Work of the Arctic Council
1. The use of Indigenous Knowledge is an overarching man-
date of the Arctic Council and is a central commitment for 
implementation by the Senior Arctic Officials, Permanent 
Participants, and all Arctic Council Working Groups.
2. Indigenous Knowledge enhances and illuminates the 
holistic and shared understanding of the Arctic environ-
ment, which promotes and provides a more complete 
knowledge base for the work of the Arctic Council.
3. Recognition, respect, trust, and increased understand-
ing between Indigenous Knowledge holders, scientists, 
and representatives of the Arctic States are essential 
elements in the meaningful and effective inclusion of 
Indigenous Knowledge in the work of the Arctic Council.
4. The inclusion, use, review, and verification of Indigenous 
Knowledge in the work of the Arctic Council will occur at 
all stages of every agreed-to initiative and will be led and 
facilitated by the Permanent Participants. Recognizing 
that Permanent Participants will determine the appropri-
ate use of Indigenous Knowledge in the work of the Arctic 
Council.
5. Indigenous Knowledge is the intellectual property of the 
Indigenous knowledge holders, therefore policies and 
procedures for accessing data and information gathered 
from Indigenous Knowledge holders should be devel-
oped at the appropriate ownership level, recognizing and 
adhering to each Permanent Participants’ protocols.
6. In order to maintain the integrity of specialized in-
formation and avoid misinterpretation of Indigenous 
Knowledge, it is crucial that evaluation, verification and 
communication of analyzed information be conducted by 
Indigenous Knowledge holders with appropriate exper-
tise, to be identified by Permanent Participants.
7. Each of the Permanent Participants represent their re-
spective cultures, communities, peoples and Indigenous 
Knowledge systems and holders; processes of including 
Indigenous Knowledge in the work of the Arctic Council 
will respect and reflect this diversity.
8. The inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge in the work of the 
Arctic Council requires adequate capacity and resources 
to address the unique needs and circumstances of the 
cultures, languages, communities, governance processes, 
and knowledge systems of Arctic Indigenous Peoples 
represented by the Permanent Participants.
9. Indigenous Knowledge and science are different yet 
complementary systems and sources of knowledge, and 
when appropriately used together may generate new 
knowledge and may inform decision making, policy devel-
opment and the work of the Arctic Council.
10. The use of Indigenous Knowledge within the Arctic Coun-
cil must benefit the knowledge providers and appropri-
ately credit indigenous contributions. 
11. The co-production of knowledge requires creative and 
culturally appropriate methodologies and technologies 
that use both Indigenous Knowledge and science applied 
across all processes of knowledge creation.
12. Communication, transmission and mutual exchange of 
knowledge using appropriate language conveying com-
mon understanding, including strategies to communicate 
through  Indigenous languages, is critical to work of Arctic 
Council.
13. Recognize the need to bridge knowledge systems, includ-
ing leveraging existing Indigenous knowledge networks, 
institutions and organizations, as well as developing edu-
cation strategies to broaden mutual understanding.
1 The following working definition has been adapted from the ICC and 
GCI TK definitions and forwarded for use by the Arctic Council. This 
definition is not intended to replace other definitions endorsed and 
used by individual indigenous organizations
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The success of these projects demonstrates that 
development goals in the Arctic do not only de-
pend on resource extraction projects or  tourism. 
The Arctic provides its own value in ways Inuit 
and other Indigenous communities have the 
knowledge to realize, as part of their internation-
ally recognized right to self-determination. These 
eff orts illustrate a new thinking about the Arctic 
conservation economy. Each protected area will 
bring economic opportunities for the communities 
involved. They will ensure local training and hiring 
and provide economic opportunities. For Inuit, a 
conservation economy is an approach that pro-
vides an opportunity across Inuit Nunaat for more 
meaningful partnerships to build equity in the 
management of resources that will in turn ensure 
cultural sustainability. 
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Arc�c Athabaskan Council (AAC)
Gwich'in Council Interna�onal (GCI)
Aleut Interna�onal Associa�on (AIA)
Russian Associa�on of Indigenous
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(North of 60˚)
light and dark: Athabaskan cultural area
Source: Compiled by Winfried K. Dallmann.
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The Caribou Economy
Gwich’in Council International
Economies, at various scales and across different 
currencies, are essential to functioning communi-
ties and wellbeing, and drive policy, behaviour, 
and actions. In northern and remote communities, 
sustainable economies may encompass more than 
monetary values and necessitate recognizing and 
valuing a broad spectrum of elements. The metrics 
commonly used do not adequately capture im-
portant attributes, including Indigenous and local 
knowledge; food harvesting and processing skills; 
language fluency; connections in and to commu-
nity; understanding animal migrations; and more. 
However, when communities and governments 
make decisions about their future, it is important 
to value these attributes and consider more than 
dollars. The subsistence economy must be recog-
nized and valued as not only food and nutrition 
but a practice and worldview holding knowledge, 
language, culture, and survival. 
The Gwich’in are a resilient and self-sufficient Na-
tion in the Arctic, maintaining an economy which 
has included birds, waterfowl, fish, caribou, and 
other animals since time immemorial. Gwich’in 
territory is bisected by the Canada-USA border, and 
further divided by territorial borders in Canada. 
Today, Gwich’in communities are located in Alaska, 
Yukon, and the Northwest Territories, and subject 
to different jurisdictions and political structures, 
as well as land claim agreements, self government 
agreements, or no agreements at all. Gwich’in 
people reside in their home communities, in urban 
settings in the north, and around the world. 
Settlement patterns and the economy changed 
following contact with Europeans, but the economy 
continued to include both economic and social ele-
ments, and the production, distribution, and trade 
of resources between them.18 When the monetary 
and wage economies were introduced, the Gwich’in 
adapted and participated to varying degrees. The 
Gwich’in economy, intertwined with the resources 
and species present and abundant through the re-
gion, continues today, though changed and adapt-
ed.19 This is especially so with vadzaih.
Vadzaih (caribou) remain intricately linked to the 
Gwich’in, and the relationship between Gwich’in 
and vadzaih encompasses stewardship, respon-
sibility, life, use, management, land, economy, 
culture, and survival. In particular, the Porcupine 
Caribou herd, whose range nearly mirrors the ter-
ritory of the Gwich’in (Figure 6.2), are the founda-
tion of the caribou economy and centre of Gwich’in 
culture.20 A fulsome understanding requires a 
study of Gwich’in language, because language, 
culture, and subsistence way of life are all closely 
intertwined.21 This overview recommends further 
reading by Gwich’in scholars, and attempts to leave 
you with the appreciation that the Gwich’in subsis-
tence economy is complex, rich in values, practiced 
to this day, and under threat. 
All parts of the caribou are valued and used, 
supporting a subsistence economy which encom-
passes tangible monetary values but also tangible 
and intangible non-monetary values. Vadzaih 
provide food; red meat high in protein and low 
in fat. Materials, whether hide, bones, or antlers, 
become clothing, tools, medicine, crafts, and art.22 
The practices of harvesting, processing, use, and 
sharing require time, money (e.g. for fuel to  access 
activities), knowledge, language, and respect, 
and in turn contribute to networks, intergenera-
tional  knowledge transfer, kinship, pride, survival, 
Intergenerational knowledge transfer while processing vadzaih. 
Photo: Malinda Bruce
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warmth, wealth, income, self government, food 
security, and well-being(Photo Credit Malinda 
Bruce). When compared with the wage economy, 
or proposed economic development in Gwich’in 
homelands, often only the monetary costs are con-
sidered but it is essential to recognize the suite of 
additional, and sometimes more important, values 
than dollars.
Participation in the caribou economy is dependent 
on knowledge, skills, and resources, and subject to 
management authorities established to preserve 
subsistence rights and ensure local access.23 The 
knowledge and rules around respectful harvesting 
continue to be documented and passed down,24
and new programs are emerging to encourage 
youth, adults, Elders, and families to be out on the 
land. The Porcupine Caribou herd’s core range is 
approximately 201 190 km2 through Alaska, Yukon, 
and the Northwest Territories, and management 
must consider two federal governments, three 
state or territorial governments, eight Indigenous 
land claim agreements, fi ve national parks or 
preserves, one territorial park, two special manage-
ment areas, and two special ordinances.25 Further, 
the customs and practices, migration patterns, 
abundance, and availability of harvesters impact 
subsistence use.  Harvesters are active in monitor-
ing, sampling, and assessing vadzaih health, con-
necting the economy with the land and steward-
ship, and demonstrate that the skills to participate 
and thrive in the subsistence economy are diverse, 
developed over decades, and honed through use 
and experience.
Despite the spectrum of values encompassed, im-
portance to cultural livelihood, and continued prac-
tice, the caribou economy is in transition and under 
threat, risking not only food security but language, 
well-being, and survival. In the words of Gwich’in 
elder Jonathon Solomon of Fort Yukon, Alaska, “It 
is our belief that the future of the Gwich’in and the 
future of the Caribou are the same. Harm to the 
Porcupine Caribou Herd is harm to the Gwich’in 
culture and millennia-old way of life.”26 Vadziah 
are aff ected by ecological and anthropologically 
linked factors such as climate change and increas-
ing wildland fi res, and by global forces and politi-
cal threats to their calving grounds.27 Oil and gas 
companies want to develop the Coastal Plain of the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, lands used by the 
Porcupine Caribou herd for calving and wintering, 
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which would have devastating consequences for 
the vadziah and Gwich’in.28 The Gwich’in call the 
Coastal Plain “Iizhik Gwats’an Gwandaii Goodlit” 
 “the Sacred Place Where Life Begins,” and are 
united in opposition to development there.29 
When the full caribou economy is not recognized, 
and it is compared to the wage economy or pro-
posed developments, its contributions and values 
are diminished. Subsistence becomes a trade off, 
and decisions are reduced to comparing dollars. 
People’s participation becomes limited by access, 
time, borders, knowledge, and skill. However, the 
caribou economy should not be reduced to num-
bers and dollars, and the challenge of understand-
ing its valuation system, integration of language, 
wellbeing, and culture, and relationship between 
people and vadziah offers an opportunity to learn, 
appreciate, and celebrate the Gwich’in and resil-
ience. A fulsome understanding requires the study 
of language, learning from Gwich’in Elders and 
scholars, and recognition that knowledge, strength, 
and expertise comes from the hearts and people in 
communities and on the land.30 
Alaska: A Subsistence Way of Life
Davin Holen, University of Alaska, Fairbanks
Subsistence in Alaska is a broad ranging category 
that refers to both a management regime and a 
way of life that is meaningful to residents of Alas-
kan communities. The Alaska Department of Fish 
and Game, Division of Subsistence defines subsis-
tence as the customary and traditional uses of wild 
resource for food, clothing, fuel, transportation, 
construction, art, crafts, sharing, and customary 
trade. Harvesting wild resources in Alaska occurs 
under several regulatory regimes. Most fish har-
vested by rod and reel are subject to sport fishing 
regulations, whereas the use of set nets to harvest 
salmon for home use is considered subsistence. 
Game harvested under general hunts is considered 
sport hunting, and residents who are engaged in 
commercial fishing often retain fish for home use 
called “home pack.” Under these regimes, harvest-
ers of wild resources must relate to different sea-
sons, gear allowances, and harvest limits, adding 
to the complexity of regulations that residents of 
Alaska must navigate. Sharing with family and com-
munity is an important and traditional component 
of the subsistence economy.
Wild resources harvesting meets the needs for 
nutrition and personal, family, and community 
wellbeing through customary and traditional 
practices that embody spiritual ties to the land 
and animals, fish, and birds. In order for the best 
evidence-based information to be put forward 
in the management process of harvesting, both 
Indigenous Knowledge and science are needed, 
with Indigenous Knowledge holders taking part in 
the decision-making process and in the analysis of 
information.
Commercial harvests of salmon, herring, pollock, 
and other fish are also important for communities. 
In Alaska, a report on economic impacts of sea-
food estimated that the seafood industry directly 
created the full time equivalent of 26 800 jobs. In 
addition the seafood industry demands services 
and input from other industries in terms of vessels, 
machinery, maintenance, transportation and a va-
riety of other services, bringing employment to the 
Sockeye salmon drying on the shores of Lake Clark, Bristol Bay, 
Alaska.  Photo: Michelle Ravenmoon, National Park Service.
Cleaning sockeye salmon on the shores of Sixmile Lake,  
Bristol Bay, Alaska. Photo: Davin Holen.
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full time equivalent of 36 800 jobs, compensated by 
USD 2 billion as part of a total income in seafood 
related activities of USD 5.2 billion in 2016.31 Com-
mercial and subsistence fi sheries are inter-related 
as fi shing equipment is often used for subsistence 
fi shing outside commercial fi shing periods. House-
holds with commercial fi shing permits often have 
a high production of subsistence foods.32 A house-
hold’s wild food harvest increases by 125.8 per 
cent if the household is also involved in commer-
cial fi shing. Subsistence harvests in Alaska are still 
relatively high compared to other Arctic areas.33
However, commercial fi sh harvests account for 
98.6 per cent of the harvests of all wild resources in 
Alaska in terms of volume (Figure 6.3). Subsistence 
users harvest 0.9 per cent of wild resources while 
sport activities account for the other 0.5 per cent 
(Figure 6.3).34
Dual Management in Alaska
Subsistence is regulated by state and federal 
agencies, referred to as “dual management.” The 
State of Alaska passed the subsistence law in 1978 
providing a priority for subsistence over other uses 
of wild resources. Federal lands in Alaska comprise 
about 60 per cent of Alaska (222 million acres) and 
80 per cent federal land is set aside for public use. 
Twenty-eight percent of Alaska is designated state 
lands. In addition, under the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA), Alaska Natives received 
44 million acres, considered private and managed 
by Alaska Native corporations created as part of 
ANCSA. Other private lands make up less than 1per 
cent of the total land area. Federal and state regu-
lations diff er as to harvest limits and seasons.
The State of Alaska seeks to manage wild resources 
for maximum opportunity for residents and visi-
tors, through general hunts and sport fi shing. If 
there is a conservation concern, a fi shery or hunt 
may be restricted to Alaska residents only, referred 
to as Tier I. If the harvestable surplus cannot sus-
tain the harvesting of all Alaska residents, a Tier II 
fi shery or hunt is established where Alaska resi-
dent must apply to participate by demonstrating 
a long term and continued dependence on the re-
source. Under Alaska state law (1989) all residents 
of Alaska qualify to participate in subsistence.
Federal law gives rural communities preference 
to subsistence unlike the State of Alaska which 
provides for subsistence for all residents. Title VIII 
of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation 
Act (ANILCA) enacted in 1980 created 10 National 
Parks and Preserves on existing federal lands, and 
priority was given to residents of rural communi-
ties that border or are located within these lands. 
The two competing laws, Alaska Subsistence Law 
and ANILCA, are commonly referred to by Alaskans 
as the “subsistence dilemma.” Federal lands often 
follow state seasons and harvest limits to make it 
less confusing for local users. However, there are 
cases where regulations can be confusing. On fed-
eral ANILCA lands and waters, subsistence hunts or 
























Source: Division of Subsistence, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and Fall (2018), see note 38.
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fisheries are often restricted to local residents. This 
often leads to confusion as crossing from federal 
land to state land could mean moving from an area 
where hunting is open to where it is closed.35 Vary-
ing court cases and efforts by the State of Alaska 
have tried to amend this impasse; however, resolu-
tion would require a change in the Alaska constitu-
tion introducing a rural priority to comply with Title 
VIII of ANILCA. Marine mammals are managed by 
the Federal Government through co-management 
agreements with Alaska Native Organizations. Only 
Alaska Natives may harvest marine mammals in 
Alaska, referring to Marine Mammal Protection Act.
Variety of Subsistence Economies throughout 
Alaska
Surveys completed over the past 30 years have 
found that there is not one typical subsistence 
economy in Alaska; they vary by region and even 
between neighboring communities as Alaska’s eco-
systems and natural resources are diverse, stretch-
ing from the high Arctic along Alaska’s northern 
coastal plane, through interior Alaska with its bo-
real forest environment, southwest Alaska with its 
expansive tundra and multitude of river systems, 
the rainy, windswept islands of the Aleutians, to 
the temperate rain forests of Southeast Alaska.
Figure 6.4 shows the composition of wild food har-
vest in Alaska. Salmon (32 per cent) and large land 
mammals (22 per cent) such as moose, caribou, 
bears, and deer make up the highest percentage of 
harvest in terms of edible weight. Also important 
are other finfish (21 per cent), especially in coastal 
communities where halibut and cod are avail-
able and in the interior of Alaska where whitefish, 
sheefish, and grayling are more abundant than 
salmon. Marine mammals (14 per cent) such as 
harbor seals are harvested in many coastal com-
munities and whales are harvested in the Arctic. 
Berries and other edible and medicinal wild plants 
make up 4 per cent of the harvest, birds and eggs 
including migratory waterfowl and upland game 
birds make up 3 per cent, and shellfish such as 
clams, crab, and other marine invertebrates com-
prise 3 per cent.36
Figure 6.5 shows the composition of harvests by 
region. Salmon are common in many areas, making 
up around 50 per cent of the harvest in Southcen-
tral and Southwest Alaska, whereas in the Arctic 
households harvest more marine mammals. In 
the interior of Alaska, large land mammals such as 
moose and caribou comprise a larger share of the 
harvest than in other areas. Figure 6.6 shows per 
capita harvest of wild resources by region. 
Harvests are typically higher in rural communities 
as compared to urban areas (Figure 6.7). Within 
Southcentral Alaska, there are large differences 
in household harvest. Anchorage has the lowest 
harvest at 15 pounds per person, followed by the 
Mat-Su Area (22 pounds per person), and the Kenai 
Peninsula (32 pounds per person), compared to 
Figure 6.4. Wild foods harvest as share of edible weight by 
rural residents. Alaska, 2017. Per cent
Birds and Eggs 3 %
Shellfish  
Wild Plants 4 %
Marine Mammals







Source: Division of Subsistence, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 
and Fall (2018), see note 12.
Figure 6.5. Composition of the harvest of wild resources in 
Alaska, by region. Per cent based on pounds 
edible weight. 2017  
Per cent















Source: Division of Subsistence, Alaska Department of Fish and Game. 
Adopted from Fall (2018), see note 12.
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rural Southcentral Alaska in general (145 pounds 
per person). Fairbanks follows a similar pattern 
for Interior Alaska and Juneau and Ketchikan for 
Southeast Alaska.
Participation in harvesting wild resources is highest 
in Western Alaska with 70 per cent of households 
participating in harvesting game species and 83 
per cent of households participating in fishing 
activities. In rural Alaska on average 60 per cent of 
households harvest game and 83 per cent harvest-
ing fish.37 The number of households using wild 
resources is higher than those harvesting the wild 
resources. The Division of Subsistence found a 
general pattern in that 30 per cent of households 
harvest 70 per cent of the resources as a communi-
ty average.38 These households tend to have higher 
incomes and spend more money on gear such as 
boats, snow machines, nets, rifles, and fuel.
Cash and Subsistence Economy
The cost of living in rural Alaska has risen signifi-
cantly in recent years due to high gas prices for 
transportation. With few year-round ice-free ports, 
most goods must arrive in rural communities by 
air in winter. In the summer cost of transportation 
is lower as coastal communities receive barges 
with fuel and supplies, with smaller barges sailing 
supplies up major rivers such as the Yukon and 
Kuskokwim. Residents must order a year’s worth 
of groceries and other supplies to be brought in on 
the barge. During trips to Anchorage or other ur-
ban centers rural residents stock up on supplies to 
be mailed back to their communities or pay fees on 
air transportation. Energy costs are a main concern 
in rural communities. A study by the State of Alaska 
in 2016 found that gasoline was 2.3 times more ex-
pensive in rural interior Alaska communities than 
in urban communities along the coast, and heating 
oil was 2.6 times more expensive.39 Typically, dur-
ing cold winters residents will use several barrels 
of heating oil. Many homes receive electricity from 
diesel powered generators. 
There is an effort to move towards using wood 
both in efficient home wood burning stoves and 
in large scale biomass boilers in public buildings, 
especially in interior Alaska and Southeast Alaska 
where boreal and rainforest environments pro-
vided adequate biomass.
A study in 2012 found that in the eastern interior 
of Alaska 7 out of 9 rural communities had aver-
age incomes lower than the statewide per capita 
average and lower than the larger interior Alaska 
communities of Fairbanks and Delta Junction.40 
Many jobs are short-term summer employment 
such as working in commercial fishing, fire crews, 
or construction crews repairing roads or airports, 
and short-term work through grant funded proj-
ects in communities. High transportation costs 
can represent a barrier to employment and limit 
benefits of access to wage income, credit, subsidies 
and market-related transfer payments.41
Figure 6.6. Per capita harvest of wild resources in rural 
Alaska by region, 2017. Pounds edible weight 
Pounds usable weight per capita
















Source: Division of Subsistence, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 
and Fall (2018), see note 12.
Figure 6.7. Harvest of wild resources by region. Alaska. 
























Rural harvest:  276 lb per person per year








Source: Division of Subsistence, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 
and Fall (2018), see note 12.
130
Interdependency of subsistence and market economies The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020
Box 6.2: The Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence
Davin Holen, former Subsistence Program Manager, Alaska Department of Fish and Game
The Alaska Subsistence Law in 1978 laid the groundwork for the Division of Subsistence within the Alaska Depart-
ment of Fish and Game. The Division has two tasks, identify populations of game or stocks of fi sh customarily har-
vested and used by residents, and identify amounts reasonably necessary for subsistence in communities surround-
ing those resources. The subsistence is identifi ed in regulation as a way of life that is based on consistent, long-term 
reliance upon fi sh and game resources for the basic necessities of life.1
Since 1980 the Division has conducted comprehensive surveys documenting harvest of wild resources in 278 com-
munities in Alaska. The map below shows the locations of survey communities. Comprehensive surveys record all 
species harvested while targeted surveys record specifi c species, such as migratory waterfowl, salmon, or large land 
mammals. Surveys are not done in all communities each year. Hence there are gaps in data
Harvest survey data and permit data for fi sheries or harvest ticket data for game are used to inform the Boards of 
Fisheries and Game. Household harvest surveys record activity for a calendar year. They are administered face-to-
face to record demographics, harvests, sharing and distribution, and the cash economy including jobs and income. 
Typically, the surveys are a census for smaller communities under 200 households and a 50 per cent or 25 per cent 
sample for larger rural communities. The surveys record eff orts, harvest, use and sharing for each wild resource, 
and a variety of attributes such as month, access to resource, and gear type.
In recent years surveys include food security, health and other indicators to understand patterns and trends. The 
surveys are in English with Alaska Native translations such as Central Yup’ik and Inupiaq.
A special thanks to Dr. Jim Fall and David Koster at the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Subsistence 
for providing data for this chapter. Dr. Fall recently retired as the Research Director of the Division of Subsistence 
after 40 years with the Alaska Department of Fish and Game.
1 Alaska Administrative Code 99.005
Location of communities in Alaska surveyed for harvest assessments
Source: Division of Subsistence, Alaska Department of Fish and Game.
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Subsistence maintains the ability to continue liv-
ing in areas where jobs are harder to come by 
and costs of living are higher. In a study focused 
on salmon, respondents stated that they rely 
on salmon to meet their subsistence needs, for 
cultural continuity, and for economic wellbeing.42 
A 2017 summary of wild food production in Alaska 
estimated the cost of replacing the wild food har-
vest of rural communities with corresponding com-
mercial products at USD 454 million estimated at 
USD 10 a pound, a realistic amount for many rural 
communities in Alaska (Table 6.1).
Residents in these communities are eating a higher 
percentage of protein in their diet than the nation-
al average due to their harvest of wild foods that 
averages from 159 pounds per capita edible weight 
found on Kodiak Island to a high of 400 pounds per 
capita in the Arctic (Table 6.1).43
Alaska’s Personal Use Salmon Fisheries
Hannah L. Harrison, University of Guelph
Residents living in urban areas may take part in 
personal use’ designated fishery that allows for 
those living on or near the road system to harvest 
fish for personal consumption. This designation 
is different from recreational angling in that only 
Alaska residents may take part, and personal use 
fishing requires both a sport license and personal 
use permit issued by the Alaska Department of Fish 
and Game. 
Personal use salmon fisheries, more commonly 
known as dip net’ fisheries, are found in several 
locations along Alaska’s road system (see Figure 6.8 
of personal use fisheries in Southcentral Alaska).
The most popular dip net locations are the Kenai 
and Kasilof River fisheries along the eastern side 
of Cook Inlet. These fisheries are typically fished by 
standing on the river shore or wading in the water 
while holding a net up to 5 feet in diameter out into 
the water to intercept passing salmon. All dip net 
fisheries are subject to closure or restricted hours 
during years where salmon runs are weak.
Personal use salmon fisheries have grown in 
popularity since the mid-1990s when harvest 
efforts were first recorded. This is in part due to 
some fishery’s close proximity to major popula-
tion centers, access along the road system, and 
ease of participating as little specialized gear or 
experience is required. Personal use fisheries may 
support food security for low income households 
by providing an easily-accessible source of high-
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Rural Southcentral 145 1 032 896 93 13 5 164 479 10 328 957
Kodiak Island 159 2 106 866 101 14 10 534 332 21 068 665
Rural Southeast 186 4 996 351 119 17 24 981 756 49 963 512
Southwest-Aleutian 210 3 331 143 134 19 16 655 713 33 311 426
Interior 293 2 797 785 187 26 13 988 923 27 977 845
Western 379 9 427 608 242 34 47 138 039 94 276 079
Arctic 402 10 269 886 257 36 51 349 428 102 698 855
Subtotal 276 33 962 534 176 25 169 812 669 339 625 339
Urban areas
Anchorage Area 15 4 447 633 9 1 22 238 163 44 476 327
Fairbanks-Delta 16 1 713 258 10 1 8 566 292 17 132 584
Juneau Area 21 686 167 13 2 3 430 833 6 861 667
Mat-Su Area 22 2 257 007 14 2 11 285 034 22 570 068
Ketchikan Area 26 359 357 17 2 1 796 787 3 593 574
Kenai Peninsula 32 1 829 072 20 3 9 145 362 18 290 724
Valdez 38 151 750 24 3 758 750 1 517 499
Subtotal 19 11 444 244 12 2 57 221 221 114 442 442
Alaska Total 62 45 406 778 39 6 227 033 890 454 067 781
Source: Division of Subsistence, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, and Fall (2018), see note 12.
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quality protein.44 Dip net fi sheries have been linked 
to important cultural and social components of 
urban Alaskan way of life and relationships with 
local food.45 Dip netting is often a kin-oriented ac-
tivity, where groups of family members or friends 
fi sh together and where generational knowledge 
and values related to salmon fi shing are passed 
on. Few data exist for dipnet fi sheries in the state 
beyond the number of people who participate and 
estimates for total catch.
The rapid growth of personal use fi sheries repre-
sents a challenge for state fi sheries managers and 
local municipal governments. Many personal use 
fi shers arrive from other locations, often creating 
a seasonal population boom in small communities, 
where increased demand for goods and services 
provides economic opportunities. However, lack 
of local infrastructure may contribute to crowding 
at the peak of the season. The Alaska Department 
of Fish and Game and local municipalities inform 
fi shers of the regulations, and infrastructure has 
been developed, yet tensions arise between local 
residents and out-of-town fi shers, and between 
personal use fi shers and other gear-type users, 
particularly in the Cook Inlet fi sheries.46
Increasing interest of subsistence 
economies in the North: Canadian Research 
Perspectives
David Natcher, University of Saskatchewan
The term subsistence has received varied and 
uneven treatment by the social sciences. In the 
North, subsistence has been characterized as the 
minimum resources necessary to support life. 
This has entrenched a belief that subsistence 
represents the procurement of the most basic of 
human material needs thus allowing for meager 
economic existence. Although subsistence does in-
volve food procurement, subsistence also encom-
passes a complex array of norms, social relation-
ships, technologies, worldviews, and place-based 
 knowledge that are all embedded in food procure-
ment  systems. In this way subsistence represents 
a seamless whole, where culture, economy and 
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Alaska residents participate in the Kasilof River personal use dip 
net fi shery, Cook Inlet, Alaska.  Photo: Davin Holen.
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environment overlap, and boundaries become 
blurred.47
Notwithstanding this broader and more holistic 
view, subsistence is, more often than not, charac-
terized in the literature and public policy as simply 
a food-getting activity, and a means of household 
provisioning. This view of subsistence is found for 
example, in comprehensive land claims agree-
ments in northern Canada, where subsistence is 
characterized as “the non-commercial means of 
providing food and other household necessities 
from the land or simply “the taking of wildlife into 
possession, and includes hunting, trapping, fishing, 
 or taking wildlife] by any means.”48 While these 
definitions were agreed to by land claims negotia-
tors, and ultimately ratified by Indigenous Peoples 
themselves, they fail to capture the cultural dimen-
sions of wildlife harvesting. It is this definition, and 
variations thereof, that more often than not reflect 
how Indigenous subsistence economies have come 
to be treated in subsistence research.
Between 1950 and 2019, an estimated 321 papers 
and books have been published on subsistence in 
northern Canada, the majority of which have been 
published in the past two decades. Whereas the 
subsistence research conducted in the latter half of 
the 20th century was largely dominated by anthro-
pologists and human geographers whose research 
explored the cultural dimensions of Indigenous 
food systems, the last two decades has witnessed a 
shift to more interdisciplinary research that consid-
ers the effects of climate change on subsistence 
harvesting. General nutrition studies that address 
the food habits and nutrition of Indigenous Peo-
ples in northern Canada have long been represent-
ed in the subsistence literature and more recently 
traditional ecological knowledge studies that 
include subsistence and environmental monitoring 
data have become increasingly common.49
A recent area of subsistence studies can be found 
in the food security literature. Another category 
includes studies of food procurement in regions, 
communities, or for specific species. This cat-
egory includes studies designed to estimate the 
harvest of fish, wildlife and plants by Indigenous 
Peoples. These studies tend to focus on the who, 
what, when, where, how, and how much of wildlife 
harvesting50 In Canada, one of the earliest harvest 
studies was conducted in Nunavik. In September 
1975, the Northern Quebec Inuit Association initi-
ated a seven-year study entitled Research to Estab-
lish Present Levels of Native Harvesting. The study 
set out to determine the extent of Inuit harvesting, 
the results of which would be used to establish a 
best estimate of harvest levels by species and com-
munity51 The objective of the harvest study was 
to provide data needed to establish guaranteed 
harvesting levels for Inuit households.
Since the completion of the Nunavik study, other 
land claims regions have carried out harvest 
assessments. The Inuvialuit Harvest Study was 
conducted from 1988 to 1997. The object was to 
obtain a continuous, long-term record of Inuvialuit 
harvest levels for the six regional communities. 
Harvest data are to be used by co-management 
boards and other wildlife and fisheries agencies to 
determine and recommend subsistence quotas. 
Environmental screening and impact review boards 
also use harvest information to fulfill their role in 
dealing with resource development and for deter-
mining compensation in cases of loss or damage.
The Gwich’in Harvest Study (GHS) was a require-
ment of the Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim 
Agreement (1992). The objective of the GHS was 
to record the number of animals, fish and birds 
harvested by Gwich’in within the Settlement Area. 
These harvest levels would then be used to calcu-
late Gwich’in Minimum Need Levels for Gwich’in 
households and would inform the management 
efforts of the Gwich’in Renewable Resources Board 
(GRRB) and other government partners.
The Nunavut Wildlife Harvest Study (NWHS) was 
mandated by the Nunavut Lands Claim Agreement 
(NLCA) and carried out under the direction of the 
Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB). The 
purposes of the Harvest Study were to determine 
current harvesting levels and patterns of Inuit use 
of wildlife resources, aid in the management of 
wildlife resources of Nunavut, and once again to 
establish ‘basic needs levels’. 
With the settlement of the Labrador Inuit Land 
Claims Agreement (LILCA - 2005), Inuit of Nunat-
siavut secured clearly defined rights to a 72 500 
km2 land-base and a 48 690 km2 of coastal zone. 
Within the settlement region, Inuit have the right 
to harvest wildlife resources in order to meet their 
domestic needs, or, as defined by the LILCA, Inuit 
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Domestic Harvest Limits. Domestic need is defined 
as the amount of resources necessary to satisfy 
individual non-commercial use. The use of domes-
tic harvest levels as a basis for wildlife harvesting 
policy was promoted by the federal and provincial 
governments for its ability to set clearly defined 
harvest limits and facilitate effective monitoring 
and enforcement capabilities. Since its settlement, 
the Nunatsiavut Government has established In-
dividual Domestic Harvest Levels for 138 different 
species and resources used by Inuit residing within 
the Nunatsiavut Settlement Region.
Wildlife-harvesting studies have been designed to 
establish minimal need levels of subsistence re-
sources for Indigenous households. This approach 
reduces subsistence to a regulatory issue, where 
conservation of wildlife receives a prior concern. 
In these studies, household harvesting data are 
collected, analyzed statistically, and used to chart 
population dynamics for species in order to allo-
cate harvesting rights. These studies clearly dem-
onstrate that wildlife harvesting remains critical 
to the nutritional health and well-being of Indig-
enous communities. Yet this approach obscures 
the historical, cultural, and institutional contexts 
that shape Indigenous subsistence economies. 
Researchers tend to concentrate on methodologi-
cal challenges of subsistence research rather than 
the structural conditions that shape and provide 
cultural meaning to subsistence production. Lost 
is the fact that subsistence represents a cultural 
system, which cannot be reduced to an economic 
activity or regulatory process.
The Market Economy and Land-based 
Subsistence Economy of Northern Canada
Ryan Macdonald, Statistics Canada
Northern Canada is defined as the three territo-
ries: Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut. 
This comprises the regions for which a majority of 
comparable statistics are published, but does not 
include all of Inuit Nunangat, which is the home-
land of the Inuit in Canada. In particular, Nunavik 
and Nunatsiavut are not included, and statistics do 
not show Inuvialuit Settlement Region separately.
Characteristics of the Northern Canadian 
communities
Northern Canada is characterized by small popu-
lations, with a large proportion of Indigenous 
residents (Table 6.2, Figure 6.9). Most communi-
ties in Nunavut are located along coastlines, while 
Yukon and Northwest Territories have more inland 
communities situated along roads. The majority 
of communities have less than 500 residents, and 
only the territorial capitals, Whitehorse, Yellow-
knife and Iqaluit, have populations exceeding 5 000 
people.
The 2016 Census of Population shows that be-
tween 2011 and 2016, the population of Yukon 
grew 5.8 per cent, of the Northwest Territories by 
0.8 per cent, and Nunavut’s population grew 12.7 
per cent.
Across the territories, the capitals all had positive 
population growth between 2011 and 2016. White-
horse grew by 7.8 per cent, Yellowknife by 1.7 per 
cent and Iqaluit by 15.7 per cent. For Yukon and 
Northwest Territories, the growth in the capital 
cities more than offset the declines in smaller com-
munities so that territorial population increased. 
For Nunavut, the growth in Iqaluit added to growth 
in smaller communities.
The 2016 Census of Population shows 1 673 785 
Indigenous people in Canada, including First Na-
tions (North American Indians), Inuit, and Métis. 
Indigenous populations are young and growing 
rapidly.52 For all of Canada, Indigenous Peoples 
accounted for 4.8 per cent of the Canadian popula-
tion, up from 4.3 per cent of the population in the 
2011 National Household Survey and 2.8 per cent 
in the 1996 Census.
In Northern Canada, the majority of the small com-
munities are predominantly Indigenous and repre-
sent diverse cultures where tradition is important 
in daily life. In Yukon, communities tend to have a 
lower percentage of the population that is Indig-
enous, while in many communities in Northwest 
Territories, and particularly for Nunavut which is 
predominantly Inuit, the Indigenous percentage of 
the population exceeds 90 per cent of residents. 
The median age in Northern Canada is lower than 
for Canada as a whole, with Nunavut having the 
youngest population. In Nunavut, half of residents 
in are younger than 25.1 years old. Across Yukon, 
about half of communities have a median age 
younger than that of Canada (41.2 years old) while 
in Northwest Territories almost all communities 
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tinues to affect generations of Indigenous Peoples 
and has been identified as a factor negatively 
 affecting high school graduation rates.53
Living conditions in Northern Canadian communi-
ties can influence the ability of young people to 
gain an education, particularly for younger female 
led households.54 Northern Canada has a higher 
rate of lone female parent families than does the 
rest of Canada, particularly in Nunavut. However, 
care is needed with interpreting these rates as the 
lack of housing in the Canadian North makes com-
parisons with Southern Canada challenging.
had a younger median age. In Yukon, communi-
ties tend to be older, and some are experiencing 
population decline.
In Northwest Territories and Nunavut, the youth-
ful age structure presents a challenge to gain an 
education when living in remote communities 
often entails leaving the community to attend 
school. Across Northern Canada, smaller communi-
ties tend to have fewer persons with at a diploma 
(post-secondary education), and the effect is most 
pronounced in Nunavut and then Northwest 
 Territories. The legacy of residential schools con-




Population, 2016 35 151 728 35 874 41 786 35 944
Population growth 2011 to 2016 (per cent) 5.0 5.8 0.8 12.7
Median age 41.2 39.5 34.0 25.1
Persons with Aboriginal identity 1 673 785 8 195 20 860 30 555
Share of population that identifies as aboriginal 4.8 22.8 49.9 85.0
Population density (per square km) 3.9 0.08 0.04 0.02
Share of population in urban areas1 81.3 60.6 64.1 49.0
Share of families (in census) that are lone female parent families 12.8 14.1 16.1 20.7
Percentage of persons that have a diploma (post-secondary education) 81.7 83.7 72.6 49.4
1 Urban is defined as community with a population greater than 1 000 persons and a population density greater than 400 people per square kilometer. 
Source: Statistics Canada 2016 Census of population. 
Figure 6.9. Population growth rates, share of Indigenous population, age and tertiary education. Yukon, Northwest 
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Market economies and the role of government 
in Northern Canada
Market economies in Northern Canada differ 
 markedly from southern regions, as well as be-
tween territorial capitals and the smaller, geo-
graphically dispersed communities. Compared to 
Southern Canada, there is less infrastructure and 
resource extraction, and government activity plays 
a larger role in the economy than in Southern 
Canada.55 In the territories, the most important 
industries for employment and GDP are based 
on natural resource extraction or the provision of 
government services (public administration and 
defense, education, health care). These indus-
tries tend to be pay better wages, but not to have 
jobs located in remote communities. The largest 
government industries are public administration, 
health care and social assistance, and education.
Resource extraction has long been a major feature 
of territorial economies, with a general expectation 
that development of natural resources will provide 
benefits to Northerners while progressing in a 
sustainable manner where adverse environmental 
and social consequences are minimized.56 Yukon 
has over the last century had important lead, 





Gross regional product (GRP) (CAD millions) 2 691 4 304 2 536 1 886 103
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Share of top 3 industries in GRP 49.9 45.8 53.8 31.5
Share of Tourism in GRP (2014) 2.7 1.7 1.2 1.9
Share of Exports of goods (customs basis) in GRP 8.17 33.38 0.09 24.83
Source: Statistics Canada 2016 Census of population 
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nickel, copper mines and continued placer mining 
for gold, particularly around Dawson city. North-
west Territories has had extensive mining opera-
tions for oil and gas, uranium, gold, silver and now 
diamonds. Nunavut also has a long history with 
mining and has the potential to produce notewor-
thy quantities of iron, gold, copper, uranium, and 
diamonds.
The development and extraction of resources can 
come with impacts that can manifest over long 
periods of time. This is particularly the case if plan-
ning and regulation do not adequately account for 
closure and reclamation when resource projects 
end.57 Additionally, effects from the warming cli-
mate, such as warmer winters and thawing perma-
frost, have negative effects on local peoples and 
the ability of northerners to meet their needs when 
relying on the environment for subsistence.58
Tourism in Northern Canada has been viewed as a 
method of providing jobs and for developing local 
economies.59 Major tourist activities in Northern 
Canada include nature based tourism, museums, 
arts and crafts, hunting and fishing, aurora viewing, 
hiking and canoeing or whitewater rafting. Tourism 
encompasses parts of many different industries, 
such as transportation; accommodation and food 
services; arts, entertainment and recreation; and, 
retail trade. The share of tourism is highest in 
Yukon, which comprises a significant length of the 
Alaska Highway which sees considerable road traf-
fic in the summer months. While tourism can bring 
benefits, particularly to local economies, it can 
also present negative effects such as crowding and 
degradation of natural locations or degradation of 
historic sites.60
One of the largest recent tourism developments in 
Northern Canada is the advent of cruises through 
the Northwest Passage or among arctic islands. 
These cruises bring opportunities for employment 
and income to remote communities, but also as-
sociated challenges with managing the new indus-
try.61 The increased shipping and tourism can also 
stress search and rescue capabilities struggling to 
keep up with increased activity.
Land-based subsistence economies
In Northern Canada, land-based subsistence 
economic activity is an important source of nutri-
tion and well-being.62 However, there is limited 
data on land-based subsistence economic activi-
ties in Northern Canada, and a complex inter-play 
between market economic activity and land-based 
subsistence economic activity exists. Land-based 
subsistence economy activities are those where 
households source food, materials, clothing, art or 
cultural items from nature.
Across Northern Canada, land-based subsis-
tence economic activities vary by community 
and  territory, with participation being highest in 
Nunavut and lowest in Yukon. The 2017 Aboriginal 
Peoples Survey included a number of questions on 
land-based subsistence economic activities and the 
responses to a selection of responses on hunt-
ing and gathering activities are reported on Table 
6.4. Across the territories, hunting and gathering 
 activities were most prevalent in  Nunavut where 
an estimated 19 980 persons hunted and  gathered, 
more than the total for Yukon and Northwest 
 Territories combined. Residents of Nunavut 
also reported a higher frequency of hunting and 
 gathering than the other territories, with 67 per 
cent of persons who hunted, fished or trapped 
 reporting they did so at least once a week during 
the season and 72 per cent of persons who report-
ed gathering doing so at least once a week during 
the season.
Table 6.4. Aboriginal peoples survey, harvesting activities by Aboriginal identity, Number of persons, 15 years and over, 2017
Hunting, fishing and trapping Yukon
Northwest 
Territories Nunavut
Hunted, fished or trapped in the last year 2 540 3 630 12 900
Hunted, fished or trapped at least once a week during the season 1 080 1 870 8 620
Hunted, fished or trapped less than once a week but at least once a month during the season 910 990 2 890
Hunted, fished or trapped at least once during the season but not in the last month 520 780 1 370
Gathering wild plants
Gathered wild plants in the last year 2 210 2 740 7 300
Gathered wild plants at least once a week during the season 1 060 1 460 5 220
Gathered wild plants less than once a week but at least once a month during the season 690 680 1 390
Gathered wild plants at least once during the season but not in the last month 450 600 640
Source: Statistics Canada
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Foods that are sourced from the environment are 
sometimes referred to as country foods, and they 
can represent an important source of health.63 
Across Northern Canada, there are a number of 
important plant and animal types for hunting and 
gathering that are (mostly) common. Numerous 
berry varieties are available in summer. In tundra/
boreal environments, Caribou, Moose, Bison, and 
Muskox are important species for harvest. In coast-
al areas, whale, narwhale, seal, walrus, and polar 
bear are important species. Fish are an important 
source of protein across wide ranges of Northern 
Canada, with the various species of salmon being 
the most sought after. Hares, ducks, geese, grouse 
and ptarmigan are also harvested.
Interaction between Market Economy and 
Land-based Subsistence Economy
The presence of the land-based subsistence 
economy presents the possibility that the poor la-
bour market situation and housing issues in many 
smaller communities may be alleviated through 
land-based subsistence economic activity. One 
type of interpretation would indicate this to be the 
case when high unemployment, low labour market 
participation, low incomes and limited access to 
external markets for expensive goods produces 
a situation where food insecurity is present and 
where the land-based subsistence economy thus 
constitutes an important source of nutrition and 
well-being. A more nuanced model for understand-
ing the relationship between the market-based 
economy and land-based subsistence economy 
may be a mixed model where both market-based 
activity and land-based activity is necessary for 
community health.64
Research indicates that a complex interaction oc-
curs between market-based activities and land-
based subsistence activities.65 For example, the 
2017 Aboriginal Peoples Survey shows that across 
Inuit Nunangat employment can be an important 
determinant for the ability of people to participate 
in the land-based subsistence economy, while 
simultaneously acting as a barrier. This occurs 
because
employed persons can better afford the supplies 
necessary for land-based subsistence economic 
 activity. These supplies include boats, snow mo-
biles, rifles and ammunition, gas and food to eat 
while on the land.66 On the other hand, employed 
person have less flexibility and more cash income 
to buy food in the market.
The market-economies and subsistence interact in 
complex ways, through the traditions and institu-
tions within communities. This interaction has 
been described as the social economy.67 Often, 
the forms of social capital and social infrastructure 
that underpin the social economy do not integrate 
well with practices for measuring market economic 
 activity. As a result, in the future, it will be benefi-
cial to better understand the social and institution-
al arrangements within Northern Canada, and how 
they interact within the dual economy, in order to 
have a fuller understanding of the Northern Cana-
dian economy.
Reindeer husbandry in the Russian Arctic 
and the private nomadic family-based 
reindeer entrepreneurship of the Yamal-
Nenets Autonomous Okrug
Alexander Pilyasov and Valeriy Kibenko68
In the last 30 years, significant changes occurred in 
the reindeer herding in the Russian Arctic, and as 
a result of the processes of denationalization and 
privatization, a very diverse reindeer herding indus-
try, in terms of ownership, has been formed (Table 
6.5). Under the Soviet era the majority of domestic 
reindeer were in state-owned enterprises, while 
now, in Yamal-Nenets, the opposite is true as the 
majority is organized in private family enterprises, 
a new phenomenon in herding. Private reindeer 
husbandry has become widespread as a type of 
business.69
The types of reindeer ownership in the Russian 
Arctic, in general, include agricultural organiza-
tions, consisting of previous state-owned enter-
prises with public ownership of reindeer, officially 
registered peasant farms and private households 
(Table 6.5).70 A specific case of agricultural orga-
nizations is small enterprises in public ownership 
(third column of Table 6.5), which, on the one hand, 
have characteristics in common with small private 
enterprises, and, on the other hand, are similar to 
large agricultural organizations with public owner-
ship of reindeer. The large agricultural organiza-
tions, with public ownership of reindeer, consist 
of teams, resembling the brigades of the state 
collective agricultural enterprises, different from 
the family farms of the traditional organization 
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of nomadic reindeer herding. These transitional 
forms of  ownership, resembling the  previous 
state-owned enterprises, are common in the 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug (NAO), the Republic of 
 Sakha-Yakutia, the Kamchatka Territory and the 
Murmansk Region.
Reindeer husbandry as a typical Arctic business 
is an activity with exceptionally high risks, due to 
 annual herd dynamics, annual variations in weath-
er conditions, predators, and diseases.71 Statistical 
data on the annual dynamics of domestic reindeer 
from 1998 to 2015 for each of the ten reindeer-
breeding regions of Russia, showing that in six of 
them there were periods, for example, 2003, 2004, 
2006, when the numbers of reindeer in neighbor-
ing years diff ered by 18-20 per cent and in one 
case, the Magadan region in 2014, the number of 
reindeer in neighboring years diff ered by 35 per 
cent. In the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, only 
ab e  Number of reindeer in enter rises of diff erent categories as of  ussian Arctic    heads
Region
Sum in enterprises 
of categories 













Russia 1 906.0 1 133.1 239.4 68.5 704.4
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YaNAO) 886.8 274.0 54.6 7.0 605.8
Nenets Autonomous Okrug (NAO) 207.6 174.0 77.4 14.6 18.9
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (ChAO) 182.1 177.0 0.0 0.0 5.1
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 172.8 162.3 43.1 0.5 10.0
Krasnoyarsk region 146.7 110.4 6.8 35.4 0.9
Republic of Komi 105.3 71.3 0.0 3.4 30.6
Murmansk region 61.1 57.5 25.3 0.0 3.6
Khanty-Mansii Autonomous Okrug (KHMAO)-Yugra 53.7 26.3 0.0 4.0 23.4
Kamchatka region 52.3 51.6 31.1 0.0 0.7
Magadan region 17.0 14.0 0.0 2.7 0.3
Other regions 20.6 14.7 1.1 0.9 5.1
Source: Preliminary results from All-Russian agricultural census-2016.
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in the Priuralsky district, the number of reindeer 
livestock decreased by 40 per cent from 55.8 thou-
sand to 33.5 thousand due to the death of reindeer 
in the autumn-winter of 1998 and spring of 1999. 
There are regions where private reindeer livestock 
is dominated by private households, i.e. nomadic 
reindeer herding families. More than 90 per cent 
of all private reindeer livestock in Arctic Russia is 
concentrated in these regions; the Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug, the Komi Republic, and the 
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (KhMAO)-
Yugra. Regions where private livestock is domi-
nated by small and individual enterprises are the 
 Krasnoyarsk territory (Taimyr and Evenkia) and the 
Magadan region.
Private and nomadic family-based reindeer hus-
bandry in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 
is particularly notable: the region is the leader in 
number of privately owned reindeer, not only in 
Russia, with three-quarters of all privately owned 
reindeer in Russia, but also in the world.
There are more privately owned reindeer in the 
Tazovsky district of Yamal-Nenets Autonomous 
Okrug (YaNAO) alone than in the whole of Finland. 
Yamal has three times as many family reindeer 
farms as Finland, and almost six times as many 
nomadic reindeer herding families as Norway.
The revival of nomadic entrepreneurship in Yamal 
in the 1990s, was that, as often happens, organi-
zational and institutional changes went along with 
the technological revolution, expressed in the mass 
introduction of snowmobiles and other individual 
technical means (diesel generator, mobile phone, 
etc.) in the “small” units of the nomadic family 
reindeer herding.72 This technological revolution 
came to Yamal about 30 years after similar radi-
cal changes appeared in the traditional industries 
of reindeer husbandry and fisheries in Northern 
Scandinavia, Canada and Alaska. It is no exaggera-
tion to say that it was the nomadic reindeer herd-
ers of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug who 
took advantage of this technological revolution to 
the maximum extent among the peoples of the 
North of Russia. 
Private reindeer herding in the Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug is concentrated in family 
enterprises of the nomadic populations of the 
Yamalsky, Tazovsky, and Priuralsky districts of the 
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. In these dis-
tricts there are about three thousand Indigenous 
reindeer enterprises (Table 6.6), they employ about 
15 thousand entrepreneurs and their relatives, and 
the average size of a private family farm is about 
six people.
The internal diversity of the reindeer herding 
economy, is the most important insurance for 
nomadic small businesses with reindeer numbers 
of up to 200-250 heads, with earnings from rein-
deer, from state subsidies and fishing and hunting. 
Poor reindeer herders, with reindeer numbers of 
less than 100 heads, strive to reduce the number 
of slaughtered reindeer, by providing themselves 
and reindeer herding dogs with food from other 
sources, primarily fishing, thus preserving the 
 number of reindeer.
Magadan: Each person had permission to catch 50 kg of fish per 
year without a quota (2004), for their own consumption. This is 
not much fish to eat for people, whose traditional way of life is 
fishing for subsistence. Photo: M. Yashchenko (2004). 
Photo: Nenets family in a nomadic reindeer herders’ camp, 
Cooperative  Voskhod’, village Oma, Nenets Autonomous Okrug. 
Photo: Yasavey
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New stereotypes of market behavior among pri-
vate reindeer herders have revealed a number of 
paradoxes in private reindeer husbandry in Yamal, 
which are absent in other reindeer herding regions, 
where privately owned reindeer do not dominate 
in numbers. For example, Yamal is the only region 
in which the production of reindeer meat is radi-
cally lower than expected when compared with the 
total reindeer population (Figure 6.12).
The reason is that the economic incentives for pri-
vate entrepreneurs are mainly determined by the 
most important ratios of prices for venison (meat) 
and gasoline; venison (meat), and the informal 
market for panta, the highly priced product from 
the antlers of male reindeer. In social (public or 
collective) ownership of reindeer herding in other 
regions, these comparative prices do not affect the 
economic behavior of herders to such an extent. In 
fact, Figure 6.12 testifies to the role of the informal 
panta market, in which thousands of Yamal family 
reindeer farms are involved.
Problems of Yamal reindeer husbandry, including 
pasture depletion and loss of pastures to develop-
ment of infrastructure, are primarily institutional. 
They are the result of state support institutions 
that have created the wrong incentives for reindeer 
herder-entrepreneurs in recent decades. State 
support should be guided by the specific patterns 
of the development of reindeer business, in order 
to find a balance between the revival of the rein-
deer husbandry based on the Indigenous Nenets 
family nomadism, and the rise of the entrepre-
neurial economy. There is a contradiction between 
the new realities of private reindeer nomadic 
entrepreneurship and the support to old state 
institutions inherited from the Soviet era, as if all 
reindeer herding is still in state-owned enterprises. 
For example, the development of purchaser prices 
for reindeer meat lag behind the rise in gasoline 
prices, which became, with the massive introduc-
tion of snowmobiles, simply the most important el-
ement of the reindeer herder’s expenditures. Thus, 
the unfavorable price development contributes to 
an increase in reindeer livestock, beyond what is in 
accordance with nomadic reindeer herding, and to 
an overgrazing of pastures, exacerbated by loss of 
pasture land to infrastructure development.
The entrepreneurial model of reindeer husbandry 
is a very complex management system that re-
quires a deep understanding of the patterns of 
its development.73 An interesting feature of the 
reindeer-entrepreneurial environment is the 
Table 6.6. Institutional structure of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YANAO) reindeer husbandry as of 1.01.2017. 












All categories of reindeer enterprise 3 436 1 001 930 23.6 292
Agricultural enterprises, including: 44 428 484 28.3 9 738
Organizations of agricultural industrial complex (APK) 16 196 710 31.5 12 294
Indigenous communities (obshchina) 22 199 886 25.3 9 086
Small enterprises 6 31 888 27.2 5 315
Peasant farms 1 946 27.4 946
Privately owned reindeer 3 347 572 500 20.1 171
Source: Information from Yamal-Nenets information system Yamal  https://dkmns.yanao.ru/about/isystems/22/
Figure 6.12. Number of reindeer and production of reindeer 
meat. Reindeer husbandry in the Russian Arctic. 
2016
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Source: Russian Federal statistic service and mass-media: http://tass.
ru/ekonomika/4231054; http://www.ks87.ru/20/28/6521.html Figure 
6.10 prepared by expert of ANO Institute of Regional Consulting  PhD 
student Darya Sidorova
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importance of knowledge spillovers.74 Repeatedly 
in the course of field research (Figure 6.13), re-
spondents noted the influence of information from 
neighbors on their moving practice. When asked: 
“How and from whom exactly do you learn about 
the impending natural hazards during moving? 
A common response was: “From nomadic neigh-
bors”, and “Meetings with neighbors more than five 
times a year, sometimes their decisions strongly 
influence”. The most reliable and fastest means of 
communication is considered to be “tundra radio”, 
i.e. word of mouth, from camp to camp, which by 
respondents is considered “faster than cellular 
communication”, which works only near facilities 
of the fuel and energy infrastructure, trading posts 
and settlements. In the tundra, it is very simple to 
assess how effectively the reindeer owner’s pro-
cess of commercializing this knowledge is proceed-
ing – by the dynamics of the population of his own 
private reindeer.
Sámi reindeer pastoralism in Norway: The 
role of traditional knowledge for economy 
and governance
Ravdna Biret Marja E. Sara, Ellen Inga Turi, Risten MM 
Buljo, Anders Oskal, Svein Disch Mathiesen and Iulie 
Aslaksen75
Reindeer pastoralism is livelihood for more than 20 
Indigenous Peoples in Arctic and Sub-Arctic areas 
in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Mongolia, Chi-
na, Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, involving about 
100 000 people and 2.5 million reindeer (Rangifer 
tarandus) on natural pastures from the North Sea 
to the Pacific Ocean (Figure 6.15). Reindeer pasto-
ralism is a nomadic livelihood, adapting to natural 
migration patterns of reindeer, often from coastal 
grassland in summer to lichen covered inland 
areas in winter. In Norway, reindeer pastoralism 
is predominantly a Sámi livelihood. Traditional 
knowledge is the basis for managing the herd and 
ensuring diverse use of the reindeer, while adapt-
ing to climate change.76
Loss and fragmentation of pastures and migra-
tion routes, from infrastructure associated with 
hydropower, mining, cabin areas, forestry, and re-
cently wind power, have severe consequences for 
reindeer husbandry.77 
Reports of the Intergov-
ernmental Science-Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES) and the Inter-
governmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) 
call for maintaining 
ecosystems to sup-
port climate mitiga-
tion and biodiversity.78 
Traditional knowledge 
is of key importance 
for adapting to climate 
change.79 Traditional 
knowledge is defined by 
the  Ottawa Indigenous 
Figure 6.13. Dominance of “tundra radio”, i.e. word of mouth 
from other families in all communication 
methods of reindeer herders-entrepreneurs of 
the Yamal district. 2017
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Source: Social and economic factors of life and well-being of the Indi-
genous people living traditional life style in the Yamal district of Yamal 
Okrug. Volume 1. Sociological survey. Principal investigator: Valerii 
Kibenko. Salekhard. 2017. 101p. (non-published materials).
Reindeer herding, Finnmark. Photo: Tom Nicolaysen
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 Knowledge Principles.80 While food governance is 
the  institutional framework for managing food sys-
tems, Arctic food sovereignty is defined by scholars 
from reindeer herding as an understanding of food 
security based on Indigenous Peoples’ possibilities 
for sustainable use of resources in accordance with 
their traditional food systems.
Sámi traditional knowledge and governance of 
reindeer husbandry
While Indigenous rights are implemented in legisla-
tion in Norway, a challenge remains to integrate 
traditional knowledge in governance of reindeer 
husbandry. There is need to develop institutions 
that support cooperation, with the aim of gover-
nance to achieve ecological, economic, and cultural 
sustainability. The issue of sustainability involves 
dealing with the competing objectives of reducing 
the size of herds and increasing profit in reindeer-
husbandry.81
Sámi reindeer pastoralism is based on partnership 
of the siida, households cooperating on reindeer 
herding.82 This traditional organization is similar 
across reindeer herding regions in the Arctic. A 
key issue is the possibility for reindeer herders to 
determine the composition and size of the herd.83 
While previously reindeer calves were hardly 
slaughtered, today subsidies provide economic 
incentives to slaughter calves. On average, female 
reindeer make up 77 per cent of herds and male 
reindeer only 6 per cent. In the 1960s reindeer 
herds in Finnmark typically comprised up to 50 per 
cent adult males. Their strength enabled them to 
break crusted snow, providing access to plants to 
females and calves.
Structural changes of reindeer herds, in Russia 
from the 1930s and in Norway from the 1960s, 
led to the practice of slaughtering calves and low 
shares of male reindeer.84 These structural changes 
of Sámi reindeer husbandry may have made the 
pastoral economy more vulnerable in times of 
climate change and risk of ice-covered pastures. 
A consequence is increased feeding of reindeer in 
winter, contributing to erosion of herders’ econo-
my. In the winter 2019-20 Sámi reindeer herders in 
Finnmark used 624 tons pelleted feed, supported 
by more than 40 mill NOK by the government.85 
Use of pellets, hay and silage in reindeer herding 
has increased throughout Fennoscandia.86
The economy of Sámi reindeer husbandry in 
Norway
The Norwegian Agricultural Agency compiles 
 annual reports of the economy in reindeer hus-
bandry.87 The value of meat production was about 
32 per cent of total income of reindeer husbandry 
in 2018 (Table 6.7). Compensations for loss of rein-
deer, to predators and traffic accidents and loss 
of area, was about 27 per cent of total income in 
2018, hereof 24 per cent for loss to predators and 
traffic accidents and 3 per cent for loss of area. Of 
the 22 563 lost reindeer in 2018, 94 per cent were 
lost to predators and 6 per cent to traffic accidents 
(Table 6.12). Subsidies to reindeer husbandry were 
about 24 per cent of total income in 2018. In addi-
tion, bonus is paid from surplus in slaughterhouses 
to the reindeer owners. Changes in the value of the 
herd are estimated based on number of reindeer, 
composition of the herd, and assessed weight of 
reindeer.
Table 6.7. Composition of total income in reindeer 










Production based income 128 344  190 543  
Meat and by-products total 122 767 44.3 122 767 31.7
Meat production slaughter 
house 98 124 35.4 108 742 28.1
Meat production private 24 553 8.9 14 025 3.6
Bonus   3 988 1.0
Changes in the value of the 
herd -28 587 -10.3 12 879 3.3
Incomes from related 
activities 6 861 2.5 13 776 3.6
Other production-based 
incomes 27 303 9.9 37 132 9.6
Subsidies 76 361 27.6 92 461 23.9
Compensations 72 419 26.1 104 006 26.9
Total income 277 124 100 387 010 100
Source: Norwegian Agriculture Agency (2019), table 4.1.12.
Table 6.8. Incomes from related activities in reindeer 
husbandry in Norway. 2018. 1 000 NOK
Reindeer herding region 2014 2018
East-Finnmark 2 277 3 630
West-Finnmark 2 214 3 608
Troms 217 4 411
Nordland 662 566
Nord-Trøndelag 313 99
Sør-Trøndelag/Hedmark 1 177 1 462
Total 6 861 13 776
Source: Norwegian Agriculture Agency (2019), table 4.1.12.
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Incomes from related activities comprise  incomes 
from handicrafts (duodji) made from skin, bones 
and antlers of reindeer and incomes from 
 harvesting form nature, such as cloudberries. Table 
6.8 shows that incomes from activities related to 
reindeer husbandry have increased, however, they 
vary over time.88 Vehicles, machinery and equip-
ment are large items of the total cost, in addition 
to depreciation (Table 6.9). An important factor 
behind this development is increase in Sámi food 
and other products and services to tourists.
Income from work outside reindeer herding is of 
large importance for the economy of the reindeer 
herding family (Table 6.10). Among siida share 
leaders, 88 per cent of women and 62 per cent of 
men have income from outside employment or 
self-employment. Of these, 79 per cent of female 
siida share owners had income above 200 000 
NOK, whereas 21 per cent of men had incomes 
below that level.
In particular, the contribution from female spouses 
is important, as 91 per cent of female spouses 
and 73 per cent male spouses have income from 
outside reindeer herding, and a large share have 
relatively high incomes (Table 6.11).
With regard to ownership of reindeer, 67 per cent 
of the reindeer are owned by the leader of the siida 
share, while 5 per cent of the reindeer are owned 
by the spouse and 28 per cent are owned by oth-
ers, i.e. mainly family members.89 The total number 
of reindeer in reindeer herding in Norway was 
estimated to 214 200 for 2019 and has been stable 
since 2015 (Figure 6.14).
Strategy for creating new value chains
Traditional knowledge may be used to develop 
strategies for enhanced value creation in Sámi 
reindeer husbandry, in line with the competi-
tive advantage strategy model of VRIO, i.e. Value 
Table 6.9. Siida share costs in reindeer husbandry in Norway. 2018. 1 000 NOK  







Freight and transportation 197 304 50 122 20 0 693
Intermediate goods 8 351 3 465 2 558 6 317 1 131 1 025 22 848
Travels 1 039 634 291 418 180 136 2 698
Equipment 9 070 10 928 2 355 2 953 2 178 1 277 28 762
Vehicles and machinery 8 736 15 056 2 104 2 788 1 519 1 564 31 767
Buildings and infrastructure 2 279 1 963 280 999 405 139 6 064
Depreciation 10 838 13 640 2 983 3 402 2 116 1 462 34 440
Electricity, energy 3 092 3 315 553 628 473 313 8 373
Administration, rent, insurance, 
sales and marketing 3 634 4 955 1 137 2 608 1 356 659 14 349
Acquisition of services 2 611 2 286 1 186 3 091 920 1 358 11 453
Miscellaneous 5 890 4 682 1 716 729 486 975 14 477
Total 55 737 61 227 15 214 24 056 10 785 8 906 175 924
Source: Norwegian Agriculture Agency (2019), table 4.4.2. 
Table 6.10. Share of female and male siida share leaders 
with wage or self-employment income outside 
reindeer husbandry1. 2018. Per cent
Reindeer  





Women Men Women Men
East-Finnmark 91 58 6 84 94 16
West-Finnmark 92 65 18 74 82 26
Troms 80 65 13 65 88 35
Nordland 63 47 60 63 40 38
Nord-Trøndelag 86 52 33 81 67 19
Sør-Trøndelag/
Hedmark 100 80 80 95 20 5
Totalt 2018 88 62 21 77 79 23
1 In the Economy of the North 2015 the corresponding table gave data 
separately for the areas Polmak/Varanger and Karasjok in East-Finnmark 
while we now present total data for East-Finnmark.   
Source: Norwegian Agriculture Agency (2019), table 7.1.4.
Table 6.11. Share of female and male spouses with wage or 
self-employment income outside reindeer 
husbandry1. 2018. Per cent
Reindeer  





Women Men Women Men
East-Finnmark 98 58 14 29 86 71
West-Finnmark 92 100 10 60 90 40
Troms 81 75 38 33 62 67
Nordland 88 100 20 0 80 100
Nord-Trøndelag 78 100 21 100 79 0
Sør-Trøndelag/
Hedmark 94 50 20 100 80 0
Total 2018 91 73 15 47 85 53
Total 2017 91 81 18 62 82 38
1 In the Economy of the North 2015 the corresponding table gave data 
separately for the areas Polmak/Varanger and Karasjok in East-Finnmark 
while we now present total data for East-Finnmark.   
Source: Norwegian Agriculture Agency (2019), table 7.1.5.
145
The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020 Interdependency of subsistence and market economies
 realizing, Rarity of resources, Imitability (i.e. dif-
ficult to imitate) and Organizational ability.90 A 
key element here is that traditional knowledge is 
non-imitable and that quality products can be de-
veloped in long value chains, from reindeer grazing 
on the mountain to high-quality products to target 
groups, to provide extended income from reindeer 
herding. Utilizing more of the resources from the 
reindeer, such as skin, may also improve work op-
portunities for more people in activities related to 
reindeer herding. Rarity of resources refers to their 
uniqueness, only available in specific seasons of 
the annual reindeer cycle. Traditional knowledge 
is a barrier for imitation as the abilities are learned 
by doing the work. The unique products can reach 
customers with high willingness to pay. In the 
Parliament (Stortinget) debate on the White Paper 
on reindeer husbandry, the Standing Committee 
on Business and Industry emphasized the impor-
tance of the value creation by the reindeer herding 
families, in addition to meat production.91
Sámi traditional knowledge, tenderness of 
reindeer meat, and food sovereignty
A study of reindeer slaughtering practices docu-
ments use of S mi traditional knowledge in rein-
deer slaughtering and in the skill of food prepara-
tion and explores how traditional knowledge can 
be applied to develop Sámi gastronomy for reach-
ing new groups of consumers and to develop the 
understanding of food sovereignty and food gov-
ernance. For example, Sámi reindeer herders have 
no tradition in hanging meat for tenderization, 
while using other insights to tenderize meat for 
everyday gastronomic purposes. In Sámi language 
there is a variety of concepts that carry knowledge 
of slaughtering practices and tenderness of rein-
deer meat, a prerequisite for the food sovereignty 
of Sámi reindeer herders’ families through genera-
tions.
While slaughtering of reindeer for sale is strictly 
regulated, S mi reindeer owners in Kautokeino, 
Northern Norway, still slaughter reindeer for 
own consumption of meat in a similar way as the 
traditional slaughtering. It is common to leave the 
carcass inside the skin, for at least an hour before 
removal of rumen and skin, to make the meat 
tender. The rumen fills with gas, in a process called 
baggan. Today this traditional practice conflicts 
with regulations for industrial slaughtering in 
Norway. From the 1950s, reindeer meat for the 
commercial market was slaughtered in an industri-
alized way as the traditional knowledge of reindeer 
meat quality was not acknowledged in the modern-
ization processes.92
Many tourists seek knowledge about authentic and 
traditional ways of living in the Arctic, and a grow-
ing interest in Indigenous food culture has resulted 
Table 6.12. Number of compensated reindeer in reindeer husbandry in Norway, by region and  by cause of loss to predators 
and tra c accidents    









Lynx 1 352 1 633 722 1 143 791 140 5 5 786
Volverine 2 262 1 866 463 1 153 665 256 51 6 716
Bear 156 12 0 0 60 0 0 228
Wolf 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Eagle 2 059 3 657 790 351 362 153 54 7 426
Unspecified predator 64 8 231 380 260 140 0 1 083
Train 0 0 0 546 137 0 0 683
Road traffic 128 175 94 64 51 24 102 638
Total 6 024 7 351 2 300 3 637 2 326 713 212 22 563
Source: Norwegian Agriculture Agency (2019), table  4.3.3.  
Figure 6.14. Number of reindeer in reindeer husbandry in 




















Source: Norwegian Agriculture Agency (2019), table 4.1.9. 
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in more Sámi products and tourism companies,93 
reflected in increasing income from activities 
related to reindeer herding (Table 6.8). Sámi family 
produced reindeer meat is tender, but such meat 
is rarely available for visiting tourists and other 
consumers. Sámi reindeer herders mainly boil, 
smoke and dry reindeer meat when preparing food 
for the family. The traditional method includes 
selecting specific reindeer for slaughtering and 
special slaughtering methods to meet the food 
culture requirement at home. The unique quality of 
reindeer meat, a result of the nature of the grazing 
areas, the traditional knowledge, and slaughtering 
practices, provides a template for future Sámi gas-
tronomy. Gastronomy, “the art of good eating”, is a 
key element in tourism, related to culture, knowl-
edge, heritage, and the landscape that provides 
the food.94 According to a study from Canada, food 
identified as Indigenous, for example Arctic char, is 
positively received by consumers, who are interest-
ed in knowing how, where and by whom the food 
was produced.95
Traditional knowledge and Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD)
The Convention for Biological Diversity (CBD), 
Article 8 (j), calls for applying traditional knowledge 
of Indigenous Peoples to achieve sustainable use 
and conservation of biodiversity.96 The Norwegian 
Government’s Arctic Strategy recently raised the 
challenge of land encroachment and need for 
dialogue with Sámi interests.97 The Nature Diversity 
Act §8 stipulates that authorities shall emphasize 
knowledge, based on many generations of experi-
ence acquired through use of and interaction with 
the natural environment, including traditional Sámi 
use, that can promote the conservation and sus-
tainable use of nature diversity.98
Figure 6.15. Circumpolar reindeer pastoralism
Source: International Centre for Reindeer Husbandry (ICR)
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Gender roles and contributions to the 
household in Greenland99
MarieKathrine Poppel and Birger Poppel, 
 lisimat sarfik  ni ersity of reenland
The development of the Greenlandic welfare state 
has resulted in social, educational and economic 
improvements for women. The increased share of 
women in education and the labor force is closely 
related to changes in occupational structure, from 
a structure dominated by traditional men’s jobs in 
fisheries and hunting, to a labor market with more 
jobs in service sectors including health care, social 
institutions and education that to a larger degree 
attract women. An analysis of data from the Survey 
of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) supports 
an assumption that women’s changed labor mar-
ket participation may have influenced perceptions 
of how women and men contribute to the house-
hold.100
The Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) 
is a comprehensive comparative study of the qual-
ity of life among Arctic Indigenous Peoples. As a 
circumpolar research project, it has taken place 
among Inuit, Sámi, and the Indigenous Peoples of 
Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula. More than 8 000 
respondents in the northernmost parts of Russia, 
Alaska, Canada, Norway, Sweden and in Greenland 
have participated and contributed to the overall 
comprehensiveness of the SLiCA research pro-
gram.101 SLiCA has been carried out by an inter-
national group of researchers in partnership with 
Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic. The core ques-
tionnaire of SLiCA offers opportunities to exam-
ine and grasp some of the economic, and social, 
cultural, and nutritional significance of subsistence 
activities. A broad variety of questions have been 
asked about individual and household activities 
and behavior.102 The importance of a mixed cash 
and subsistence economy for living conditions in 
the Arctic is one of the research topics suggested 
by the Indigenous Peoples’ representatives partici-
pating in SLiCA.
The question in SLiCA about how women and men 
perceive their contributions to the household was 
phrased like this: “Now I’d like you to think about 
what you feel is the most important way you con-
tribute to your household. This may or may not be 
paid work. Of all the things you do what is the most 
important way you contribute to your household?”
The answers were grouped into categories: job, 
income, paying bills; showing love and affection; 
emotional support; domestic duties, cooking; 
bringing pleasure to the household; taking care of 
children, hunting and fishing, keeping the house-
hold going; other kind of help. Data are presented 
for women and men by age group (Figures 6.16 
and 6.17).
For women, both youngest and oldest group, the 
three contributions to the household (besides the 
category other kind of help) they ranked highest 
are showing love and affection, domestic duties, 
cooking, and job, income paying bills. For women 
in the age group most likely to be in the labor 
force, the three contributions (besides the category 
other kind of help) they ranked highest are job, 
income paying bills, showing love and affection, 
and keeping the household going. The youngest 
Figure 6.16. Most important ways women in Greenland 
contribute to the household, by age group. Per 
cent. 2004-2006
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Source: Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) and adapted from 
Table 2 in Poppel (2015).
Figure 6.17. Most important ways men in Greenland 
contribute to the household, by age group. Per 
cent. 2004-2006
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Source: Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) and adapted from 
Table 1 in Poppel (2015).
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female group perceives to a larger degree than the 
older groups that taking care of children and bring-
ing pleasure to the household are their important 
contributions. Among elder women, almost a third 
perceive showing love and affection as their most 
important contribution.
For men, the two younger groups perceive that 
their main contribution to the household is job, 
income and paying bills. They see themselves more 
as providers than as contributing to keeping the 
household going. Most men perceive the catego-
ries (besides the category other kind of help) (1) 
job, income, paying bills and (2) showing love and 
affection as their most important contributions to 
the household. Income is perceived as the most 
important contribution by the group most likely to 
be in the labor force, while the oldest group consid-
ers more of their contribution to be in keeping the 
household going.
Hunting and fishing are perceived as important 
contributions to the household, more by the 
younger groups of men than the older men. It is of-
ten assumed that subsistence hunting and fishing 
is an obvious alternative to paid labor. However, 
background data indicate that only 10 per cent of 
those who did not work in paid employment the 
previous year perceive that their primary contribu-
tion to the household is from hunting fishing and 
gathering. This finding might, at least partly, be re-
lated to SLiCA results indicating that it is costly (and 
thus presupposes an income) to buy and maintain 
equipment necessary to hunt and fish.103
In the middle age group, both women and men 
identify income, job and paying bills and showing 
love and affection as their most important contri-
bution to the household. Among the older, more 
men than women see keeping the household going 
as an important contribution, including taking care 
of children. A generational pattern can be seen 
where women in the age group most likely involved 
in active employment to a larger degree have be-
come bread-winners. The younger women most of-
ten take care of younger sisters and brothers, while 
older women contribute with affection and care 
in a broad sense, including cooking and domestic 
duties. The analysis of data from the Survey of 
Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) supports an 
assumption that women’s changed labor market 
participation may have influenced perceptions of 
how women and men contribute to the household, 
as the group of women most likely to be in the 
labor force perceived their most important contri-
bution to be of an economic kind.
Photo: Greenland. Colorbox
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Subsistence: A Way of Life in the North
Davin Holen and Susanna Gartler
Most economies of the Arctic are characterized by 
a combination of market participation and harvest 
of wild resources. What is often referred to as 
subsistence is a way of life that includes, but is not 
limited to, hunting, fishing, gathering, and herding. 
Subsistence activities are part of a way of life that 
represents continuity, sharing, and connection to 
nature.104 Understanding the centrality of nature-
based livelihoods to Arctic residents is important 
for legal regulations, compensation payments for 
lost lands, land-use planning, and wildlife manage-
ment. 
In the community of Kokhanok in Southwest 
Alaska, with a mean household harvest of 559 
kg of salmon annually, a group of students was 
asked why fishing was important to them and their 
families. They replied “ ] that harvesting salmon 
meant they did not have to buy as much food, and 
therefore, could have money for other necessities 
such as fuel and rent.”105 In a survey of three com-
munities, Aklavik, Canada; Qeqertarsuaq, Green-
land; and Longyearbyen, Svalbard, Norway, almost 
60 per cent of respondents regularly hunt, fish 
and gather (medicinal) plants, berries and mush-
rooms. In Aklavik and Qeqertarsuaq more than 96 
per cent eat country foods at least one time per 
week. Even in Svalbard, with no Indigenous popu-
lation, about 18 per cent of respondents indicate 
that subsistence harvesting is very important for 
the household.106 A study of hunters in Greenland 
showed that the estimated value of production for 
own consumption was almost as large as the sales 
value, which is a considerable share of income.107 
Estimates of subsistence production for Indigenous 
families in Northern Russia indicate that the value 
of consumed goods from their own production can 
be several times the monetary income.108
Hunting and harvesting can be costly, with use 
of equipment such as snow machines, all-terrain 
vehicles, and motorized boats. Due to the rapidly 
changing climate in the North, hunters and fish-
ers must travel further away and under increas-
ingly unpredictable conditions.109 Other economic 
activities, such as large-scale industrial mining, can 
affect and pose considerable risks to Arctic wildlife 
and vegetation.110 With notable exceptions, such 
as Alaska, wild harvesting activities are mostly 
 invisible in official statistics. Calculating the value 
of subsistence activities in monetary terms poses a 
challenge, precisely because subsistence is linked 
to the functioning and identities of entire societies, 
including their languages, governance, legal struc-
tures, and cultural expressions.111
Hunting, whaling, reindeer herding, fishing, trap-
ping and gathering continue to shape social re-
lationships and cultural identity, especially of the 
Indigenous Peoples. The subsistence activities are 
intertwined with Indigenous Knowledge, as a cul-
tural practice informed by and contributing to the 
development of Indigenous Knowledge.
There are multiple perspectives and diverse infor-
mation on subsistence economies. While we have 
not yet been able to fulfil the aim of ECONOR to 
present the subsistence economies of all Indig-
enous Peoples who are Permanent Participants 
to the Arctic Council, this chapter presents contri-
butions from Indigenous People with whom the 
ECONOR IV project has established cooperation, 
in the time available. It is our hope that future 
ECONOR projects, in partnership with Indigenous 
Peoples, may enable a more comprehensive under-
standing of the role of the Indigenous Peoples in 
the Arctic economies and the intertwined nature of 
the subsistence and market activities in the Arctic.
The Ottawa Indigenous Knowledge Principles, 
developed and agreed upon by the Arctic Council 
Permanent Participants for use in the Arctic Coun-
cil in 2014, updated in October 2018, define Indig-
enous Knowledge as “a systematic way of thinking 
and knowing that is elaborated and applied to 
phenomena across biological, physical, cultural and 
linguistic systems. Indigenous Knowledge is owned 
by the holders of that knowledge, often collectively, 
and is uniquely expressed and transmitted through 
indigenous languages. It is a body of knowledge 
generated through cultural practices, lived experi-
ences including extensive and multi-generational 
observations, lessons and skills. It has been de-
veloped and verified over millennia and is still 
developing in a living process, including knowledge 
acquired today and in the future, and it is passed 
on from generation to generation”.112
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The highway leads on below the Chugach Mountains in Alaska. Photo: Colourbox
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Introduction
Tourism is an economic, social and cultural 
 phenomenon that requires movement of people. 
The United Nations World Tourism  Organization 
 (UNTWO) defines tourism as the activities of 
persons travelling to places outside their usual 
environ ment for leisure, business and other pur-
poses.1 Travelers are drawn to the Arctic as an area 
that is largely untouched and still sparsely popu-
lated, where the midnight sun and aurora borealis 
can be experienced against a rugged backdrop of 
wilderness. Activities like skiing, mountain walk-
ing, dog mushing and berry picking can be enjoyed 
as visitors take in the natural surroundings, and 
other attractions are based on the cultural heritage 
of the Indigenous Peoples. Rapid expansion by 
 airlines, cruise operators and package tour provid-
ers has made the Arctic areas increasingly acces-
sible.
Tourists are important economically, providing 
 revenue and employment opportunities, thus 
reducing the likelihood of outward migration from 
Arctic regions that have previously been heavily 
based on traditional resource-based industries. 
Table 7.1 presents the industries that are associ-
ated with tourism in the framework of the United 
Nation’s Tourism Satellite Accounts (TSA).
As tourism increases, it is paramount to balance 
economic growth with the need for inclusive 
 development and environmental sustainability, 
and to this end, the UNTWO has developed its 
work for the promotion of responsible, sustainable 
and universally accessible tourism geared towards 
the achievement of  the “2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development and Sustainable Development 
Goals”.2 Here tourism should make optimal use 
of environmental resources, maintaining essen-
tial ecological processes and helping to conserve 
natural heritage and biodiversity. Moreover, 
 tourism should respect the socio-cultural authen-
ticity of host communities by conserving their built 
and living cultural heritage and traditional values 
and contribute to inter-cultural understanding 
and  tolerance. Last, but not least, tourism should 
ensure viable, long-term economic operations, 
7. Tourism in the Arctic
Derek J. Clark, Mikko Moilanen and Stein Østbye
 providing socio-economic benefits to all stake-
holders that are fairly distributed, including stable 
income-earning opportunities and social services 
to host communities.3
The environmental impact of tourism is especially 
relevant for the Arctic since it is often the “un-
touched” nature that tourists flock to experience. 
Preserving the authenticity of host communities is 
important due to the many Indigenous Peoples in 
the Arctic regions, and there is a danger that  “Local 
communities may engage in so called “staged 
 authenticity” to adapt to tourists’ demands”.4 Tour-
ism is an essentially seasonal activity, a factor that 
must be addressed to provide year-round employ-
ment, and long-term economic viability of tourist 
service providers.
Table 7.1. Tourism industries1 
1. Accommodation for visitors
2. Food- and beverage-serving activities
3. Rail, road, water and air passenger transport
4. Transport equipment rental
5. Travel agencies and other reservation services activities
6. Cultural activities
7. Sports and recreational activities
8. Retail trade of country-specific tourism characteristic goods
9. Other country-specific tourism characteristic activities
1 See Figure 3.1 in “Tourism Satellite Account: Recommended Methodo-
logical Framework 2008”, United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs. https://www.oecd.org/cfe/tourism/TSA_EN.pdf.
Polar fox. Photo: Colorbox.
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This chapter looks at recent trends in tourism in 
the Arctic regions, focusing mainly on the economic 
impacts and implications of tourist activity. First, 
we present an overview of the drivers of tourism 
by looking at the demand and supply sides of the 
market for tourism as outlined in TSA. Then we 
consider the developments in each Arctic region, 
before briefly assessing potential future develop-
ments. 
We frequently refer to TSA as a source of infor-
mation.5 Another important source of information 
is data on national and subnational levels pub-
lished by national statistical bureaus. In addition, a 
plethora of sources are used to fill in the picture. 
Drivers of tourism
The demand side of the market emerges as tour-
ism expenditures paid for consumption goods and 
services from the industries in Table 7.1. Important 
Figure 7.1. Overnight stays in the Arctic 2008-2019 and 











































1 Statistics Canada and tourism authorities in Alaska do not register 
overnight stays. We have estimated number of overnight stays following 
Müller (2015): Alaska, visitor numbers x 5; Yukon and Nunavut, border 
crossings x 5; NWT, total visitation x 5.
Sources: Statistical bureaus of Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Nor-
way, Sweden, Alaska Visitor Volume Reports, Government of Northwest 
Territories. 
Figure 7.2. Number of cruise passengers in main 
destinations in the Arctic. 2010-2019
2 000 000








Northern Norway (excl. Svalbard)
Alaska
Source: Statistics Greenland, The Norwegian Coastal Administration, 
Icelandic Tourist Board, Alaska Visitor Volume Reports.
Box 7.1: Nordic collaboration – Visit Arctic 
Europe
Since 2015, the Finnish Lapland Tourist Board, 
Northern Norway Tourist Board and Swedish Lapland 
Visitors Board have been involved in an EU-sponsored 
project designed to increase cross-border coopera-
tion in the Arctic region. Activities in the project have 
been directed towards marketing the region as a 
whole, and improving the competence in the areas 
of digitalization, sustainability, market understanding 
and product development. In addition, the project 
seeks to improve transport connections internally and 
between the countries. One example of this is the es-
tablishment from December 2019 of The Arctic Route, 
a collaboration between three bus companies who 
operate daily services in the winter season between 
Tromsø and Narvik, Lyngen, Alta, Rovaniemi, Luleå 
and Kiruna.1 This brings visitors to attractions in each 
country such as Santa Claus Village in Rovaniemi, the 
Arctic Cathedral in Tromsø, and numerous nature-
based activities such as dog sledding and northern 
lights safaris. The first phase of the project docu-
ments an increase of 70 000 new guests to the area 
as well as an increase in overnight stays of 516 000.2 
To recognize these achievements, the EU commis-
sion bestowed on the project “The Arctic Award” in 
the category “Overcoming Critical Mass” in November 
2017, and a further phase of the project received 
funding of 5.3 million Euros stretching into 2021. Visit 
Arctic Europe II intends to continue the development 
of Finnish Lapland, Swedish Lapland and Northern 
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indicators from the demand side are number of 
overnight stays, shares of domestic and foreign 
guests, as well as the occupancy rate in accommoda-
tion. 
Actors in the tourism industries comprise the sup-
ply side of the market, offering goods and services 
that visitors might demand. Accommodation 
services can be provided by a wide array of actors 
such as hotels, guesthouses, hostels, and camp-
sites. Capacity can be influenced by investment 
programs or through digital platforms like Airbnb. 
The number of visitors will be influenced by the ca-
pacity, price and perceived quality of transport op-
Box 7.2: Tourism policy, infrastructure and accessibility
Strengthening the position of the tourist sector is a 
priority of governments in Arctic countries. In  Sweden, 
a White Paper in 2017 aimed to “ enhance the tourism 
and hospitality industry’s contribution to economic, 
 social and environmental components of sustainable 
development throughout the country”.1 A change of 
Government has delayed announcement of the new 
policy which was scheduled to be unveiled in the 
course of 2020 and fully implemented by 2030. Other 
countries take a more regional approach, such as 
Norway whose government in 2019 unveiled a strategy 
for the future development of Svalbard,  emphasizing 
the impact of tourism on nature and the seasonal 
 pattern associated with the tourist industry.2 To en-
hance sustainability, the strategy  recommended to 
utilize existing capacity  as much as possible, so that 
tourism displays less of a seasonal trait on the islands. 
In this way, it is hoped that the stream of tourists will 
be smoothed over the year, in turn leading to a larger 
proportion of jobs in the tourist industry that employ 
people all year round.
Tourism policies generally seek to improve access to 
different markets, and provide necessary infrastruc-
ture for providing an attractive experience to visitors. 
In 2018, the Swedish Lapland Visitors Board followed 
up the establishment of direct flights to Skellefteå 
from Rotterdam and to Kiruna from Amsterdam with 
a targeted campaign on the Dutch market. A Fly & 
Drive concept was marketed for summer tourists and 
another targeted at winter ice-skating tourists. This 
resulted in an increase in Dutch guest nights in Arctic 
Sweden by 42 per cent.3
Accessibility of tourist attractions in Arctic Finland has 
improved during the winter season. Several direct 
international route connections have been opened to 
the airports of Northern Finland, focusing mainly on 
Rovaniemi, Kittilä (near Levi), and Kuusamo airports. 
Direct routes from Europe to Northern Finland have 
been established since 2015, with seasonal direct 
flights from London, Paris, Dusseldorf, Berlin, Zurich 
and Amsterdam. Finnair and Norwegian have also 
increased their capacity for transporting passengers 
from Helsinki to Arctic Finland.4 From 2016 to 2017, the 
number of international airport passengers travel-
ling through the capital Helsinki increased by 11.4  
per cent, whereas the change was 37.6 per cent for 
 Rovaniemi, 29.1 per cent for Kittilä, and 47.5 per cent 
for Kuusamo.  For summer time tourism, poor acces-
sibility remains a bottleneck.
Cruise traffic generally has a lower regional economic 
impact than arrivals by air, and these two types of 
tourism compete over limited resources in the peak 
season. The rising cruise trend and limited airport 
facilities in recent years have been a matter of  concern 
for policy makers in Greenland. The main airport for 
international travelers is Kangerlussuaq. After  decades 
of political discussions about new airports, the Green-
landic Parliament decided in November 2018 to invest 
3500 million DKK in no less than 3 new airports,5 
an corresponding to 40 per cent of the annual GDP 
 (Christensen et al., 2020).6 From a tourism perspective, 
the most important of the new airports is  probably 
 Ilulissat. The construction work has started and this 
new airport is supposed to be opened by the end of 
2023. The ambition is to attract direct flights from 
North America and Europe.
In order to take advantage of the investments in air-
port capacity, land-based facilities and activities need 
to be put in place. A report by Nordic consulting group 
Rambøll in 2014 identified several challenges facing 
Greenland such as the short tourism season, lack of 
infrastructure, limited capacity, and a lack of package 
tours. Insufficient  marketing and coordination in the 
Greenland tourism sector were also highlighted as fac-
tors that prevent growth.7 Although the new airport will 
not be operating for another 2 years, steps have to be 
taken to increase accommodation capacity and provide 
other infrastructure, stimulating the local economy 
only indirectly attributable to the tourism industry even 
in the short run.  
___________________________________ 
1 “One country to visit - A unified policy for sustainable tourism and 
the growing tourism industry” SOU 2017: 95 (in Swedish: https://www.
regeringen.se/4addac/contentassets/153ef49a58224148be5ae509ebb
619b0/sou-2017_95-webb.pdf).
2  “Innovation and industrial development on Svalbard”, Department 









6 Christensen, L., Anker Nielsen, O., Rich, J., Knudsen, M. 2020. 
Optimizing airport infrastructure for a country: The case of Greenland. 
Research in Transportation Economics 79: 1-25.
7 Rambøll Group (2014), «Hvor skal udviklingen komme fra? Potentialer 
og faldgruber i den grønlandske erhvervssektor frem mod 2015» (in 
Danish). The issues reported here can be found in «Steaming up or 
staying cool? Tourism Development and Greenlandic Futures in the 
Light of Climate Change” Lill Rastad Bjørst and Carina Bregnholm Ren, 
Arctic Anthropology, 52(1), 91-101, 2015.
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erators such as airlines and cruise providers. Some 
parts of the Arctic region can also be accessed by 
land travel such as rail, or bus/car. Some suppli-
ers may cooperate with other domestic or even 
cross-border actors to provide attractive offers for 
tourists. One of these initiatives in the Nordic Arctic 
region is described in Box 7.1.
To give an initial overview of the development of 
tourism in the Arctic, consider Figure 7.1 depict-
ing overnight stays in the period 2008-2019 by 
region.6 Clearly, Iceland has been a driving force in 
the increase in the number of guest nights in the 
Arctic region. All regions have seen an increase in 
overnight stays, although not comparable to the 
increase in Iceland. 
Some areas are more dependent on tourists that 
arrive by sea as illustrated by Figure 7.2, showing 
that Alaska accounts for roughly half of the num-
ber of cruise passengers in the Arctic. Alaska has 
exhibited steady growth in this type of tourism 
since 2008, and Northern Norway has experienced 
an upturn since 2016. 
Some of the Arctic countries have introduced strat-
egies for improving the accessibility of their tourist 
destinations as outlined in Box 7.2.
Iceland: From bust to boom
Tourism has been a driving force behind Iceland’s 
recovery from the financial crisis of 2008, support-
ed by the substantial devaluation of the Icelandic 
currency in the wake of the crisis. Tourism contrib-
uted about 8 per cent directly to GDP each year in 
the period 2016-2019.  The number of inter national 
travelers to Iceland has grown at an average 
 annual rate of 22.4 per cent in the period 2010-
2018, with most of the increase due to transport 
by air. The fall in visitor numbers in 2019 is largely 
attributable to the bankruptcy of the Icelandic low-
cost air carrier WOW air. As Figure 7.3 indicates, 
the vast majority of foreign tourists access Iceland 
by air, although the number of tourists arriving on 
cruise ships has risen in recent years.
Hotel rooms in the capital region of Reykjavik ac-
count for about half of the total overnight stays in 
Iceland, showing an average yearly growth rate of 
12.3 per cent in the period 2015-2019. Occupancy 
rates follow a seasonal pattern that is clearly domi-
nated by the capital region, and in which winter 
and summer are especially important seasons. 
Except for 2019, hotels in the capital region had 
an occupancy rate above 90 per cent in February/
March and July/August (Figure 7.4). Additionally, 
there were approximately 4000 properties to rent 
on the private market through platforms such as 
Airbnb in the capital region in summer 2019, with 
an occupancy rate of 83 per cent, roughly match-
ing the supply of hotel bedrooms in the capital 
area. The financial crisis coincided with the birth of 
digital platforms for overnight private rentals and 
contributed to the boost of tourism. 
Figures 7.5 and 7.6 illustrate both the rapid growth 
in the number of overnight stays in Iceland, and 
their changing seasonal pattern in the period 
2010-2019.7 Tourism has increased in the summer 
months, but the largest growth occurs outside of 
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this season. In fact, the number of overnight stays 
are quite evenly distributed between the autumn, 
winter and spring seasons, indicating that  tourism 
in Iceland is on the way to being a year-round 
industry, allowing seasonal variations in tourist 
related employment to be smoothed if not elimi-
nated. 
The rapid expansion of the tourist market has 
led to an increase in employment in the sector as 
indicated by Figure 7.7. On average, employment 
in tourism has risen by 11.8 per cent per year from 
2014 to the peak year 2018. However, year on year, 
employment fell by 6 per cent in 2019. Most jobs 
in the tourist sector in Iceland are related to the 
provision of accommodation and food/beverages.
The international market is vitally important for the 
Icelandic tourist industry, with a steadily increas-
ing share of overnight stays, reaching around 85 
per cent in recent years; see Figure 7.8. The steady 
stream of international visitors is ensured by the 
fact that two particularly important markets – the 
UK and USA – prefer diff erent seasons; UK guests 
mostly come to Iceland in the winter, and US tour-
ists in the summer. Figure 7.8 shows the com-
position of foreign visitors in 2019, as well as the 
percentage growth since 2010.8 China and the USA 
are the most rapidly growing tourist groups.
One downside of the rapid growth is the  challenge 
to sustainability and the negative environmental 
impact. Each year the number of tourists  visiting 
Iceland from abroad is roughly six times the 
 Icelandic population, and this puts pressure on 












Figure 7.6. Seasonality measured by number of overnight 
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the natural environment which is one of the main 
reasons for the tourist boom. Iceland is facing a di-
lemma in trying to turn mass tourism into sustain-
able tourism, increasing revenue per tourist rather 
than by increasing tourist numbers.9
Arctic Sweden: Unrealized potential from 
foreign markets
Arctic Sweden comprises the counties of Västerbot-
ten and Norrbotten. About 8 per cent of Sweden’s 
available capacity for housing tourists in 2019 is in 
these areas, distributed between hotels and holi-
day villages. Capacity in Arctic Sweden has risen 10 
per cent in the period 2010-2019, below the nation-
al average of 15.8 per cent. The occupancy rate was 
48.7 per cent in the northernmost areas compared 
to 57.2 per cent on average in Sweden in 2019. The 
occupancy rate in Arctic Sweden has increased by 
10.6 percentage points since 2010, above the na-
tional average of 8.1 percentage points (Figure 7.9).
Business customers account for 57 per cent of all 
guest nights at hotels, compared to the national 
average of 52 per cent. Domestic customers are 
important with 75 per cent of hotel stays attributed 
to Swedish nationals in 2019 (Figure 7.10). Given 
the reliance on domestic tourism, the low growth 
and the seasonal pattern of overnight stays in Arc-
tic Sweden in Figure 7.10 is not surprising.
Although a relatively small proportion of hotel 
guest nights in Arctic Sweden are attributable 
to foreigners, it would seem to be here that the 
potential for growth lies. Figure 7.12 indicates the 
Figure 7.9. Hotel capacity and occupancy rates. Arctic 
Sweden. 2010-2019
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Figure 7.10. Share of domestic and foreign overnight stays 
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Figure 7.11. Seasonality measured by number of overnight 
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Figure 7.12. Top twenty foreign markets in 2019 and 
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major countries of origin of the largest foreign 
markets for Arctic Sweden. The number of guest 
nights has increased by 12.9 per cent from 2010 to 
2019 for guests from Scandinavia (except Sweden), 
45 per cent for the rest of Europe, and 132 per cent 
for the rest of the world. There are almost three 
times as many Chinese guests in 2019 compared to 
2010. 
Whilst Norwegians are clearly the largest group of 
foreign visitors to Arctic Sweden, Belgium and the 
US are the markets that have grown most rapidly 
since 2010. Of countries with growth potential, 
China is notable with its current relatively small 
share of overnight stays in Arctic Sweden.
Arctic Finland: Mass tourism to Santa Claus
Arctic Finland (Lapland, Kainuu and North 
 Ostrobothnia) has specialized in mass tourism 
at compact resorts. The best-known example is 
probably Levi in North Lapland, catering for 750 
000 visitors per year, mostly in the skiing season.10 
There has also been a large increase in visitors 
in the months leading up to Christmas, indicat-
ing the popularity of the Santa Claus Village in 
 Rovaniemi.11  Accessibility of these attractions has 
improved  during the winter season, especially due 
to  increased air traffic (see Box 7.2).  
Hotel capacity has shown a steady increase since 
2010, and occupancy rates have increased on a 
yearly basis since 2014 (Figure 7.13).
Employment is mainly concentrated in the areas 
of accommodation and restaurant/bar services, 
although many bus companies are registered in 
the north, making bus transport an important 
employer, transporting tourists in and out of the 
region (see Figure 7.14).
Figure 7.15 shows that international tourism in 
Northern Finland has grown faster than  domestic 
tourism since 2015. Figure 7.16 indicates the 
 importance of different foreign markets for tour-
ism in Arctic Finland. Since 2010, significant growth 
has been recorded, especially in the Asian  market, 
and China has overtaken Norway as the fifth 
l argest market (Figure 7.16). This is partly due to 
a  successful cooperation between Visit  Rovaniemi 
and Alitrip, one of the largest online travel book-
ing sites in Asia, belonging to Alibaba Group. 
A  significant UK market has developed in recent 
Figure 7.13. Hotel capacity and occupancy rates. Arctic 
Finland. 2010-2019

























Figure 7.14. Employment in tourism industries. Arctic 
Finland. 2013-2015
















Figure 7.15. Share of domestic and foreign overnight stays in 















Tourism in the Arctic The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020
years, whereas tourism from Russia has not picked 
up again after the fi nancial crisis. The dependence 
on only one or two markets has decreased in the 
last decade, and new emerging markets include the 
US, Australia and India.
Tourist fl ows have increased mostly in the winter 
and spring seasons as indicated by Figure 7.17. 
Tourism in northern Finland is quite dependent on 
winter, accounting for nearly two-thirds of annual 
registered overnight stays. Tourism is also structur-
ally diff erent in winter since the share of interna-
tional tourists is appreciably higher than the share 
of domestic ones, and especially in recent years 
has grown signifi cantly. Summer tourism is quite 
dependent on the domestic market.
Arctic Norway: The advent of year-round 
tourism
Arctic Norway consists of two counties on the 
mainland, Nordland and Troms & Finnmark, and 
the Svalbard islands.12 Hotel capacity has expanded 
in the course of the last decade, increasing by 45 
per cent on Svalbard and 21 per cent on the main-
land in the period 2010-2019. Occupancy rates on 
Svalbard have been higher than on the mainland 
in recent years and have stabilized at around 62 
per cent since 2014. Occupancy rates in Nordland 
and Troms & Finnmark have shown a weak upward 
trend, peaking at 57.5 per cent in 2019 (Figure 
7.18).
The share of foreign hotel guests has increased 
more on Svalbard than on the mainland, peaking 
at 43.2 per cent in 2019 compared to 30 per cent 
foreign guests on the mainland. Growth in foreign 
overnight stays in Arctic Norway has been espe-
cially large since 2014 (Figure 7.19). Figure 7.20 
indicates that tourists from Germany, Sweden and 
the US dominate this category, although with rapid 
growth in the numbers of visitors from China and 
the US in the decade 2010-2019. 
The summer season is most important to Arctic 
Norway, but there is clear growth in overnight stays 
in the other seasons in the last decade  (Figure 
7.21). Arctic Norway seems to be making the transi-
tion to a year-round tourist industry, partly driven 
by the increasing interest in experiencing the 
northern light, which can best be seen in the dark 
season. 
However, there is a concern that tourism might 
confl ict with sustainable development, in particular 
in vulnerable wilderness on Svalbard. The tourist 
industry on Svalbard accounted for 54 per cent 
Figure 7.17. Seasonality measured by number of overnight 
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Figure 7.16.Top twenty foreign markets in 2019 and 
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of all employed people in the region in 2017. On 
the mainland, Troms is the county with the largest 
proportion of total employees involved in tour-
ism (10.8 per cent), with Nordland and Finnmark 
both around 8 per cent in 2017. Employment on 
the mainland has shown a weak upward trend in 
recent years (Figure 7.22).
The tourism industry is increasing in importance on 
Svalbard, especially since the traditional coal min-
ing industry is being closed down. In 2019 there 
were 155 tour operators registered with activity on 
Svalbard, an increase of 25 per cent compared to 
the year before.  The operators range from large 
international companies to one-person enterprises, 
and about 20 per cent of registered tour operators 
have an address on Svalbard. Cruise traffi  c is quite 
large on Svalbard, although the number of cruise 
Figure 7.18. Hotel capacity and occupancy rates. Northern 
Norway and Svalbard. 2010-2019































Figure 7.20. Top twenty foreign markets in 2019 and 

























Figure 7.21. Seasonality measured by number of overnight 
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passengers arriving in the main city of Longyear-
byen was around 40 000 in 2019, down 10 per cent 
from2018. On the other hand, there has been an 
increase in expedition cruises where tourists fl y 
in to Svalbard and then cruise around the islands, 
often combined with stays in hotels. Around 21 
000 tourists participated in this activity in 2019, an 
increase of 30 per cent compared to 2018. Seventy-
six ships were registered with this type of activity in 
2019.13
Greenland: A clear strategy for the future
The number of international visitors to Greenland 
followed a declining trend for several years after 
the fi nancial crisis in 2008, only interrupted by an 
increase in 2010 to above the level in 2008. How-
ever, there was a steady decline from 2010 to 
2014.14
There has been a continuous increase in number 
of international visitors since 2014, but the level 
close to 90 thousand in the previous peak in 2010  
was not surpassed until 2017 (Figure 7.23). In 2019, 
the estimated number of international visitors 
reached 115 000. The majority of visitors arrive by 
air, but if we look at the arrivals by mode of trans-
port from 2014, the relative increase has been 
much higher for cruise visitors with an average 
annual growth rate of 22 per cent compared to air 
with 5 per cent. 
The number of overnight stays in Greenland is 
illustrated in Figure 7.24 and shows a growth over 
the last decade; whilst the summer months are 
dominant, also autumn and spring have grown in 
importance (Figure 7.25).



























Figure 7.25. Seasonality measured by number of overnight 

















Figure 7.26. Top twenty foreign markets in 2019 and 
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Figure 7.26 shows that around 2/3 of foreign visi-
tors to Greenland come from Denmark, although 
the number of visitors from Germany, France and 
Italy has grown rapidly in the last decade.15
Arctic Russia: Large potential
The economic impacts of tourism in Arctic Russia 
are expected to be very low except for the Kola 
Peninsula (Müller, 2015).16 The lack of information 
on tourism from an economic point of view, may 
be related to regarding tourism more as a cultural 
phenomenon than an economic activity. The Feder-
al Agency for Tourism was only recently transferred 
from the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federa-
tion to the Ministry of Economic Development. This 
is a clear signal that tourism is no longer regarded 
as a predominantly cultural phenomenon, but also 
recognized as more important from an economic 
point of view.17 
An important attraction is the third largest national 
park in Russia, established in 2009 and compris-
ing Franz Josef Land and part of Novaya Zemlya. 
Similar to Svalbard, Arctic Russia stands out as a 
particular attractive destination for Arctic cruise 
tourism. In 2011, 11 tours with 800 visitors, among 
them 90 per cent foreigners, were organized.
In the cruise industry, the supply and quality of ter-
minal facilities are important for attractiveness. In 
North West Russia, there are two cruise ports: Mur-
mansk and Arkhangelsk.18 Up until 2016, there was 
no designated port for cruise vessels in Murmansk, 
and ships had to dock in a remote fishing harbor. 
Although less convenient for visitors19, there was 
no alternative cruise port, as landing in Arctic Rus-
sia coming from the west required customs clear-
ance in Murmansk, the nearest port of entry. A new 
pier exclusively for cruise vessels was built, and 
Murmansk was added to the list of ports where 
visiting cruise tourists were allowed 72 hours visa 
freedom. However, the number of port calls by 
foreign cruise ships did not go up as expected, but 
on the contrary decreased. In 2015, before the 
new facilities were established, the number of port 
calls by foreign cruise vessels was 13 with visitors 
estimated to about 10 000.20 In 2019, the number 
of port calls by foreign cruise vessels in Murmansk 
was down to 4.21 The disappointing development 
has most recently triggered a discussion in Russia 
on alternatives to Murmansk as a gateway to Arctic 
Russia. The director of the national park suggested 
setting up a security checkpoint on the main island 
of Franz Josef Land, opening up for direct sailings 
from Svalbard, saving 3 days of sailing and making 
Arctic Russia more competitive compared to other 
Arctic destinations.22
On the supply side, there is evidence that other 
efforts also are being made to improve the at-
tractiveness of Arctic Russia besides upgrading 
cruise port facilities (see Box 7.3). However, given 
the unresolved institutional issues and conflicts 
of interest between accommodating for visitors 
and security related to border control pointed out 
in the literature, it seems difficult to take out the 
economic potential, in particular what is related to 
international tourism.23
Box 7.3. Tour development in Arctic Russia1
Kuklina et al. (2017) indicate that Arctic Russia can be 
divided into three zones: the Western zone (mainly 
Archangelsk and Murmansk) that border Finland and 
Norway, the Central zone, and the Far Eastern zone. 
Regional policy has enhanced the development of in-
frastructure in the Western zone, so that tourist flows 
are increasing in this region. In the first nine months 
of 2015, inbound tourist flows in the Archangelsk 
region were already 11 per cent above the previous 
year, and the Murmansk region experienced growth 
of approximately 10.5 per cent each year on aver-
age from 2012-2015. Attracting tourists over time is 
dependent also upon having a good offer of activities. 
Figure 7.27 documents the number and types of tour-
ist activities available in Arctic Russia in 2015.
Of the total number 367, 205 tours were available 
in the Western region, and 106 in the central areas. 
Extreme sport accounted for 101 of the available 
activities, and these were well dispersed in all three 
regions. There were 78 general sightseeing tours, 
mostly in the Western region.
_______________________ 
1 This section is based on Kuklina, V., Kuklina, M., Ruposov, V, Rogov, 
V. 2017. Multi-polar trajectories of tourism development within 
Russian Arctic. Advances in Economics, Business and Management 
Research 38: 379-385.
Figure 7.27 Available tours in Arctic Russia 2015













Source: Kuklina et al. (2017). See note 1 (below).
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Arctic US: Cruise is still the cornerstone in 
Alaska
Although the state of Alaska in its entirety is con-
sidered an Arctic region, in terms of climate and 
geography there are at least two distinct parts. 
Southeast Alaska, called the Alaska panhandle, is 
the narrow coastal strip bordering British Colum-
bia to the east. Unlike the rest of Alaska, average 
daytime temperature is above freezing during the 
winter months in this region. To put things in a 
European perspective, the panhandle goes from 
a latitude similar to Kiel in Germany to a latitude 
similar to Oslo in Norway, one of the popular ferry 
voyages connecting the European continent to 
Scandinavia. 
As observed in Grimsrud (2015), tourism and travel 
have become the most important driver of eco-
nomic growth in Alaska. Visitors typically arrive in 
summer as cruise passengers (Figure 7.29). From 
a circumpolar perspective, Alaska is the most 
important arctic region in terms of the number of 
overnight stays, and second to Iceland in terms of 
growth over the period 2008-2019 (Figure 7.1, see 
also Figure 7.28). However, it is for cruise tour-
ism Alaska in particular excels as shown in Figure 
7.2. This was true in 2010 and is still true in 2019, 
although the rest of the Arctic regions combined 
closed some of the gap during this period.  
The typical cruise tourist to Alaska travels along 
the coast of the panhandle and stays south of the 
Gulf of Alaska. The most important cruise ports 
are Juneau, Ketchikan and Skagway with up to 1.3 
million passengers visiting from late April to early 
October.24 The number of cruise passengers visit-
ing Juneau exceeds by far any cruise destination 
elsewhere in the Arctic and even in the north of Eu-
rope including popular cruise ports like Copenha-
gen and St. Petersburg. Hiking and wildlife viewing, 
including whale watching, are major attractions. 
A smaller but increasing number of visitors go 
further north and west to ports closer to Anchor-
age. In 2018, there were 109 port calls by very large 
cruise vessels as far north as Seward or Whittier.25 
Most of the overall growth in cruise traffic in recent 
years might be explained by this expansion. An 
 attractive feature of these cruises is that they may 
be combined with return flights, reducing sailing 
from two weeks to the 7 day ‘Glacier route’ cruise 
and offering much greater opportunities to market 
land packages to Denali National Park and other 
interior Alaska destinations. Since a cruise is a 
self-contained, prearranged tourist experience, 
the stimulus to the regional and local economy 
depends on onshore spending. A short port call 
is less important than a longer lasting landing, for 
example an extensive trip to an interior Alaska des-
tination. Excursions like this have a long tradition 
in Alaska, starting with the development of motor 
coach and rail tours to the interior hinterland in the 
1960s, supplementing the cruise experience.26
For 2004 the economic impact of travel and 
 tourism on the Alaska economy based on TSAs 












1 2014-15 numbers for summer season 2014 and winter season 2014-15 
(and similar for other years).
Sources: McDowell Group 2018 “Alaska Visitor Volume Report Fall/Win-
ter 2015-16, 2016-17, and 2017-18”. Prepared for Alaska Department 
of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development. August 2018. 
McDowell Group 2019 “Alaska Visitor Volume Report Summer 2018”. Pre-
pared for Alaska Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic 
Development. February 2019.
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167
The Economy of the North – ECONOR 2020 Tourism in the Arctic
have been estimated to 5.6 per cent of Alaska 
Gross State Product. By the US fi scal year 2012-
13, this share had increased to 6.9 per cent27 and 
further increased by about one percentage-point 
by 2017.28
Arctic Canada – unexploited potential
Arctic Canada comprises Yukon, Nunavut and The 
Northwest Territories. Figure 7.30 provides infor-
mation on overnight stays for Arctic Canada that 
is broken down on domestic and foreign visitors. 
Initially, domestic overnight stays were relatively 
constant from 2008 but show a weak upward trend 
2015-2019. The number of visits from foreigners 
has shown a larger variation but seems to lie at the 
heart of the increase in overnight stays recorded 
since 2017. The seasonal pattern of stays in Arctic 
Canada has changed little between 2010 and 2019 
(Figure 7.31), with the winter months still witness-
ing small numbers of tourists. The largest foreign 
market in 2019 was the United Kingdom, although 
there has been little growth in visits during the last 
decade. China is becoming an increasingly impor-
tant source of foreign visitors, both in  current mar-
ket share and in terms of growth between 2010 
and 2019 (Figure 7.32). Mexico and India are also 
rapidly developing customer segments.
We now look at Yukon, Nunavut and NWT in more 
detail.
Yukon 
The tourism sector in Yukon continued to grow in 
2019. Over 500 000 travelers entered the territory, 
US citizens representing nearly a quarter, followed 
by Canadians and overseas visitors.29 The US his-
torically accounts for about 70 per cent of Yukon’s 
annual international border crossings.30 Data for 
the fi rst ten months of 2019 also showed growth 
in air arrivals at Whitehorse airport, up 7 per cent 
from the year before.31 From 2010 to 2019, the esti-
mated annual overnight stays in Yukon have grown 
by 727 000 guest nights, see Figure 7.1. The most 
important factors behind the growth were favor-
able exchange rates, increased interest in Alaskan 
cruises (many of them are off ering tours to Yukon), 
and favorable economic conditions in many of the 
markets. Tourism accounted for 2.7 per cent of 
gross domestic product in Yukon in 2014.32 Total 
visitor spending in Yukon reached 348 million CAD 
in 2018, nearly eight  per cent over 2017.33












1 Statistics Canada does not register overnight stays. We have estimated 
number of overnight stays following Müller (2015): Yukon and Nunavut, 
border crossings x 5; NWT, total visitation x 5.
Source: Statistics Canada.
Figure 7.31. Seasonality measured by number of overnight 
stays by months. Arctic Canada (Yukon and 
















1 Statistics Canada does not register overnight stays. We have estimated 
number of overnight stays following Müller (2015): Yukon and Nunavut, 
border crossings x 5; NWT, total visitation x 5.
Source: Statistics Canada.
Figure 7.32. Top twenty foreign markets in 2019 and 
percentage change 2010-2019 in Arctic Canada. 
Non-resident travelers entering Canada, by 
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Nunavut
Canadian residents, including people who live 
in Nunavut, made about 134 thousand visits to 
Nunavut in the second and third quarters of 2018. 
Over two-thirds of all visits by Canadian residents 
were in the summer season. Residents from other 
provinces and territories made up slightly under 
one-third of all visits to Nunavut by Canadians. 
Visitors from outside of Canada made 7 800 visits 
to Nunavut (5.5 per cent of all visits to Nunavut).34 
Nunavut had 37 000 more overnight stays in 2019 
than in 2010, see Figure 7.1. In Nunavut, 2  per cent 
of GRP is attributable to tourism (Figure 7.33). 
In 2019, 13 ships conducted 23 voyages through-
out Nunavut, carrying a total of approximately 
4200 cruise passengers.35 Against other Arctic 
cruise destinations, the amount of marine tourism 
in Canada’s Arctic is minimal. One of the primary 
barriers to development in Nunavut is that the 
territory does not have the kind of marine support 
infrastructure that Alaska, Greenland or Svalbard 
or Norway can offer.36
Northwest Territories (NWT)
The 2018/19 fiscal year represented 
an all-time high for visits to NWT, with 
120 000 travelers recorded. This is a 7 
per cent increase from the previous year. 
Compared to 2010, the region now has 
234 000 more yearly overnight stays 
(Figure 7.1). Winter tourism is develop-
ing, although numbers are still small. The 
tourism authorities report that it is par-
ticularly the number of visitors who come 
to see northern lights that is increasing; 
34 900 visitors travelled to NWT to see 
the Aurora in the fiscal year 2018/2019, 
with most of them visiting the Yellowknife 
area.37 This development has resulted in 
private sector investments to increase ac-
commodations in Yellowknife in response 
to growing demand during peak Aurora 
seasons. The other regions of NWT have 
also benefited from this trend and car 
rental companies have experienced 
increased demand. The primary focus 
is the domestic market, which currently 
generates the largest number of visitors. 
However, marketing efforts focus on in-
ternational markets, which are  attractive 
because of higher spending per visitor.38
Figure 7.33. Share of tourism in gross regional product (GRP) 
and employment for Arctic regions












Per cent of GRP
Per cent of employment
Iceland: Statistics Iceland; Northern Finland: Statistics Finland; Northern 
Sweden: Statistics Sweden; Northern Norway: Statistics Norway; Arctic 
Canada: Statistics Canada; Greenland: Statistics Greenland; Alaska: Econ-
omic impact of Alaska’s visitor industry 2017: https://www.commerce.
alaska.gov/web/Portals/6/pub/TourismResearch/VisitorImpacts2016-
17Report11_2_18.pdf?ver=2018-11-14-120855-690
Kasilof River. Photo: Davin Holen
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Final remarks
The economic impact that tourism has on 
the Arctic region is summarized in Figure 
7.33 which shows the most recent figures for 
the contribution of tourist industries to gross 
regional product and their share of regional 
employment.
In 2014, Alaska was the clear leader in the 
region with a 7 per cent contribution to 
gross regional product.39 In the meantime, 
Iceland has caught up, increasing tourism’s 
contribution to GRP from 4.5 per cent in 
2013 to approximately 8 per cent in 2017. 
The same share is found in Alaska, but with 
a lower share of employees. The counties 
comprising mainland Arctic Norway have a 
roughly similar contribution to gross region-
al product in 2017 as in 2011, and the county 
of Troms has a relatively large employment 
share in the latest figures. Lapland increased 
its share of GRP from 3.5 per cent in 2006 
to 5.6 per cent in 2015; this is on par with 
Troms, but Troms achieved this result with a 
lower share of employed resources. Kainuu 
has increased its contribution to GRP by 
about 1.5 percentage points since the last 
survey in 2006, and North Ostrobothnia is 
at the same level. Tourism in Arctic Canada 
contributes relatively little to the gross 
regional product; the number reported 
in Figure 7.18 is not comparable with the 
(previous) survey of 2006 due to a change in 
data collection and registration.
In 2019, forecasts for future development 
in the global tourism industry reflected a cautious 
optimism, with UNTWO predicting 3-4 per cent 
growth in international tourist arrivals in the world 
as a whole in 2020.40 The onslaught of the CO-
VID-19 pandemic saw an initial slowdown in tour-
ist numbers since China banned travel in January 
2020, and most other countries followed suit in 
March. 
It is currently unclear to what extent tourism will be 
hit by the global economic downturn, with global 
GDP projected to fall between 6-7.75 per cent in 
2020. A meta-analysis of international demand for 
tourism estimated that on average, the change 
in demand for tourism is 2.5 times the change in 
income, so that the projected fall in tourism de-
mand in 2020 will be 15-19.4 per cent.41 Since travel 
to Arctic regions may be regarded as “last chance” 
tourism due to for example global warming and 
the melting of Arctic glaciers, the effect might be 
mitigated by a post-pandemic rebound.
On the supply side, many of the firms that oper-
ate tourism services in the Arctic region are small 
and might have difficulty in surviving the current 
crisis. Widespread bankruptcies will reduce the 
amount of activities that are on offer, particularly 
critical for the Arctic regions, which rely heavily on 
adventures. Hence, it may take time to build up the 
demand and the supply sides of the tourist market. 
The recovery in the industry is expected to be led 
by domestic tourism, since travel restrictions will 
be eased internally first. 
Husavik, North Iceland. Photo Gérard Duhaime, 2008
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Historic background for transport in the Arctic
Nadezhda Zamyatina, Lomonosov Moscow state 
university
It is important to understand that, as a rule, “lone-
ly” transport routes arose in response to some kind 
of emergency, which made it possible to side-step 
the economic inefficiency. For example, a number 
of highways were built during war times for stra-
tegic reasons. The railway to the city of Murmansk 
was built during the 1st World War, when a new 
outlet to the sea was required to replace the Baltic 
Sea, where the fighting was going on. During World 
War II it was necessary to improve communica-
tion with Alaska, which received a strategic posi-
tion of an outpost in the war with Japan, leading 
to the Trans-Alaska Railway. Also in War II, the coal 
deposits in the Donbass were occupied and re-
quired accelerated development of coal deposits 
in the Pechora basin, leading to the railway line 
approaching the city of Vorkuta. 
Another common type of conditions giving rise to 
new transport projects is the discovery of large 
mineral deposits. To rapidly get large volumes into 
economic circulation allows for a frontier effect 
that justifies the costs of building the highway. 
Often this frontier stage of territory development 
coincides with high prices for the corresponding 
resource. Hence, the first railways of Alaska and 
Yukon in Canada were built during the “gold rush”. 
Other examples are the Trans-Alaskan oil pipeline 
built shortly after the “oil crisis” of the 1970s,  the 
Kolyma highway to the rich gold fields of Kolyma, 
as well as the roads and railways of Western Sibe-
ria, which were built quickly during the years when 
the richest oil and gas reserves of this region were 
developed, including the most recent develop-
ment of the large natural gas fields on the Yamal 
Peninsula, where not only gas pipelines, but also a 
railway were extended.
8. Transportation, infrastrucure and permafrost 
degradation in the Arctic
Nadezhda Zamyatina, Ryan Macdonald, Alexander Pilyasov, Dmitry Streletskiy  
and Luis Suter
Infrastructure in Northern Canada
Ryan Macdonald, Statistics Canada
There is limited infrastructure in Northern Canada, 
and this affects economic development, the cost 
of goods and services, and the cost of doing busi-
ness.  All weather road access is not available to 
many communities, and suitable housing is lacking 
in many instances.1 Whitehorse, Yellowknife and 
Nunavut have reliable power generation connected 
to regional power grids (or micro grids in the case 
of Iqaluit) while in many cases remote communities 
rely on diesel power generation for electricity. Die-
sel generation reliance is more common in Nuna-
vut than in Northwest Territories or Yukon.2  
In terms of power grids, Yukon has the most devel-
oped power generation and transmission system 
followed by Northwest Territories and then Nuna-
vut.  The Yukon Electric Corporation is examining 
the use of thermal generation and solar arrays and 
has invested in liquefied natural gas facilities to re-
place diesel generators in Whitehorse.3 The Vuntut 
Gwitchin have also undertaken projects to reduce 
diesel generator use and have invested in a solar 
panel array for summer electricity generation. The 
implementation of the array has, however, been 
delayed due to the Covid-19 pandemic.4
The Tshiuetin train leaves Schefferville for Sept-Iles, Quebec. 
Photo Gérard Duhaime, 2011
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Cargo container ship, Alaska. Photo: Colourbox
In Northwest Territories, the Northwest Territories 
Power Corporation maintains three sets of hydro 
generation and/or transmission systems: Snare 
system; Bluefish hydro; and, Taltson hydro.  It has 
also invested in low-carbon and alternative energy 
production with the goal of reducing the environ-
mental impacts associated with diesel generators.5 
This includes an LNG plant in Inuvik and solar 
arrays in Fort Simpson, Colville Lake, Wrigley and 
Aklavik. In Nunavut, the Qulliq Energy Corporation 
(QEC) maintains micro grids in communities that 
run diesel generators for electricity needs.6 QEC 
has implemented a demonstration solar panel 
array in Iqaluit and plans to install a solar array in 
Kugluktuk.
Whitehorse and Yellowknife have all weather road 
connections which permits truck transportation 
for importing goods. This lowers the cost of trans-
portation and increases the regularity with which 
goods, particularly bulky, heavy goods can be 
delivered. In Nunavut and many parts of Northwest 
Territories, shipping and travel are dependent on 
air and water, as there are no road connections, or 
only during periods with winter ice roads. 
Planning new transport routes in the Arctic
Nadezhda Zamyatina 
In the last decade, there has been a change in 
the thinking about large transport projects in the 
Arctic. The impetus for their development is no 
longer so much the development of large resource 
regions as international trade. In the new logic, 
new transport routes are called upon not to “open 
up” a particular resource region for development, 
as has happened over the past hundred-odd years, 
but to ensure remote economic regions the short 
connection to markets, primarily for intercontinen-
tal trade.
A striking example of the implementation of such 
a strategy is the prospect of a new railway to 
Kirkenes, providing access to the Northern Sea 
Route from Western Europe. In Russia, the pros-
pects involve Belkomur, Barentskomur and a new 
port in Indiga, as well as the construction of a rail-
way from Yakutsk to Tiksi.
In the light of the new paradigm, the view of the 
Northern Sea Route (NSR) is being transformed. 
Despite the fact that it is usually positioned as a 
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route between the western and eastern outskirts 
of Eurasia, that is, transcontinental, the bulk of 
cargo for almost the entire existence of this route 
is carried out along a shorter route. Along the NSR, 
raw materials are exported from Siberia to West-
ern Europe, first, timber, then copper and nickel, 
in the last decade LNG from Sabetta and oil from 
the Novoportovskoye field in Yamal. And only in 
recent years there has been a real transition from 
using the short western arm of the NSR primarily 
for exporting raw materials towards a truly trans-
continental role of the entire ocean highway. On 
the one hand, this is facilitated by the warming of 
the climate, on the other hand, it is driven by the 
growing interest in the Arctic of China, which is 
actively developing Arctic shipping and has initiated 
a special program for the Arctic Silk Road.
In the future, however, as the ice melts in the cen-
tral part of the Arctic Ocean, it is possible to orga-
nize intercontinental routes directly through the 
circumpolar regions at high latitudes.
The operation of transport in the Arctic gives rise to 
several specific groups of problems that complicate 
logistics and increase the cost of transportation.
The first group of problems is associated with the 
heterogeneity of conditions in space and time, 
which requires multiple reloads and a change of 
transport modes. For example, when exporting 
oil through the Varandey terminal and from the 
Prirazlomnaya offshore oil platform, Arc6 ice class 
tankers are used at the initial leg of the route. 
 Using them on the western leg in milder conditions 
is unprofitable, therefore, in the Murmansk region, 
oil is being transshipped to a floating tanker.
Similar problems arise when reloading from river 
vessels to sea vessels, from year-round roads 
to river transport for example, from the city of 
 Ust-Kut. The port of Igarka emerged as a trans-
shipment center for exported timber. It was de-
livered to Igarka by river in rafts, stored, and then 
loaded onto powerful sea vessels that could not 
climb upstream of the Yenisei River, to where the 
forest was cut. The city of Igarka grew up to serve 
this transshipment.7
The second group of problems is associated with 
the high cost of operating long highways running 
through a sparsely populated area. In some cases, 
economic inefficiency leads to the dismantling 
of highways. In the middle of the 20th century, 
railway tracks in the Magadan Region were dis-
mantled, and so was a railway line to the Yamburg 
gas field in Western Siberia, at the beginning of the 
21st century. Experts have great doubts about the 
economic efficiency of the railway laid by Gazprom 
to the Bovanenkovo gas field in Yamal.
Transformation of trans-Arctic shipping under climate change.
Source: http://www.climatecentral.org/news/study-shows-how-warming-may-transform-trans-arctic-shipping-15685
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Scientific searches for specific Arctic transport: a synthesis of traditional and innovative technologies.  
Arctic design school. https://www.facebook.com/ArcticDesignSchool/photos/
Norilsk Nickel vessels at the port of Dudinka.  
Photo by Zamyatina
The third group of problems is related to season-
ality, as well as variability of weather conditions in 
the Arctic. Nuclear icebreakers capable of navigat-
ing ships through solid ice are very costly to oper-
ate. The high cost of their services led during the 
years of economic reform in Russia in the1990s, to 
the fact that Arctic companies began to abandon 
their icebreaker assistance, preferring to build 
their own or charter vessels with the ice class Arc6 
and Arc 7. In Russia, the pioneer was the company 
 Norilsk Nickel, which has built five of its own ves-
sels, equipped with an innovative AZIPOD engine, 
which allows to move both bow and stern forward, 
which helps in overcoming difficult ice conditions.
However, in some cases icebreakers are still in 
demand even by the most modern ships that can 
pass through ice up to 1.5-2.1 meters thick, while 
in the conditions of the NSR there is ice up to 3 
meters, and in very rare cases - up to 4 meters. 
The problem of maintaining icebreakers, which 
are in demand from time to time, is very acute 
and in Russia, a fee has been introduced for using 
the infrastructure of the NSR, which is levied even 
when the direct assistance of an icebreaker is not 
required. To a large extent, this fee supports the 
maintaining of icebreakers.
Difficult climatic conditions make transportation in 
the Arctic not only a resource-intensive task, but 
also a science-intensive task, requiring the use of 
substantial scientific support and monitoring of 
climatic and environmental trends, weather and ice 
conditions, and ocean transport security systems.
Arctic transport: the circumpolar world and 
Russia
Nadezhda Zamyatina
Transport and, more broadly, ensuring mobility 
play a special and paradoxical role in the life and 
economic development of the Arctic. On the one 
hand, the modern Arctic economy, largely based 
on the export of raw materials, while import-
ing food and everyday goods, fuel and materials, 
is highly dependent on transport. On the other 
hand, the provision of transport accessibility is 
faced with enormous natural difficulties with snow 
cover that makes it difficult to travel on roads, 
with permafrost and seasonal freezing and thaw-
ing of soils that break the asphalt road surface, 
and with freezing of waterways along seas, lakes 
and rivers in winter. Strictly speaking, the serious 
constraints on transport accessibility are precisely 
a key  characteristic in making the Arctic a zone with 
special economic conditions. 
The limited transport accessibility of the Arctic, 
however, must be historically considered. In earlier 
times, the Arctic and some adjacent, more south-
ern territories were not “immobilized” by snow and 
ice as now, especially completely roadless areas, 
often connected only by air transport, or with the 
help of special all-terrain vehicles, implying that 
even if there is some possibility of transport, the 
high cost of transportation in fact means isola-
tion. This is in contrast to earlier times, when it 
was invented a number of vehicles ideally suited to 
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travel under Arctic conditions. These are all sorts of 
sliding types of transport like skis and sledges, Inuit 
canoes and kayaks, keeping their buoyancy even 
during a coup, as well as reindeer and dog sleds. 
All of these transport modes are distinguished by 
an almost complete autonomy of movement in 
their native landscape – an autonomy unattain-
able by “civilized” modes of transport, dependent 
on transport infrastructure and points of refueling 
and service.8 However, local modes of transport, 
as a rule, have a low carrying capacity and cannot 
compete with industrial transport designed for 
other conditions. Understanding the history of the 
“off-road” transport of the Arctic is useful in the 
development of specialized modes of transport, 
closer to traditional Arctic modes of transport, in 
order to overcome impassability by reviving tradi-
tional Arctic modes of transportation.9
Three zones of transport accessibility
The modern Arctic is clearly divided into zones that 
are radically different in terms of transport acces-
sibility. The first zone has a network of roads and 
railways and regular air traffic. This is a significant 
part of the Arctic regions of Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, the Russian Murmansk region, southern 
Alaska, and the southern regions of Arctic Canada. 
From an economic point of view, the uniqueness 
of these areas (in relation to more southern ter-
ritories) is due to a relatively sparse network of 
settlements, but this difference from more south-
ern regions is less than their difference from the 
climatically most severe areas of the high Arctic. In 
economic terms, the areas of the first zone can be 
attributed as “Arctic” more by tradition than based 
on modern conditions. Here, specialized modes of 
transport are scarcely in use, and weather condi-
tions and seasonal changes have almost no effect 
on mobility.
On the other end of the scale we find the third 
zone, the most remote transport zone that can be 
called the “real” Arctic. This zone differs sharply 
from other regions in terms of living and eco-
nomic conditions. This is a territory generally 
devoid of year-round ground transport links with 
other regions. Communication is carried out by 
air although at a very high cost, all year round, 
but flights with small aircrafts largely depend on 
weather conditions. Basically, in this zone the 
 traffic is seasonal, in summer along rivers or in 
coastal waters, in winter along temporary ice 
roads, which are widespread mainly in Canada 
and Alaska. In Russia they are called winter roads, 
or zimnik, and as opposed to the Canadian ana-
logue, they are not spilled with water, but simply 
“tamped” down with snow, i.e. a heavy grader rides 
through the snow, pressing it into a dense mass. 
Moving along winter roads requires the presence 
of people with relatively unique skills: as a rule, in 
a settlement with a population of several thousand 
people, there are no more than one or two dozen 
people capable of driving on winter roads. These 
“mobility providers” like pilots, airport employees 
and administrations enjoy a high social status even 
subject to cultural highlights, like in Chukotka in the 
far northeast of Russia, where a dance was dedi-
cated to a real pilot, by a local Indigenous dance 
ensemble (the dance “Petrenko the Pilot Has Ar-
rived”). In general, off-road transport links repre-
sent not only technical and economic aspects, but 
also a social and cultural component, which makes 
the task of ensuring mobility a complex one. 
Difficulties in transport cause high prices of almost 
all imported goods in the off-road zone, for fuel, a 
significant part of food, and building materials. In 
Damaged bridge near Murmansk interrupted railway communi-
cation with the regional capital
Source: https://www.rzdnew.ru/2020/06/blog-post.html?view=mosaic
White Pass railway in Yukon territory from the time of the «gold 
rush . Photo: Nadezhda Zamyatina
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An entrepreneur in the city of Igarka (Krasnoyarsk Territory, Russia) demonstrates a natural refrigerator - a glacier (lednik), in which 
the permafrost cold was used to cool food. In the middle of the 20th century, in the chambers of this glacier, the annual supply of 
food for the city, imported during the summer navigation, was stored. However, in modern conditions, the glacier is not used, since 
the ability to maintain a constant temperature does not meet modern sanitary standards. Photo: Nadezhda Zamyatina
The destruction of the railway, due to which 
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some cases, prices are several times higher than 
in areas located several hundred kilometers to the 
south. This seriously complicates the development 
of most types of economic activity and lowers the 
standard of living.
To adapt to the high transportation costs pref-
erence is given to the most compact and easy-
totransport types of goods, for example, when 
developing housing for Alaska natives, specialists 
use a set of building materials that can be trans-
ported on one flight of a small plane.10 Another 
consequence is the need for long-term storage of 
goods as large volumes are required to lower the 
cost of transportation. However, storage facilities 
involve additional costs, for instance to store an 
 annual supply of food or to have available a broad 
set of spare parts (Box 8.1).
Between the zone with a developed transport 
network and the off-road zone, there is a second 
zone of uncontested year-round transport. It is 
distinguished by long transport arteries connecting 
chains of sparsely located settlements, but these 
arteries are these settlements’ only ground-based 
options for communication with the outside world. 
The difference from the third zone is not radical, 
however, the risk of interruption of transport com-
munication with the outside world in the event of 
an accident on the transport network is higher, as 
for example the case in Canada, when the trans-
port routes to the port of Churchill were washed 
out in 2018.
A similar situation happened in the spring of 2020 
in the Murmansk region of Russia, when the bridge 
of the only railway leading to Murmansk was dam-
aged. However, in this case the communication 
was not completely interrupted due to the preser-
vation of the road.
A big problem is the maintenance of highways 
going through vast and sparsely populated areas. 
Maintenance requires clearing of snow, monitoring 
the condition, and repairing. In the Arctic, mainte-
nance costs are high, so the question often arises 
about the efficiency of large transport routes. On 
the other hand, for decades, different countries 
have repeatedly considered the same projects, for 
example, a tunnel under the Bering Strait or a gas 
pipeline from the Mackenzie Delta. The issue of 
efficient new transport routes is one of the most 
difficult in the development of the Arctic.
Permafrost degradation impact on critical 
infrastructure in the circumpolar Arctic
Nadezhda Zamyatina
The Arctic is warming at more than twice the rate 
of the global average, hence the impact of climate 
change manifests itself most clearly at northern 
latitudes, with shrinking sea ice cover being one of 
the most highly visible and well-known effects.11 
Infrastructure and buildings in permafrost regions 
are thus exposed to risk. Preventing increased 
wear and direct damage to these constructions 
 requires engineering knowledge, expertise, tech-
nology, and equipment. In some cases, permafrost 
is thawed prior to construction, however, more 
often attention is focused on protecting the per-
mafrost, in order to ensure stability of structures. 
In permafrost regions, construction techniques are 
designed to decouple structures from the fro-
zen ground, often accomplished by elevating the 
structures, such as the building in Figure 8.1, using 
pillars anchored in the permafrost. 
This elevation of infrastructure to create ventilated 
crawl-spaces underneath buildings is frequently 
used method. The circulation of cold air between 
the building and the ground isolates the perma-
frost from the heat given off from the building and 
helps prevent permafrost thaw. In Russia’s large 
Arctic cities, where multi-storey buildings tradition-
ally dominate - and where the density of housing 
Box 8.1. Challenge of logistics: The need to 
store an annual supply  
“The problem of exploitation is, first of all, in logistics. 
If you order yourself something that you need for 
your activity, then you must clearly understand that 
it will come to you in a year and a half. A year is the 
minimum. 
This raises the problem of illiquid assets. And it is a 
very serious problem, because you understand that 
you have to order something in reserve. You don t 
know what s going to break tomorrow ... We have 
55% of units of something that have never been in de-
mand by anyone in their life. And this is an incredible 
amount of nomenclature and everything else. 
From Nadezhda Zamyatina’s interview with the Vice 
President of Kinross Gold in Russia for Industrial 
Safety and Environment.
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helps reduce the use of motor-vehicles inside the 
city – the crawl-spaces are sometimes uncovered, 
leaving the structural bearing pillars exposed. More 
often, a facade which still promotes good ventila-
tion is used. 
Another common engineering measure for pre-
serving permafrost is the use of thermosyphons, as 
pictured alongside the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline in 
Figure 8.2. Thermosyphons rely on convection and 
the phase-changes in fluids or gas to draw heat out 
of the ground and release it above ground. This 
method is also used to preserve the temperature 
of permafrost underneath buildings and urban 
structures, as illustrated in Figure 8.3 in Dudinka, 
Russia.
Despite these features, it is important to monitor 
the characteristics of the permafrost underneath 
structures and maintain the condition of structural 
foundations and protective features. Such activi-
ties are costly, but more efficient than repeatedly 
repairing damages caused by permafrost thaw. 
In many cities which are built on permafrost, many 
urban space contain voids where there  previously 
were buildings. Many of these had structural 
failures due to problems caused by permafrost 
thaw, which required them to be abandoned and/
or demolished. A striking example is the multi-
storey brick building of the Research Institute of 
Agriculture of the Far North (now Research Insti-
tute of Agriculture and Ecology of the Arctic) in 
Norilsk, Russia, illustrated in Figure 8.4. The facade 
of the building was seriously deformed due shifting 
foundation pillars, which is in turn due in part to  
thawing permafrost. This building was demolished 
in 2018, so as not to pose a threat to human life 
resulting from the collapse of the structure.
There are several assessments of the impacts of 
permafrost degradation on critical infrastructure 
in the circumpolar Arctic.12 In all models, there 
is strong agreement that permafrost will warm 
significantly across much of the Arctic, and  impact 
significant amounts of infrastructure. More  recent 
studies have also attempted to quantify the eco-
nomic value of impacted infrastructure. In the 
following we present some published results on 
the value of infrastructure and buildings projected 
to be impacted by permafrost degradation in the 
circumpolar Arctic, from the recent article in Polar 
Geography by Suter, Streletskiy and Shiklomanov.13 
Figure 8.1a. The elevation of buildings (and other infra-
structure) onto pillars allows for a ventilated layer between the 
structure and the ground, which helps protect against perma-
frost degradation: Igarka, Russia. Photo: Nadezhda Zamyatina
Figure 8.1b. The elevation of buildings (and other infrastruc-
ture) onto pillars allows for a ventilated layer between the 
structure and the ground, which helps protect against perma-
frost degradation: Norilsk, Russia. Photo: Nadezhda Zamyatina. 
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Climate change impacts on permafrost
Dmitry Streletskiy, Luis Suter and  
Nadezhda Zamyatina
The study by Suter, Streletskiy and Shiklomanov 
utilized climate inputs from an ensemble of six 
models included in the CMIP5 project of the World 
Climate Research Programme.14 The decade of 
2006–2015 is used as a baseline of current climatic 
conditions, and 2050–2059 represents the climate 
scenario of the near future, within the expected 
lifespan of present infrastructure. Changes in 
permafrost temperature were assessed for two 
scenarios relevant to infrastructure stability. In the 
first scenario, it is assumed that snow and vegeta-
tion are removed, as would be the situation around 
buildings and on roads and railroads. In the second 
scenario, it is assumed that snow and some veg-
etation are present, representing close to natu-
ral conditions, as would be the situation around 
above-ground pipelines. 
In all models within the ensemble used, it is pro-
jected that permafrost will warm significantly 
across much of the Arctic. In the scenario of natural 
conditions (where snow and vegetation are undis-
turbed) the average ground temperature increase 
is expected to be 3.7 C (ranging from 1.3  to 5 C), 
about 0.1 C lower than the scenario with snow 
removed. When snow and vegetation are absent, 
the projected average of the model ensemble is an 
increase of 3.8 C (ranging from 1.6  to 6.5 C). All 
the models show that the most significant warming 
will take place in the High Arctic, and that the areas 
with the largest increases in ground temperature 
will be in continental Siberia, northeast Alaska, and 
Yukon. 
The study found that the average reduction of 
bearing capacity of structural pillars under the 
natural conditions scenario is 41 per cent, with a 
maximum reduction of 69 per cent. The spatial 
distribution of changes in this key variable show 
that more southerly areas of the Arctic, around 
the edges of the permafrost covered region 
are more significantly impacted. Generally, the 
southern areas of Siberia, Canada, Alaska, Yukon, 
Yamal- Nenets, which are covered by permafrost 
regions are particularly impacted by a reduction 
in bearing capacity. In central Siberia, permafrost 
is projected to remain slightly more stable. The 
highest  projected decreases in bearing capacity 
Figure 8.2. Thermosyphons alongside the Trans-Alaskan pipe-
line draw heat out of the ground and help keep permafrost tem-
peratures low enough to support the above-ground structure. 
Alaska pipeline (2019). Photo: Nadezhda Zamyatina
 
Figure 8.4. Building damaged by permafrost degradation,  Norilsk, 
Russia. (Photo from 2013, now the building is dismantled).  
Photo: Nadezhda Zamyatina
Detail of fa ade: Building damaged by permafrost degradation, 
Norilsk, Russia. (Photo from 2013, now the building is dismant-
led). Photo: Nadezhda Zamyatina
Figure 8.3. In Russia, thermosyphons are also often used to 
protect buildings, in combination with elevating structures on 
piles, such as with this building in the city of Dudinka (2018).  
Photo: Nadezhda Zamyatina
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are in Eastern Siberia, Northwest Alaska, Northeast 
Canada, and Chukotka. Some areas that currently 
have near-surface permafrost, especially in interior 
Alaska, may even become permafrost-free by 2059.
Cost estimates of permafrost degradation
Dmitry Streletskiy, Luis Suter and  
Nadezhda Zamyatina 
The study by Suter, Streletskiy and Shiklomanov 
assessed the costs associated with the increased 
maintenance and shortened planned lifespan of 
Arctic infrastructure at circumpolar scale, based 
on an infrastructure lifecycle cost model.15 Planned 
lifecycle costs were projected to increase by about 
27 per cent, or about US dollars (USD) 15.47  billion, 
by 2059, due to the increased wear and tear on 
Arctic infrastructure resulting in shorter infra-
structure life-span. The largest increase in lifecycle 
costs was found to impact pipelines, with more 
than a 60 per cent increase on planned costs. 
 Lifecycle costs for roads, railways, airports, and 
ports were projected to increase by more than 40 
per cent, and for buildings by about 12 per cent.
Increases in road lifecycle costs accounted for the 
largest share of the total estimated lifecycle costs, 
about 39 per cent of the total lifecycle cost across 
all infrastructure types. The lifecycle costs related to 
buildings accounted for 22 pr cent of the total. Pipe-
lines, railroads, and airports combined to account 
for 35 per cent of total lifecycle cost increases, with 
ports accounting for the remaining 4 per cent. How-
ever, the study noted that damage to ports is very 
likely to be underestimated, as the model did not 
account for the impact of coastal erosion.
The geographic distribution of the increased 
lifecycle costs were concentrated, with the largest 
in Russia, where the by far the most infrastruc-
ture. Russia’s incurred about 43 per cent of total 
increase in lifecycle cost across the circumpolar 
region, with at least USD 6.63 billion by 2059, 
 followed by Canada with USD 4.33 billion and 
Alaska with USD 2.56 billion. In Russia, buildings 
are at the greatest cost factored risk, while in North 
America, mainly roads and airports are impacted. 
This reflects historic development trends, with 
Russia having concentrated populations in urban 
areas, while Arctic regions in Canada and Alaska 
are more characterized by smaller, more dispersed 
settlements.
Aside from rising lifecycle costs, which are the 
 ongoing costs resulting from increased mainte-
nance needs and shortening of planned infra-
structure lifespan, the study also quantified the 
value of infrastructure which would need to be 
completely abandoned or demolished and re-
placed due to irreparable damage. The projected 
value of such damaged infrastructure across the 
circumpolar Arctic is USD 21.6 billion dollars by 
2059. This  represents about 15 per cent of the 
total value of infrastructure assets quantified in 
the study. Impacts are projected to be highest in 
Russia, where about 32 per cent of Arctic infra-
structure is at risk of being damaged, followed by 
22 per cent in  Alaska and 19 per cent in Canada. 
Within other  Arctic countries, no substantial direct 
 damages  related to permafrost thaw were found. 
At a regional level, the value of damaged infrastruc-
ture was highest in Sakha Republic, Alaska,  Yukon, 
Northwest Territories, Krasnoyarsk Krai, and 
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.
By 2059, combined value of lifecycle cost increases 
and damaged infrastructure are projected to be 
over USD 6 billion in Sakha Republic and Alaska, 
and about USD 4 billion for Yamal-Nenets. In Yukon 
and Krasnoyarsk Krai the combined costs are USD 
3.9 billion and USD 3.2 billion, respectively.
Relative to gross regional product (GRP), the 
combined lifecycle costs and direct damages were 
highest in Yukon, where the value was about 3.7 
per cent of annual GRP from now until 2059. In the 
Northwest Territories, the combined costs account-
ed for 1.5 per cent of annual GRP, and for 1 per 
cent of annual GRP in Nunavut. In Russia, Magadan 
and Sakha Republic are particularly impacted, with 
the combined costs accounting for 1 per cent to 
1.4 per cent of annual GRP. Yamal-Nenets, Komi 
Republic, and Krasnoyarsk are also impacted, with 
about 0.3 per cent of annual GRP needed to cover 
costs related to permafrost degradation.
Snowmobiles on display at Northern Store in Nunavik, Québec. 
Photo Gérard Duhaime, 2011
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Climate change and new technological opportuni-
ties generate a shift in logistics for Arctic extrac-
tive resource projects that previously relied on 
the southern overland export scheme, by road, 
rail or pipeline. More recently, the Northern Sea 
Route export scheme is becoming an option, 
 using specialized vessels with reinforced ice class 
certification, with or without partial support by 
icebreakers. The maritime Arctic is exposed to new 
climatic dynamics with rapid decrease in ice cover 
along the Northern Sea Route. This strengthens the 
attractiveness to investors of the maritime Arctic 
transport scheme. 
The last three decades have demonstrated the 
emergence of complex marine logistics in the 
 Russian Arctic, with development of ports, termi-
nals, docking hubs, and coastal support bases. The 
new offshore logistic scheme requires reconfigura-
tion of old export hubs, creating a network of new 
transshipment points and changes of schemes 
for extraction and processing of resources. The 
new marine production and transport model for 
 development of Arctic resources is, as a rule, float-
ing and mobile, based on platforms or artificial 
islands, serving as economic hubs localized for 
achieving synergies by combining various produc-
tion and processing stages.
The results can be compared with a study by 
 Streletskiy and co-authors, which assessed that 
thawing permafrost in Russia impacted infra-
structure worth over USD 100 billion, based on 
data from the Russian Federal Statistical  Services.16 
The value of infrastructure in the study by Suter 
and co-authors was based instead on an infra-
structure inventory compiled from open data 
sources, and had itself noted that the total value 
of infrastructure in the Russian Arctic, and across 
the Arctic was underestimated. Another study by 
Porfiriev and co-authors include indirect costs 
of climate change impacts, such as the release 
of methane into the atmosphere from thawing 
permafrost, amounting to total projected cost of 
USD 160 trillion by 2100, or about USD 1.9 trillion 
annually across the Arctic region. For some  Russian 
Arctic regions, increased costs may amount to 5 to 
6 per cent of annual GRP.17 The difference between 
the studies indicates significant gaps in availability 
of Arctic infrastructure data, especially in areas 
where geospatial data are difficult to obtain. Data 
on spatial  location and value of buildings and 
other structures are not available in a common 
format across the Arctic.  Improved estimates of the 
 projected costs of permafrost degradation impacts 
are important, to ensure that government and 
industry funding is available to cover these costs. 
New resource projects in the Russian Arctic, 
entrepreneurship, and the cargo base for the 
Northern Sea Route
Alexander Pilyasov, Lomonosov Moscow state university
In order to enhance the knowledge about extrac-
tive industries in the Russian Arctic, a register of 
 selected large projects, in the period since 2007, 
has been developed.18 This includes new  projects 
and upgrades of old facilities based on new 
 technologies, for projects involving investments 
of at least 500 million rubles. Another criterion 
for selecting projects was their potential to form 
a cargo base for the Northern Sea Route (NSR), 
contributing to activate the marine transport route 
for development of the Russian Arctic. In total, 23 
 projects already implemented or planned for the 
near future were included in the register.19 More 
than 40 per cent of these projects are concentrated 
in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and 
 Taimyr.
Akureyri, North Iceland. Photo Gérard Duhaime, 2008
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Key elements of Arctic maritime logistics typically 
include a year-round berth, which often has a sig-
nificant share in project costs; ships of reinforced 
ice-class or ordinary ships conditional upon use of 
expensive icebreakers; and obligatory trial ship-
ments and flights for adapting the logistics system 
to unexpected, but inevitable, Arctic weather and 
ice conditions. Project operations generally seek to 
minimize the use of expensive icebreakers, by rely-
ing on their own fleet of reinforced ice-class ves-
sels, or as in the Pavlovsky lead-zinc mining project 
on Novaya Zamlya in Archangelsk Oblast, by adapt-
ing the export scheme to seasonal transportation 
of mined ore.
In recent years, the new scheme for organization 
of production and transportation has been real-
ized in several development projects in the Russian 
Arctic. Examples are the Prirazlomnaya platform 
in Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the Sabetta port 
and liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant in Yamal, the 
Varandey terminal in Nenets Autonomous Okrug, 
and the gold deposit Kupol in Chukotka Autono-
mous Okrug. On artificial islands in Kola Bay is the 
Center for Construction of Large-Capacity Offshore 
Structures, a marine shipyard with co-location of 
factories that will manufacture offshore structures 
for producing, storing and shipping LNG and pro-
vide repair and maintenance of marine equipment. 
The key feature of this approach to resource 
 projects is the emphasis on co-localization and 
compactness of placement of production and 
social facilities, in order to “not spread over the 
surface”. The platform approach relies on water 
transport, also by connecting the Northern Sea 
Route and river transport. Russian Arctic resource 
corporations aim to deliver material for their new 
resource projects in the coastal Arctic partly by 
Siberian rivers, not only via Arctic seas and the 
Northern Sea Route. 
Large companies operating in the Arctic strive to 
obtain a synergy effect from common use of infra-
structure between hubs. One example is Kinross 
Gold, that in 2007 began to develop the Kupol gold 
deposit and in 2010 acquired the Dvoinoye deposit, 
located 100 km to the north. Extracted ore from 
the Dvoinoye deposit is processed at the Kupol 
Mill, delivered daily along the specially built Kupol-
Dvoinoye road, open year-round, and then pro-
cessed gold is delivered by plane to Moscow.
Gazpromneft aims to utilize this synergy effect so 
that the flagship Novoportovskoye field in Yamal in 
the future will form a cluster when surrounded by 
other fields of the company. The next stage in the 
development is the launch of the Yamal Gas proj-
ect, the creation of infrastructure for transporta-
tion of gas from fields on the Yamal Peninsula. The 
gas infrastructure will make it possible to combine 
up to 15 fields in Yamal and develop a new oil and 
gas province based on the Novoportovskoye field.
Rosneft plans to reduce operating and capital 
expenditures through synergy effects, firstly, by 
making the Vankor oil field in Krasnoyarsk krai a 
Table 8.1. Indicators of entrepreneurship in regions of the Russian Arctic: Number of small enterprises, turnover and share 
of part-time workers. 2017 and 2018
Number of small  
enterprises per  
1 000 people
2018
Turnover in small enterprises  
(including micro-enterprises  
and individual entrepreneurs),  
billion rubles.
2017 
Share of part-time workers  
in small businesses  
(without micro-enterprises),  
per cent
2018
Murmansk Oblast 22.9 214.7  7
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 30.6 170.7 15
Nenets Autonomous Okrug 28,3     7.8 20
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 25.4     9.0 15
Source: Pilyasov, A.N. 2020. Entrepreneurship in the Arctic
igure  hare of construction firms in the tota  number 


















Source: Rosstat. Collection Small and Medium Business in Russia  for 
selected years.
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base for testing advanced technologies in chal-
lenging areas of oil production, with subsequent 
replication by other facilities in the Vankor cluster. 
Secondly, Rosneft combines several fields (Vankor-
skoye, Lodochnoe, Tagulskoye and Suzunskoye) 
into a single cluster for integration of transport, 
production and energy infrastructure. These ef-
fects can become even more powerful when JSC 
Neftegazholding joins the group of Payakhsky oil 
fields, in Krasnoyarsk krai, with the Vankor clus-
ter and combines the facilities into a joint project 
Vostok Oil. The project involves construction of an 
oil pipeline between the Vankor and Payakhskaya 
fields, to allow transporting the products of all 
fields of this industrial region through an oil termi-
nal along the Northern Sea Route.
The resource projects generate a large demand for 
construction services. In the Russian Arctic, many 
construction firms are small enterprises. The share 
of construction firms in the total number of small 
enterprises in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous 
 Okrug is the highest among all oil and gas terri-
tories of Russia and is significantly higher than the 
average for Russia (Figure 8.5).
Entrepreneurial activity in the Russian Arctic is 
often assessed by the number of small enter-
prises.20 These enterprises often have a large share 
of part-time workers. Yamal-Nenets Autonomous 
Okrug has the largest number of small enterprises 
per 1 000 people. Murmansk region has the largest 
turnover, given the production profile and capital 
intensity of the predominant fishing enterprises. 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug has the largest share of 
part-time workers (Table 8.1). 
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Livelihoods depending on Arctic biodiversity are increas-
ingly under the impacts by threats to biodiversity from 
development of buildings, infrastructure, and industry 
and climate change impacts. This represents a chal-
lenge to the adaptive capacity and resilience of nature-
based communities. Reindeer herding based on natural 
pastures is a livelihood for more than 20 indigenous 
Peoples in the circumpolar Arctic. Reindeer husbandry is 
practiced in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Mongolia, 
China, Alaska, Canada and Greenland and involves about 
100 000 herders and 2.5 million semi-domesticated 
reindeer.
Reindeer pastures have been exposed to loss and frag-
mentation of land and climate change. To study pres-
ent and future impacts of land-use change and climate 
change on reindeer herding land, the GLOBIO3 model 
was applied for Finnmark. Finnmark is a core area for 
S mi reindeer herding in Norway.  The model incorpo-
rates impact of pressure from land use change, infra-
structure development, fragmentation, climate change, 
and nitrogen deposition (which is excluded from this 
study). 
The current GLOBIO3 model was developed by the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL). 
GLOBIO3 expresses the state of biodiversity by a natural 
intactness indicator, Mean Species Abundance (MSA), 
defined as average abundance of species in the current 
situation compared to their abundance in the original or 
reference state.
The GLOBIO3 study of Finnmark was made in collabora-
tion with the Nomadic Herders S pmi project. The study 
incorporated local information, both local spatial data, 
local expert knowledge and reindeer owners’ traditional 
knowledge on the use of pastures. 
To study the future impact on biodiversity in Finnmark 
with GLOBIO3, a future development scenario was 
constructed based on development plans from munici-
pal zoning plans and local environmental reports. The 
scenario assumes that all plans have been realized by 
the year 2030. The scenario also includes an increase in 
annual mean temperature of 7 C  in the Arctic regions. 
Although this temperature increase may not occur 
before 2070 it is chosen to analyse the impact of climate 
change in the long term. 
Results of the study show that climate will be the largest 
contributor to additional biodiversity loss. Given a lower, 
and more realistic temperature increase for the year 
2030 (e.g.  4 C ), the infrastructural, urban, and min-
ing developments will have a larger impact than climate 
change, both in total and locally. Hence, the relative im-
pact of the drivers should be interpreted in light of their 
perceived realism in the future scenario. 
From figure 1 we see that the total remaining biodiver-
sity (MSA) in Finnmark in 2011 as estimated by GLOBIO3 
and the relative biodiversity loss caused by different 
pressure types. The analysis shows that the remain-
ing biodiversity in Finnmark is 54 per cent of the intact 
situation. The largest biodiversity loss is caused by new 
land use (23 per cent), followed by fragmentation of land 
(12 per cent), infrastructural constructions (8 per cent), 
and climate change (3 per cent). Although the impact of 
new infrastructure might seem relatively small for entire 
Finnmark, the local impact can be remarkably high.
Figure 2 shows current and future MSA maps for Finn-
mark. The overall loss of biodiversity from the current 
situation to the 2030 scenario for Finnmark amounts 
to 10 percent, from 0.53 to 0.43. Climate change is the 
largest contributor to the additional loss, but locally large 
losses mainly occur because of infrastructural, urban, 
and mining development. 
Reindeer husbandry depends on the availability of suit-
able pastureland. Reindeer herds use ancient migra-
tion routes to move from one seasonal pasture area to 
the other. Physical changes due to urban expansion, 
increased mine exploration and construction of new 
 infrastructure are not only causing loss of biodiversity 
but also loss of pastureland and forced changes of 
reindeer migration routes. Infrastructural changes close 
to or in important calving grounds and migration routes 
will severely disturb the reindeer´s possibility to breed, 
graze and migrate. 
Figure 3 shows the total impact from a change in MSA 
on current and future biodiversity in Finnmark within 
calving grounds and migration routes. The average MSA 
value of calving grounds in 2011 is 0.5. This means that 
50 per cent of the original biodiversity on the calving 
grounds is already lost. The average MSA of the calving 
grounds is expected to be reduced with another 10 per-
cent to 0.4 within 2030. The loss in biodiversity along the 
migration routes is also significant with a reduction of 
MSA from 0.57 in 2011 to 0.46 in 2030. As these numbers 
are average biodiversity loss, much higher and lower 
losses may occur locally. 
 
Figure 1.  Share of remaining biodiversity and 













1 This text builds on Chapter 9 in the forthcoming book Adaptation and 
Resilience to Changing Arctic: Taking Knowledge to Action in Reindeer 
Husbandry, Springer 2021, and the ECONOR III report, The Economy of 
the North 2015, Chapter 9.
Box X: Change in biodiversity and the loss of reindeer pastureland in Finnmark, Norway.  
 An example of the use of GLOBIO3 as a decision support tool in the Arctic1
185
Box X: Change in biodiversity and the loss of reindeer pastureland in Finnmark, Norway.  
 An example of the use of GLOBIO3 as a decision support tool in the Arctic1
At a GLOBIO3 workshop in Sk idi, Finnmark the 
 researchers met with Sámi reindeer owners to discuss 
the relation between what the maps showed and what 
they saw as the real situation in the reindeer areas. The 
reindeer owners observed the biodiversity impact in 
their areas and discussed the pressures behind them 
and the possible consequences. Serious threats can 
directly be located on the maps by the reindeer  owners. 
As planned developments are mapped as part of the 
biodiversity modelling the maps can be used to facilitate 
discussions between politicians, planners, and rein-
deer owners. Success depends on a full involvement 
with rights holders and inclusion of their traditional 
knowledge in discussions about possible outcomes and 
alternatives. 
An important lesson gained from these dialogues is that 
the biodiversity loss should be interpreted with caution. 
The maps are clearly a warning that planned develop-
ments may be detrimental to biodiversity in pasture-
land. Severely affected areas should not be considered 
completely lost because as they could still be important 
for migration and grazing at 
certain times of the year.
The Convention on 
 Biological Diversity (CBD) 
and The Norwegian Nature 
Diversity Act call for the ap-
plication of traditional and 
experience-based know-
ledge of nature use such 
as Sámi use of nature in 
the contribution to achieve 
sustainable use and protec-
tion of biodiversity. S mi 
reindeer herding in Norway 
is framed as the economic 




expresses the interrelated 
issues of managing pas-
tureland and managing the 
herd. The traditional orga-
nization in reindeer herd-
ing reflects a knowledge-
based adaptation to use of 
seasonal pastures to build 
resilience. Strategies include 
flexible use of seasonal 
pastures and diversity in 
herd structure. Traditionally 
it was the overall condition 
of the herd that mattered. 
Acknow ledging traditional 
knowledge in governance 
requires an understanding 
of the landscape to reflect 
relations between nature 
and people.
Climate calculations are 
based on global data with limited information on Arctic 
species. Typical Arctic  aspects that are currently not yet 
dealt with in GLOBIO3 are impacts of permafrost thaw-
ing and the increased  occurrence of ice on snow. The 
latter has a major impact on reindeer pastures. 
For future research, it is suggested to develop a specific 
reindeer model in GLOBIO3 with focus on calving ground 
and migration impediments, drawing on similar experi-
ences in Sweden. This will provide a reindeer monitor-
ing system as proposed by the special rapporteur to 
the  Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. To test 
the  value of the models as decision support tools they 
should be implemented in policy cases at municipal 
and county level. Knowledge of cumulative impacts and 
potential future consequences of climate and socio- 
economic drivers achieved through modeling and includ-
ing the traditional knowledge of reindeer owners, may 
provide a tool to assist in planning future developments 
and advancing strategies for adaptation and resilience.
Figure 2. Current (2011) versus projected total MSA in 2030 for Finnmark
  
Figure 3. MSA total for calving grounds and migration routes in Finnmark for 2011 and 
projected future scenario
  
Wilbert van Rooij: Plansup. Iulie Aslaksen: Statistics Norway. 
Philip Burgess: International Centre for Reindeer Husbandry (ICR). 
Per Arild Garnåsjordet: Statistics Norway. 
Svein D. Mathiesen: International Centre for Reindeer Husbandry (ICR)
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Business Index North (BIN) is a recur-
ring report to assess conditions for 
business development in the Northern 
regions.1 BIN provides comparable 
socio-economic information and 
analysis for a wide range of actors 
interested in the Arctic, such as politi-
cal and economic actors, academia and 
media. The latest BIN report focused 
on sustainable development in 14 
northern regions of Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and North-West Russia2 using 
indicators for the United Nations (UN) 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
BIN used 30 indicators selected from 
the UN SDGs framework under criteria 
of data availability and relevance for 
Arctic socio-economic conditions.
Our analysis revealed that for 34 per 
cent of the SDG indicators the situation is about the 
same for the Arctic and non-Arctic regions of the coun-
tries, and about 45 per cent of the indicators describe 
a situation in the North worse than that prevailing in 
the respective countries as a whole. In case of only 21 
per cent of the used SDG indicators, the situation in the 
North is better than average for the respective countries.
Below we present several indicators from the recent 
BIN report and illustrate how they can be used for the 
assessment of challenges to sustainable development 
in the Arctic regions. For this presentation we selected 
indicators associated with social, economic and environ-
mental sustainability. In the case of Northern Norway, 
numbers for Finnmark and Troms are presented sepa-
rately as they appeared in the statistics up to 2019, prior 
to their merger since 1 January 2020. 
Social sustainability challenges 
There are considerable discrepancies in achieving the 
goal of health and wellbeing for the Arctic population. 
In the following we present the indicators of death rates 
(Figure 1) and risk of poverty rate (Figure 2). Already high 
death rates due to chronic diseases (heart, respiratory) 
and cancer create vulnerabilities and potentially higher 
death rates in a population in case of a pandemic like 
COVID-19. 
By measuring total death rates attributable to chronic 
diseases (heart, respiratory), cancer and to mental health 
problems, indicated by rate of suicides, we observe that 
in the Arctic regions of Norway, Finland and Sweden 
total death rate equalled 47.7 per 10 000 of population. 
In contrast, death rates for Sweden, Norway and Finland 
as a whole were markedly lower at 41.4 per 10 000 of 
population, measured as averages during the period 
2015-2017. In Russia, total death rate was 59.1 with 
wide discrepancies among regions. In Yamalo-Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug the death rate was 26.1 compared 
to Arkhangelsk Oblast (without Nenets Autonomous 
Okrug)3, where it amounted to 75. The reason for this 
large difference may be that Yamal-Nenets is a region 
with a huge investment programme in oil and gas and 
infrastructure, with a relatively young population of in-
migrated labour.
The statistics presented on figure 2 (at-risk-of-poverty-
rate) reveals large proportions of people with living stan-
dards below the standard for the respective nation as a 
whole. In times of pandemic these groups are exposed 
to increased pressure. 
The at-risk-of-poverty rate is the share of people in popu-
lation with an equivalised disposable income (after taxes 
and social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty income 
threshold, which is set at 60 per cent of the national 
median equivalised disposable income.4 As defined by 
Eurostat, the equivalised disposable income is the total 
income of a household, after tax and other deductions, 
divided by the number of household members con-
verted into equalised adults; household members are 
equalised by weighting each according to their age, using 
the so-called modified OECD equivalence scale.5
Figure 1.  Total death rate due to coronary heart disease, 
cancer, chronic respiratory diseases and 
suicides, average rate for 2015–2017 and change 
2008–2017 BIN regions























Data sources: Statistics Finland, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, The 
National Board of Health and Welfare (Sweden), Rosstat (Russia)
BIN Area - 5.6 million People
Box XI: Sustainability in the Barents region measured with indicators from the  
   United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) framework
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The average at-risk-of-poverty rate in the BIN Nordic 
regions in 2017 was 12.1 per cent, slightly lower than in 
Norway, Sweden, Finland as a whole. Regional variation 
is wide. In Finland, all BIN regions have a higher at-risk 
of poverty rate than the national average. Conversely, 
in Norway the BIN regions are on average slightly less 
exposed to risk of poverty than the national average. 
At-risk-of-poverty rate in the BIN Russian regions on 
average was about 23 per cent in 2017. In the Russian 
BIN regions, proportion of people exposed to risk of 
poverty is twice as high as in the Nordic BIN regions. It 
is noteworthy that risk of poverty decreased in most of 
the BIN Russian regions from 2013 to 2017.  In Finn-
mark (Norway) the risk of poverty increased in this 
period.
Economic sustainability challenges
In this section we present the following indicators: 
unemployment rate as challenge to economic sustain-
ability (related to the SDG8: Decent work and economic 
Growth), number of patent applications per 10 000 
inhabitants as marker of innovative activity, and com-
mercialization of knowledge (related to SDG9: Industry, 
Innovation and Infrastructure), and electricity balance 
in relation to the SDG7: Affordable Clean Energy. 
High unemployment results in a loss of income for indi-
viduals, increased pressure for government spending on 
social benefits and a reduction in tax revenue. Figures 
3 and 4 present unemployment rates for 2018 (year 
average) and those by summer 2020. Comparing the two 
figures we can see that unemployment rate has grown 
from 2018 to 2020 throughout the whole BIN area and 
in the respective countries. This indicates negative effect 
of the covid-19. However, data for 2020 are not directly 
comparable with data for 2018 for the Nordic countries 
as they are calculated based on different methods of 
data collection (workforce survey in 2018 and unemploy-
ment register in 2020). 
The impact of COVID-19 on unemployment in June 2020 
is most pronounced in the regions of Northern Finland, 
with an average 4.4 per cent increase in unemploy-
Figure 2.  At risk of poverty rates 2013 and 2017. BIN 
regions. Per cent





















Data sources: Eurostat and Rosstat.
Figure 4. Unemployment rates 2020 based on  
unemployment register (Nordics) and WLO 
survey (Russia).  Per cent


































Data sources: Statistics Norway, Swedish Public Employment Service, 
 Statistics Finland, Rosstat. Nordic data are based on  workforce survey 
(2018) and unemployment register (2020).  Russian data for both 2018 
and 2020 are based on survey using method of World Labour Organiza-
tion. 2020 data for Sweden, Russia and Finland are from June, 2020 data 
for Norway are from September 2020.
Figure 3. Unemployment rates 2018 based on workforce 
survey. Per cent




































Data sources: Statistics Norway, Swedish Public Employment Service, 
Statistics Finland, Rosstat. Nordic data are based on  workforce survey 
(2018) and unemployment register (2020).  Russian data for both 2018 
and 2020 are based on survey using method of World Labour Organiza-
tion. 2020 data for Sweden, Russia and Finland are from June, 2020 data 
for Norway are from September 2020.
Box XI: Sustainability in the Barents region measured with indicators from the  
   United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) framework
Alexandra Middleton: Oulu Business School (Finland)
Andrey Mineev: Nord University Business School / High North Center (Norway)
Erlend Bullvåg: Nord University Business School (Norway)
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ment from 2018. The region of Lapland had an increase 
of 5.6 per cent compared to 2018, resulting in almost 
every sixth person being unemployed. Originally high 
unemployment rates in Finland are due to structural 
unemployment arising after the recession of the 1990s 
after the disruption of the Soviet economy. The impact 
of COVID-19 in Norwegian and Swedish BIN regions is 
less pronounced, with an average increase of 0.7 per 
cent in the Norwegian BIN regions and 0.9 per cent in 
the  Swedish BIN regions. The Russian BIN regions except 
for the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug had a 1.2 per 
cent increase in unemployment, while the Yamal- Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug was not impacted, showing only a 
slight increase of 0.3 per cent in 2020 from what was 
already the lowest level of 2.1 per cent unemployment in 
the Russian BIN area in 2018. This reflects the persistent 
activity in oil and gas development in the region. The 
differences in magnitudes of the impact of COVID-19 on 
unemployment are due to regionally inherent industrial 
structure, different government support schemes and 
differences in socio-economic conditions before the 
pandemic. 
New challenges associated with the pandemic require 
new solutions. The ability to innovate and to develop 
knowledge economy infrastructure is becoming even 
more critical for regional development. Knowledge-
based economies sustain growth through technological 
advantage, access to information and know-how; to a 
lesser extent it depends on natural resources and physi-
cal means of production located in the region. In par-
ticular, patenting is an important indicator of innovative 
activity in the commercialisation of new knowledge.
Figure 5 shows the average number of patent applica-
tions per 10 000 capita submitted to national intellectual 
property rights authorities. On a national basis, Finland 
has the highest level of patenting activity followed by 
Sweden, Norway and Russia. Among the BIN regions, 
North Ostrobothnia and Västerbotten demonstrate the 
highest patenting activity. Since the statistics shown 
are based on the applicant’s (owner of the invention) 
address, a large number of inventions made in the 
regions of Norrbotten and North Ostrobothnia by local 
inventors are included in numbers outside the North-
ern regions for Sweden and Finland (such as inventions 
owned respectively by Eriksson and Nokia). Apart from 
 Norrbotten, Västerbotten and North Ostrobothnia, the 
other BIN regions demonstrate very low levels of patent-
ing activity at less than half of their respective national 
averages. This limits the integration of the regions into 
the knowledge-based economy. 
The SDG 7: Affordable clean energy assumes by 2030 
 ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and 
modern energy services. One of key indicators here is 
electricity production from wind and hydropower in TWh 
and as share of energy mix. Abundance of electricity in 
the BIN regions can potentially make them attractive 
for establishing energy-intensive industries, such as 
steel-making and battery cell production. In figure 6 we 
 present electricity balance as difference between elec-
tricity produced and consumed in the BIN regions. 
Figure 6 demonstrates that several BIN regions have a 
substantial surplus of electricity, for instance, Västerbot-
ten, Norrbotten, Nordland, Murmansk. The electricity is 
however accumulated from various sources. Northern 
Norway and Northern Sweden generate about 90 per 
cent of electricity using hydro-power. Northern Finland 
relies on a mix of hydro (around 50 per cent), thermal 
and wind power. As for Murmansk Oblast, about 46 
per cent of electricity produced originates from nuclear 
power, while 45 per cent is hydropower and the rest 
is thermal power. Among these sources of electricity 
 energy, only hydro power can be considered as clean. 
Even wind power is questionable as it destroys eco-
systems by fragmentation of habitats and impacts on 
igure  Number of atent a ications er  
inhabitants, BIN regions, yearly average 
2008-2018



















Data sources: Swedish Intellectual Property Office, Finnish Patent and 
Registration Office, Norwegian Industrial Property Office, Rosstat. For 
Russia annual averages are calculated for the period 2013-2018; Annual 
averages for the Nordic countries are calculated for the period 2008-
2017.
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wildlife through increased death rate of avian creatures 
such as birds and bats. We can see that the High North 
regions even with abundant electricity has a way to go 
in improving their energy mix. Regions that have an 
electricity deficit should address energy security issues 
and adopt strategies for installing capacity for generating 
renewable energy. 
Environmental sustainability challenges
In this section we focus on climate and emissions with 
less attention to other issues of environmental sustain-
ability. Getting detailed and comparable environmental 
data is a challenge which limits researchers’ possibilities 
for calculation and analysis of corresponding SDG indica-
tors. 
Figure 7 shows emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) 
per capita in the BIN Nordic regions. Industry accounts 
on average for 75 per cent of all GHG emissions. Energy- 
intensive industries explain high emissions per capita, 
for example, in Norrbotten and North Ostrobothnia 
(steel-making, which also uses coal and coke in the pro-
cess) and relatively low population density. For instance, 
90 per cent of the EU’s iron ore extraction takes place 
in the Norrbotten region, while only 2.4 per cent of 
 Sweden’s population live there. The population density 
is very low in Norrbotten with just 2.6 people per square 
km, while in the whole of Sweden it is 25.1. Relatively 
high numbers in Finnmark are caused by relatively low 
number of population, but also the oil and gas industry. 
The EU countries signed a Euro 750 billion recovery 
package to alleviate the consequences of the COVID-19 
pandemic, aiming to contribute to a green, digital and 
resilient recovery of the economy. Specially reserved 
funding for northern sparsely populated areas may 
result in the greening of the northern economy and a 
reduction of CO2 and other GHG emissions in the long 
term. In Arctic Sweden, proactive steps are being taken 
in addressing high CO2 emission as part of steel produc-
tion. In 2020, the Swedish companies SSAB, LKAB and 
Vattenfall launched a globally unique pilot HYBRIT plant 
to produce fossil-free iron. Moreover,  FREYR green 
battery production plant in Mo i Rana demonstrates the 
Arctic regions’ ambition to create pioneering solutions in 
addressing the climate change challenge. 
One should note that despite potential low carbon 
footprint of battery production in the Arctic,  batteries 
themselves have environmental drawbacks as they 
contain toxic and in some cases flammable materials. As 
for the mining industry, its environmental sustainability 
can and should be improved, but this industry will always 
be associated with challenges for eco-systems. Sustain-
ability discussion would inevitable involve the discussion 
of trade-offs between social, economic and environmen-
tal issues. 
Figure 8 presents emissions to air in Russia measured as 
pollutants from stationary sources. For Russia in general, 
about half of the pollutants into the atmosphere are 
released from stationary sources. The pollutants include 
solids, gaseous and liquid substances: sulphur  dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, 
volatile organic connections, other gaseous and liquid 
substances. The Yamalo-Nenets Okrug and the Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug have the highest emissions due to 
the hydro-carbon projects in the area.
1 https://businessindexnorth.com
2 The regions are referred to in the text as BIN regions or in total as BIN 
area.
3 Nenets Autonomous Okrug (NAO) is a part of Arkhangelsk Oblast. In the 






Figure 7. Emissions of greenhouse gases per capita. 2017. 
Ton CO2 equivalents












Data sources: Statistics Finland, SSB, Statistics Sweden. A carbon dioxide 
equivalent or CO2 equivalent is a metric measure used to compare the 
emissions from various greenhouse gases on the basis of their global-
warming potential (GWP), by converting amounts of other gases to the 
equivalent amount of carbon dioxide with the same global warming 
potential (Eurostat).
Figure 8. Emissions to air in Russia. Pollutants from 
stationary sources per capita.2012-2017. Kg 
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The purpose of the ECONOR IV project has been 
to give a comprehensive overview of the economy 
in the Arctic, including a snapshot of the subsis-
tence economy of the Indigenous Peoples and local 
people of the region. To achieve this goal, we have 
utilized data from the statistical agencies of the 
Arctic nations and from other sources when rele-
vant. The overview of the Arctic economy provided 
by this report in terms of scale, composition and 
structure may help policy makers and communities 
to better see the position of various stakeholders, 
the large-scale commercial interests, the local and 
central governments, the Indigenous Peoples, and 
the citizens of the Arctic as a whole.
There are large differences in the levels of gross 
regional product (GRP) per capita among the Arctic 
regions and nations. However, in natural resource-
based economies, using data for GRP, or GDP at 
national level, to evaluate the wealth or well-being 
of the population can be especially misleading. 
Since a large part of GRP in such economies com-
prises return to fixed capital and resource rents 
that can be taken out of the region as income, it 
is difficult to assess what share of GRP is actually 
available in the region for consumption and invest-
ments. Moreover, transfers within Arctic states 
tend to modify the gaps in disposable income per 
capita between the Arctic and non-Arctic regions. 
Hence, data for disposable income of households 
per capita are included, to give a better picture of 
consumption possibilities. The change in income 
during 2015-2018 is discussed, and a broad set of 
socioeconomic and social indicators contributes to 
a better picture of well-being, livelihood, and public 
services from regional and national government.
In the Arctic, with its population of Indigenous 
 Peoples, subsistence activities are very important 
for providing local food, as well as maintaining 
 social relationships and cultural values. Subsis-
tence activities contribute to consumption over and 
above what is recorded in the national accounts. 
As more attention is brought to the intertwined 
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nature of the market economy and subsistence 
economy and its importance for the well-being of 
Arctic Indigenous Peoples, an important challenge 
for analysts and policy-makers is the lack of sys-
tematic monitoring of the subsistence activities.
To improve the understanding of the subsistence 
activities in the Arctic economies, future ECONOR 
projects will aim to strengthen partnerships with 
the Indigenous Peoples represented in the Arctic 
Council, to achieve more insight of concepts of 
subsistence and food security that have differ-
ent meanings in different cultural perspectives. 
More knowledge is needed on Indigenous roles 
in Arctic economies. Indigenous economies are 
not only subsistence, as documented for example 
in the work by the National Indigenous Economic 
Development Board in Canada, and by numerous 
Indigenous-led economic development corpora-
tions in the Arctic. Acknowledging and exploring 
the increasing role and prominence of Indigenous-
led economic development can be addressed in 
future ECONOR reports.
A crucial question that we have not been able to 
answer in this report is to what extent climate 
change and other environmental impacts, such as 
from long range transported pollution, will limit the 
possibilities for subsistence activities in the Arctic. 
Since environmental impacts of economic activity 
are not explicitly included in GDP, it is a challenge 
to develop environmental statistics and indicators 
that can be applied complementarily with eco-
nomic indicators. 
Many tasks are remaining for Arctic statistical agen-
cies and researchers in order to compile economic, 
environmental and social statistics for the Arctic 
regions. There is a clear potential for establishing a 
wider set of data and economic, social and environ-
mental indicators for the circumpolar Arctic. Based 
on the experiences from the ECONOR projects, we 
see in particular a need to emphasize a direct focus 
on the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development 
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goals in future ECONOR projects. In particular, one 
can aim to:
• Continue dialogue with statistical agencies of 
Arctic nations in order to enhance statistical 
 cooperation and establish an institutional ba-
sis for providing statistical information on the 
economy, livelihood and environmental impacts 
in the circumpolar Arctic.
• Develop partnership with the Indigenous Peoples 
represented in the Arctic Council to strengthen 
a common understanding of the conditions for 
nature-based livelihoods and to develop a better 
understanding of the role of wages and other 
forms of income in supporting Indigenous econo-
mies. 
• Improve statistical indicators to give a better 
knowledge of social conditions, well-being, and 
inequalities in Arctic regions. Continue to link 
the national account based industry data with 
environmental and climate data to facilitate a 
comprehensive analysis aligned with the 2030 
Agenda for sustainable development.
• Improve indicators of disposable income of 
households by adjusting for in-kind transfers of 
services from public sector, as carried out in a 
pilot study by Canada in this report.
• Provide regionally based price indices for Arctic 
regions for improved assessments of livelihoods. 
• Present time series for core economic indicators 
in diagrams, to visualize development trends
• Harmonize and present statistics communi cating 
progress in the green transition, aligned with 
Sustainable Development Goals.
• Establish statistical indicators relevant for 
 Sustainable Development Goals that set out a 
wide range of economic, social, cultural, and 
 environmental objectives.
• Facilitate research on how climate change and 
biodiversity loss will affect the Arctic economy 
and socio-economic conditions by formatting 
statistics, such as providing spatial (gridded) data 
on population, capital assets and nature-based 
activities, to make socio-economic and economic 
data compatible with output from regionally 
downscaled climate models and ecosystem 
 accounting.
• Establish statistical indicators for the subsis-
tence economy of Indigenous Peoples and local 
residents of the Arctic, to document the impor-
tance of nature-based livelihoods for economy, 
well-being, nutrition and culture. Indicators for 
subsistence activities could be developed as sup-
plementary accounts (satellite accounts) to the 
national accounts. Discussions should take place 
with Indigenous Peoples Organizations about 
how these indicators might be developed. Indica-
tors for the subsistence economy could improve 
assessments of impacts of climate change and 
trans-boundary pollution on nature-based liveli-
hoods and well-being, and of progress towards 
Sustainable Development Goals.
The list above does not aim to be complete, and 
there are certainly more areas that need further 
study. Taking into account the limited availability of 
economic statistics and analysis of the circumpolar 
Arctic before the ECONOR projects, there are many 
tasks that deserve further efforts. The Economy of 
the North – ECONOR 2020 has updated the earlier 
versions of the ECONOR reports and demon-
strated the potential for both regularly updating of 
the statistics and expanded coverage of topics. A 
strong focus on documenting progress towards the 
2030 Agenda for sustainable development goals, in 
terms of livelihoods, natural wealth management 
and environmental challenges, and strengthening 
partnerships in circumpolar cooperation for future 
ECONOR reports, can be regarded as a synthesis of 
the main findings from the ECONOR IV project.
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